Page images
PDF
EPUB

the tenancy without notice, it was held that the claim was founded on the determination of a tenancy at will and not on forfeiture, and that the writ could be specially endorsed.-Kemp v. Lester, L.R [1896] 2 Q.B. 162.

Principal and Agent:

(i.) C. A.-Receiver appointed by Trustees for Debenture Holders-Order to Wind-up Company-Goods ordered by Agent subsequently-Liability of Trustees.-Trustees for debenture holders in possession of the property of a company were held liable, as undisclosed principals, for goods supplied, after a winding-up order, to an agent appointed by them under powers of a deed, who was to be "the agent of the company who alone should be liable for his acts." (Dissentiente, Rigby, L.J.)Gaskell and Another v. Gosling and Another, L.R. [1896] 1 Q.B. 669; 74 L.T. 674.

Probate:

(ii.) P. D.-Chain of Executorship-Missing Executor to whom Power Reserved-Death of Acting Executor-Citation.-A grant of adminis tration de bonis non was refused where one executor to whom power had been reserved had not been heard of for 14 years and the other to whom probate had been granted had died before he had fully administered, as the chain of executorship could be continued in the executor of the deceased executor, and citation could be effected on the missing executor by advertisement.-In the goods of Reid, L.R. [1896] P. 129; 74 L.T. 462.

(iii.) P. D.-Foreign Will-Probate of Copy.-A German having personal property in England died domiciled in Wurtemberg where his will was proved, his wife being the equivalent of executrix. By the local law the custodian of the will is forbidden to let it leave his custody. Held that probate of a copy of the will might be granted.—In the goods of Von Linden, L.R. [1896] P. 148.

(iv.) P. D.—Presumption of Death-Filing Letter.--The Court granted an application for probate and for leave to depose to death of testator on presumptive evidence, subject to the filing of a letter from an insurance company, in which the testator had insured his life, stating that they would not interfere in the proceedings.—In the goods of Saul, L.R. [1896] P. 151.

Promissory Note:

(v.) Q. B. D.—Unnecessary Provisions in Document Described as Promissory Note-Bills of Exchange Act, 1882, s. 83, sub-s. 3.-Where a document contained a clause that "no time given to, or security taken from, or composition or arrangements entered into with either party hereto, shall prejudice the rights of the holder to proceed against any other party," it was held that it was not a promissory note and could not be sued on as one.-Kirkwood v. Smith, L.R. [1896] 1 Q.B. 582; 74 L.T. 423.

Public Health :

(vi.) C. A.-House Refuse-Refusal to Permit Removal-Penalty--Public Health (London) Act, 1891, ss. 16, 30, 31, 116.-The London County Council made a bye-law that the sanitary authority should remove the refuse of houses in their district once a week. A householder refused to admit the men sent to perform the duty. Held, that he was guilty of "wilfully obstructing" within the meaning of sect. 116 of the Public Health Act and was liable to the penalty imposed by the section.-Borrow v. Howland, 74 L.T. 787.

Railway :

(i.) R. & C. C.-Carriage of Goods-Duty of Company to Disintegrate Charges Railway and Canal Traffic Act, 1888, s. 33, sub-s. 3.-Sect. 33, sub-sect. 3 of the Railway and Canal Traffic Act, 1888, requires a railway company to distinguish in an account rendered the charge for conveyance from terminal charges whether the total claim exceeds or falls below the maximum authorised for conveyance alone; but if it falls below, it is sufficient for the company to state formally that no part of the claim is for terminals.-New Union Mill Co. v. Great Western Railway Co., 74 L.T. 791.

(ii.) R. & C. C.-Increase of Rute-Cartage―Jurisdiction of Railway Commissioners-Railway and Canal Traffic Act, 1894, s. 1, sub-s. 1.-The Railway Commissioners have jurisdiction to determine a complaint against a railway company of the unreasonableness of an increase in its rates or charge for cartage since the last day of 1892.-The Mansion House Association on Railway Traffic v. London and North-Western Railway Co., L.R. [1896] 1 Q.B. 273; 74 L.T. 463.

