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may not have jurisdiction to refer the bill for taxation. Decision of Court below affirmed.-In re Baylis, L.R. (1896] 2 Ch. 107 ;
74 L.T. 337 and 506. (i.) C. A.-Costs-Order of Course to Tax One of Several Bills.- Where a
solicitor who had delivered separate bills to his client on distinct matters wrote that he treated the sums which he had received on account as a complete discharge and gave up all documents, it was held that a common order of course to tax one only of the bills which the client had subsequently obtained was properly made.---In re Ward (a Solicitor),
L.R. (1896] 2 Ch. 31 ; 74 L.T. 567. Stock Exchange :(ii.) H. L.-.“ Differences Cover -Gaming and Wagering Contract
Gaming Act, 1845, s. 18.-. Where a Stock Exchange transaction is
Stock Exchange v. Strachan, L.R. (1896] A.C. 166; 74 L.T. 468. Succession Duty:(iii.) Q. B. D.-New Succession-Consideration of Money or Money's
Worth ”-Succession Duty Act, 1853, ss. 2, 15, 17, 18.– The interests of beneficiaries under a will were conveyed by deed to trustees in trust amongst other things to (1st) payan annuity for life to F. Lord W. during the life of another, and (2nd) after that other's death to “continue to pay the said annuity" to the person for the time being holding the title of Lord W. Held, that the annuity in the 2nd clause was not a continuation of the annuity provided by the 1st clause, but created a new succession; and that the circumstances shewed that the deed was not made in consideration of “money or money's worth ” so as to be exempt from duty under sect. 17 of the Act.—The Attorney-General v. Baron Wolverton, 75 L.T. 71.
Trade Mark:(iv.) C. D.- Registration, Portrait of Manufacturer as Distinctive Device
Infringement--Delay-Patents, &c., Act, 1888, s. 10, sub-s. 1 (c):-The plaintiff registered the name of a lozenge with a device of his own portrait. Another manufacturer imitated the trade mark. Held, that the portrait was a distinctive device ; that as it was obviously the defendant's intention to pass off his goods as made by the plaintiff, the plaintiff was entitled to an injunction, notwithstanding a delay in
claiming his right.- Rowland v. Michell, 75 L.T. 65. (v.) C. D.-Registration by Agent of Trade Mark of Foreiyn Producer
Patents, Designs and Trade Marks Act, 1883, s. 90.-An English company were agents, but not sole agents, for goods supplied by an American firm and registered in the United States. The English company registered the trade mark in this country a few weeks before the American firm sold its business to another firm. Held, that such registration was without sufficient cause, and rectification was ordered.
-In re European Blair Camera Company's Trade Mark, 75 L.T. 63. (vi.) C. D.- Registration-- Change of Name of Proprietor-Patents, Designs
and Trade Marks Acts, 1883, ss. 78, 87, 90, 92; 1888, ss. 21, 23.Where the registered proprietors of a trade mark changed their name, it was held that the new name should be inserted in the register under sect. 87 of the Act of 1883.-In re New Ormonde Cycle Co., Limited, L.R.  2 Ch. 520; 75 L.T. 50.
(i.) C. A.-Bovril—Fancy Word not in Common Use-Patents, Designs and
Trade Mark« Act, 1883, ss. 64, 90.—“Bovril ” was held to have been properly registered in 1886 as a “fancy word not in common use within sect. 64 of the Act of 1883.-In re Trade Mark “ Bovril,” 74 L.T. 805.
(ii.) C. A.- Foreign Words or Oriental Characters-Trade made Limited
to Goods Exported.-Foreign words or oriental characters, merely descriptive of a device already registered, cannot be registered as part of the existing trade mark. Nor can a trade mark be registered with a limitation of its use to fabrics exported to a particular foreign country.- The Trade Mark Application of John Dewhurst & Sons, Limited,
L.R. (1896] 2 Ch. 137; 74 L.T. 388. (iii.) C. A.-Right to Name apart from Registration as Trade Mark.
Decision of Ch. D. (see Vol. 20, p. 58, iii.) affirmed. (See also Vol. 19, p. 27, i., and p. 106, iv.) Powell v. Birmingham Vinegar Brewery Co.,
L.R. (1896] 2 Ch. 54; 74 L.T. 509. (iv.) C. D,- Registration, Representation of a Crown.—There is no binding
rule prohibiting the registration of a trade mark which contains the representation of a crown.-In re König and Ebhardts Application, L.R. (1896] 2 Ch. 236.
Trades Union :(v.) C. A.-Strike-Picketting. -Picketting except “to obtain or com
municate information” will be restrained by interlocutory injunction. - Lyons & Sons v. Wilkins, L.R.  1 Ch. 811 ; 74 L.T. 358.
Trespass :(vi.) Ch. D. & C. A.-Tipping Spoil on to Neighbouring Land—Measure of
Damages.- Where defendants had been restrained by injunction from tipping spoil on to plaintiff's land, it was held, on the principle applied to waylea ves, that the measure of damages for the trespass committed previous to the injunction was to be based on the value for tipping of so much of the land as had been used for that purpose by the defendants, and on the diminished value to the plaintiffs of the remainder of the land.- Whitwham v. Westminster Brymbo Coal and Coke Co., Limited, L.R.  1 Ch. 894; 74 L.T. 405 and 804.
