JANUARY, 1809.] Naval Establishment. [H. OF R. the public service should require it; and the expense which would attend them was a sufficient argument against it, if no urgent occasion existed for their service, which he believed did not. In case of war there must be some ships of war of one kind or other; and it would take six months at least to prepare all our ships for service. At present they were rotting in the docks. If it were never intended to use them, it would be better to burn them at once than to suffer them to remain in their present situation. He believed if out at sea they might be useful and would be well employed. Why keep them up at this place, whence they could not get out of the river perhaps in three weeks or a month? He believed that a naval force would form the most effectual protection to our seaports that could be devised. Part of our little navy was suffered to rot in the docks, and the other part was scarcely able to keep the Your committee have no certain data on which to ascertain the number of inhabitants in each section of the Territory; but, from the most accurate information they are enabled to collect, it appears that west of the Wabash there are about the number of eleven thousand, and east of said river about the Mr. STORY entertained a very different opin number of seventeen thousand, and that the popula-ion from that of the gentleman from Tennessee. tion of each section is in a state of rapid increase. Your committee, after maturely considering this subject, are of opinion that there exists but one objection to the establishment of a separate Territorial Government west of the river Wabash, and that objection is based on the additional expense which would, in consequence thereof, be incurred by the Government of the United States. But, it is also worthy of observation, that the increased value of the public lands in each district, arising from the public institutions which would be permanently fixed in each, to comport with the convenience of the inhabitants, and the augmentation of emigrants, all of whom must become immediate purchasers of these lands, would far exceed the amount of expenditure produced by the contemplated temporary governAnd your committee, being convinced that it is the wish of a large majority of the citizens of the said Territory that a separation thereof should take place, deem it always just and wise policy to grant to every portion of the people of the Union that form of government which is the object of their wishes, when not incompatible with the constitution of the United States, nor subversive of their allegiance to the national sovereignty. ment. Your committee, therefore, respectfully submit the following resolution: Resolved, That it is expedient to divide the Indiana Territory, and to establish a separate Territorial Government west of the river Wabash, agreeably to ocean. Could not a single foreign frigate enter almost any of our harbors now and batter down our towns? Could not even a single gunboat sweep some of them? Mr. S. said he could not conceive why gentlemen should wish to paralyze the strength of the nation by keeping back our naval force, and now in particular, when many of our native seamen (and he was sorry to say that from his own knowledge he spoke it) were starving in our ports. Mr. S. enumerated some of the advantages which this country possessed in relation to naval force. For every ship which we employed on our coasts, he said, to be able to cope with us. The truth was, any foreign nation must incur a double expense that gentlemen well versed in the subject, had pre-calculated that it would require, for a fleet competent to resist such a naval force as the United States might without difficulty provide, four or five hundred transport ships to supply them with provisions, the expense of which alone A motion was made by Mr. WYNN, that when would be formidable as a coercive argument to this House adjourns, it will adjourn until Tues-Great Britain. He wished it to be shown, day morning, eleven o'clock: And the question being taken thereupon, it was resolved in the affirmative—yeas 60, nays 45. the ordinance for the government of the Territory of the United States northwest of the river Ohio, passed on the 13th day of July, 1787. Mr. THOMAS, from the same committee, sented a bill for dividing the Indiana Territory into two separate governments; which was read twice and committed to a Committee of the Whole on Monday next. MONDAY, January 9, 1809. Naval Establishment. however small our naval force, that we do not undervalue it, or underrate the courage and ability of our seamen. Mr. Cook followed Mr. STORY on the same side of the question. He compared the nation to a fortress on which an attack was made, and the garrison of which, instead of guarding the portal, ran upon the battlements to secure every small aperture. He thought their attention should first be directed to the gates, and that a naval force would be the most efficient defence for our ports. The amendments of the Senate to the bill sent from the House for employing an additional number of seamen and marines, were taken up. [The amendments propose the immediate arm-nays on the amendments. ing, manning, &c., all the armed vessels of the United States.] Mr. D. R. WILLIAMS called for the yeas and Mr. G. W. CAMPBELL expressed a hope that the House would disagree to the amendments. The President was already authorized by law to fit out these vessels, whenever, in his opinion, VOL. IV.