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C. A.—Money lent for Deposit at Boxing Match.—An action cannot be maintained for the recovery of money lent to be deposited with a stakeholder on conditions of repayment depending upon the result of a boxing match.–Carney v. Plimmer, L.R.  1 Q.B. 634; 76 L.T. 374.
Husband and Wife:—
C. A.—Divorce—Husband's Petition—Dispensing with Co-respondent— Matrimonial Causes Acts, 1857 (20 & 21 Vict., c. 85), ss. 27 and 21; 1858 (21 & 22 Vict., c. 108) s. 11–Divorce Court Rules, 1865, rr. 2, 4, 6.— The Court will, according to the circumstances of each particular case, exercise the discretion conferred by sect. 28 of the Act to give leave to a petitioner for a divorce on the ground of his wife's adultery, to proceed without naming a co-respondent. Jones v. Jones (see Vol. 22, p. 11 (ii.)) disapproved.—Saunders v. Saunders, L.R.  P. 89; 76 L.T. 330.
C. A.—Deed of Separation–Judicial Separation—Alimony and Maintenance—Agreement set up in Bar—Matrimonial Causes Acts, 1857, ss. 32, 34, 35; 1859, s. 4; 1866, s. 1.–On a dissolution of marriage or a judicial separation, the Court may grant maintenance, and may order alimony agreed to in a prior deed of separation to be increased, notwithstanding a covenant by the wife not to sue for an increased allowance. Decision of Court below (see Vol. 22, p. 62 (ii)) affirmed. Gandy v. Gandy (30 Ch. Div. 57; 53 L.T. 306) considered.— Bishop v. Bishop; Judkins v. Judkins, L.R.  P. 138; 76 L.T. 169 and 409.
Q. B.—Summary Jurisdiction (Married Women) Act, 1895, s. 11–
P. D.—Divorce—Alimony—Practice—Permanent Maintenance out of Income to which Husband had no legal right.—The facts on which alimony pendente lite has been fixed are those in which permanent maintenance should be determined. The Court granted permanent maintenance out of an allowance made voluntarily to the respondent by a relative.—Bonsor v. Bonsor, L.R.  P. 77; 76 L.T. 168.
P. D.—Divorce—Suit of Wife for Judicial Separation—Counter Charge of Adultery—Leave to Intervene Refused to Alleged Adulterer.—Where, in a petition by a wife for judicial separation, the husband countercharged adultery, but asked for no relief, leave was refused to the alleged adulterer to intervene and defend. – Farrell v. Farrell, 76 L.T. 167.
P. D. —Divorce–Variation of Settlement.—Where a wife had obtained a decree absolute for dissolution of marriage, an ante-nuptial settlement of the husband’s property was varied so to give her more than one-third of the income of the settled property, and after his death more than one-half, and the limitation of the settlement dum sola virerit was not imposed.—Bashall v. Bashall, 76 L.T. 165.
P. D.—Divorce Practice—Notice to Queen's Proctor—23 d6 24 Vict, c. 144, s. 7–36 Vict., c. 31.–In an undefended suit by a husband for nullity of marriage, on an intimation from the Queen's Proctor that he did not intend to intervene at the initial stage of the proceedings, the case was set down for hearing after the undefended causes in the supplemental list had been disposed of.—M. v. M., otherwise A., 76 L.T., 172.
Q. B.—Insurance of a Debenture—Postponement of Payment by Resolution of Debenture Holders—Liability of Insurer.—The defendants insured the payment at maturity of “any principal sum due under” a debenture held by the plaintiff on condition that he did not consent to any modification of his rights. A subsequent meeting of debenture holders, which the plaintiff did not attend, passed a resolution assenting to postponement of payment. Held, that as the date of maturity, mentioned in the debenture, was past, the plaintiff was entitled to recover on his policy, the defendants succeeding to his rights.–Finlay v. The Mexican Investment Corporation, L.R.  1 Q.B. 517; 76 L.T. 257.
Q. B.—Levy–Liability for Sheriff's Fees.—An execution creditor unsuccessful in an interpleader issue is liable for the sheriff's fees.— Blaker v. Seager and Others, 76 L.T. 392.
Landlord and Tenant :
C. A.—Covenant by Landlord to Pay Water Rate–Water Supplied for Trade Purposes—Waterworks Clauses Act, 1847, s. 3—New River Company's Act, 1852, ss. 35, 38, 40.—A covenant by the lessor to pay the water rate assessed in respect of the leased premises was held not to apply to the charge for water supplied to the lessee for trade purposes under agreement between him and the water company.— Floyd v. Lyons & Co., Limited, L.R.  1 Ch. 633; 76 L.T. 251.
C. A.—Lease of Hotel—Covenant to Sell Wines of Lessor Only—Covenant Running with Land–Benefit of Proviso—Ownership of Lessor's Business Severed from Reversion.—A covenant in an hotel lease that the lessee will sell only wines supplied by the lessor his successors and assigns runs with the land without mention of the assigns of the lessee; and these assigns can claim the benefit of a proviso that so long as the covenant is observed there shall be an abatement of the rent, notwithstanding that the ownership of the lessor's business as a wine merchant is severed from the ownership of the reversion.—White v. The Southend Hotel Co., Limited, L.R.  1 Ch. 767; 76 L.T. 273.
