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sell, in real property in England, the Court appointed persons resident in New South Wales as trustees of the settlement.—In re Simpson; in re Whitchurch, 76 L.T. 131.


(i.) C. D.–Marriage Settlement—Appointments—Assignments—Interest– Costs.—Under powers of a marriage settlement, the surviving parent made several successive appointments in favour of several of herchildren, and appointed the residue of the settled fund in favour of another child. Some of the appointees assigned or encumbered their shares. In the course of an action for administration of the trusts, questions arose as to interest and costs. Held, that interest at 4 per cent. from the death of the life tenant was to be allowed on the several appointments; in re Goodenough; Marland v. Williams (see Vol. 21, p. 1, ii.), not followed; and that one set of costs was to be given to each child in respect of the several appointments to him, the assignees of a child to divide the costs so allowed, rateably. Cartwright v. Duc del Belzo (see Vol. 21, p. 55, iii.) applied.–In re Hill's Settlement Trusts; Hill v. Equitable Reversionary Interest Society, Limited, 75 L.T. 477.

: (ii) C. A.—Will–Hotchpot Clause.—By a settlement a contingent reversionary interest in a sum of money was reserved to the settlor, who - by his will gave half the residue of his estate to the cestui que trust, on condition that the settled fund should be taken in part satisfaction of the bequest. Held, that the hotchpot clause operated as a gift to the legatee of the settlor's interest in the trust fund.—In re Cosier; Humphreys v. Gadsden, L.R. [1897] 1 Ch. 325; 75 L.T. 31.

(iii.) C. D.—Estoppel.—Trustees of a will settled certain estates including estate B, to uses declared in the will, and a life tenant under the settlement caused himself to be registered in the land registry as owner in fee of estate B, and devised it. On an action by the person next entitled under the settlement, the devisee of B estate claimed that the language of the will of the first testator was inadequate to pass the estate, and that the person from whom he derived having been in possession for more than 20 years, had acquired a title in fee. Held, that the last testator and all claiming under him were estopped from denying as effectual the settlement under which he derived.—Dalton v. Fitzgerald, L.R. [1897] 1 Ch. 440; 76 L.T. 83.

(iv.) C. A.—Charter-party–Dates for Arrival at Loading Port—Perils of Sea
and Towage Clauses–Obligation to Load–Delays.—A charter-party
provided for the arrival at a loading port abroad, of several steamers,
“as nearly as possible a steamer a month,” unless prevented by perils
of the sea, or by rendering assistance to vessels in distress. Cargo was
to be presented 24 hours after notice. No. 2 ship, owing to perils of
the sea, arrived late. While she was loading, No. 3 arrived, and had
to wait till the loading of No. 2 was completed. No. 4 arrived late,
owing to having assisted a disabled ship, but not so late as to have
frustrated the object of the adventure. Held, that the shipowners
were entitled to damages for detention of No. 3, and that as salvage
services were allowed by the terms of the contract, the charterers were
liable for damages for detention of No. 4, from the date of her arrival
to date when loading was commenced.—Potter and Co. v. Burrell and
Son, L.R. [1897] 1 Q.B. 97; 75 L.T. 491.

(v.) Q. B. —Charter-Party–Demurrage—Place of Discharge.—A charterparty stated that a steamer was to proceed to a port named with a cargo of coal “and as usual and customary deliver some afloat to the order” of the charterers “alongside of any store, craft, &c.” “Time for delivery


to count when steamer is ready to discharge.” There was only one customary place to discharge and that was occupied when the steamer arrived. Held, that the time for delivery did not commence till the steamer was able to occupy the customary place of discharge.— Sanders v. Jenkins, L.R. [1897] 1 Q.B. 93.

(i.) Q. B.-Marine Insurance—Arrival in “Final Port "–Construction.—A vessel was insured to certain places and “for 30 days after arrival in final port, however employed.” Held, that “final port’” meant final port of loading for the homeward voyage, and that the vessel was covered by the policy for 30 days after arrival in such port.—Crocker and Others v. Sturge and Another, L.R. [1897] 1 Q.B. 330; 75 L.T. 549.

