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(i.) C. A.-Through Booking --Railway and Canal Traffic Act, 1854, s. 2
Through booking over a route formed of more than one line of railway cannot be claimed of the railway commissioners as a matter of right under sect. 2 of the Railway and Canal Traffic Act, 1854. The granting of an application for such a facility depends upon a consideration of the provisions of sect. 25 of the Act of 1888 as to through rates.—Didcot, Newbury, and Southampton Railway v. The London and South Western Railway and The Great Western Railway, L.R.  1 Q.B. 33; 75 L.T. 401.
Rating: (ii.) C. A.-Poor Rate--Joint Occupation for Crown Purposes and for Local
Purposes-Rateability.—Decision of Queen's Bench Division (see Vol. 22, p. 25, vi.) affirmed.—County Council of Middlesex v. Assessment
Committee of St. George's Union, L.R. (1897] 1 Q.B. 64; 75 L.T. 464. (iii.) Q. B. D.—Distress Warrant-Poor Rate—Justices—Jurisdiction to
Inquire into Beneficial Occupation. -- Justices have jurisdiction to enquire whether a person against whom a distress warrant for recovery of the amount of a poor rate is applied for is really the person in occupation of the rated property.—Reg. v. Bagshawe and
Others, 75 L.T. 513. (iv.) C. A.-Tithe Rent Chargé-Rateable Value - Deductions. In assessing
rectorial tithe rent charge to the poor rate no deduction is made for liability for repairs to the parish church ; and qnarter sessions can only make an allowance for tenant's profits when it finds as a fact that the allowance for expenses is insufficient.—The Dean and Chapter of St. Asaph v. The Overseers of the Parish Llanrhaiadr yn Mochnant and the Assessment Committee of Llanfyllin Union, L.R. (1897] 1 Q.B. 511 ;
76 L.T. 42. (v.) Q. B. D.—“Line of Railway"_“ Land Used as Railway.”- Local Acts
which prescribe a principle of assessment for a line of railway " and “land used as a railway” different from that for “ stations, buildings, and other hereditaments” the words “ line of railway” include only the land on which the rails are laid and the connected works stand; and the words “ land used as a railway "include the line and works on the land necessary for the use of the railway. Special assessment advantages given to a railway to be constructed under a particular Act do not extend to land acquired for the same purpose under later Acts.London and North Western Railway v. Llandudno Improvement Commissioners, L.R. (1897] 1 Q.B. 287 ; 75 L.T. 659.
Revenue:(vi.) C. A.-Succession Duty-New Succession-Succession Duty Act, 1853
(16 & 17 Vict., c. 51), ss. 2, 15, 17, 18.-Decision of Court below (see Vol. 22, p. 31, iii.) affirmed.—Attorney-General v. Lord Wolverton,
L.R.  1 Q.B. 231 ; 75 L.T. 569. (vii.) C. A.–Stamp Duty-Foreign Marketable_Securities—Stamp Act, 1891
(54 & 55 Vict., c. 39), s. 82, sub-s. 1.—Decision of Court below (see Vol. 22, p. 52, iv.) affirmed.--Chicago Railway Terminal Elevator Co. v.
Commissioners of Inland Revenue, 75 L.T. 572. (viii.) C. D.-Estate Duty—“Incumbrance”—Finance Act, 1894 (57 & 58 Vict.,
c. 30), s. 6 (sub-s. 2); 8. 7 (sub-s. 1), s. 8 (sub-s. 3 & 4), s. 9 (sub-s. 4 & 5) 8. 14 (sub-s. 1).-By a revocable post nuptial settlement trustees were to hold a specified part of the trust fund upon certain trusts and the residue in trust for the settlors, his executors, &c. Held, that the specified part was not an “incumbrance” within sect. 7 (1) of the Finance Act, and must bear a rateable proportion of the estate duty.
In re Meyrick; Meyrick v. Hargreaves, L.R.1 Ch. 99; 75 L.T. 621. (i.) C. A.-Stamp Duty-Licence to use Patent in One of the Colonies
Stamp Act, 1891, s. 59, sub-s. 1.–Decision of Court below (see Vol. 22, p. 26, vi.) affirmed.--The Smelting Co. of Australia v. Commissioners of
Inland Revenue, L.R.  1 Q.B. 175; 75 L.T. 534. (ii.) H. L.-Probate Duty-Colonial Mortgage.-Judgment of Court of
Appeal (see Vol. 21, p. 82, vi.) affirmed.-Sudeley (Lord) v. The Attorney.