Licensing:— (vi.) Q. B. D.—Transfer of Licence—Protection Order—Alehouse Acts, 1828,
s: 4; 1842, s. 1; Licensing Act, 1872 (35 d5 36 Vict., c.94), s. 3.—A person licensed to sell intoxicating liquor can continue to do so on the licensed premises, although a magistrate has at his request granted a temporary authority or protection to another person.—Andrews v. Denton, L.R.  2 Q.B. 37; 76 L.T.423.
(vii.) Q. B. D.—Power of Constable to Enter Licensed Premises—Licensing
Act, 1874 (37 dé38 Vict, c. 49), s. 16.—A constable is not empowered by sect. 16 to enter on licensed premises unless there is evidence by which he may reasonably conclude that an offence against the Licensing Acts is being committed.—Duncan v. Dowding and Others, L.R. [1897. 1.Q.B. 575; 76 L.T. 294.
(i.) Q. B. D.—“Found Drunk on Licensed Premises”—Licensing Act, 1872, 4. 12.—A person, not an inmate of the house, “found drunk on licensed premises” during closing hours is liable to conviction under sect. 12 of the Licensing Act. 1872.—Reg. v. Pelly and Another (Justices), L.R. 1897. 2 Q.B. 33: 76 L.T. 457.
(ii.) C. D.—Inspectorship Deed–Separate Estate—Whether Trust Express or Constructive–Statute of Limitations.—Where a creditor of a partnership firm, which had executed a deed of inspection in 1833, claimed a fund standing to the credit of the personal representative of the last surviving partner, it was held on the construction of the deed that no express trust of separate estate had been created, and, therefore, that the claim was barred by the Statute of Limitations.--Trevor w. Hutchins, 76 L.T. 183.
(iii.) C. D.—Water Supply—Local Government Act, 1888 (51 & 52 Vict, c. 41), s. 57–Public Health Act, 1875 (38 & 39 Vict., e. 55), ss. 51, 52. —The extension of existing water mains of an urban authority is not a construction of water works within the meaning of sect. 52 of the Public Health Act. Cleveland Water Co. v. Redcar Local Board followed.—Corporation of Huddersfield v. Raventhorpe Urban District Council, L.R.  1 Ch. 652; 76 L.T. 377.
(iv.) Q. B. D.—Borough Funds–Chief Constable respondent in Licensing Appeals—Power to pay Costs—Municipal Corporation Act, 1882, s. 140.— A watch committee refused to allow the chief constable to act as respondent in licensing appeals to quarter sessions, but the borough Council gave him authority to do so and passed a resolution that his costs be paid. Held, that there was no right to use the borough funds for this purpose under the circumstances.—Atty.-Genl. and the Newcastle Breweries, Limited, v. The Mayor, déc., of Tynemouth, 76 L.T. 566.
(v.) Q. B. D.—Lunacy. Commissioners—Discretion—Certificate that Person detained may be Discharged—Lunacy Act, 1890 (53 a 54 Vict., c. 5), s.49. —The lunacy commissioners have, under sect. 49, discretion to refuse to discharge a person detained as of unsound mind, though two doctors gave a certificate that he may be safely discharged.—Reg. v. The Lunacy Commissioners, L.R.  1 Q.B. 630; 76 L.T. 353.
(vi.) C. D.—Foreigner found Lunatic Abroad–Fund in Court Transferred— Where there were funds in Court in the name of a foreigner found lunatic abroad the Court ordered the transfer of the fund to the proper official of the State in which the lunatic was domiciled. In r. Barlow's will (57 L.T. 95; 36 Ch. D. 287) distinguished.—In r. De Linden; in re Sparrier; De Heyn v. Garland, L.R.  1 Ch. 453; 76 L.T., 180.
Malicious Representation :
(vii.) Q. B.-Wilful Act—Physical Pain–Cause of Action.—Where in consequence of a false and malicious statement by the defendant to a wife that her husband had been seriously injured, she suffered a dangerous illness and her husband was put to expense thereby, it was held that the defendant had wilfully done an act calculated to cause physical
. B. D.—Consent under s. 13 of London Building Act, 1894 (57 & 58 Vict., c. 213).—The Court will not grant a mandamus to the London County Council to hear and determine an application for consent under sect. 13 after a building has been erected contrary to the London Building Act, 1894.—Reg. v. London County Council, 76 L.T. 472.
Married Woman :— (ii) C. D.—Married Women's Property Act, 1882 (45 & 46 Vict., c. 75), ss. 5
and 19–Contingent interest under Will subsequent to Act—Addition of Separate use by the Act.—By a will made subsequently to the Married Women's Property Act, a fund was left to trustees of a marriage settlement to be held for a married woman on the trusts of the settlement, under which property was settled to her separate use without power of anticipation, and in the event of her husband surviving her, as she should appoint and in default to her next-of-kin. Held, that the incident of separate use was added by sect. 5 of the Act, and that she could appoint her contingent interest under the will. --In re Williams ; Williams v. Grant, 76 L.T. 150.
