effect that the vessel was compelled by weather to put back to repair; that expenses were incurred in unloading and repairing; that they exceeded the value of the vessel; that they were necessary for the preservation of the ship and cargo, and for the completion of the voyage, and were done for the common benefit of all concerned; that the master having no funds, nor the means of raising any by bottomry or hypothecation, and no power of conveying the cargo to the port of discharge unless the repairs were completed, sold part of the cargo to defray such expenses; and that, by the custom of merchants, such loss was the subject of a general average contribution among all parties interested in the ship and cargo. On demurrer: Held, that the pleas were bad and the declaration good. Hallett v. Wigram, 19 Law J. (N. S.) C. B. 281.

And see WARRANTY.

SPLITTING VOTES.-7 & 8 Will. 3, c. 25, and 10 Anne, c. 23 -Effect of conveyances under.-In an action on a covenant for the payment of an annuity, the defendant, the grantor, is estopped from pleading that the annuity was granted for the fraudulent purposes of multiplying votes. The statutes of 7 & 8 Will. 3, c. 25, and 10 Anne, c. 23, are to be construed only as affecting the parliamentary law; the 7 & 8 Will. 3, c. 25, invalidated fraudulent conveyances entered into for splitting votes only so far as to prevent the grantee from having a vote, and did not prevent the estate from passing; and the 10 Anne, c. 23, assuming that an estate passed under conveyances, avoided by the statute 7 & 8 Will. 3, c. 25, so far as the right to vote was concerned, made such conveyances free and absolute, notwithstanding secret trusts and conditions of defeazance only preventing the grantor from voting under a penalty. Phillpotts v. Phillpotts, 20 Law J. (N. S.) C. B. 11.

STAMP.-1. Agreement Complete contract — Admission. — A declaration alleged in substance that the defendant obtained S. D. as a partner for the plaintiff in his business upon the terms, amongst others stated in the declaration, that the plaintiff afterwards paid to the defendant 251. for obtaining the said partner; and it was then agreed between the plaintiff and the defendant that the plaintiff should accept and deliver to the defendant a bill of exchange for 271. 10s., payable in eighteen months, upon condition that S. D. should accept the partnership beyond two years, but if S. D., at the expiration of eighteen months, should give notice of his wish to retire from the partnership, and not rescind it, the said bill should be null and void; that in consideration of the plaintiff's delivering the said bill, accepted, to the defendant, upon the said condition, the defendant promised, if he should negotiate it, and the said notice were given and not rescinded, to indemnify the plaintiff from the payment of the said bill and all costs, &c.; that the defendant afterwards negotiated the bill; that the plaintiff had been compelled to pay the amount; that S. D. gave notice at the end of eighteen months of his wish to retire from the partnership, and did not rescind

the same. Breach, that the defendant had not indemnified the plaintiff from the payment of the said bill. The defendant pleaded non assumpsit and a traverse of the condition upon which the bill was given, and at the trial the following unstamped document, signed by the defendant, was admitted as part of the evidence on behalf of the plaintiff:-" Mem. I have this day received of Mr. Fenwick de Porquet a bill for 271. 10s. at eighteen month's date, on condition that Mr. Samuel Douglas accepts the partnership beyond two years; but should Mr. Douglas give notice at the end of eighteen months (the bill to be null and void) and not afterwards rescind the same:" Held, that the document had been properly received in evidence without an agreement stamp. De Porquet v. Page, 20 Law J. (N. S.) Q. B. 28.

2. Agreement-Evidence- Costs, suggestion to deprive.-In an action for wages for the salary of an actor, three letters were put in from the defendant to the plaintiff. The first was dated the 17th of November, 1848: "If you are disposed to take a weekly salary of 27. and a clear half annual benefit, I think I could receive you at Christmas, provided the terms suit you (and a month's notice on either side in case of separation). Let me have your reply." The second, dated the 14th of April, 1849, stated that the defendant was obliged to offer lower terms for the summer season, and offered 17. 10s. per week, and gave notice that if this offer was not accepted the plaintiff's services would not be required after the 26th of May. No answer from the plaintiff was put in evidence. The third letter, dated the 21st of April, ran as follows: "I have received your letter, and on reconsideration will give you the same terms," 21. per week for the summer season: Held, on motion to enter a nonsuit according to leave reserved, that these letters were properly admitted without a stamp, as amounting only to a proposal, and not constituting an agreement in writing. Where an action is brought for more than 20%., and a plea in abatement is pleaded as to part, which is found in favour of the defendant, and the plaintiff gives credit in his particulars for a sum, which, together with the sum to which the plea in abatement applies, reduces the claim to less than 201.: this is a case for a suggestion to deprive the plaintiff of costs within section 129 of the 9 & 10 Vict. c. 95. Hudspeth v. Yarnold, 19 Law J. (N. S.) C. B. 321.

