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(i.) P. D.-Summary Jurisdiction (Married Women) Act, 1895, s. 5, sub-s. (c) -Provision for Wife-Her Costs.-Courts of summary jurisdiction must consider the means and the earning capabilities of the husband and of the wife before making an order. Where a wife has to defend on appeal an order which she has obtained, her costs will be allowed. -Earnshaw v. Earnshaw, L.R. [1896] P. 160; 74 L.T. 560.

(ii.) C. A.-Divorce-Maintenance—Alienation

or Release-Divorce and Matrimonial Causes Acts, 1857 (s. 32) and 1866, s. 1.—An allowance to a divorced wife under sect. 1 of the Divorce and Matrimonial Causes Act, 1886, is for her maintenance and cannot be assigned or released without the sanction of the Court. Payment will not be enforced of arrears left unclaimed for a long time.-Watkins v. Watkins, L.R. [1896] P. 222; 74 L.T. 636.

(iii.) C. D.-Post-Nuptial Settlement with Covenant as to After-Acquired Property-Operation of Fines and Recoveries Act and of Malins's ActDivorce-Resettlement by Divorce Court under Mistake-20 & 21 Vict., c. 85, s. 45; and 22 & 23 Vict., c. 61, s. 5.-A married woman in 1877 made a post-nuptial settlement in which her husband joined of personal property to which she was entitled under intestacies and under instruments of earlier date than Malins's Act. There was a covenant to settle after-acquired property and the instrument was acknowledged under the Fines and Recoveries Act. By the will of a person who died in 1890, she acquired real property. In May, 1893, she was divorced. Under the impression that the instrument was valid, the Divorce Court varied it by consent of parties. In a subsequent action by the settlor, Held, that the settlement was void as to property not reduced into possession at the date of the decree nisi, as she was not at the date of the instrument entitled to real property within the Fines and Recoveries Act nor to personal property within Malins's Act; that consequently the resettlement by the Divorce Court did not bind this property. That the Court having power to put her upon terms required an undertaking from her that any further applications should be dealt with as if they had been made prior to the resettlement.-Allcard v. Walker; in re Lucas Walker v. Lupton, L.R. [1896] 2 Ch. 369; 74 L.T. 487.

(iv.) P. D.-Persistent Cruelty-Wilful Neglect to Provide Maintenance-Time for Proceeding-Summary Jurisdiction (Married Women) Act, 1895, ss. 4. 8; Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1848, s. 11.-Persistent cruelty by a husband towards, and neglect to provide maintenance for, his wife are not continuing offences. Complaint must be made within six calendar months of the offence.-Ellis v. Ellis, L.R. [1896] P. 251.

Industrial and Provident Society :

(v.) Q. B. D.-Intestate Member-Distribution of his Property— Industrial and Provident Societies Acts (1876, s. 11, and 1893, s. 27).-The power given by sect. 27 of the Industrial and Provident Societies Act, 1893, to the committee of a society to distribute the property therein of an intestate member who has made no nomination of such property is completely discretionary.-Escritt v. Todmorden Co-operative Society, L.R. [1896] 1 Q.B. 461; 74 L.T. 350.

Improvements:

(vi.) Ch. D.-Tenants in Common-Mortgage-Sale-Allowance for Improvements. When tenants in common in fee had effected improvements, one half of the present value of the improvements was allowed to them and the other half to the life tenant in distributing proceeds of sale by a mortgagee.—In re Cook's Mortgage; Lawledge v. Tyndall, L.R. [1896] 1 Ch. 923.

Insurance:—

(i.) C. A.-Accident-Nervous Shock from Fright.-A railway signalman, in the excitement of his efforts in the course of his duty to prevent an accident to a train, suffered a nervous shock which incapacitated him. He was insured by the railway company under a policy which declared that the insurance was absolute for all accidents occurring in the discharge of his duty. Held, that he had sustained an accident within the terms of the policy.-Pugh v. London, Brighton and South Coast Railway, L.R. [1896] 2 Q.B. 248; 74 L.T. 724.

(ii.) C. D.-Accident Renewed Policy is New Contract. A renewal of a policy of insurance for the term of a year against accident is a new contract, not a renewal of the original contract.-Stokell v. Heywood, 74 L.T. 781.

