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of a balance being found in their favour (following Bevan and Whitting and re Faithfull, L.R. 6 Eq. 325). —- In re Hanbury, Whitting and NlCh0l807l, 75 L.T. 449.

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(i.) C. A.—Bridge Toll——Tramcar—C0ach—7 Geo. III., c. 73.-Where the owners of a bridge were empowered to charge sixpence for the passage of “ every coach, chariot, berlin,” &c., “ drawn by more than two horses,” and fourpence for the passage of “every Waggon, wain, dray, car, or other carriage drawn by three or four horses,” it was held that a tramcar drawn by three horses was liable to toll as a “ coach.” Decision of Court below reversed.—Plymouth, Stonehouse, and Devonport Tramway Co. v. The General Tolls Co., Limited, 75 L.T. 467.

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(iii.) C, A,— of Foreign Land by Trustee—Statute of Frauds, s. 7-— ParolEvidence—Statutes of Limitation—Laches and Delay.—-More than 12 years after a purchase was made of lands in Ceylon by a person who subsequently became bankrupt, an action was commenced for a declaration that the purchaser was a trustee for the plaintiff. Held, that parol evidence that a conveyance of land absolute in form was upon trust may be given notwithstanding sect. 7 of the Statute of Frauds ; though the statute may in other circumstances be a defence to proceedings in this country having for their object the enforcing of a trust of lands abroad (Leroux v. Brown, 12 C.B. 801). That bankruptcy trustees are not discharged from claims of a cestui que trust by sect. 49 of the Bankruptcy Act; that by sect. 25, c. 2, of the Judicature Act, 1873, “no claim of a cestui que trust on an express trust or on a breach of trust is barred by any Statute of Limitations ; " and that laches and delay of a claimant depend upon the conduct of the parties as well as upon time. Bartlett v. Pickersgill (1 Eden 515) disapproved.-—De la Rochefocauld v. Boustead, L.R. [1897] 1 Ch. 196; 75 L.T. 502.

(iv.) G. A.-Precatory Trust.—A testatrix in a document relating to family jewels wrote: “My mother-in-law told me that Sir R. H. gave them to her without any restriction. When I married she gave them to me for life with the request that at my death they might be left as heirlooms." Held, that there was no precatory trust.—Viscount Hill v. Dowager Viscountess Hill, L.R. [1897] 1 Q.B. 483; 76 L.T. 103.

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(v.) C, D,--Loss—Liability—Indemnity by Trustee who was Solicitor to Trust. —Where one of two trustees was a solicitor to the trust on whose advice the other without enquiry invested the trust funds in an improper security,it was held that both trustees were jointly and severally liable for the loss by the breach of trust and for the costs of the action, and that the solicitor must indemnify his co-trustee against the latter’s

share of the liabilities and costs.—In re Turner; Barker v. Ivimey, L.R. [1897] 1 Ch. 536; 76 L.T. 116.

Vaccination :-
(i.) Q. B. D.—Vaccination Act, 1867 (30 & 31 Vict, c. 86), s.31—Sufficiency

of Notice.—Notice to a parent to have a child vaccinated need not be served personally. The question of the sufficiency of a notice is one to be determined by justices.—Holloway v. Coster, L.R. [1897]

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(ii.) Q. B. D.—Neglect–Signing of Summons and Order—Vaccination Act,

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1867, s. 31.—The justice who signs an order for vaccination need not be the same who signed the summons.—Southcombe v. The Guardians of Yeovil Union, L.R. [1897] 1 Q.B. 343; 76 L.T. 58.

Q. B. D.—Power of Vaccination Officer to take Proceedings—Vaccination Act, 1867 (30 a. 31 Vict., c. 84), s. 31–General Order of Local Government Board, October 31st, 1874, art. 16.—Under sect. 31 of the Act a vaccination officer is empowered to take proceedings for an order directing a child to be vaccinated.—Bramble v. Lowe, L.R. [1897]

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Vendor and Purchaser:— (iv.) Q. B.–Conditions of Sale.—By conditions of sale of land within the

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metropolis, all outgoings up to the date fixed for completion were to be cleared by the vendor. Before that date the county council took down, in accordance with an order of a magistrate, dangerous structures on the land. Held, that the expenses of the demolition were outgoings which the purchaser was entitled to recover from the vendor. Midgley v. Coppock, followed; Boor v. Hopkins, distinguished.— Tubbs v. Wynne, L. R. [1897] 1 Q.B. 74. C. D.—Action for Rescission of Contract—Motion for Specific Performance —Receiver.–In an action for rescission of a contract for the sale of leasehold lands on the ground of misrepresentation on the part of the purchaser who had been let into possession, it was held that a motion that the purchaser should deliver up possession in default of paying moneys he had agreed to pay, could not be allowed; but leave was given to amend the notice of motion and to ask for the appointment of a receiver to preserve the property from forfeiture by payment of the rents and rates.—Cook v. Andrews, L.R. [1897] 1 Ch. 266; 76. L.T. 16.