Trust: (vii.) C. A.-Breach-Following Trust Funds.-Where a father had appro
priated trust funds to which his son was ultimately entitled, it was held, affirming the decision of the Court below, that as there was no evidence of arrangement between the parties or of presumption of satisfaction, the son's interest under the trust was not diminished by the father having settled upon him funds in excess of that interest; notwithstanding in this respect reversing the decision of the Court below) that part of the sums so settled had been derived from the trust fund appropriated.-Chrichton v. Chrichton, L.R.  1 Ch. 870; 74 L.T. 357. (Vide 50 (vii.) ante.)
Trustee :(viii.) C. A.-Liability, Breach of Trust-Lapse of Six Years—Account
Statute of Limitations— Trustee Act, 1888.-Decision of Chancery Court (see Vol. 21, p. 85, iii.) affirmed. How v. Earl Winterton, 75 L.T. 40.
C. D.- Investment, Company Incorporated by Act of Parliament.Power to trustees to invest in “bonds, debentures, or debenture stock of any company incorporated by Act of Parliament” does not authorise investment on similar securities in a company registered under the Companies Act.-In re Smith; Davidson v. Myrtle, L.R. (1896]
2 Ch. 590; 74 L.T. 810. (ii.) C. D.-Negligence-Loss-Liability of Sleeping Trustee-Trustee Act,
1888, s. 8, sub-s. 1-Statute of Limitations.-Money for investment under a marriage settlement was handed to trustee A., who, without further steps, handed it to his fellow trustee B., who confided it to an outside broker, with the result that the greater part was lost. Held, that B. was liable to make good the loss; that both trustees were liable to the cestuis que trust following Speight v. Gaunt; that as A. and B. were in pari delicto, B., on making good the loss, would have right of contribution from A., following Chillingworth v. Chambers (Vol. 21, p. 51, i., and p. 85, iv.), and that Statute of Limitations furnished nó
defence.-Robinson v. Harkin, L.R.  2 Ch. 415 ; 74 L.T. 777. (iii.) Ch. D.-Trustee Act, 1893, ss. 31, 32, 50—Infant Tenant-in-tail—Vesting
Order.—The estate tail and remainders over are barred by the issue of an order under the Trustee Act, 1893, appointing a person to convey the estate of infant tenant-in-possession. — Faber V. Montagu,
L.R. 1 Ch. 549; 74 L.T. 346. (iv.) C. D.-Absconding Trustee · Vesting Order Trustee Act, 1893,
ss. 26 f. 35; Lunacy Act, 1890, ss. 135 & 136.—Where one of the trustees under a marriage settlement absconded, the Court made an order vesting the property in the remaining trustees.-In re Lees Settlement, L.R.  2 Ch. 508; 75 L.T. 178.
Vendor and Purchaser:(v.) C. D.-Misdescription of Lease for Underlease.—Under a contract of
sale a vendor described the property as held under a lease with which the title was to commence.
The so-called lease contained covenants relating to the lessor and his superior landlord. Held, that the misdescription was fatal and that therefore a good title had not been
shewn.—Broom v. Phillips, 74 L.T. 459. (vi.) C. A.-Title Deeds —“ Information not in the Vendor's Possession":
Conveyancing Act, 1881, s. 3, sub-s. 6.—The expense of ascertaining the whereabouts of title deeds which are out of the vendor's possession falls upon the purchaser, under sect. 3, sub-sect. 6, of the Conveyancing Act, 1881, unless there is a stipulation to the contrary.-In re Stuart
and Olivant and Seadon’s Contract, L.R.  2 Ch. 328; 74 L.T. 450. (vii.) C. D.-Will-Residue Charged with Legacies—Power to Trustees to Sell
- Concurrence of Residuary Devisees.-A testator after pecuniary and specific bequests left part of the residue of his real and personal estate to trustees upon trusts and part to certain persons equally share and share alike, with power to the trustees to sell any of the realty and hold the proceeds upon the trusts. The personal estate was not sufficient to meet the debts on the legacies. Held, that the trustees could make a valid assurance of freehold to purchaser without the concurrence of the residuary devisees. -- In re Dyson and Fowke's Contract,