(ii.) P. D.—Seamen's Wages Forfeited—“Slops’ Supplied by Master— Gratuities Received by Master Account with Owners. —Where seamen had forfeited their wages by desertion, the master of the vessel was held entitled to debit the owners with “slops” previously supplied to the deserters, and the owners were held not entitled to debit him with money presents made to him by consignees on the discharge of the cargo.—The Parkdale, L.R. [1897] P. 53; 7.5 L.T. 597.

(iii.) P. D.—Collision—Bail—Arrest– Lis Alibi Pendens.—A guarantee to answer for damages had been given by the agents of a British and a German ship which had come into collision at Rotterdam, and an estimate of the necessary repairs to both vessels had been made by Lloyd's surveyor, but no further proceedings were taken. The German ship having arrived at an English port, it was arrested in an action in rem; and on a motion by the owners for a release and a stay of proceedings, it was held that as the vessel was not arrested in Holland, the guarantee was no bar to an action in this country. The Christiansborg, 10 P.D. 141 distinguished.—The Mannheim, L.R. [1897] P. 13; 75 L.T.424.

(iv.) P. D.—Collision—Swin Channel-Course of Navigation—Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, Art. 21.—An outward bound vessel navigating the channel between the Foulness or Whitaker, and the Middle Sands at the entrance to the Thames, contravenes Art. 21 if she passes the Swin Middle lightship on her starboard. Owing to alterations in lighting, the rule laid down in The Minnie (L.R. [1894] P. 336; 71 L.T. 715) no longer applies.—The Oporto, 75 L.T. 599.

(v.) H. L.–Maritime Lien—Admiralty Law—Law of Scotland.—-A steamer whose escape from peril in an open roadstead in Scotland was prevented by the moorings of another vessel, cut these moorings after warning, and in consequence of the severance the latter vessel suffered damage, for which the owner recovered judgment. Held, that the judgment did not give a maritime lien on the steamer as against a mortgagee. The Bold Beccleuch (7 Moo. P.C. 267) approved.—Currie v. McKnight, L.R. [1897] A.C. 97; 75 L.J. 457.

(vi.) Q. B.—Insurance—Liability of Brokers for Premiums,—The liability of a broker to underwriters for premiums on a policy of marine insurance, extends not only to the ordinary Lloyd's policy, but to policies which contain a promise on the part of the assured to pay premiums.— Universo Insurance Co. of Milan v. Merchants' Marine Insurance Co., L.R. [1897] 1 Q.B. 205.

(vii.) Q. B.—Marine Insurance - Warranty.—A time policy on a steamer contained a proviso “warranted £2,400 uninsured.” On the insolvency of an underwriter the owner, to cover an expected loss, increased the insurance to an amount which nullified the proviso. Held, that there had been no breach of warranty.—The General Insurance Co. of Trieste, Limited (Assicurazione Generali) v. Cory and Others, L.R. [1897] 1 Q.B. 335.

(i.) P. D.-Salvage-Derelict-Award.-In remunerating salvors of a

derelict, the Court will consider the risk of the derelict; the absence of anyone on board to assist the salvors; and the drain upon the salvors'

Where the salvors towed a derelict 850 miles, occupying eight days in the service, the Court awarded £3,000 on a value of £7,350.The Janet Court, L.R. (1897] P. 59; 76 L.T. 172.


Solicitor:(ii.) C. D.-Practice--CostsAgency Charges-Solicitors Act, 1843 (6 & 7

Vict., c. 73), s. 37.-In a country solicitor's bill, the items of charges made for professional work done by his London agents must be set out, otherwise it is not a complete bill, and it can be taxed, although & year has elapsed since its delivery.-In re Pomeroy v. Tanner,

L.R. (1897] 1. Ch. 284; 75 L.T. 625. (iii.) C. A.-Scale Fee--Solicitors Remuneration Act, 1881 (44 & 45 Vict.,

c. 44), General Order, Schedule 1, Part 2, First Scale ; rule 6.-In the scale, fixing the allowance to a lessor's solicitor for preparing a lease at rack rent the words “ £2 10s. in respect to each subsequent £100 of rent” apply to complete sums of £100; and no change can be made under those words for any fraction of £100.-In re McGarel (a lunatic),

