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applied by the English Courts is neither the lex fori nor the law of the husband's domicil, but tertium quid. In such a case as that of the Goodman family the tests of English law would have made all the children, save those born in wedlock, illegitimate. Tested by the law of the husband's domicil at the marriage, all, it seems, were equally legitimate. Tested by the tertium quid, one of the antenati was legitimate, the others not. The practical result is that the English Courts not only impose on themselves the labour of ascertaining the husband's domicil at the time of the marriage, which is inevitable, and the legal consequences of the marriage of that person, according to the law of the country of domicil, but also the seemingly gratuitous labour of enquiring into, and drawing conclusions from the man's previous history, though the personal law of the husband declines the enquiry and disregards the conclusions. I venture to think that it is sufficient, the foreign domicil of the husband at the time of the marriage being proved, to ascertain, by evidence of foreign experts or otherwise, what effects the law of the country of domicil attached to the marriage, and to concede those effects so far as status of persons and rights in movables are concerned.
I am not prepared to say that an argument of some plausibility might not have been framed against the legitimation, per subsequens matrimonium, of the bastard child of a domiciled English woman, on the score of its deriving its domicil of origin from her, and it is singular that no weight seems to have been attached to this circumstance in cases in which it occurred; see Munro v. Munro, 7 Cl. & F. 842, and In re Goodman's Trusts.
The notion that no child is legitimated by the subsequent marriage of its parents, unless it received a capacity for legitimation derived from the putative father's domicil at the time of conception or birth seems to me to have originated in Vice-Chancellor Wood's view of the doctrine of legitimatio per subsequens matrimonium, as being based on the fiction of a marriage prior to the conception. It may well be that this is so historically, but there seems good reason for thinking that, even in Scotland, the fiction had been practically discarded before 1856. That the doctrine of legitimatio per subsequens matrimonium should be still held not to apply to children born ex damnato coitu* is probably an instance of what is not unknown in legal history,-a rule originally based on reasons of one kind being retained and justified by reasons of another kind, the first set of reasons having been discarded as not squaring with modern modes of thought. If, then, this fiction be discarded, what reason is there for regarding the domicil of the husband, and his resulting personal law, at any other time than the actual date of the marriage? There is no other "act in the law" on which the question of legitimation can depend, and, if the English Courts are prepared, for the purpose of determining status of children and rights in movables, to regard, in any particular case, the personal law of the husband at the date of the contract, the only reasonable and consistent course seems to be to apply it thoroughly.
If a case like In ve Wright's Trust could come up in 1897 as res integra, I think the Court would adopt a ratio decidendi which would not expose this country to the reproach of “standing aloof in barbarous insularity from the rest of the civilised world.” What we stand to gain by the authoritative disapproval of the principles enunciated in In ve Wright's Trust, and reiterated in the dicta in Udny v. Udny, In re Goodman's Trusts, In re Andros, and In re Grove, is the ability to state a rule of that chapter of English Law which treats of "private international” relations in terms which
* The capacity to marry must exist at all events at the birth. This is Lord Fraser's opinion with regard to the law of Scotland ; see Parent and Child, p. 36.
will have the academic merits of simplicity and consistency, and the practical merits of promoting substantial justice between parties, and commanding the approval of the Courts and lawyers of other communities.
T. K. NUTTALL.
VI.-CURRENT NOTES ON INTERNATIONAL
The Pacific Blockade of Crete. A good deal of misconception has arisen from the use of the term.“ Pacific Blockade." A “ Blockade" is an act of one of two belligerent States precluding neutral ships from having access to, or egress from, a particular enemy port or coast. It is essentially a belligerent privilege directed primarily against neutrals, and, like the right of visitation and search and the doctrine of Contraband, the right to Blockade is a concession by neutrals to belligerents, arising out of the fundamental principles of Neutrality. A "Pacific Blockade,” on the other hand, is essentially a belligerent or quasi-belligerent act of coercion directed not against neutrals, but against the State coerced. M. Perels, in his admirable article in the Revue de Droit International (Vol. 19, p. 244, et seq.), says: “Le Blocus pacifique n'est "autre chose que la fermeture des portes ou des districts
particuliers de la côte d'un pays en dehors du cas de “guerre déclarée et dans le but d'empêcher les relations “commerciales maritimes." Professor T. E. Holland, in a recent letter to the Times,* in reply to an anonymous correspondentt, rightly says that it is “one of the various “methods generically described as Reprisals
by “ which, without resort to war, pressure, topographically or
* Times, 7th March, 1897.