(iii.) C. A.-Level Crossing-Obligation to Build Bridge-Railway Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845, ss. 46, 61.-The Railway Clauses Act does not impose on a railway company whose line crosses a public footpath the obligation to carry the path over the line or the line over the path by means of a bridge.-Reg. v. Bexley Heath Railway Co., L.R. [1896] 2 Q.B. 74; 74 L.T. 540.

(iv.) Q. B. D.-Accommodation Works-Fence Constructed more than Five Years after Opening of Railway -Railway Clauses Act, 1845, ss. 68, 73. -Where damage had arisen through the defective state of a fence erected by a railway company more than five years after the opening of the railway, it was held that sect. 73 of the Railway Clauses Act did not relieve the company from the obligation to keep the fence in repair.-Dixon v. Great Western Railway Co., L.R. [1896] 2 Q.B. 333.

Rating:

(v.) H. L.-Poor Rate-Appeal to Quarter Sessions-Assessment Committee as Respondents-Consent of Guardians Necessary-Union Assessment Committee Amendment Act, 1864, s. 2.—If an assessment committee appear as respondents in an appeal to quarter sessions against a rate they will not be entitled to costs unless they have previously obtained the consent of the guardians to their appearing.-Assessment Committee of West Ham Union v. London County Council and Others, 75 L.T. 1. (vi.) Q. B. D.—Poor Rate-Joint Occupation for Crown Purposes and for Local Purposes-Ratability.—Buildings occupied jointly for purposes of a county council and for Crown purposes are ratable in so far as they are not occupied for purposes of the Crown.-County Council of Middlesex v. Assessment Committee of St. George's Union, L.R. [1896] 2 Q.B. 143; 75 L.T. 153.

Rent Charge:—

(vii.) Q. B. D.-Ecclesiastical Augmentation-Rent Charge Greater than Annual Value.—Where a rent charge has been granted in augmentation of a curacy under 1 and 2 William IV., c. 45, the owner of the land is liable for the full amount of the charge, even if it should exceed the annual value of the land.-Pertwee v. Townsend, L.R. [1896] 2 Q.B. 129; 75 L.T. 104.

Riparian Rights:

(i.) C. A.-River Bed-Alteration-Adjoining Lands-Accretion.- A portion of the bed of a river, which becomes dry during part of the year, does not by accretion become the property of the adjoining riparian owner. -Hindson v. Ashby, L.R. [1896] 2 Ch. 1; 74 L.T. 327.

Revenue:

(ii.) Q. B. D.-Postage Stamps-Possession of Die - "Lawful Excuse"Post Office (Protection) Act, 1884, s. 7.—The respondent, whose bona fides was admitted, had in his possession, for purposes of illustration, a die capable of making a representation of a current colonial postage stamp. Held, that he had no "lawful excuse," and was liable to the penalty imposed by sect. 7 of the Post Office (Protection) Act, 1884. - Dickens v. Gill, L.R. [1896] 2 Q.B. 310; 75 L.T. 32.

(iii.) Q. B. D.-Income Tax-Colliery Contributions to Strike Compensation Fund-Income Tax Act, 1842, s. 100, sch. D.-The Court disallowed a claim of colliery owners in income tax returns to deduct from profits the average excess of their contributions to a strike indemnity fund over the amounts received by them as indemnities.-The Rhymney Iron Co., Limited v. Fowler, L.R. [1896] 2 Q.B. 79.

(iv.) Q. B. D.-Excise Licence- Secretary to Watch Club-Liability – Bonâ fide Traveller Revenue Act, 1867, ss. 1, 3, 17.-The respondents were secretaries of provincial" watch clubs," the members of which paid a weekly sum, and in consideration the successful drawer at a periodical ballot received a watch from the proprietors who were London tradesmen. Held, that the respondents came within sect. 17 of the Revenue Act, 1867, as persons who solicit, take, or receive any order" for excisable articles without a licence, and did not come within the exemption as bonâ fide travellers.-Killick v. Graham; Linton v. Burchell, L.R. [1896] 2 Q.B. 196; 75 L.T. 29.