Vestments :(vi.) C. A.—Preaching in Black Gown.—It is not illegal for a clergyman of

the Church of England to wear a black gown in the pulpit when preaching.—In re Robinson; Wright v. Tugwell, L.R. [1897] 1 Ch. 85;

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Will :(vii.) P. D.—Letter from Officer on Active Service-Construction—Wills Act

(1 Vict, c. 26), s. 11–Probate.—A British officer, on active service in the Maori War of 1864, wrote to his sister a letter, saying: “The chances are in favour of more of us being killed. . . . In case of accident, I wish to make everything I possess over to you. There is money at Cox's and over £100 in N.S.W. Bank. * Keep this till I ask you for it. Your affectionate brother, J. Spratt.” The testator returned to this country and died in 1894, having been for some time previously not on good terms with his sister. Held, that as there was no expression in the letter of any period within which alone it was to be operative, or any indication that it did not

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apply to whatever properly the testator might at any time be possessed of, the document was a valid will within sect. 11 of the Wills Act.-—-In the goods of James Spratt, L.R. [1897] P. 28; 75 L.T. 518.

C. A.—- Constr1zction—Uncertaintg/.—A will ran: " I give all the residue of my estate unto the children of the deceased son (named Bamber) of my father’s sister, share and share alike.” There were three deceased sons of the father’s sister, all of that name. Held, reversing decision of Court below, that the gift was void for uncertainty. Hare v. Cartridge (13 Sim. 165) distinguished.—-In re Stephenson; Donaldson v. Bamber, L.R. [1897] 1 Ch. 75; 75 L.T. 495.

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P, D,——ll1isdescrip!ion of Le_qatees.—A testator left £4,000 to the widow of a nephew for life, and afterwards in trust for her two children, but the Christian names by which these children were described in the will were the names of the children of another nephew to whom he left £2,000, and to whose wife he also left £2,000, both bequests with the like remainder to their two children who were described by the names of the widow’s children. A motion, to omit from the probate the Christian names so transposed, was refused on the ground that it was not shewn that the testator did not mean the names to be inserted, and the point was left for a Court of Construction.——Iu the goods of Alexander Durlacher (deceased), 75 L.T. 664.

C, ])_—Ea:ecutor —Intenneddling — Remune'ration— Wilful Default.-A solicitor who had been named as an executor, but who had not joined in proving the will and who claimed in all that he did to have acted as the agent of the executor who proved, was held, by having signed with the other executors a letter dealing with a policy on the testator’s life, to have intermeddled with the estate and to be precluded from renunciation; but a delay in getting in the policy moneys was held not to warrant an account on the footing of wilful default, though

some loss of interest had occurred.—In re Stevens; Cooke v. Stevens, L.R. [1897] 1 Ch. 422 ; 76 L.-T. 18.

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P, D,-Will in English F01'm—Scotch Domicile—Hol0graph Letter— Probate—Censtruction.—-A domiciled Scotchman before commencing a voyage with his wife, wrote a letter partly repeating and to some extent supplementing the provisions of his will made in English form. He and his wife returned and settled in England, where some years later he died. Held, that the letter was entitled to probate as a testamentary paper with the will; but that the effect should be left to a Court of Construction.—Halford v. Halford (Boyce intervening), L.R. [1897] P. 36; 75 L.'1‘.520.

P, D_—Duplicate Will—-Part Retained by Testator not to be Fo1md— Holograph C0py—Properly Executed Oodicil admitted to probate Alone.— In 1891, a testator executed a will in duplicate, one part of which he sent in the next year to a beneficiary, who subsequently tore it up by accident, but pasted together the fragments. No testamentary papers

were found on the decease of the testator in his repositories; but a
friend produced a holograph copy of the will, and of a codicil stated
to have been executed in 1892, and a later holograph properly executed
codicil, described as “a second eodicil to my will.” Held, that the
will and the first codicil were revoked by the testator, but that the
second codicil was entitled to probate.—P¢u'ge v. Brooks, 75 L.T. 455.

C, A,—Duplicate Will-Destruction of 0ne——Evidence.—Hearsay
evidence that a testator had declared that he had,with the intention of
revocation, destroyed one part of a will executed in duplicate is not
admissible. Sugden v. Lord St. Leonards; Doe d. Shallcross v.
Palmer; in the goods of Ripley, applied.—Atkinson v. Morris. L.R.
[1897] P. 40; 75 L.T. 440.

C. D,—Gift for Life with Power to Dispose amongst a Class-—No
Gift 0ver.—-A wife gave by will real property to her husband for
life, with “ power to dispose of all such property by will amongst our
children in accordance with the power granted to him as regards other
property which I have under my marriage settlement.” There was
no gift over, and the husband died intestate. Held, that the power was
a bare power, imposing no trust, and that there was no gift by
implication to the children in default of appointment.—In re Weaker’:
Settlement, L.R. [1897] 1 Ch. 289; 76 L.T. 112.

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