Sale of Goods :(iii.) C. A.-Goods “ on Sale or Return” Pawned—Title of Pawnee-Sale of
Goods Act, 1893 (56 & 57 Vict., c. 71), s. 18, r. 4.-A good title is acquired by the pawnee where goods are pawned by a person to whom they were delivered on sale or return.-Kirkham v. Attenborough ; Kirkham v. Gill, L.R. (1897] 1 Q.B. 201; 75 L.T. 543.
School Board :(iv.) Q. B. D.-Election-Ballot Papers Marked with Crosses ; or not Bearing
Oficial Mark; or not Cancelled.—Where, in a school board election, some of the voters had placed a cross on the ballot paper opposite to the names of the candidates for whom they desired to vote, instead of using figures to indicate the ratio in which they allotted votes, it was held, that one cross ought to count for one vote. Held, also, that ballot papers not bearing the official mark were properly rejected under sect. 2 of the Ballot Act, 1872, and that ballot papers which bore no mark of cancellation ought to be rejected.—Morris and Others v. Bevis and Others, L.R. (1897] 1 Q.B. 449 ; 76 L.T. 120.
Sea Fisheries :(v.) Q. B. D.—“Removing from the Fishery”—Sea Fisheries (Shell Fish)
Regulation Act, 1894 (57 & 58 Vict., c. 26), s. 1.—The taking of shell fish from their bed with the intention of taking them away is, even if they are not actually taken away, a removal within the bye-laws under sect. 1 of the Fisheries Act of 1894.—Thomson v. Burns, 76 L..T. 58.
Sea Walls :(vi.) Q. B. D.-Liability to Repair—Custom-Presumption of Legal Origin.-
A liability, asserted and submitted to for a long period, to keep in repair a sea wall, will be presumed to have had a legal origin unless the contrary is proved. -- London and North-Western Railway v. Commissioners of Sewers of Fobbing Levels, 75 L.T. 629.
Settled Land :(vii.) C. D.-Lease-Payment not as a Fine to Tenant for Life-Setting Aside
Lease-Settled Land Acts, 1882 to 1890.—A lease is void against trustees of the settlement if money not intended as a fine is paid by the lessee to the tenant for life on the granting of the lease.—Chandler v. Bradley,
L.R. (1897] 1 Ch. 315; 75 L.T. 581. (viii.) C. A.-Settled Land Act, 1882, ss. 2 (sub-s. 1, 8), 38, 59, 60—Settled
Land Act Rules, 1882, App. Form 19-Infant Beneficiary-Residents in a
sell, in real property in England, the Court appointed persons resident in New South Wales as trustees of the settlement.--In re Simpson ; in
re Whitchurch, 76 L.T. 131. Settlement:(i.) C. D.--Marriage Settlement- Appointments— Assignments — Interest
Costs.-Under powers of a marriage settlement, the surviving parent made several successive appointments in favour of several of her children, and appointed the residue of the settled fund in favour of another child. Some of the appointees assigned or encumbered their shares. In the course of an action for administration of the trusts, questions arose as to interest and costs. Held, that interest at 4 per cent. from the death of the life tenant was to be allowed on the several appointments; in re Goodenough ; Marland v. Williams (see Vol. 21, p. 1, ii.), not followed; and that one set of costs was to be given to each child in respect of the several appointments to him, the assignees of a child to divide the costs so allowed, rateably. Cartwright v. Duc del Belzo (see Vol. 21, p. 55, iii.) applied.-In re Hill's Settlement Trusts ;
Equitable Reversionary Interest Society, Limited, 75 L.T. 477. ; (ii.) C. A.-Will-Hotchpot Clause.—By a settlement a contingent rever.
sionary interest in a sum of money was reserved to the settlor, who by his will gave half the residue of his estate to the cestui que trust, on condition that the settled fund should be taken in part satisfaction of the bequest. Held, that the hotchpot clause operated as a gift to the legatee of the settlor's interest in the trust fund.—In re Cosier ;
Humphreys v. Gadsden, L.R. (1897) 1 Ch. 325 ; 75 L.T. 31. (iii.) C. D.-Estoppel.— Trustees of a will settled certain estates including
estate B, to uses declared in the will, and a life tenant under the settlement caused himself to be registered in the land registry as owner in fee of estate B, and devised it. On an action by the person next entitled under the settlement, the devisee of B estate claimed that the language of the will of the first testator was inadequate to pass the estate, and that the person from whom he derived having been in possession for more than 20 years, had acquired a title in fee. Held, that the last testator and all claiming under him were estopped from denying as effectual the settlement under which he derived.—Dalton v.
