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a charge on the land of the defendant for the apportioned amount of expenses incurred by them under sect. 41 of the Act of 1875, and under sect. 19 of the Amendment Act.—Walthamstow Urban District Council v. Henwood, L.R. [1897] 1 Ch. 41; 75 L.T. 375.

Q. B. D.—Fences—Accommodation Works—Liability of Company— Limit of Time—Railway Clauses Act, 1845, ss. 68, 73.—Sect. 68 of Railway Clauses Act, 1845, imports an obligation on a railway company to make and maintain sufficient fences for separating the line from adjoining lands, and sect. 73 does not relieve from this obligation where the fences have not been put up within the period named, but only relieves from a claim for additional accommodation works where those afforded have not been shown to be insufficient within the prescribed time.—Diron v. Great Western Railway, 75 L.T. 245.

C. A.—Powers to Take Land–-Severance—Accommodation JWorks—Compensation—Manchester, Sheffield and Lincolnshire Railway Act, 1893, s. 42–Railway Clauses Act, 1845, s. 68.—The private Act of a railway company incorporated the Lands Clauses Act and part 1 of the Railway Clauses Act, and contained a section empowering the company to take such part only as they might require of a certain manufactory if severance could be effected without material detriment to the entire property. The company proposed to carry their line by a viaduct over the access to this manufactory, and undertook in an arbitration to grant a perpetual right of way under the viaduct, by which practically the existing access to the manufactory would be continued. Held, that the company had power to grant a perpetual right of way; that they were liable under sect. 68 of the Act of 1845 to make good the interruption to the use of the land and that the umpire should take these two points into his consideration in deciding whether the severance would be a “material detriment ’’ to the rest of the property. Held, also, that the Court had jurisdiction over the costs of an appeal in a special case. Holliday v. Mayor of Wakefield held not now to be a binding authority.—In re An Arbitration between Gonty and the Manchester, Sheffield and Lincolnshire Railway, L.R. [1896]

2 Q.B. 439; 75 L.T. 239.

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Q. B. D.—Lighthouse—Rateable Value.—Commissioners of a harbour and docks were empowered by Act of Parliament to levy dues for the maintenance of a lighthouse erected by them. Held, that the rateable value of the lighthouse was to be based on its structural value only. —Commissioners and Trustees of the Port of Lancaster v. Overseers of the Parish of Barrow-in-Furness, 75 L.T. 358.

C. A.-Floating Pontoon.—A railway company owned a pontoon which by leave of the owner of a pier was moored thereto in a tidal river, and at low water rested on the ground. The company drove a pile into the river bed as a fender to the pier. Held, that the company were not in occupation of the land and were therefore not liable to be rated.—Manchester, Sheffield, and Lincolnshire Railway Co. v. Kingston-upon-Hull, 75 L.T. 127.

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Assessment Act, 1869, s. 16.—Distraint for rates can be made on the goods of a company, of whose property a receiver and manager has been appointed under an order which does not direct the company to give up possession.—The North of England Trustee Debenture and Assets Corporation, Limited v. Marriage, Neave at Co., Limited ; re Marriage, Neave & Co., L.R. [1896] 2 Ch. 663; 75 L.T. 169.

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(i.) H. L.-Income Tar—Deductions—Money Expended for Purpose of Trade.—Judgment of Court below (see Vol. 21, p. 47 (i.)) affirmed.— Royal Insurance Co. v. Watson, 75 L.T. 334.

(ii.) Q. B. D.—Foreign Firm with English Trade Mark and Goodwill— Agreement Stamp Act, 1891, s. 59 (1).—A limited company, by agreement made in England, bought the work and goodwill of a company in America supplying goods for consumption in England, and having a registered trade mark here and an office in London. Held, that the English trade mark and goodwill were “property” within sect. 59, sub-sect. 1, of the Stamp Act, and that the agreement was liable to ad valorem stamp duty.—Brooke v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue, L.R. [1896] 2 Q.B. 356.

(iii.) H. L.--Income Tax-Exemption–Literary and Scientific Institution— Public Library—Public Libraries Act, 1892–Income Tax Act, 1842, s. 61, r. 6.—Decision of Court of Appeal (see Vol. 20, p. 117 (iv.)) reversed (the Lord Chancellor dissenting).—Mayor of Manchester v. McAdam, 75 L.T. 229.

