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Hayes Common (Conservators of) v.
Bromley Rural District Board
(L.R.  1 Q.B. 321; 76 L.T.
51), 58, iv.
31), 78, ii.
INCANDESCENT GAS LIGHT Co., LTD.
International Commercial Co., Ltd.,
Isaac, in re; Cronbach v. Isaac (L.R.
Janet Court, the (L.R.  P. 59;
Jones v. German (L.R.  1 Q.B.
KENT County CouncIL v. LoRD GERARD
Kiliin v. Swatton (76 L.T. 55), 66,
LAcAvE AND Co. v. THE CREDIT
Lamond v. Richard (75 L.T. 693),
MANCHESTER AND MILFoRD RAILWAY,
Where a case has already been given in the Digest for a preceding quarter, the additional report is given after the name of the case, with a reference to the volume of the Digest in which it first appeared, the thick number being the number of the volume.
C. D.—Obstruction to Light—3 & 4 Wm. IV., c.42, s. 2.—An obstruction to ancient light is an injury continuing from day to day, and therefore an action brought within six months of the decease of the tort feasor can be maintained against his executors or administrators though the obstruction was completed by the deceased more than six months # his death.—Jenks v. Viscount Clifden, L.R.  1 Ch. 694; 76 L.T., 382.
C.A.--Executor and Trustee—“Wilful Default”—Judicial Trustees Act, 1896 (59 d. 60 Vict, c. 35), s. 3.—Where the executor of a solicitor was reasonably satisfied that he could not maintain an action to recover costs from a client of his testator, it was held that he was not guilty of wilful default; and that even if he had been technically liable, he would have been excused under sect. 3 of the Judicial Trustees Act, 1896.–In re Roberts; Knight v. Roberts, 76 L.T. 479.
C. D.—Administrator's Costs—Interest—Set Off–0. lxv., r. 1.--An executor or administrator is entitled to his proper costs, and will not be ordered to pay interests on sums not improperly paid away by him, and an administrator of an intestate is entitled to set off against the next-of-kin’s share costs which the next-of-kin had been ordered to pay to him.—In re Jones; Christmas v. Jones, 76 L.T. 454.
(i.) C. D.—Insolvent Estate-Crown Debt—Specialty and Simple Contract Debts—Priority—Hinde Palmers Act, 1869 (32 & 33 Vict, c. 46).—A question arose under an order in an action for the administration of an insolvent testator's estate whether or not a crown debt should come out of the whole fund without distinguishing between specialty and simple contract creditors, and it was held that it was to be borne entirely by the portion of assets available for simple contract creditors. –In re Bentinck; Bentinck v. Bentinck, L.R.  1 Ch. 673;
(ii) C. D.—Annuity subject to Condition—Deficiency of Assets—-Payment of Fund.—Where a covenantor's estate was not sufficient to meet an annuity granted without any gift over for the life of the annuitant, or until he should do or suffer something by which, if the annuity had been his absolutely, it would have become vested in some other person, it was held, following Wroughton v. Colquhoun (1 De G. & Sm. 357), that a fund representing the balance of the covenantor's estate must be paid to the annuitant, the Court declining to follow Carr v. Ingleby (1 De G. & Sm. 362).—In re Sinclair; Allen v. Sinclair, L.R. 
Assignment:— (iii.) C. A.—Assignment in form Absolute to Agent to Collect—Judicature Act, 1873, s. 25, sub-s. 6.—A foreigner resident abroad assigned to enable another to sue for him in England a debt without consideration by a deed which purported to assign absolutely in consideration of £50. Held, reversing the judgment of the Court below, that it was a valid assignment within sect. 25, sub-sect. 6, of the Judicature Act, 1873, and enabled the assignee to Sue in his own name for the benefit of the
(iv.) C. D.–Specific Performance–Sale of Lands by Auction—Signature of Auctioneer binding Purchaser—Delay—Delegation—Statute of Frauds.— The defendant, under a mistake, bid, as a puffer at an auction, for freehold property, which was knocked down to him. He repudiated the contract at once, and refused to pay the deposit, but the auctioneer's clerk signed the usual memorandum, and a week afterwards the auctioneer signed another memorandum as agent for the defendant. Held, that though the mistake might be a defence to a claim for specific performance, it did not of itself affect the validity of the contract (Tamplin v. James). But that the action failed under the Statute of Frauds, for, as to the first memorandum, the auctioneer could not delegate his authority (Pierce v. Corf, L.R. 9 Q.B. 210; 29 L.T. Rep. 919), and the signature to the second memorandum was not contemporaneous with the auction (Buckmaster v. Harrop, 13 Wes. 456).—Bell v. Balls, L.R.  1 Ch. 663; 76 L.T. 254.
(v.) Q. B.—Revocable Mandate—Fraudulent Preference Bankruptcy Act, 1883 (46 & 47 Vict., c. 52), s.48.—A solicitor just before bankruptcy conveyed real estate to trustees, without the knowledge of the cestuis que trust, to cover a breach of trust which he had committed. Held, that the deed was not a revocable instrument within the doctrine of Garrard v. Lauderdale (3 Sim. 1), and was not a preference to a creditor within the meaning of sect. 48 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1883.— The Trustees of New, Prance and Garrard v. Hunting d. Others, L.R.