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(iii.) C. A.-Lease-Covenant not to Assign without Licence-Licence Withheld.--The plaintiff held the reversion of a lease which contained a covenant not to assign without a licence, which was "not to be unreasonably withheld," and a proviso for re-entry on breach. He refused his licence, because he wished to acquire possession himself, although he had made no binding offer to purchase. Held, that the licence had been unreasonably withheld.-Bates V. Donaldson, L.R. [1896] 2 Q.B. 241; 74 L.T. 751.

(iv.) C. A.-Farm Lease-Covenant to Consume Hay and Straw on Premises -Penalty.- A covenant in a farm lease fixed a penalty of £3 per ton for all hay and straw sold off the premises during the last year of the tenancy. There was a difference in the manurial value of hay and of straw. Held, that the sum made payable was a penalty, and not liquidated damages.-Willson and Another v. Love and Others, L.R. [1896] 1 Q.B. 626; 74 L.T. 580.

(v.) Q. B. D.-Allotment ?—Allotment and Cottage Gardens Compensation for Crops Act, 1887, s. 4.-A small piece of land cultivated by a seedsman for trade purposes is not an allotment within sect. 4.-Cooper v. Pearse, L.R. [1896] 1 Q.B. 562; 74 L.T. 495.

Lease:

(vi.) C. D.—Possession Prior to Parol Agreement—Continuance-Part Performance Statute of Frauds, ss. 1 and 4.-The plaintiff went into possession of premises on a parol agreement for a lease for more than three years, which was subsequently varied as to rent. Held, that continuance of possession was a parol performance which took the case out of the Statute of Frauds and entitled the plaintiff to specific performance.-Hodson v. Heuland, L.R. [1896] 2 Ch. 428; 74 L.T. 811. (vii.) H. L.-Covenant to Keep in Repair-Damages. Decision of the C. A. (see Vol. 21, p. 12, v.) affirmed. -Conquest v. Ebbetts, 75 L.T. 36.

Licensing:

(viii.) Q. B. D. & C. A.-Licensing Acts--Refusal of Licence—Appeal— Non-Appearance of Objector-Costs.-A person who is successful in an objection before justices to the renewal of a licence may be liable to the costs of a successful appeal, though he does not appear.-Reg. v. The Justices of Kent and Others, L,R. [1896] 2 Q.B.; 74 L.T. 618 and 75 L.T. 11.

(i.) Q. B. D.-Sale of Intoxicating Liquor to Drunken Person by Barman— Liability― Licensing Act, 1872, s. 13. The licensee of a public-house is guilty under sect. 13 of the Licensing Act if, in his absence and contrary to his standing instructions, his servant supplies intoxicating liquor to a drunken person.-The Commissioners of Police v. Cartman, L.R. [1896] 1 Q.B. 655; 74 L.T. 726.

Limitations :

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(ii.) C. A.- Rent-Charge · Non-payment Extinguishment Statute of Limitations, 3 & 4 Wm. IV., c. 27, ss. 1, 2, 34.-A rent-charge is a "rent" within the Statute.-Jones v. Withers, 74 L.T. 572.

Local Government:

(iii.) C. A.-District Council--Refusal to Approve Plans for new BuildingsPublic Health Act, 1875.-A district council was held not entitled to disapprove of plans of houses in new streets on the ground that they did not shew into what sewer the house drains were to communicate; and on the requirement that the street and outfall sewers should be constructed at the expense of the house owners.-Reg. v. Tynemouth Rural District Council, L.R. [1896] 2 Q.B. 219; 75 L.T. 86.

(iv.) C. A.--Street-paving Expenses-Apportionment—Arbitration-Enforcing Award-Public Health Act, 1875, ss. 150, 180 (sub-s. 14)-Arbitration Act, 1889, ss. 12, 24.-An award of an arbitrator under sect. 150 of the Public Health Act, 1875, cannot be enforced under sect. 12 of the Arbitration Act, 1889.-The Willesden Local Board v. Wright, 75 L.T. 13. (v.) C. A.-" Single Private Drain"-Public Health Act, 1875, s. 41Amendment Act, 1890, s. 19.-A private drain connecting houses of several owners with a public sewer was held to be within sect. 19 of the Public Health Act, 1890, rendering the owners liable under sect. 41 of the Public Health Act, 1875, for a nuisance in the drain.-The Mayor of Eastbourne v. Bradford, L.R. [1896] 2 Q.B. 205; 74 L.T. 763. (vi.) C. A.-Bye-Law-Coal in Vehicle-Request to Weigh-Weights and Measures Act, 1889, s. 28.-A bye-law made by the corporation of Blackburn under sect. 28 of the Act, to the effect that every person in charge of any vehicle carrying coal for sale in quantities not exceeding two hundredweight, should re-weigh the coal at the request of the purchaser or of anyone on his behalf, or of an inspector of weights and measures, or of a constable, was held to be unreasonable and bad.— Alty v. Farrell, L.R. [1896] 1 Q.B. 636; 74 L.T. 492.