-7 Mr. SMILIE said that raising a naval force for the purpose of resisting Great Britain, would be attacking her on her strong ground. If we were to have a war with her on the ocean, it could only be carried on by distressing her trade. Neither did he believe that these vessels H. OF R.] Naval Establishment. of war would be of any effect as a defence. They did not constitute the defence on which he would rely. If we had a navy, it would form the strongest temptation for attack upon our ports and harbors. If Denmark had possessed no navy, Copenhagen would never have been attacked. The only way in which we could carry on a war on the ocean to advantage, Mr. S. said, would be by our enterprising citizens giving them sufficient encouragement. Were we to employ a naval force in case of war, it would but furnish our enemy with an addition to her navy. He hoped the House would disagree to the amendments of the Senate and appoint a committee of conference. Mr. DANA said that the amendments sent from the Senate presented a question of no small importance to the nation. Without expressing any opinion on the question, it appeared to him to be at least of sufficient importance to be discussed in Committee of the Whole. Coming from the other branch of the Legislature, and being so interesting to the nation, he wished that it might be discussed fairly and fully; and, therefore, moved a reference to a Committee of the Whole. Messrs. DANA, TALLMADGE, and STORY, urged a reference to a Committee of the Whole on account of the great importance of the subject, on which a full discussion would be proper; and Messrs. MACON, G. W. CAMPBELL, and HOLLAND opposed it, because the seamen proposed by the original bill were now wanted, and the subject of the amendment was already referred to a Committee of the Whole in a distinct bill. Motion lost, 58 to 55. Mr. MACON observed, that the immediate expense of this arrangement, if agreed to, would be at least five or six millions of dollars, and but four hundred thousand were appropriated by the bill. When he compared this bill with the report of a select committee made to the House of Representatives, he said he was astonished. A part of that report was a letter from the Secretary of the Navy, in which the very number (two thousand) contained in the bill as it went from this House, was desired. Mr. M. adverted to the observation of Mr. STORY, that it would cost Great Britain as much to keep one frigate as it would cost us to keep two. He thought the expense would be about equal. The expense of the transportation of provisions would be counterbalanced by the difference of expense between the pay of the British and American seamen, the latter being double of the former generally. He objected to this bill from the Senate because no estimate accompanied it. He thought they would go far enough if they gave the departments all that they asked. This House had indeed as much right to judge of the force requisite, as any other department; but he did not wish to be called upon to supply a deficit in the appropriation, which never failed to occur even in the ordinary appropriations for the Navy Department. Give the four hundred thousand dollars (JANUARY, 1809. asked for, and the deficit in the appropriation will be at least ten times the amount of the sum appropriated. Mr. Cook contended strenuously in favor of a naval force. He detailed the advantages which would accrue to the nation from a few fast sailing frigates. He said they were essentially necessary to defence. He expatiated on the difficulty with which any foreign power could maintain a force on our coast. Mr. HOLLAND did not profess to have much knowledge on this subject, but he said it did not require much to overthrow the arguments of gentlemen on the subject. What defence a few frigates would be to the extensive coast of this country, he could not understand. There certainly never had been a time when this country should rely on a maritime force as a sufficient protection. Indeed, he said, if we had fifteen or twenty or more sail-of-the-line, he should hesitate much before he would go to war with Great Britain, because these would undoubtedly be lost. Our power of coercion was not on the ocean. Great Britain had possessions on this continent which were valuable to her; they were in the power of the United States, and the way to coerce her to respect our rights on water, would be attacking them on land. He said he certainly did not undervalue the disposition and prowess of our seamen ; and it was because he valued them, that he did not wish them to go into an unequal contest, in which they must certainly yield. Gentlemen might understand naval matters; but it was no reason that they should therefore understand the efficiency of a naval force. There was sufficient evidence in history to warn the United States against it. Mr. TROUP said he rose but for the purpose of stating facts which struck him as being applicable to the subject before the House. He referred chiefly to an extract of a letter written to himself and published in the paper of to-day. [Mr. T. then read the extract which appeared in the National Intelligencer on the 9th instant.] In addition to these facts, letters had been received, in the course of this morning, containing further particulars, which he begged leave to state to the House. After the officer (commander of a British armed vessel) had been forced on board his vessel, and while lying in our waters and within our jurisdiction, he had fired several shots at pilot-boats, passing and repassing, had been very abusive, and threatened the town with what he called vengeance; and, in addition to these facts, letters had reached Savannah from Liverpool, giving satisfactory information that vessels of fifteen or twenty guns had been fitted out for the purpose of forcing a cotton trade with South Carolina and Georgia. This information, Mr. T. said, came from unquestionable authority. And it was because he was unwilling that the people of this country should longer submit to the abuse of British naval officers; because he was unwilling that they should be exposed to the insolence of JANUARY, 1809.] Naval Establishment. [H. OF R. If that every British commissioned puppy who chose | possessed. It was not