[ocr errors]

(v.) Q. B. D.-Stamp Duty on "Annuity or Sum Periodically Payable"Stamp Act, 1891, Schedule.-By an agreement terminable by three months' notice the manager of an hotel was to receive all the profits on paying a weekly sum to the proprietor. Held, that the " sum periodically payable" within the terms of the Stamp Act was the sum payable for one week only.-Clifford and Another v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue, L.R. [1896] 2 Q.B. 187; 74 L.T. 699.

(vi.) Q. B. D.- Stamp Duty-Licence to Use Patent in one of the ColoniesStamp Act, 1891, s. 59, sub-s. 1, sch. 1.-A share of a patent and of a licence to use the patent in New South Wales was held to be an interest on property within the meaning of sect. 59, sub-sect. 1, of the Act.-The Smelting Company of Australia v. The Commissioners of Inland Revenue, L.R. [1896] 2 Q.B. 179; 74 L.T. 694.

(vii.) C. A.-Dog Licence-Exemption—Jurisdiction of Justices-Customs and Inland Revenue Act, 1878, s. 22-Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1879, s. 16. -The granting of a certificate of exemption to the owner of a dog is within the discretion of the commissioners, and the justices have no jurisdiction to review their decision. The refusal to take out a dog licence is not an offence of a trifling nature within sect. 16 of Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1879.-Phillips v. Evans, L.R. [1896] 1 Q.B. 305; 74 L.T. 314.

(viii.) H. L.-Income Tax-Trade exercised within the United Kingdom--Assessment through Agent-Income Tax Acts, 1853, sch. D.; 1842, s. 41.Where orders were obtained within the United Kingdom by an agent there resident for a merchant in France who shipped the goods thence at the purchaser's risk, issued the invoices in his own name, and

generally received the purchase money direct, it was held (reversing the judgment of the Court below-see Vol. 20, p. 54, iv.-Lord Morris dissenting), that the foreign merchant did not exercise his trade within the United Kingdom, so as to bring him within sched. D. of the Income Tax Act, 1852.-Grainger & Son v. Gough, L.R. [1896] A.C. 325; 74 L.T. 435.

Scotch Law:

(i.) H. L.-Portions to Children.—The rule of English law against double portions to children is not applicable to Scotland.-Johnstone v. Haviland, L.R. [1896] A.C. 95.

Settled Land:

(ii.) C. D.-Power to Trustees to purchase particular Land—Settled Land Act, 1882, s. 33.—A power to trustees to purchase certain land at the request of the life tenant renders personal property in their hands "liable "" to be so laid out within the meaning of sect. 33 of the Act.— In re Hill's Settled Estates; Hill v. Pilcher, L.R. [1896] 1 Ch. 962; 74 L.T. 460.

(iii.) C. D.-Tenant for Life Lunatic-Annuity to Remainderman Overpaid— Claim for Return by Representative of Life Tenant.-By orders in lunacy an annuity was ordered to be paid out of settled estate to a remainderman for a limited period. The annuity was continued in error beyond the period and the remainderman mortgaged his estate. Held, that the personal representative of the life tenant was entitled to retain the overpayments with interest, notwithstanding the mortgage. In re Langham; Otway v. Langham, 74 L.T. 611.

(iv.) C. D.-Jointure-Portions.-A power of jointuring does not cover the creation of a rent charge in favour of the wife during the life of the husband. But a power conferred on the husband to charge the settled estate with portions for the children and with interest thereon by way of maintenance, may enable him to charge the estate, with payment to himself as guardian of the children of interest on their expectant portions. In re De Hoghton; De Hoghton v. De Hoghton, L.R. [1896] 2 Ch. 385; 74 L.T. 613.

(v.) C. D.-Will-Incumbered and Unincumbered-Estates Devised as a whole-Tenant for Life and Remainderman.-Where a testator devised incumbered and unincumbered estates as a whole to a tenant for life who mortgaged his interest to an insurance company who foreclosed, the company were held not to be entitled to give up the incumbered portions which were profitless, but to be bound to apply the income of the whole to paying off the interest of the mortgages on the incumbered parts. Frewen v. The Law Life Assurance Co., L.R. [1896] 2 Ch. 511; 75 L.T. 17.