(iv.) Q. B. D.—Foreign Marketable Securities—Stamp Act, 1891, s. 82.—The business of an English company was purchased by, and transferred to, an American company, with an arrangement that the debentures of the old company should be exchanged for debentures on the American company, payable in Chicago. Held, that the American debentures were not “made or issued in the United Kingdom,” or “offered for subscription,” or “given or delivered to a subscriber in the United Kingdom,” within sect. 82 of the Stamp Act, and were therefore not liable to duty as marketable securities of a foreign company.—The Chicago Railway Terminal Elevator Co. v. The Commissioners of Inland Revenue, 75 L.T. 157.

Riparian Owner:

(v.) Q. B. D.—Bed of Thames—Dredging Sand–Thames Conservancy Act, 1894.—The foreshore of the tidal part of the Thames is not the “bed” within sect. 87 of the Thames Conservancy Act, 1894, and the owner of such foreshore can dredge sand from it without the licence of the Conservators.–Pearce v. Bunting; Reg. v. Justices of Kent; e. p. Pearce, L.R. [1896] 2 Q.B. 360; 75 L.T. 184,

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(vii.) H. L.-Testing Clause in Marriage Contract.—There is no legal effect in a declaration in the testing clause of a deed which purports to qualify provisions in the body of the deed.—Blair and Another v. Assets Co., Ltd., L.R. [1896] A.C. 409,

Settled Land :

viii.) C. D.–Money to be Invested in Land–Permanent Repairs—Tenant for Life and Remainderman.—Where personal property was bequeathed to trustees for the purchase of land to be limited, like realty devised to them, to a tenant for life with remainder to his son in tail male with remainder over, with power to the trustees to postpone investment, and to apply any of the personalty for the benefit of the estate, it was held that the Court could not direct any part of the capital to be applied to the permanent repairs of the mansion house. In re De Teissiers Settled Estates followed.—In re Lord De Tabley; Leighton v. Leighton, 75 L.T. 328.

(i.) C. D.—Mansion House—Tenant for Life.—Where a testator had directed the sale of a mansion house on the death of the life tenant, it was held that the tenant for life could sell at his discretion.— In re. Wortham's Settled Estates and the Settled Land Acts, 75 L.T. 293.

Ship :—

(ii.) H. L.—Collision—Special Contract—Merchant Shipping Act, 1862, s. 54. —The owner of a yacht is liable for the consequences of violating a rule which he has bound himself to observe during a race, and the limitation of liability in sect. 54 of the Merchant Shipping Act is excluded.–Clarke v. Lord Dunraven; The Satanita, 75 L.T. 337.

(iii.) P. D.–Freight–Damage—Inherent Vice.—A charter-party contained a provision for payment of freight “less value of cargo short delivered or damaged not covered by the preceding act of God clause.” Some of the cargo was damaged owing to inherent vice. Held, that the consignees were liable for the entire freight as the deduction applied only to damage from causes for which the shipowner was responsible. —Eyre, Evans a Co. v. Watsons; The Barcore, L.R. [1896] P. 294; 75 L.T. 168. -


(iv.) C. D.—Costs—Lease in Consideration of Rent a Premium–General Order under Solicitors Remuneration Act, 1881, sched. 1, part 2, r. 5.— For a lease at a rent and in consideration of a premium the lessor's solicitor is not entitled to a fee for negotiation in addition to the scale charge calculated on the rent and to the scale charge for deducing title calculated on the premium.—In re Horn and Francis, L.R. [1896] 2 Ch. 797; 75 L.T. 370.

Theatre :—

(v.) Q. B. D.—Licence Under Conditions—Theatre Regulation Act, 1843, 8.5, 5 and 6 Will. IV., c. 39, s. 7.—A county council can in the exercise of its judgment make it a condition to the grant of a licence for the public representation of stage plays, that the grantee shall not apply for an excise licence for the premises under sect. 7 of the Act of Will. IV.—Reg. v. County Council of West Riding of Yorkshire, L.R. [1896] 2 Q.B. 386; 75 L.T. 252.


(vi.) C. D.—Marriage Settlement –“ Next-of-Kin in Blood” to Wife— Construction.—By a marriage settlement there was an ultimate trust for “the persons who shall be next-of-kin in blood” to the wife “at the time of her decease in case she had so died intestate and unmarried.” Held, that the words imported a reference to the Statute of Distributions, and that the children of the deceased brothers and sisters of the wife, as well as her living brothers and sisters, were entitled to participate.–In re Gray's Settlement; Akers v. Gray, L.R.