(vii.) Q. B. D.-Obstruction on Highway—Removal—Public Health Act, 1875, s. 149-Local Government Act, 1894, s. 26.-Encroachments upon a highway may be removed by the urban district_council without first proceeding summarily or by indictment against the person causing the obstruction.-Reynolds v. The Urban District Council of Presteign, L.R. [1896] 1 Q.B. 604; 74 L.T. 422.

(viii.) H. L.-Public Conveniences Below the Surface of a Street-Public Health Act, 1875, s. 149-Tunbridge Wells Improvement Act, 1890, ss. 4, 93.-Where a street is vested in an urban authority by the Public Health Act, the authority has only such property in the soil as is necessary for the maintenance of the highway, and have no right to make public conveniences below the surface.-Mayor of Tunbridge Wells v. Baird and Others, 74 L.T. 385.

(ix.) Q. B. D.-Differences Between District Councils-Mode of Adjustment-Local Government Act, 1888, ss. 57, 59 (4 and 6), 62 (2).-Sect. 62 (2) of the Local Government Act, 1888, provides for the settlement by arbitration of differences between district councils "if no other mode of determining such difference is provided by this Act."

The only other mode is by terms of the order issued by a county council under sect. 57 of the Act.-An Arbitration Between the Sowerby Urban District Council and the Mytholmroyd Urban District Council, 74 L.T. 313.

Lunacy :

(i.) C. A.-Jurisdiction — British Subject Detained as Lunatic Abroad"Not so Found by Inquisition "-Management of Estate-Lunacy Act, 1890, s. 116, sub-s. 1 (c) 2.—An order for the management of the estate of a lunatic will not be made unless the lunatic is so found by inquisition or is resident within the jurisdiction.-In re Florence Louise Watkins (a person of unsound mind), L.R. [1896] 2 Ch. 336; 74 L.T. 505. (ii.) Nisi Prius.-Lunatic's Business Carried on by Committee-Personal Liability?-A committee appointed by the Court to carry on the business of a lunatic is in a different position from that of a manager and receiver. The committee has no personal liability for credit given to the firm.-Isaacs v. Chinery, 74 L.T. 320.

Marriage Settlement:

(iii.) C. A.-Divorce-Variation of Settlement-Death of Petitioner--Jurisdiction-Matrimonial Causes Acts, 1859, s. 5, and 1878, s. 3.--On obtaining a decree absolute for dissolution of her marriage a husband, in terms of an arrangement with his divorced wife, filed a petition to vary the marriage settlement. Before any further step had been taken he died. Held, that the Court had no jurisdiction to make the order to vary on the application of the executor.-Thomson v. Thomson, 74 L.T. 801.

Married Woman:

(iv.) Ch. D. & C. A.-Separate Estate Restraint on Anticipation--Conveyancing Act, 1881, s. 39.-The Court refused the application of a married woman to be relieved of a restraint on anticipation in order to pay off a debt contracted with a money lender.-Pollard's Settlement, L.R. [1896] 1 Ch. 901; 2 Ch. 552; 74 L.T. 374; 75 L.T. 116. (v.) C. A.-Costs in Probate Action-Restraint on Anticipation-Caveat is not a "Proceeding " within Married Woman's Property Act, 1893, s. 2. -Decision of Probate Division (see Vol. 21, p. 79, i.) affirmed.— Moran v. Place, L.R. [1896] P. 214; 74 L.T. 661.

(vi.) H. L.-Separate Estate-Restraint on Anticipation-Liability of Income. -Income from property of a married woman subject to a restraint on anticipation can be taken in execution as soon as it is accrued due. Decision of C. A. reversed.-Hood-Barrs v. Heriot, L.R. [1896] A.C. 174; 74 L.T. 353.