74 L.T. 759. (viii.) Ch. D.-Auction-Non-disclosure of Covenants-Constructive Notice.
A purchaser of leaseholds at auction, when neither the contract nor the printed conditions of sale gave notice of onerous covenants, and who was unaware that he could have inspected the lease, was held
entitled to a rescission of the contract.- In re White and Smith's Contracts and the Vendor and Purchaser Act, 1874, L.R. (1896] 1 Ch. 637;
74 L.T. 377. (i.) C. D.--Deed of Assignment -- Bankruptcy - Conveyance — Doubtful
Title-13 Eliz., c. 5 --Under a deed of assignment a trustee for creditors entered into possession of freehold property. Shortly after the debtor was adjudicated a bankrupt, and subsequently the creditors' trustee sold the freehold by auction. Held, that the purchaser was right in refusing to accept the title without the concurrence of the trustee in bankruptcy.-In re Poppl-ton and Jones's Contract and the
Vendor and Purchaser Act, 1874, 74 L.T. 582. (ii.) C. D. - Married Woman Trustee — Conreyance Concurrence of
Husband-Mrried Women's Property Act, 1882, ss. I, 18, 24. — The Act does not empower a married woman to convey without the concurrence of her husband property of which she is a trustee.-In re Harkness and
Allsopp's Contract, L.R. (1896] 2 Ch. 358; 74 L.T. 652. Volunteer Corps:(iii.) Q. B. D.- Rules as to Non-Efficients-- Volunteer Act, 1863, s. 24.— It is
ultra vires for a volunteer corps to make a rule that any member of the corps who should fail to make himself efficient and earn the capitation grant, shall pay to the corps a sum equal to the capitation grant which he has failed to earn.-— Reg. v. Lewis and Moss, L.R.
1 Q.B. 665 ; 74 L.T. 551. Will :(iv.) P. D.- Construction. A bequest of " shares ” in a company was held
to pass debenture stock which was the only holding of the testatrix in the company.- In re Weeding; Armstrong v. Weeding, L.R. 
2 Ch. 364; 74 L.T. 651. (v.) C. A.-- Construction-Legal Disability.—Decision of Ch. D. (see
Vol. 21, p. 85, vii.) affirmed.-In re Carew ; Carew v. Carer, L.R. 
2 Ch. 311; 74 L.T. 501. (vi.) Ch. 1.- Construction-Bequest of “ All my Money”—Contingent
Interests— Bequest of Specific Sum invested in B. Company-Shares at Premium.--A testatrix who, amongst other property, possessed 500 shares (nominally of £1 each, but worth more) in a dairy company and was entitled in reversion to certain railway stock, bequeathed, in the terms of her will, “all my money except the sum of £400 invested in the Belgravian dairy company” in trust for certain persons.
“ The interest of the money in the Belgravian dairy company" she gave to three other persons for life “ in equal sums”; and added " on their deaths I will that the whole sum invested as above be used for the purpose specified. One of the life beneficiaries predeceased the testatrix. Held, that 400 shares represented the capital sum of which the three beneficiaries were to have the interest for life; that “on their deaths” meant on the death of the survivor; that the share of the one who died in the life of the testatrix was payable to the surviving beneficiaries in equal parts for their joint lives; that the survivor would take the whole interest on the 400 shares for life; and that “all my money was the residue of the testatrix's personal property, whether in possession or reversion.-In re Buller; Buller v.
Giberne, 74 L.T. 407. (vii.) C. A.-Bequest of Furniture to A.- Power to B. to take all he might
desire from same Furniture-Equitable Charge within Locke King's Act Amendment Act, 1877, s. 1.-A testator gave to one person by will all the furniture in a house except such as should be otherwise disposed
of; and by codicil he gave to another person everything this person might desire from the said furniture, except certain articles. Held, that the person named in the codicil could take all the furniture, other than the excepted articles. Where land is made security for a debt by any instrument which gives to the person entitled to the charge an equitable interest in the land, such instrument creates an equitable charge within the meaning of Locke King's Amendment Act, 1877.
In re Sharland ; Kemp v. Rozey (No. 2), 74 L.T. 664. (i.) C. D.--Covenant to Pay Sum Certain-Payable at Certain Time
Interest-3 & 4 Wm. IV., c. 42, s. 28.- Where a testator, covenanted to pay a fixed sum of money within six months after his death, it was held that interest at 5 per cent. was payable from the end of the six months till the money was paid.-In re Horner; Fooks v. Horner,
L.R. (1896] 2 Ch. 188; 74 L.T. 686. (ii.) C. D.-Tenant for Life and Remainderman- Reversion - Discretionary
Power of Sale-Construction. A testator left property, part of which consisted of a reversion expectant on the death of his mother, upon trust for his mother for life with remainder to others, with a discretionary power of sale on the trustees, which was not exercised. Held, that the personal representative of the mother was not entitled to any share or proceeds of the sale of the reversion.-In re Pitcairn ;
Brandreth v. Colvin, L.R. (1896] 2 Ch, 199. (iii.) C. D.- Construction- Absolute Gist-Direction to Pay Part of Proceeds
of Sule-Repugnant and Void.-A testator left tea plantations in Assam and all his other property to the plaintiff, whom he appointed sole executrix, subject to the payment of his debts; but on any sale of the tea plantations he directed her to pay out of the proceeds certain sums to other persons. Held, that there was no obligation imposed upon the plaintiff to sell, and that the direction to pay to other persons part of the optional sale was repugnant and void.-In re Elliot; Kelly v. Elliot, L.R. (1896] 2 Ch. 353; 75 L.T. 138.