3. Memorandum of debt discharged-Debt for goods sold-Pleas of payment—Under a plea of payment to an action for goods sold and delivered, a document in the following form is not admissible in evidence without a stamp: "Memorandum, that any demand we may have against Mr. George Whiting for ironwork, &c., is this day discharged in consideration of services rendered by him to us. N.B. Particulars of our account shall be delivered with stamp receipt." Livingston v. Whiting, 19 L. J. (N.S.) Q. B. 528.

STAMP DUTY.-A policy of insurance on the lives of cattle is an insurance on lives within the 55 Geo. 3, c. 184, and is liable to duty; but such an instrument is liable to a 5l. penalty for want of a

stamp, under the 10 Anne, c. 26, and not to the penalty of 5007. under 35 Geo. 3, c. 63, s. 17, which applies to marine insurances only. Att.-Gen. v. Cleobury, 4 Exch. 65.

STATUTE OF FRAUDS.-Surrender-Evidence.-Defendant was tenant to A. B. of certain apartments, under a written agreement for a term of years, at a rent payable quarterly; A. B. became bankrupt. Defendant having occupied for a short time after the bankruptcy and after appointment of the assignees, sent the key to the office of one of the plaintiffs, the official assignee, by a person who left it there with one whom he supposed to be the clerk, stating that it was the key of the apartments in question, and that he had brought it from the defendant; a tin plate was fixed outside the door announcing that the defendant had removed to another address. The plaintiffs having eighteen months afterwards demanded six quarters' rent due since the bankruptcy: Held, that there was no evidence from which a jury could properly find that there had been a surrender by operation of law, assuming that the delivery by the defendant and acceptance by the official assignee of the key of the apartments would have amounted to such surrender within the Statute of Frauds. Cannon v. Hartley, 19 L. J. (N. S.) C. B. 323.

SUGGESTION UNDER COUNTY COURTS ACT.-Statement of residence.-On a motion for a suggestion to deprive a plaintiff of costs under the County Courts Act, an affidavit which stated that the plaintiff dwelt within twenty miles from the defendant, instead of from the residence of the defendant, was held to be bad. Room v. Cottam, 20 L. J. (N. S.) Exch. 24.

SUGGESTION. See COUNTY COURT.

PRACTICE.

SUMMONS ABROAD.-Service of. Service of a writ of summons abroad is an irregularity only, and not a nullity. Where, therefore, a defendant resident at Boulogne was served there with a writ of summons on the 13th of September, an appearance was entered for him on the 24th of October, and the declaration was served by leave of a judge, by sending it on the 25th through the post: Held, that an application made on the 14th of November to set aside the writ and other proceedings was too late, even though the subsequent proceedings were taken under affidavits which suppressed the fact that service had been effected abroad. Minet v. Round, 1 Q. B. P. 654.

SURRENDER. See STATUTE OF FRAUDS.

TOLLS.-Great Western Railway.-The Great Western Railway Company are entitled to take the tolls authorized by the 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. cvii., 6 & 7 Will. 4, c. xxxviii., and 1 Vict. c. xcii., until they have completed the purchase of either the Birmingham and Oxford Junction Railway, or the Birmingham, Wolverhampton and Dudley Railway, but after such completion, the tolls, both on the original line and on such purchased line, must be reduced to the lower scale fixed

by the 10 & 11 Vict. c. cxlix. and 10 & 11 Vict. c. ccxxvi.-Att.-Gen. v. Great Western Railway Company, 19 L. J. (N. S.) Exch. 407. TORT. See MISJOINDER.

TRESPASS.-1. Injury done by an engine propelled at a certain rate. The plaintiff's sheep got upon the defendants' railway, through defect of fences, and were run over by a locomotive engine driven by a servant, who had directions from the railway company to drive at a certain rate per hour: Held, that trespass would not lie against the company, and that, if the cattle had a right to be on the railway, the plaintiff's remedy was by action on the case for causing the engine to be driven in such a way as to injure that right. If the cattle were altogether wrongdoers, there was no neglect or misconduct for which the company were responsible. If the cattle escaped through defect of fences which the company should have kept up, their damage was consequent on that wrong, and irrecoverable in an action on the case against the company for letting their fences be incomplete or out of repair. Sharrod v. London and North-Western Railway Company, 4 Exch. 580.