Settlement:

(vi.) Ch. D.-Mortgage for a Term-Premature Repayment with a ForfeitRights of Tenant for Life and Remainderman to Accretion.-The trustees of a fund, which was settled on a person for life with remainder in fee to others, invested it on mortgage with a covenant that it should remain undisturbed for a fixed period. By agreement it was redeemed before the period had expired on payment of a forfeit of one year's interest, in addition to the interest accrued due. Held, that the additional sum was capital and belonged to the remaindermen. -In re Searancke; Simonds v. Huntington, 74 L.T. 339.

(i.) P. D.-Variation of Settlement-Extinguishment of Divorced Parents' Interest-Acceleration of Infant's Interest.—The Court on the ground that as infant's interest would be thereby accelerated, extinguished the interest on a marriage settlement of a husband from whom the wife had obtained a divorce with custody of the only child, notwithstanding that there was a power to her in such circumstances to raise a sum which would nearly exhaust the value of the entire estate.-Creagh v. Creagh, 74 L.T. 430.

(ii.) C. D.-Determinable Life Interest-Settlor Subsequently Bankrupt— Forfeiture. By a marriage settlement the settlor assigned property to trustees upon trust to pay to him until he should die, become bankrupt or assign or incumber the income, or do anything whereby any part of it would become payable to any other person. He became bankrupt after the sole surviving trustee had advanced to him part of the trust funds on a covenant to repay and indemnify. After the bankruptcy the trustee was compelled to make good the trust fund. On a question arising, it was held that the settlor's life interest had not determined previously to his bankruptcy.-In re Brewer's Settlement; Morton v. Blackmore, L.R. [1896] 2 Ch. 503; 75 L.T. 177.

Ship :

(iii.) C. A.-Collision-Raising Wreck-Expenses of Harbour Board and Conservators-Basis of Calculation-Damages in Nature of Demurrage.— The Mersey Docks and Harbour Board who were also the Conservancy Commissioners of the Mersey, were held entitled to recover as part of their damages the cost price of raising a lightship and a dredger, their property, which had been sunk in the harbour of Liverpool by the negligence of the defendants, and it was also held that interest on the original cost to the Board of their plant employed in the work was to form part of this cost price. But no allowance was made to them for the loss of use of the dredger while it was disabled. The rule laid down in the case of The Harrington followed.-The Emerald; The Greta Holme, L.R. [1896] P. 192; 74 L.T. 645.

(iv.) Q. B. D.-Charter Party-" Safe Port"-Evidence of Custom.-By a charter party a ship was to discharge all her cargo at one port to be named by the charterers, which was to be a safe port where she could enter dock safely and lie afloat at all times. The ship was ordered to discharge at Gloucester, but being of too great a draught to proceed thither, discharged all her cargo at the nearest safe point. Held, that the port named was not "safe" within the meaning of the charter party, and that evidence of custom of similar ships to lighten before proceeding to Gloucester was inadmissible.-Reynolds & Co. v. Tomlinson and Another, L.R. [1896] 1 Q.B. 586; 74 L.T. 591.

(v.) C. A.--Marine Insurance-Perils of the Sea-Judgment in Salvage Suit-Evidence.-At the request of the master of a steam-vessel which had consumed nearly all its coal, but which could have proceeded under sail, towage was rendered to the incapacitated steamer. Salvage services were subsequently recovered. Held, that there had not been a loss by perils of the sea within the meaning of a time policy of insurance; and that a judgment against a shipowner for salvage award is not evidence of loss by perils of the sea.-Ballantyne & Co. v. Mackinnon, 75 L.T. 95.

(vi.) C. A.-Collision-Compulsory Pilotage-London District-Merchant Shipping Acts, 1854, s. 379 (3); 1894, s. 625 (3)—Privy Council Order, Dec. 21st, 1871.-A British ship, loaded at Cardiff for the River Plate, and on the return voyage landed cattle in London, and took the rest of the cargo to Rotterdam. Held, that she was within the terms of sect. 625, sub-sect. 3, of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1894, as trading from a

« PreviousContinue »