CARPENTER, J. Cuyahoga County Appeals. The relator alleges that he had duly presented to the trial judge a "true" bill of exceptions of all the evidence produced at the trial in the case of the John Gill & Sons Co. v. J. Ablisky, at which trial the said Hon. George P. Baer presided, and asked him to sign and to correct the same, if necessary, and to allow and sign such bill as provided in Sec. 11566 G. C.; that said defendant refused arbitrarily and unjustly and for the sole purpose of defeating relator's right to proceed in error in said cause; to settle, allow or correct and sign said "true" bill of exceptions, etc. An alternative writ was allowed to issue. a The defendant in his answer says in substance that the trial consumed two full days, during which time much testimony was required and that he advised counsel then to secure stenographer so that a record might be made, but that said counsel did not so do; that the relator, after the rendition of the verdict, changed counsel; that the said bill of exceptions which said counsel had so prepared and presented to him for signature was not a "true" bill and did not and does not truthfully set forth the testimony nor evidence; that it does not properly or fully report, even in substance, the testimony of the witnesses at said trial; that it charges and accredits testimony to the defendant that was obtained from relator's superintendent on cross-examination, does not give the charge of the court correctly or fairly, and untruthfully states that said bill contains "all the evidence offered and given at said trial." Defendant further alleges that all the matters regarding said bill of exceptions were fully presented to him at a hearing at which both plaintiff's and defendant's counsel were present and arguments made, and at which hearing the court held that the bill presented to him was not a "true" bill of the testimony nor evidence in said case; that then and there he offered to help relator's counsel to prepare a suitable bill to raise any questions of law involved in the trial and now offers to sign any "true" bill that is presented. In the argument of counsel at the hearing it was substantially admitted that the bill did not contain "all the evidence" and that it was not a "true" bill. Excuse was made State ex rel. v. Baer. that by reason of change of counsel and the circumstances connected therewith that it was impossible to procure from the memory of counsel who was present and conducted the trial all of the evidence and charge of court, the intimation being that the court should furnish from his memory such evidence and charge and prepare for relators an entire and true bill. That a judge who has presided at a trial is not required by law to prepare a bill of exceptions for counsel and that he is only obligated to sign a "true" bill, and when the adverse party files an objection or amendment to correct the same, is fully established in the case of State v. Todd, 4 Ohio 351. As said by the court: "The bill of exceptions, is in practice, and by law, to be signed and sealed only, not to be prepared by the judges; the only obligation upon the judges, is to sign and seal a true bill of exceptions." But the object of the Relator is not to compel the judges to sign a correct bill of exceptions, but to sign the bill offered by Relator. The power of determining whether a bill of exceptions is true, or not, is vested in the judges, to whom it is presented for signature. If the court had granted a rule to sign a bill of exceptions, the judge could have returned that he had performed that duty. But the object of the rule is to oblige the judge to sign a particular bill of exceptions, which had been offered to him. The court granted the rule to show cause, and the judge has shown cause, by saying that he has done all that can be required of him; and that the bill is not such a one as he can sign. Nothing is more manifest, than that the court cannot order him to sign such a bill of exceptions. See Bradstreet, Ex parte, 29 U. S. (4 Pet.) 105, 106 [7 L. Ed. 798]. It will be remembered that in the present case the court refused to sign the bill of exceptions because it was not a "true" bill; that he had suggested to counsel to have the testimony taken down as given; that thereafter he offered his assistance in preparing a correct bill and that he offers to sign any "true" bill that is presented to him; but it is insisted upon by counsel that he sign the particular bill presented to him. In the case of Creager v. Meeker, 22 Ohio St. 207, it is said in the syllabus that: Cuyahoga County Appeals. "An application for a mandamus to compel a judge to sign a bill of exceptions, should be accompanied by the bill that was tendered to him for his allowance. Where the answer in such case shows that the defendant is willing to sign a true bill, but denies that the bill presented is true, the writ must be refused, as the right to determine as to the truth of a bill of exceptions is vested in the judge to whom