even a question whether to insult us; because he was unwilling that we would have a navy at all or not. armed vessels should force a cotton trade, when were the question, he would not hesitate to say every man knew that nine-tenths of the people that even our present political condition required of Georgia would treat as traitors the violators a navy to a certain extent, to protect our comof the embargo; it was for this reason that he merce against the Barbary Powers in peace, was disposed to vote for the amendments from and in time of war for convoys to our merchantthe Senate. The great objection which had men. He only meant a few fast-sailing frigates, been taken to them was the expense which such a navy as we have at present, for the purthey would produce. Economy, Mr. T. said, pose of harassing the commerce of our enemies was a good thing in time of peace; but if this also. He therefore thought our present naval contracted spirit of economy predominated in force ought to be put in service. As far as the our war councils, if we were forced into a war, appropriation ($400,000) would go, it would be so help him God, he would rather at once tame- employed; but if Congress should hereafter see ly submit our honor and independence than cause to countermand or delay the preparation, maintain them in this economical way. If we they would have it in their power to do so by went to war, we ought not to adopt little meas- refusing a further appropriation. ures for the purpose of executing them with little means; neither should we refuse to adopt great measures, because they could not be executed but with great means. It was very true that, in war as well as in peace, calculation to a certain extent was necessary; but, if they once resolved on an object, it must be executed at whatever expense. He was no advocate for standing armies or navies, generally speaking; but, in discharging his duties here, he must be governed by the circumstances of every case which presented itself for his decision, and then ask himself, Is it wise, politic, and prudent, to do this or omit that? He said he would never go back to yesterday to discover what he had then said or done, in order to ascertain what he should now do or say. Political conduct must depend on circumstances. What was right yesterday might be wrong to-day. Nay, what was right at the moment he rose to address the House, might, ere this, be palpably wrong. Conduct depended on events, which depended on the folly or caprice of men; and, as they changed, events would change. It might have been a good doctrine long ago that this country ought to have a navy competent to cope with a detachment of the British navy; it might have been good doctrine then, but was shocking doctrine now. Mr. D. R. WILLIAMS said it was his misfortune to differ with gentlemen upon all points on the subject of the navy. He was opposed to it from stem to stern; and gentlemen who attempted to argue in favor of it as a matter of necessity, involved themselves in absurdities they were not aware of. When money had been appropriated for fortifications, there had been no intimation that it would be necessary to prop them up with a naval force. If our towns could not be defended by fortifications, he asked, would ten frigates defend them? The gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. STORY) had * even gone so far as to say that a single gunboat could sweep one-half of our harbors. If a single gunboat could now sweep most of our harbors, Mr. W. said he should like to know what eleven hundred and thirty vessels of war could do, even when opposed by our whole force of ten frigates! The gentleman from Massachusetts had said it would be cheaper to keep these vessels in actual service than in their present situation. Mr. W. said he supposed that the gentlemen meant that they would rot faster in their present situation than if they were at sea. He said he was for keeping them where they were, and would rather contribute to place them in a situation where they would rot faster. Mr. W. combated the arguments that employing the navy would afford relief to our seamen, and that the maintaining a navy on our coast would be more expensive to an European power than the support of a larger naval force by us. And he said we should never be able to man any considerable fleet except the constitution were amended to permit impressments, following the example of Great Britain. At that time England had to contend with the navies of Russia, Denmark, France, Holland, Spain, &c. Now England was sole mistress of the ocean. To fight her ship to ship and man to man, and it was impossible that gentlemen could think of fighting her otherwise, if they fought her at all, we must build up a huge navy at an immense expense. We must determine to become less agricultural and more commercial; The gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. STORY) to incur a debt of five hundred or a thousand had said that except we begun with this bill, million of dollars, and all the loans and taxes and got his fast-sailing frigates, we should never attendant on such a system, and all the corrup-regain our rights. If that were really the case, tion attendant on them. He should as soon | Mr. W. said he was ready to abandon them. think of embarking an hundred thousand men He considered that the sort of maintenance of for the purpose of attacking France at her threshold, as of building so many ships to oppose the British navy. It was out of the question; no rational man could think of it. But that was not now the question. It was, whether we would call into actual service the little navy we our rights adverted to by the gentleman from Massachusetts, would be destructive to those rights. Gentlemen must have forgotten that when Hamburg was in the greatest state of prosperity, she did not possess even a single gunboat. Why! there was