L.R. (1897] 1 Ch. 400; 76 L.T. 70. (iv.) C. A.-Fund in Court-Payment out on Fraudulent Petition

Unauthorised use of Name of Firm of SolicitorsCondonation by one Partner-Liability.-- Where negligence or other breach of duty is committed by a solicitor, an officer of the Court, in a matter in which the Court has seizin, the Court may and if it can do full justice, will summarily order its officer to make good the loss occasioned by his breach of duty. But the limit of liability is the measure of the loss flowing from the negligence or breach of duty. To constitute a binding adoption of acts à priori unauthorised, these conditions must exist, (1) the acts must have been done for, and in the name of the supposed principal, and (2) there must be full knowledge in him of what those acts were, or such an unqualified adoption that the inference may properly be drawn, that the principal intended to take upon himself the responsibility for such acts. It is not within the scope of the agency authority created by a partnership, for one partner in a firm of solicitors, to allow the use of the name of the firm by another solicitor, and thereby to bind his co-partner. Order of Court below (see Vol. 22, p. 30, v., in which the facts of the case are set out) varied.

--Marsh v. Joseph, L.R. (1897] 1 Ch. 213; 75 L.T. 558. (v.) C. D.-Discharge-Lien, Costs— Tender-Conditions of Delivery Up.

New solicitors of a client obtined an order on his old solicitors for a bill of costs and taxation, and then tendered the amount stated to be due with a demand for delivery up of papers. The tender was refused, the old solicitors claiming a lien on the papers for habeas corpus proceedings against them on behalf of the client; a sum to be paid into Court to meet costs of taxation; and an undertaking in the event of a final balance being found in their favour to return the papers. On a motion for an order for delivery up, held, that the old solicitors were wrong in refusing the tender and must pay the costs of the motion (following re Bevan and Whitting, 33 Beav. 439); that they had no lien for costs in proceedings against them (following re Taylor, Stileman and Underwood, 1891, 1 Ch. 590), and must deliver up the papers in exchange for a receipt; that they were entitled to payment into Court to meet taxation (following re Galland, 31 Ch. D., 296); and that they were also entitled to an undertaking to return the papers in the event

of a balance being found in their favour (following Bevan and Whitting and re Faithfull, L.R. 6 Eq. 325). — In re Hanbury, Whitting and Nicholson, 75 L.T. 449.

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Tolls :(i.) C. A.-Bridge Toll-Tramcar-Coach7 Geo. III., c. 73.—Where the owners of a bridge were empowered to charge sixpence for the passage

every coach, chariot, berlin,” &c., " drawn by more than two horses,” and fourpence for the passage of "every waggon, wain, dray, car, or other carriage drawn by three or four horses," it was held that a tramcar drawn by three horses was liable to toll as a “ coach.” Decision of Court below reversed.—Plymouth, Stonehouse, and Devonport Tramway Co. v. The General Tolls Co., Limited, 75 L.T. 467.

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Trade Mark :(ii.) C. A.-Registration-Portrait of Manufacturer as Distinctive Device

Infringement-Delay-Patents, &c., Act, 1888, s. 10, sub-8. 1 (c.).—Decision of C.D. (see Vol. 22, p. 31, iv.) affirmed.-Rowland v. Michell, L.R. (1897] 1 Ch. 71; 75 L.T. 498.

Trust:(iii.) C. 4..-Purchase of Foreign Land by Trustee-Statute of Frauds, s. 7–

Parol Evidence-Statutes of Limitation-Laches and Delay.More than 12 years after a purchase was made of lands in Ceylon by a person who subsequently ame bankrupt, an action was commenced for a declaration that the purchaser was a trustee for the plaintiff. Held, that parol evidence that a conveyance of land absolute in form was upon trust may be given notwithstanding sect. 7 of the Statute of Frauds; though the statute may in other circumstances be a defence to proceedings in this country having for their object the enforcing of a trust of lands abroad (Leroux v. Brown, 12 C.B. 801). That bankruptcy trustees are not discharged from claims of a cestui que trust by sect. 49 of the Bankruptcy Act; that by sect. 25, c. 2, of the Judicature Act, 1873, "no claim of a cestui que trust on an express trust or on a breach of trust is barred by any Statute of Limitations ;” and that laches and delay of a claimant depend upon the conduct of the parties as well as upon time. Bartlett v. Pickersgill (1 Eden 515) disapproved.--De la Rochefocauld v. Boustead, L.R. [1897]