2. Way in gross-Easements-Right of assignee of land and appurtenances.--In an action of trespass the defendants justified under a right of way supposed to have been conveyed to them by J. S. The deed was set out on oyer by the plaintiff, and in the description of the parcels conveyed contained the following: Together with all ways, &c., particularly the right and privilege to and for the owners and occupiers of, &c. (the premises conveyed), and all persons having occasion to resort thereto, of passing and repassing for all purposes in, over, along and through a certain road, &c. (describing the locus in quo). The defendants in their plea, after stating the conveyance to J. S. in the terms of the deed, and deducing their title from J. S. under a conveyance to them of the same "lands, tenements, hereditaments, premises and appurtenances," as those conveyed to him by the above-mentioned "deed, alleged that they being owners and occupiers of the premises, and having occasion for their own purposes to use the right and privilege granted by the conveyance to J. S., did on foot, &c., pass and repass for the purposes of them, the defendants, along the said road, &c. (the locus in quo): Held, first, that the right granted by the conveyance to J. S. was not restricted to a user of the road for purposes connected with the enjoyment of the land conveyed to him by the same deed; secondly, that the conveyance to the defendants of the land conveyed to J. S., and its appurtenances, could not give the defendants, as owners and occupiers of that land, a right of road over other land for purposes un connected with the enjoyment of the land of which they were owners and occupiers, and therefore did not pass to them the rights which J. S. had over the locus in quo. A vendor cannot create rights not connected with the enjoyment of the land and annex them to it, nor can the owner of land render it subject to a new species of burden so as to bind it in the hands of an assignee. Ackroyd v. Smith, 19 Law J. (N. S.) C. B. 315.

TROVER.-Sale in market overt-Stolen goods.-Goods which have been stolen may be recovered in trover from the purchaser of them in market overt, upon a conversion by him, subsequent to the conviction of the felon, without any order for restitution having been made, for the effect of the 7 & 8 Geo. 4, c. 29, s. 57, is to revest the property in stolen goods in the original owner upon conviction of the felon. Scattergood v. Sylvester, 19 Law J. (N. S.) Q. B. 447.

USURY.-Plea of.-A plea of usury stated that it was "corruptly and against the form of the statute" agreed between plaintiff and defendant, that plaintiff should advance to defendant, as he should require, sums not exceeding 1000l. by cashing defendant's cheques, and that plaintiff should charge at the rate of 10l. per cent. as interest, and under the colour of commission; it then averred that the money was advanced and the usurious interest was so charged: Held good on special demurrer, though it stated only the gross sum payable for interest and commission, without alleging how much was attributable to each, it being averred that the agreement was made colourable to enable the plaintiff to take more than 5l. per cent. In pleading usury it is sufficient to allege that it was "corruptly and against the form of the statute" agreed, so as to bring the case within 12 Anne, stat. 2, c. 16, and it is unnecessary to allege that it is not taken out of the operation of that act by 2 & 3 Vict. c. 37. Derry v. Toll, 1 Q. B. P. 589.

VENUE.-Changing-Affidavit. One of two defendants may under ordinary circumstances change the venue without the consent of the other. A rule to discharge a rule for changing the venue need not be drawn up on reading the affidavits on which the original rule was obtained. Job v. Butterfield, 20 Law J. (N. S.) Exch. 8.

VOTE. See SPLITTING VOTE.

WARRANT OF EXECUTION.-A mere verbal gift of a chattel to a person in whose possession it is, does not pass any property to the donee. Shower v. Pilk, 4 Exch. 478.

WARRANTY.-Sale of ship - Description.—The defendant being the owner of a ship inserted the following advertisement in the Shipping Gazette: "The fine teak-built barque Intrepid, A 1, 286 tons register, built under particular inspection at Counga in 1842 of the best materials, shifts without ballast, carries a good cargo, has a poop and excellent height between decks, and is well adapted for a passenger ship; length 91 feet, breadth 22 feet 8 inches, depth 16 feet 8 inches; now lying at the St. Katharine Docks. For inventories and further particulars apply to J. H. Arnold, 3, Clement's Lane, Lombard Street." The plaintiff having seen the ship, entered into a written agreement to buy her as she now lays in the St. Katharine's Docks, agreeable to the inventory annexed. This document commenced thus: "For sale by private contract the fine teak-built barque Intrepid, &c." pursuing the terms of the advertisement down to the words St. Katharine's Docks. Then followed this statement: