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Hall also has a capital note upon the point, in his “ International Law," $121. (See p.336 et seq of the 4th Edition.) The best evidence of the views held by the majority of jurists is, however, to be found in the series of Resolutions passed by the Institute of International Law, at the Heidelberg meeting of 1887.* The general effect of these is to admit what seems to be indisputable, namely, that Pacific Blockade as a form of Reprisals, is perfectly legitimate, provided it is not allowed to affect or prejudice neutrals or third parties.
There have no doubt been instances of so called Pacific Blockade, in which a claim to affect neutrals has been raised, or even in a few instances exercised. This claim, however, was candidly admitted by Lord Palmerston, in the La Plata affair of 1846, to be untenable, and was strongly repudiated by Lord Granville in 1884, in connection with the Franco-Chinese “état de réprisailles.”
It was not even asserted in the most famous modern precedent, the Blockade of the Greek Ports by the Great Powers, in 1886. A full consideration of these cases will be found in the article on "Some Recent Incidents in International Law," in Vol. XIV. of this Review, pp. 127-137.
In this paper we also anticipated the first proposition which was put forward in the anonymous letter to the Times, to which Professor Holland replied as above mentioned. We stated that two principles underlay all the recorded instances of Pacific Blockade, i.e., (1) that the Blockading State was always overwhelmingly more powerful than the Blockaded one, and (2) that “the object of the Blockade has always been “either to obtain satisfaction by means falling short of war,
for some damage caused by the other State" (as in 1831,
* See the Annuaire de l'Institut, 1888, p. 301, and see article on
" Some Recent Incidents in International Law,” in this Review, Vol. XIV., pp. 127137; and a recent article by Mr. T. Baty, on “ The Institute of International Law and Pacific Blockade,” in our number for August, 1896.
1838, 1850, 1862, 1879, etc.), “or to influence the conduct of “such other State" (as in the Greek Blockades of 1827 and 1886, and the present Blockade of Crete).
The fact is, that the first of these two principles follows ex hypothesi from the very nature of Pacific Blockade. It is only a State immensely superior in power which can indulge in reprisals of any kind without provoking war. Reprisals of every form, including Pacific Blockade, are really a belligerent act, and necessarily constitute a casus belli, if the State against which they are directed could reasonably resist or retaliate. Hence the idea of a Pacific Blockade of the ports of one Great Power by another is absurd upon the face of it. Such a thing would inevitably be followed by immediate and complete hostilities on both sides. When, however, a Great Power or a combination of several Great Powers wish to coerce a comparatively insignificant State they can do so with the utmost impunity and knowing that there can be no material resistance. In such an event there is no need of a regular war.
Such was the case in 1886 and in every other recorded instance of “ Pacific Blockade." The fact, however, cannot reasonably be adduced as an argument against the legitimacy of this particular form of Reprisals or Coercion. If a complete war can be avoided by Pacific Blockade or any other means of redress, it is difficult to see that either International Law or the broadest principles of humanitarianism are in any way infringed. The one material objection is avoided if it is assumed that no Reprisals of any kind can be recognised as directly binding third parties.
Mr. Baty in his recent article in this Review* quotes numerous authorities to shew that Pacific Blockade is in fact not merely a casus belli, but actual Bellum, and he
*“ The Institute of International Law on Pacific Blockade,” L.M. & R., August, 1896.
appears to treat this as an argument against the validity of such a Blockade. The distinction is one without much difference. It takes two parties to make a war, and if a particular coercive act is sufficient to effect the object of one party without provoking counter hostilities on the part of the other, it is difficult to see in what respect such an act is opposed to International Law. The argument of Mr. Baty seems, on the contrary, to entirely justify Pacific Blockade, except as regards its name. If the act is to be regarded as an actual operation of war, it necessarily follows that a Blockade in the proper sense of the term is legally justifiable, even as against neutrals.