Master and Servant:— (iii.) C. A.—Injury to Workman–Defect in Condition of Machinery—
Employers Liability Act, 1880, s. 1, sub-s. 1.—Decision of Court below (see Vol. 22, p. 68 (iii.)) affirmed.—Tate v. Latham at Sons, 76 L.T. 336.
Metropolis :— (iv.) C. A.—Drainage—Repairs—Metropolis Management Act, 1862 (25 and
25 Vict., c. 102), s. 112.—The “Metropolitan Commissioners of Sewers” referred to in sect. 112 of the Metropolis Management Act, 1862, are
those constituted by 11 & 12 Vict., c. 112.—Appleyard v. The Vestry of Lambeth, 76 L.T. 442.
(v.) Q. B. D.—Delegation of Powers by Vestry to Committee—Metropolis
Management Act, 1855, ss. 58, 82, 85; Amendment Act, 1862, s. 64– Public Health Act (London), 1891, s. 3.—A summons for non-compliance with a notice under the Public Health Act, taken out by order of a committee appointed by a vestry, was dismissed by the magistrate on the ground that the vestry had not approved under sect. 58 of the action of the committee until after service of the notice. Held, that approval need not be given before service of the notice.—Firth v. Staines L.R.  2 Q.B. 70; 76 L.T. 496.
Vict, c. 20), s. 105; Amendment Act, 1862 (25 & 26 Vict, c. 102), ss. 77 and 112.—A private road, which had existed before the Highway Act, and had not been altered, had on one side a public footpath, and on the other the backs of houses permanently cut off from access to it by a fence let into the soil. The local authority proposed to pave the road under sect. 105 of the Act of 1855, and claimed contribution from the owner of the road under sect. 77 of the Act of 1862. Held, that the road was not a “new street" within the meaning of sect. 105, and therefore, though there was evidence to shew that the owner was a frontager, he was not liable to contribute.—Arter v. The Vestry of Hammersmith, L.R.  1 Q.B. 646; 76 L.T. 390.
(i.) Q. B. D.—Abandoned Mine–Obligation to Fence—Metalliferous Mines Regulation Act, 1872 (35 & 36 Vict., c. 77), s. 13 (2), s. 41—Derbyshire Mining Customs and Mineral Courts Act, 1852 (15 d: 16 Vict, c. 163).—A mine had been abandoned for 30 years, and all trace of the last workers was lost. Held, that the mine reverted to the owner of the soil, who was liable to fence under sect. 13 of the Act of 1872.—Duke of Devonshire v. Stokes, 76 L.T.424.
Mistake:(ii) C. D.—Consent Order—Set Aside—Evidence of Counsel.—An order expressed to be by consent was set aside on the ground of mistake,
though it had been construed by two Courts.—Wilding v. Sanderson, 76 L.T. 346.
Mortgage:– (iii.) C. D.—Equitable Mortgage–Westing Declaration—Legal Mortgage— Notice.—A person who purchased a freehold in 1883 sold it, and later repurchased it, taking a conveyance free from incumbrance. He then deposited as equitable mortgage with a bank the conveyance of 1883, suppressing all mention of subsequent dealings with the estate, and by the memorandum of deposit he declared himself a trustee for the bank, and gave to the bank power to appoint new trustees and to vest in them the estate. He then borrowed money from a relative and executed a legal mortgage to him of the whole estate, “subject to the deposit with the bank and to the memorandum accompanying the same.” Held, that the vesting declaration was effectual to pass the legal estate to new trustees appointed by the bank.—London and County Banking Co., Limited, v. Goddard, L.R.  1 Ch. 642;
76 L.T. 277.
(v.) C. A.—Trustees-Street Paving—Sale or Mortgage—Public Health Act, 1875 (38 & 39 Vict., c. 55), ss. 4, 257; School Sites Act, 1841 (4 & 5 Vict., c. 38), ss. 6, 7, 15.—Though trustees of a national school, the site of which was conveyed under the Act of 1841, are liable for metalling a road on which their premises abut, the charge cannot be enforced by sale or mortgage of the premises free from the trusts. Decision of Court below (see Vol. 22, p. 19 (iv.)) varied.—Hornsey District Council v. Smith, L.R.  1 Ch. 843; 76 L.T. 431.
(vi) C. A.—Vacant Land–Injunction—Public Health (London) Act, 1891 (54 & 55 Vict, c. 76), ss, 13, 35, 138.—On appeal from the decision of the Court below (see Vol. 22, p. 70 (ii)) the Court of Appeal declared the Attorney-General entitled to an injunction, and gave liberty to apply.—Attorney-General v. Tod-Heatly and Brownrigg, 76 L.T. 174; L.R.  1 Ch. 560.
(vii.) C. A.—Action for Infringement—Threats—Claim for Injunction—Patents, etc., Act, 1883 (46 & 47 Vict., c. 57), s. 32.–Plaintiffs brought an action against the defendants for infringement of a patent, and after