not wealth enough H. OF R.] Naval Establishment. [JANUARY, 1809. in this whole nation, if every one were to carry | troduced at this session. It would indeed be his all, thus to maintain our rights against the difficult to reason gentlemen into a modification navy of Great Britain. If we were carried into of a principle to which they were opposed a war, and every thing really seemed to be throughout; but he trusted that this House was tending that way, we must rely upon the en- not generally so disposed. He believed that a terprise of our citizens; and that, when set at large majority of the House were at the presliberty, would be found more desperate than ent moment in favor of embargo or war, because the navy of any country. When we arrived at the House had been so distinctly told by a comthe end of the Revolutionary war we had but mittee on our foreign relations, that there was one frigate, and the best thing we ever did was no alternative but submission; and almost every to give that one away. The State of South gentleman who had the honor of a seat within Carolina had not yet got clear of the curse. these walls, had committed himself on the subShe embarked one frigate in the general strug- ject, either to persevere in the embargo or regle, and she had not rid herself of the debts sort to war. What would be the object of a war? incurred by it yet. Private enterprise must be Not the right of the soil, not our territorial depended upon. The people from the East- limits, but the right of navigating the ocean. ward had shown in the last war what they Were we to redress those wrongs, those comwould do. When vessels were loaded with mercial injuries, on the land? Not altogether, sugar they would fight like bull-dogs for it. He he conceived. Would it be good policy, he recollected a story, he said, of one of our priva- asked, to let our means of carrying on war on teers being beat off by a Jamaica man, whom they the ocean rot in our docks, and not make use of attacked. The captain not liking to lose the them? These vessels would also be useful as a prize, and finding his crew disheartened, told defence. Why then should they not be manned them she was full of sugar. "Is she?" said and put in readiness for service? It was said they, "by G-d; let us at them again." They that we could not cope with the British navy. scarcely ever failed in their enterprises. Mr. D. said this argument proved too much, if it proved any thing. If he did not feel perfectly comfortable in a cold day, should he therefore divest himself of all clothing? Why send out the sloop of war Hornet, alluded to by the gentleman last up-why rely upon it for redressing the insult at Savannah, if naval force was useless? It was no reason, because Great Britain had more vessels than we, that we should not use what we had. Indeed, those gentlemen who objected to naval force, appeared to be mostly from the interior, and of course could not properly estimate its value. In allusion to the case at Savannah, Mr. W. regretted that an insult should be offered to the people of the country. The insult at Savannah had by this time been redressed, he had no doubt. He had no information to induce him to believe so, but the knowledge that the sloopof-war Hornet was stationed off Charleston, and of course cruised near the place. The Hornet was perfectly adequate to drive any vessel of twenty guns out of our waters. She was one of the best vessels of the United States, and as well officered as any. [Mr. TROUP observed that the Hornet was off Charleston. Now, he wanted a frigate at Savannah.] Mr. W. said that Savannah was the very place where gunboats would be perfectly effectual. He meant to make no reflection against the proposer of the gunboat system, but he did against those who had only given one-half of the system, and omitted the other-the marine militia. And now, when an attack was menaced at Savannah, gentlemen wanted a frigate! If nine-tenths of the people were opposed to the evasions of the embargo law, Mr. W. said it would not be evaded. The evaders would be considered as traitors-as the worst of traitors. As to preparing a force for the protection of navigation, the gentleman from Georgia must well know that the whole revenue of the United States would not be competent to maintain a sufficient number of vessels to convoy our merchantmen. Mr. W. concluded by saying, that he wished the nation to be protected, and its wrongs to be redressed; but when he reflected that at Castine the soil had been most abominably violated, he could not view the insults in our waters as being equal to it; for, said he, touch the soil and you touch the life-blood of every man in it. Mr. DURELL considered the present subject as one of the most important which had been in Mr. SAWYER was wholly opposed to the amendments from the Senate. The objection to this particular increase of naval force on the score of expense, was not to be disregarded. He called the attention of gentlemen to the state of the Treasury. The expense of this system would be three millions; and when this sum was added to other sums which would be requisite if measures now pending were adopted, it would render it necessary for Congress now to borrow money on the credit of posterity. The expedient of direct taxation would not be resorted to. It had already been the deathblow to the political existence of one Administration. This Government, he said, was founded on public opinion, and whenever the approbation of the people was withdrawn, from whatever cause, the whole superstructure must fall. Mr. S. dwelt at some length on the disadvantage of loans. He said, if this nation was destined to raise a navy for the protection of commerce, it should have begun earlier, in the year 1793, when such outrageous violations had been committed on our commerce. The expense of such an establishment would have far exceeded the