Fitzgerald, L.R.  1 Ch, 440; 76 L.T. 83. Sbip:(iv.) C. A.-Charter-party-Dates for Arrival at Loading Port-Perils of Sea
and Towage Clauses – Obligation to Load-Delays.--A charter-party provided for the arrival at a loading port abroad, of several steamers, "as nearly as possible a steamer a month,” unless prevented by perils of the sea, or by rendering assistance to vessels in distress. Cargo was to be presented 24 hours after notice. No. 2 ship, owing to perils of the sea, arrived late. While she was loading, No. 3 arrived, and had to wait till the loading of No. 2 was completed. No. 4 arrived late, owing to having assisted a disabled ship, but not so late as to have frustrated the object of the adventure. Held, that the shipowners were entitled to damages for detention of No. 3, and that as salvage services were allowed by the terms of the contract, the charterers were liable for damages for detention of No. 4, from the date of her arrival to date when loading was commenced.-Potter and Co. v. Burrell and
Son, L.R. (1897] 1 Q.B. 97; 75 L.T. 491. (v.) Q. B. - Charter-Party-Demurrage--Place of Discharge.--A charter
party stated that a steamer was to proceed to a port named with a cargo of coal“and as usual and customary deliver some afloat to the order" of the charterers " alongside of any store, craft, &c.” Time for delivery to count when steamer is ready to discharge.” There was only one customary place to discharge and that was occupied when the steamer arrived. Held, that the time for delivery did not commence till the steamer was able to occupy the customary place of discharge.Sanders v.
Jenkins, L.R. (1897] 1 Q.B. 93. (i.) Q. B.--Marine Insurance-Arrival in “Final Port”. -Construction. A
vessel was insured to certain places and “for 30 days after arrival in final port, however employed.” Held, that "final port” meant final port of loading for the homeward voyage, and that the vessel was covered by the policy for 30 days after arrival in such port.-- Crocker
and Others v. Sturge and Another, L.R.  1 Q.B. 330 ; 75 L.T. 549. (ii.) P. D.-Seamen's Wages Forfeited—“ Slops Supplied by Master
Gratuities Received by Master – Account with Owners. – Where seamen had forfeit their wages by desertion, the master the vessel was held entitled to debit the owners with slops previously supplied to the deserters, and the owners were held not entitled to debit him with money presents made to him by consignees on the
discharge of the cargo.—The Parkdale, L.R. (1897) P. 53; 75 L.T. 597. (iii.) P. D.-Collision - Bail-Arrest - Lis Alibi Pendens.—A guarantee to
answer for damages had been given by the agents of a British and a German ship which had come into collision at Rotterdam, and an estimate of the necessary repairs to both vessels had been made by Lloyd's surveyor, but no further proceedings were taken. The German ship having arrived at an English port, it was arrested in an action in rem; and on a motion by the owners for a release and a stay of proceedings, it was held that as the vessel was not arrested in Holland, the guarantee was no bar to an action in this country. The Christiansborg, 10 P.D.
141 distinguished.—The Mannheim, L.R. (1897) P. 13; 75 L.T. 424. (iv.) P. D,-Collision-Swin Channel-Course of Navigation-Regulations
for Preventing Collisions at Sea, Art. 21.–An outward bound vessel navigating the channel between the Foulness or Whitaker, and the Middle Sands at the entrance to the Thames, contravenes Art. 21 if she passes the Swin Middle lightship on her starboard. Owing to alterations in lighting, the rule laid down in The Minnie (L.R. 