1 Ch. 196; 75 LT. 502. (iv.) C. A.-Precatory Trust.—A testatrix in a document relating to

family jewels wrote: • My mother-in-law told me that Sir R. H. gave them to her without any restriction. When I married she gave them to me for life with the request that at my death they might be left as heirlooms.” Held, that there was no precatory trust.–Viscount Hill v. Dowager Viscountess Hill, L.R. [1897] 1 Q.B. 483; 76 L.T. 103.

Trustee :(v.) C. D.-Loss-Liability-Indemnity by Trustee who was Solicitor to Trust.

-Where one of two trustees was a solicitor to the trust on whose advice the other without enquiry invested the trust funds in an improper security, it was held that both trustees were jointly and severally liable for the loss by the breach of trust and for the costs of the action, and that the solicitor must indemnify his co-trustee against the latter's share of the liabilities and costs.-In re Turner ; Barker v. Ivimey, L.R. (1897] 1 Ch. 536; 76 L.T. 116.

Vaccination :-
(i.) Q. B. D.—Vaccination Act, 1867 (30 & 31 Vict, c. 86), s.31—Sufficiency

of Notice.—Notice to a parent to have a child vaccinated need not be served personally. The question of the sufficiency of a notice is one to be determined by justices.—Holloway v. Coster, L.R. [1897]

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(ii.) Q. B. D.—Neglect–Signing of Summons and Order—Vaccination Act,

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1867, s. 31.—The justice who signs an order for vaccination need not be the same who signed the summons.—Southcombe v. The Guardians of Yeovil Union, L.R. [1897] 1 Q.B. 343; 76 L.T. 58.

Q. B. D.—Power of Vaccination Officer to take Proceedings—Vaccination Act, 1867 (30 a. 31 Vict., c. 84), s. 31–General Order of Local Government Board, October 31st, 1874, art. 16.—Under sect. 31 of the Act a vaccination officer is empowered to take proceedings for an order directing a child to be vaccinated.—Bramble v. Lowe, L.R. [1897]

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Vendor and Purchaser:— (iv.) Q. B.–Conditions of Sale.—By conditions of sale of land within the

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metropolis, all outgoings up to the date fixed for completion were to be cleared by the vendor. Before that date the county council took down, in accordance with an order of a magistrate, dangerous structures on the land. Held, that the expenses of the demolition were outgoings which the purchaser was entitled to recover from the vendor. Midgley v. Coppock, followed; Boor v. Hopkins, distinguished.— Tubbs v. Wynne, L. R. [1897] 1 Q.B. 74. C. D.—Action for Rescission of Contract—Motion for Specific Performance —Receiver.–In an action for rescission of a contract for the sale of leasehold lands on the ground of misrepresentation on the part of the purchaser who had been let into possession, it was held that a motion that the purchaser should deliver up possession in default of paying moneys he had agreed to pay, could not be allowed; but leave was given to amend the notice of motion and to ask for the appointment of a receiver to preserve the property from forfeiture by payment of the rents and rates.—Cook v. Andrews, L.R. [1897] 1 Ch. 266; 76. L.T. 16.

Vestments :(vi.) C. A.—Preaching in Black Gown.—It is not illegal for a clergyman of

the Church of England to wear a black gown in the pulpit when preaching.—In re Robinson; Wright v. Tugwell, L.R. [1897] 1 Ch. 85;

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Will :(vii.) P. D.—Letter from Officer on Active Service-Construction—Wills Act

(1 Vict, c. 26), s. 11–Probate.—A British officer, on active service in the Maori War of 1864, wrote to his sister a letter, saying: “The chances are in favour of more of us being killed. . . . In case of accident, I wish to make everything I possess over to you. There is money at Cox's and over £100 in N.S.W. Bank. * Keep this till I ask you for it. Your affectionate brother, J. Spratt.” The testator returned to this country and died in 1894, having been for some time previously not on good terms with his sister. Held, that as there was no expression in the letter of any period within which alone it was to be operative, or any indication that it did not

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