amount in value of captures made since that period. He concluded, from a number of obser vations which he made on this subject, that, on the score of the protection of trade, it would not be proper to fit out a navy. This proposition, he said, was the mere entering-wedge. The system was either unnecessary, or would be wholly futile in practice. Our seamen would cost us at least double of what is the expense of her seamen to Great Britain; and it required her utmost exertions to pay the interest of the enormous debt with which her unwieldy navy had saddled her. He therefore certainly thought that an attempt to justify it on the score of profit would not succeed. He deprecated the extension of Executive patronage, which would result from an increase of the Naval Establishment. Need he go back, he asked, to the time when the black cockade was necessary, in some parts of the country, to secure a man from insult from the officers of the navy? He wished to limit the Executive patronage; to adhere closely to the maxims of our forefathers. By sending out a navy, too, he said, we should volunteer to support the ascendency of the British navy, become the mere jackals of the British lion. Mr. S. went at some length into an examination of the former Administration in relation to a navy. There was nothing, he observed, in the nature of our Government, or of our foreign relations, to require a navy. If we could not carry on foreign commerce without a navy, he wished to have less of it and more of internal commerce, of that commerce which the natural advantages of the country would support between different parts of it. If we were to build a navy for the protection of foreign commerce, we should throw away our natural advantages for the sake of artificial ones. He was in favor of the embargo at present. There was more virtue in our barrels of flour as to coercion than in all the guns of our navy; and we had lately given our adversaries a supplementary broadside, which he hoped would tell well. Mr. S. stated the origin and progress of navies at some length, commencing with the Republic of Genoa. Our chief reliance as to defence must be on our militia. So little did Great Britain now rely on her navy for defence of her soil, that she had called upon every man in the country to be at his post, if danger came. Other nations might be justified in supporting a naval force, because they had colonies separated from them by the sea, with whom they were obliged to have means of intercourse, but we had not that apology for a navy. Mr. S. concluded his observations, after speaking near an hour, not, he said, that he had gone through the subject; but, as it was late in the day, he yielded the floor to some other gentleman. [H. OF R. pose of resisting attacks made on our territory at home. The gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. WILLIAMS) had said that an attack on the soil touched the life-blood of every man in it. Yes, Mr. J. said, it did; whether the invasion was on our jurisdiction, on land or water, it touched equally the life-blood of the nation. He would as soon resist an attack on our territorial jurisdiction on sea as on land. It made no difference with him whether a foreign frigate came up to the piles of Potomac bridge and fired over into the town, or whether its crew came on shore and assaulted us with the bayonet. The territory, he said, was equally invaded in either case. Were we not to resist Great Britain because of her 1,130 sail of armed vessels? This would amount to a declaration that we must succumb to her, because she could at any time send a squadron sufficient to destroy our naval force at a single blow. This was the tendency of the argument. Mr. J. said it would be more honorable to fight, while a single gun could be fired, notwithstanding her overwhelming force. This mode of reasoning had a tendency to destroy the spirit of the people. He would never consent to crouch before we were conquered; this was not the course of our Revolutionary patriots, and he trusted it was one which we should not follow. He would rather, like the heroic band of Leonidas, perish in the combat, although the force of the enemy was irresistible, than acknowledge that we would submit. This naval force was not, however, intended to cope with the navy of Great Britain, but to chastise the petty pirates who trespassed on our jurisdiction; pirates, he called them, because the British Government had not sanctioned their acts. It had not justified the murder of Pierce, or asserted the right of jurisdiction claimed by an officer within the length of his buoys, &c., because, if she had, it would have then been war. For this reason he wished our little pigmy force to be sent on the ocean, notwithstanding the giant navy of Great Britain. Some gentlemen had opposed this on the score of expense. Our most valuable treasure, Mr. J. said, was honor; and the House had almost unanimously declared that it could not submit without a sacrifice of that honor. SATURDAY, January 21. On motion of Mr. SMILIE the House resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole on the bill to alter the time of the next meeting of Congress. Mr. J. G. JACKSON moved to strike out the "fourth" Monday in May, and insert the "last," stating as a reason, that as the Virginia elections took place in April, the Representatives could not arrive here in time. Mr. J. G. JACKSON said, that gentlemen should not be influenced, in discussing the present question, by a belief that they were now discussing the propriety of raising a naval force Mr. MACON wished a division of the question for offensive purposes. This was not the ques- so as first to strike out, with a view to insert tion. It was only whether, at this crisis, the "September," instead of May. The motion to House would employ a little force for the pur-strike out was negatived-62 to 35. It was |