"The citizens or subjects of each of the high contracting parties shall have liberty to enter, travel, and reside in the territories of the other; to carry on trade, wholesale and retail, to own or lease and occupy houses, manufactories, warehouses, and shops; to employ agents of their choice, to lease land for residential and commercial purposes, and generally to do anything incident to or necessary for trade, upon the same terms as native citizens or subjects submitting themselves to the laws and regulations there established," and further: "They shall not be compelled, under any pretext whatever, to pay any charges or taxes other or higher than those that are or may be paid by native citizens or subjects." 36 The Court discussed the sections of the Treaty in their bearing upon the case in point, and pointed out that under this Alien Poll Tax Law, Japanese subjects, as well as other aliens, were required to pay higher taxes than were citizens of the United States, and that this poll tax was an additional burden on the alien simply owing to the fact that he was an alien. The court mentioned the many decisions of the United States Supreme Court relative to the treaty-making power conferred by the Constitution of the United States. It had been repeatedly held that a treaty entered into pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution" is a part of the supreme law of the land, binding on all states and to which all state enactments in conflict therewith must yield." 37 Therefore, the Alien Poll Tax Act was held to be void as to Japanese subjects, being violative of the Treaty between the United States and Japan, of April 5, 1911 (37 Stat. 1504), providing that "the citizens or subjects of each of the parties shall enjoy in the territories of others, the same rights and privileges as are granted to native citizens or subjects." Further, since the com 36 See 37 United States Statutes, p. 1504. Malloy's Treaties, Vol. I, p. 128; or compilation, p. 474. 37 See Geoffrey v. Riggs, 133 U. S., 258–266. Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U. S., 483. plaint only charged a violation of the Act, "it failed to state a public offense" against the petitioner.38 PORTION OF 1920 INITIATIVE ALIEN PROPERTY ACT OF A second opinion handed down on March 10, 1922, in the Supreme Court of California, invalidates a certain portion of the Alien Land Law of 1920, in the case of Tetsubumi Yano, a minor. The constitutionality of this Alien Land Act was involved, in that no alien ineligible to citizenship may be appointed guardian of " that portion of the estate of a minor which consists of property which such aliens . . . are inhibited from acquiring, possessing, enjoying or transfering by reason of the provisions of this Act." The court held that an alien Japanese father, competent in other ways, is entitled to Letters of Guardianship over the person and property of his minor child irrespective as to whether or not the child was born in the United States. In so far as the Alien Land Act of 1920 interferes with this right, the law is contrary to Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and also to Section 21 of Article I of the Constitution of California. The practical effect of this decision is that an alien Japanese father may purchase agricultural land as a gift to his child and he may then be appointed guardian of the person and property of said child. The decision also seems to indicate that the classification, which is the basis of the 1913 and 1920 Alien Land Acts of California, is arbitrary and contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. The court held in conclusion that, although the object sought to be attained by the Initiative Alien Land Act of 1920 may be a laudable effort to restrict the immigration of the Japanese, yet it considered only its validity under the Constitution. It added that in the Constitution of 1879, of California, similar efforts to exclude the Chinese were declared unconstitutional by the Federal Government. It added that the entire question is international in character and is a matter properly to be disposed of by the Federal Govern ment. 38 See 203 Pacific Reporter, 954. CHAPTER X PROGRESSIVE TENDENCY TOWARDS A PROTECTIVE TARIFF POLICY The background for protective tariff legislation in the United States. Indirect influence of standards of living on foreign relations through their direct effect on tariff laws. The effects specifically of the McKinley and Wilson-Gorman Acts in the determination of our international actions and reactions. BASIC THEORIES FOR TARIFF POLICIES The desire to maintain and safeguard the American standard of living among the wage-earners of the United States is the appeal which has been largely instrumental in securing the passage of our protective tariff laws. The average business man considers that the prosperity of his business rests upon the continuance of our doctrine of protection, and, applying to other business what is true of his own, he holds that the prosperity of the country and a higher standard of living depend upon a continuance of this policy. In the main, all economic discussions regarding this phase of the subject may be summarized by the simple statement that if the wage-earners raise themselves economically, then they invariably raise their standard of living. In effect, tariff legislation in the United States is the result of an attempt upon the part of the people to maintain better standards of living than those of foreign countries, and the consequences are international in character. Reciprocity and "favored nation" clauses in treaties rise into prominence when foreign commercial relations are disturbed, for retaliatory and adverse legislation in foreign countries is then often enacted.1 1 Some Decisions of Federal Courts in respect to questions arising under the favored nation clauses: In Powers v. Comley, 101 U. S. 789 (1879), the application and interpretation of the most favored nation clause was involved. By the Tariff Act of June 6, 1872, an additional tax of 10% had been charged on goods produced east of the Cape of Good Hope but imported from countries The question arose as to whether a surtax upon opium produced in Persia, west. In this event, new treaties are promulgated, or old ones abrogated, and economic rivalries between countries are engendered which often lead to war. The three theories of trade policy the two opposing ones, but imported from Liverpool, was in conflict with the most favored nation provision in the Persian Treaty of December 13, 1856. Article VI of this treaty reads as follows: "The merchandise imported or exported by the respective citizens or subjects of the two high contracting parties shall not pay in any country, on their arrival or departure, other duties than those charged in either of the countries on the merchandise or products imported or exported by the merchants and subjects of the most favored nation, and no exceptional tax under any name or pretext whatever shall be collected on them in either of the countries." Interpreting the above clause in reference to the facts, the Supreme Court states: "We see nothing in the Act of Congress which is in conflict with the treaty of Persia. If the subjects of Persia import their products directly to the United States, they are required to pay no more duties here than the merchants and subjects of the most favored nations.' It is only when their products are first exported to some place west of the Cape, and from there exported to the United States, that the additional duty is imposed." The Tariff Act of 1884 imposed a duty of 3 cents per ton on vessels from any foreign port in North America, Central America, the West India Islands, the Bahama Islands, the Bermuda Islands, all of the Sandwich Islands, all Newfoundland, and a duty of 6 cents per ton on bottoms from other foreign countries. When the question came to the attention of the courts in North German Lloyd Steamship Co. v. Hedden, 43 Fed. 17 (1890), the Circuit Court for the District of New Jersey held: Germany was not entitled, by virtue of the most favored nation clause, to the lower rate since the classification was merely geographical and the 3 cent rate applied to vessels of all nations coming from the specified ports." In Section 4, sub-section 7 of the Tariff Act of October 3, 1913, there is a declaration to the effect that a discount of 5 per cent is to be allowed on all duties on goods that are imported in vessels admitted to be registered under the laws of the United States. The following proviso is added: Nothing of this subsection shall be so construed as to abrogate or in any manner impair or affect the provisions of any treaty concluded between the United States and any foreign nation." (Sec. 4, par. J, subsection 7, Act of October 3, 1913.) The Supreme Court handed down a decision on March 6, 1917, in United States v. M. U. Pulaski Co., et al., 243 U. S. 97, regarding the effect of this clause. The Court of Customs Appeals had held that, owing to treaties with Belgium, the Netherlands, Great Britain, Austria-Hungary, Germany, Italy, Spain and Japan, the discount should be applied to goods imported in bottoms from those countries. When the Government carried the question to the Supreme Court on the ground that the statute applied to future negotiations, the Supreme Court found: "The statute depended upon future negotiations in order to make effective |