P. 336; 71 L.T. 715) no longer applies.—The Oporto, 75 L.T. 599. (v.) H. L.--Maritime Lien—Admiralty Law-Law of Scotland.--A steamer
whose escape from peril in an open roadstead in Scotland was prevented by the moorings of another vessel, cut these moorings after warning, and in consequence of the severance the latter vessel suffered damage, for which the owner recovered judgment. Held, that the judgment did not give a maritime lien on the steamer as against a mortgagee. The Bold Beccleuch (7 Moo. P.C. 267) approved.-Currie v. McKnight,
L.R. (1897] A.C. 97; 75 L.J. 457. (vi.) Q. B.-Insurance-Liability of Brokers for Premiums.--The liability of
a broker to underwriters for premiums on a policy of marine insurance, extends not only to the ordinary Lloyd's policy, but to policies which contain a promise on the part of the assured to pay premiums.Universo Insurance Co. of Milan v. Merchants' Marine Insurance Co.,
L.R.  1 Q.B. 205. (vii.) Q. B.-Marine Insurance - Warranty.-A time policy on a steamer
contained a proviso “warranted £2,400 uninsured.” On the insolvency of an underwriter the owner, to cover an expected loss, increased the insurance to an amount which nullified the proviso. Held, that there had been no breach of warranty.—The General Insurance Co. of Trieste, Limited (Assicurazione Generali) v. Cory and Others, L.R. 1 Q.B. 335. (i.) P. D.-Salvage-Derelict-Award.-In remunerating salvors of a
derelict, the Court will consider the risk of the derelict; the absence of anyone on board to assist the salvors; and the drain upon the salvors'
Where the salvors towed a derelict 850 miles, occupying eight days in the service, the Court awarded £3,000 on a value of £7,350.The Janet Court, L.R. (1897] P. 59; 76 L.T. 172.
Solicitor:(ii.) C. D.-Practice--Costs—Agency Charges-Solicitors Act, 1843 (6 & 7
Vict., c. 73), s. 37.-In a country solicitor's bill, the items of charges made for professional work done by his London agents must be set out, otherwise it is not a complete bill, and it can be taxed, although & year has elapsed since its delivery.-In re Pomeroy v. Tanner,
L.R. (1897] 1. Ch. 284; 75 L.T. 625. (iii.) C. A.-Scale Fee--Solicitors Remuneration Act, 1881 (44 & 45 Vict.,
c. 44), General Order, Schedule 1, Part 2, First Scale ; rule 6.-In the scale, fixing the allowance to a lessor's solicitor for preparing a lease at rack rent the words “ £2 10s. in respect to each subsequent £100 of rent” apply to complete sums of £100; and no change can be made under those words for any fraction of £100.-In re McGarel (a lunatic),
L.R. (1897] 1 Ch. 400; 76 L.T. 70. (iv.) C. A.-Fund in Court-Payment out on Fraudulent Petition
Unauthorised use of Name of Firm of Solicitors—Condonation by one Partner-Liability.-- Where negligence or other breach of duty is committed by a solicitor, an officer of the Court, in a matter in which the Court has seizin, the Court may and if it can do full justice, will summarily order its officer to make good the loss occasioned by his breach of duty. But the limit of liability is the measure of the loss flowing from the negligence or breach of duty. To constitute a binding adoption of acts à priori unauthorised, these conditions must exist, (1) the acts must have been done for, and in the name of the supposed principal, and (2) there must be full knowledge in him of what those acts were, or such an unqualified adoption that the inference may properly be drawn, that the principal intended to take upon himself the responsibility for such acts. It is not within the scope of the agency authority created by a partnership, for one partner in a firm of solicitors, to allow the use of the name of the firm by another solicitor, and thereby to bind his co-partner. Order of Court below (see Vol. 22, p. 30, v., in which the facts of the case are set out) varied.
--Marsh v. Joseph, L.R. (1897] 1 Ch. 213; 75 L.T. 558. (v.) C. D.-Discharge-Lien, Costs— Tender-Conditions of Delivery Up.
New solicitors of a client obtined an order on his old solicitors for a bill of costs and taxation, and then tendered the amount stated to be due with a demand for delivery up of papers. The tender was refused, the old solicitors claiming a lien on the papers for habeas corpus proceedings against them on behalf of the client; a sum to be paid into Court to meet costs of taxation; and an undertaking in the event of a final balance being found in their favour to return the papers. On a motion for an order for delivery up, held, that the old solicitors were wrong in refusing the tender and must pay the costs of the motion (following re Bevan and Whitting, 33 Beav. 439); that they had no lien for costs in proceedings against them (following re Taylor, Stileman and Underwood, 1891, 1 Ch. 590), and must deliver up the papers in exchange for a receipt; that they were entitled to payment into Court to meet taxation (following re Galland, 31 Ch. D., 296); and that they were also entitled to an undertaking to return the papers in the event