+ Times, 5th March, 1897.
"otherwise limited in extent, may be put upon an offending “ State.” Any such operation is not, of course, “Pacific,” except in a comparative sense. As Reis Effendi said, after Navarino, in his reply to the assurance that the Great Powers were still at peace with the Porte : “absolument comme si, cassant la tête d'un homme je “ l'assurais en même temps de mon amitié.” The term
Pacific,” in short, is merely a diplomatic amenity. The anonymous writer of the letter to the Times, above referred to, points out what he regards as two observations applicable to all historical instances of Pacific Blockade, namely—(1) that the Blockade has always been instituted by a strong Power to coerce a weak one, and there is no instance of one of the Great Powers of the world employing such measures against another of like strength"; and (2) that the "majority in number and the most weighty in authority” of International Jurists have regarded the practice as indefensible. With regard to the latter of these considerations, no doubt many writers have condemned Pacific Blockade as contrary to International Law, but the real ground of objection has almost always been against such a Blockade purporting to bind or affect neutral or quasi-neutral States or subjects. The objections of Hautefeuille, Pistoye and Duverdy, Woolsey, Gessner, Fauchille and De Martens, are entirely based on this aspect of the question. Geffcken, in his reply to M. Perels' paper, was also mainly influenced by the same siderations, though he seems to object also on general moral grounds. The views of all these jurists and the conflicting views of such authorities as Heffter, Calvo, Cauchy, Bluntschli, Wharton, Ferguson, and others, are excellently summarized in the above-mentioned paper of M. Perels, the reply of M. Geffcken (see the Revue, Vol. 19, p. 377, et seq.), and an article by M. Bulmering in the Journal de Droit International Privé, for 1884 (p. 569).
Hall also has a capital note upon the point, in his " International Law," $121. (See p. 386 et seq of the 4th Edition.) The best evidence of the views held by the majority of jurists is, however, to be found in the series of Resolutions passed by the Institute of International Law, at the Heidelberg meeting of 1887.* The general effect of these is to admit what seems to be indisputable, namely, that Pacific Blockade as a form of Reprisals, is perfectly legitimate, provided it is not allowed to affect or prejudice neutrals or third parties.
There have no doubt been instances of so called Pacific Blockade, in which a claim to affect neutrals has been raised, or even in a few instances exercised. This claim, however, was candidly admitted by Lord Palmerston, in the La Plata affair of 1846, to be untenable, and was strongly repudiated by Lord Granville in 1884, in connection with the Franco-Chinese "état de réprisailles.” It was not even asserted in the most famous modern precedent, the Blockade of the Greek Ports by the Great Powers, in 1886. A full consideration of these cases will be found in the article on “Some Recent Incidents in International Law, " in Vol. XIV. of this Review, pp. 127-137.
In this paper we also anticipated the first proposition which was put forward in the anonymous letter to the Times, to which Professor Holland replied as above mentioned. We stated that two principles underlay all the recorded instances of Pacific Blockade, i.e., (I) that the Blockading State was always overwhelmingly more powerful than the Blockaded one, and (2) that "the object of the Blockade has always been “either to obtain satisfaction by means falling short of war, “ for some damage caused by the other State" (as in 1831,
* See the Annuaire de l'Institut, 1888, p. 301, and see article on
" Some Recent Incidents in International Law,” in this Review, Vol. XIV., pp. 127137; and a recent article by Mr. T. Baty, on “ The Institute of International Law and Pacific Blockade,” in our number for August, 1896.