[1896] 2 Ch. 802; 75 L.T. 407.

(vii) C. A.—Depreciation in Authorised Securities—Liability.—To throw on

to trustees a loss sustained by a fall in value of securities authorised

by the trust, want of ordinary prudence on the part of the trustees

must be proved, otherwise the loss must be borne by the cestius que

'T', £ Chapman; Cocks v. Chapman, L.R. [1896] 2 Ch. 763;
..T. 196.


Vendor and Purchaser:— (i.) C. D.—Agreement–Names of Parties—Statute of Frauds, 8. 4

Conditional or Absolute Acceptance?—A defendant wrote to a firm of auctioneers: “I hereby offer the sum of £— for . . . . and if my offer is accepted, I will pay deposit and sign contract on the auction particulars;” and they replied: “On behalf of our client, Mrs. M. A. F., we accept your offer for –, subject to contract as agreed.” Held, that as these letters contained the names of the contracting parties, they satisfied the Statute of Frauds in that respect, and that the acceptance was absolute, notwithstanding the words “subject to contract as agreed.”—Filby v. Hounsell, L.R. [1896] 2 Ch. 737; 75 L.T. 270.

Weights and Measures:(ii.) Q. B. D.—Sale of Coal—Weights and Measures Act, 1889, s. 21.—In a

delivery of coals, if the whole specified quantity has been delivered, the seller cannot be convicted under sect. 21, because some sacks contained less than 2 cwt., the quantity which, according to the ticket supplied by him under the Act, each sack was stated to contain.— Godfrey v. Radford, 75 L.T. 224.

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Sale with Power to Postpone–Trustees not agreed—Works executed under Notice by Local Authority charged to Corpus—Public Health (London) Act, 1891, 8s. 11, 117, 121. —A testator gave real and leasehold estates upon trust for sale, but declared that it should not be necessary for the trustees to sell any part during the life of his wife unless she requested it. Held, that there was a discretionary power to postpone, and as the trustees were not agreed as to the advantage of a sale the absolute trust took effect. Held, also that having regard to sects. 11, 117 and 121 of the Public Health Act, 1891, the expenses of sanitary works executed by the trustees pursuant to notice by the local authorities were chargeable upon the corpus.—In re Lever; Cordwell v. Lever, L.R. [1897] 1 Ch. 32; 75 L.T. 383.

(iv.) P. D.—Codicils Written on Revoked Will—Mistake Rectified.—Where

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two codicils had by mistake been written on the last page of a revoked will, the Court held that words in the codicils misdescribing the revoked will as the last will should be omitted from probate, and that probate should be granted of the codicils so amended together with the last will.—In the goods of Northing Snowden, 75 L.T. 279.

C. D.—Construction–Gift to Children—Maintenance—Westing.—A testator left the residue of his estate in trust for ultimate division equally between his children who attained 21, the issue of a deceased child taking the parents' share. The trustees had a discretionary power to sell and re-invest and to apply a presumptive share of a child or grandchild to its maintenance during minority. Held, that the gift to children was contingent on their attaining 21, that the power to apply to maintenance the income of a presumptive share did not import a vested interest in the children, and therefore that children dying in minority took nothing, and that the testator's estate was not converted.—In re Wintle; Tucker v. Wintle, L.R. [1896] 2 Ch. 711; 75 L.T. 207.

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Where a case has already been given in the Digest for a preceding quarter, the additional report is given after the name of the case, with a reference to the volume of the Digest in which it first appeared, the thick number being the number of the volume.


(i.) P. D.—Testatrix of French domicile—Will in English form.—Where a will in English form was made under a power of appointment by a testatrix of English domicile of origin, but married to a Frenchman, and domiciled in France, the Court granted administration with the will annexed. In the goods of Alexander, 2 L.T. 56, and in the goods of Hallyburton, L.R. 1 P. & D. 90, commented on.—In the goods of Mary Hamilton Huber, deceased, 75 L.T. 453.

(ii) C. D.—Assets in South Australia–Colonial duties.—A testator with property in England and South Australia, left in trust an equal share of his residuary estate to each surviving child of him for life, with remainder to the children of such child; and gave power to the trustees to cultivate his real and leasehold estates in Australia till sale. Held, that the colonial duties were part of the costs of realisation, and therefore payable out of the testator's general assets before distribution.—In re Maurice; Brown v. Maurice, 75 L.T. 415.

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