it is presented." And in the case of Shephard v. Payton, 12 Kans. 616, the syllabus is: "That the decision of the trial judge that a bill of exceptions tendered to him for signature is untrue is conclusive and final and the Supreme Court will not, upon mandamus, hear testimony, or compel him to sign it." The court has judicially decided that the bill which was presented to him was not a true bill, and under the authorities above cited the court was acting within its proper jurisdiction. It being conceded that the bill was not a true bill which counsel had presented to the judge to sign, it is clearly evident that this court would not have the power in this proceeding to command him either to prepare a bill of exceptions for counsel nor to sign the bill which was presented to him. The writ is, therefore, refused and judgment is rendered for the defendant. Grant and Leighley, JJ., concur. Wolf v. Ford. ELECTRICITY-NEGLIGENCE. [Richland (5th) Court of Appeals, April 2, 1917] Houck and Shields, JJ. *JOHN WOLF, ADMR. V. S. N. FORD, RECVR. 1. Boy Climbing Tree Outside of Sidewalk Not Trespasser. A boy who, while at play, climbs a tree standing between the sidewalk and the curb of the street is not a trespasser as against an electric railway company, one of whose wires passes between the branches of the tree. 2. High Voltage Uninsulated Electric Wire in Tree in Street Proximate Cause of Death of Boy Electrocuted While Climbing Tree. The maintenance of a wire of high voltage, uninsulated at the point where it passes through a tree standing on the edge of the sidewalk, must be regarded as the proximate cause of the death of a boy who was electrocuted by coming in contact with it in climbing the tree while at play. [Syllabus by the court.] ERROR. Brucker, Voegele & Henkel, for plaintiff in error. W. S. Kerr and McBride & Wolfe, for defendant in error. HOUCK, J. The material facts necessary for a proper inquiry as to the errors complained of in this case are as follows: That on August 13, 1915, George Wolf, the plaintiff's decedent, was about eleven years of age; that on the evening of said day, after dark, he was playing with other boys a certain game, and in so doing climbed into a shade tree in front of the property of William Schwier, located at No. 297 East Fourth street, Mansfield, Ohio. Said tree was located between the sidewalk and curbing along said street. Some of the limbs of the tree were within four or five feet of the ground, and on the evening in question there was, and had been for some days prior thereto, a large number of brick piled around the body of said tree within two or three feet of the lower limbs. That on the aforesaid 13th day of August, 1915, and for a long time prior *Motion to certify record overruled July 3, 1917, Ford v. Wolf, 62 Bull. 315. Richland County Appeals. thereto, one of the electric light wires belonging to the defendant company, and carrying a high voltage, was located in said tree about twenty feet from the ground, and about three feet from the body of the tree; that at the particular point where said wire was about three feet from the body of the tree the wire had become uninsulated, and was so on said August 13, 1915, and had been in such condition for a period of more than six weeks prior thereto; that the decedent at no time knew of any impairment in said wire; that on said day and at the time aforesaid the decedent climbed into said tree, and when he had reached the place where said wire passed through the limbs of the tree, about twenty feet from the ground and about three feet from its body, the decedent came in contact with said wire where it was uninsulated, and by reason thereof the electric current from said wire passed through his body causing instant death. The case before us for review was submitted to a jury upon the evidence offered by the parties to the suit, and under the proven facts and the law, as given to the jury by the trial judge, it returned a verdict for the defendant, and the court, after overruling a motion for a new trial, entered a judgment on the verdict. From a careful examination of the bill of exceptions in this case with reference to the evidence admitted and rejected by the court below, and from the propositions of law given to the jury, as well as those refused, bearing upon the question as to whether or not the decedent was a trespasser, we are bound to find that from early in the trial in the court of common pleas, and to the end thereof, the learned trial judge was of the opinion that the decedent was a trespasser in fact and in law, and was not entitled to a judgment against the defendant. The trial court in the general charge to the jury gave the following: "Then you will further inquire as to why plaintiff's intestate was in said tree; and if you further find that the decedent was in said tree without invitation or permission on the part of the defendant company, and that defendant company had no reason to believe or anticipate that children would climb into |