The political expediency or moral defensibility of the present Blockade of Crete need not be here discussed. The avowed object appears to have been much the same as in the case of the Greek affair of 1886, although in the present case the Powers have not succeeded in their object. In the Cretan affair, however, there are several novel points of interest. In the first place it is to be observed that the Powers are blockading territory nominally subject to Turkey as a means of coercing Greece. This aspect of the case has not, we believe, been previously discussed. Theoretically speaking, as the “ Blockade” is undertaken with the consent of the Porte, the case is not strictly one of “Pacific Blockade ” at all. Any State can, if it chooses, close its ports to external commerce, subject, of course, to the risk of commercial or other retaliation. So far, therefore, as the Blockade operations are conducted by the Powers within the territorial waters of Crete, and with the consent of Turkey, the curious result above referred to seems to follow. On the other hand, if the overthrow of the Ottoman authority in Crete by the troops of Colonel Vassos or by the insurgents can be regarded as a fait accompli, then perhaps the affair may be treated as an ordinary case of Pacific Blockade.
The Government notification of the Blockade as published in the London Gazette of March 19th, 1897, is a somewhat curious document. It is dated from the Foreign Office, and runs as follows:
“ It is hereby notified that the Admirals in command of “the British, Austro-Hungarian, French, German, Italian, “and Russian naval forces have decided to put the Island of “ Crete into a State of Blockade commencing on the 21st of " March at 8 a.m.
“The Blockade will be general for all ships under the “ Greek Flag."
Ships of the six Powers, or neutral (sic) Powers, may “enter into the Ports occupied by the Powers and land “their merchandise, but only if it is not for the Greek troops “ or the interior of the Island. These ships may be visited “by the ships of the International fleets.
“ The limits of the blockade are comprised between “ 23° 24' and 26° 30' longitude E. of Greenwich and 35° 48' "and 34° 45' north latitude.”
It is observable that neutral (or as they should more properly be called quasi-neutral) vessels are not, as in 1886, entirely exempted from the Blockade.
This is a very serious omission, and it is rumoured that for this reason the United States Government has formally declined to recognise the Blockade. Probably, however, no restrictions on the vessels of any State other than the Great Powers or Greece were intended to be or will in fact be enforced. The Gazette notice reads as if it were a naval rather than a diplomatic composition. It is also noteworthy that no indication is officially given of the penalty for breach of Blockade. In 1886 the sole penalty was temporary “ detention" without compensation, and this was the only sanction recognised as permissible by the Institute in 1887. One Greek vessel appears to have been sunk by an Austrian man-of-war, in the present Cretan affair, but no claim for compensation has been made or suggested. What effect the formal declaration of war between Greece and Turkey will have upon Crete remains to be seen. Theoretically, perhaps, it should at once operate to dissolve the Blockade, but the Powers having occupied Crete will probably insist upon the Island being excluded altogether from the sphere of hostilities. It is quite certain, however, that the proposal to extend the Blockade to Greece itself must now be considered abandoned.
The “ Costa Rica” Packet Arbitration.
British experience of arbitrations has, ever since the Alabaina affair, been singularly unfortunate. The recent award of Professor de Martens in the case of the Costa Rica Packet, following on the Behring Sea success, entitles us to hope that the tide of British reverses has at last been stemmed.
The facts in the latest case occurred so long ago as 1891. Captain Carpenter, a British subject, and master of a New South Wales vessel called the Costa Rica Packet, in the course of a voyage in East Indian waters, came across a derelict Malay prahu on the High Seas laden with arrak and brandy, but with no person on board. Deeming it abandoned, he boarded the prahu, and sunk it after having removed the cargo, which he subsequently sold. On the arrival of his ship at Macassar, in November, 1891, Captain Carpenter was arrested by the Dutch authorities, detained in prison for a long period in spite of offers to give heavy bail, and after being subjected to great indignities was eventually released owing to the Macassar Court holding that it had no jurisdiction to try the case.
Demands for compensation were made and refused, but after protracted negotiations between the British and Dutch Governments the dispute was, by a Treaty of the