(vii.) C. A.-Separate Estate subject to Restraint-Liability of Arrears Accruing due since Judgment Married Women's Property Act, 1882, ss. 1 and 19.-A judgment against a married woman with separate estate subject to restraint on anticipation cannot be enforced against arrears of income which have become due since the judgment. Hood-Barrs v. Heriot (see above) explained.-Whiteley v. Edwards, L.R. [1896] 2 Q.B. 48; 74 L.T. 720.

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(viii.) C. A. Practice-Mayor's Court-Time for Appealing - The Mayor's Court of London Procedure Act, 1857, s. 8, 0.59, r. 16.—The High Court has no jurisdiction to extend the time for giving notice of appeal in the Mayor's Court.-Kirby v. The North British and Mercantile Insurance Co., Limited, L.R. [1896] 2 Q.B. 99; 74 L.T..723.

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Metropolis:—

(i.) Q. B. D.-London Building Act, 1894, ss. 54 (3); 59; 75; 77 (3).— One portion of a wall may be a party wall, and another portion an external wall only, not subject to the requirements of the London Building Act, 1894, affecting party walls.- Drury v. The Army and Navy Auxiliary Stores, L.R. [1896] 2 Q.B. 271; 74 L.T. 621.

(ii.) Q. B. D. -Nuisance Order-Costs-County Court-Summary Jurisdic tion Act, 1818, s. 11; Public Health (London) Act, 1891, ss. 11 and 117.--Sect. 11 of the Summary Jurisdiction Act, which prescribes that complaints or information under the Act shall be laid within six months from the time when the matter of complaint arose, applies to county court actions under sect. 11 of the Public Health Act for recovery of costs of enforcing a nuisance order. The Vestry of Hammersmith v. Lowenfeld, L.R. [1896] 2 Q.B. 278; 75 L.T. 182.

Metropolis Management:

(iii.) Q. B. D.- New Street with Houses on one side only-Paving New Footpath where Houses built on other side-Appointment—Metropolis Local Management Act, 1855, s. 105.-At a time when a new street had houses upon the north side only, the cost of paving under sect. 105 of the Act was charged upon and paid by the owners of these houses. Subsequently houses were built and a footpath made on the south side. Held, that the local authority had no jurisdiction to compel further contribution from the owners on the north side. –White v. The Vestry of the Parish of Fulham, 74 L.T. 425.

(iv.) Q. B. D. & C. A.-Drainage-" Sewer"-Metropolis Management Act, 1855, ss. 68, 69, 74, 250-Amendment Act, 1862, ss. 47, 48.-The owner of a block of houses, without order from the vestry and without approval by the Board of Works, drained them by one pipe running into a sewer in another street. Held, that the pipe was a "sewer" notwithstanding sects. 69 and 250 of the Metropolis Management Act, 1855, and was to be repaired by the Vestry.-Reg. v. Vestry of St. Matthew, Bethnal Green, L.R. [1896] 2 Q.B. 95 and 319; 74 L.T. 701 and 75 L.T. 60.

Mines:

(v.) C. A.-Inspector of Mines-Authority to Agent to Lay InformationMetalliferous Mines Regulation Act, ss. 33 and 35.-An inspector of mines can authorise an agent to lay information in a court of summary jurisdiction in the inspector's name for an offence under the Act.Foster v. Fyfe and Another, L.R. [1896] 2 Q.B. 104; 74 L.T. 784.

Mortgage:

(vi.) C. A.-Power of Sale to one of Several Mortgagors.—In a mortgage by tenants in commor, the mortgagee may sell to one of the mortgagors, without notice to the others, for the amount of principal, interest and costs, and even though the purchaser was manager for his comortagors. Kennedy v. De Trafford, L.R. [1896] 1 Ch. 762; 74 L.T. 599. (vii.) C. D.-Equitable Mortgage Fraud-Priorities - Conveyancing Act, 1881, ss. 2, 54, 55.—A solicitor fraudulently procured a conveyance to himself of an equity of redemption by a trustee. The deed contained a receipt for purchase money though none was paid. The solicitor deposited the deed with his bankers, who had no notice of the fraud, as security for a loan. Held, that the deed was not void, though possibly voidable between the solicitor and the trustee; and that the bankers had priority over the trustee and the cestuis que trust.—Lloyd's Bank, Limited v. Bullock, L.R. [1896] 2 Ch. 192; 74 L.T. 687.

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