Zanesville Lodge v. Fluharty. members in the misfortune of sickness, injury or death. Thus, in the practical application of the beneficial objects of a fraternal society it must not lose sight of the fact that where one of its members has departed this life leaving loved ones behind who are the natural objects of his bounty as well as the fraternal subjects of the brotherly love and financial help of the society, as provided by its constitution and laws, it can not escape such duties resting upon it by mere technical defenses; they must be sound in fact and law. The undisputed facts in the case at bar show that the decedent and this plaintiff have fully and completely complied with all the requirements of the order necessary to entitle the plaintiff below, the defendant in error, to the relief prayed for in the petition in the common pleas court. We have examined all the alleged errors, as set out in the petition in error, and we find none that would warrant a reviewing court in reversing the judgment in this case as entered in the court below. Therefore the judgment of the common pleas court is affirmed. Powell and Shields, JJ., concur. PRINCIPAL AND SURETY. [Lucas (6th) Court of Appeals, June 29, 1917.] Chittenden, Richards and Kinkade, JJ. HORATIO N. JEX V. JEWEL TEA Co. Employer Concealing Information of Embezzlement by Agent after Knowledge thereof Cannot Hold Liable Sureties on Continuing Guaranty of Faithful Performance. An employer who holds a continuing guaranty signed by sureties to secure the faithful performance of the duties of his agent and acquires knowledge that his agent is embezzling funds collected for the employer and conceals the information from the sureties, can not hold them liable on the guaranty for funds received and misappropriated by the agent after the employer had knowledge of his guilty conduct. [Syllabus by the court.] Lucas County Appeals. ERROR. L. M. Murphy and A. J. Croll, for plaintiffs in error. RICHARDS, J. The plaintiffs in error became sureties in 1910 on a bond in the amount of $500 given to guaranty the faithful performance of the duties of one Walter Frank Dieterle who was an employe of the Jewel Tea Co. Among the duties which devolved upon the employe was the collection of money from customers, aggregating $25 to $75 per day, and making a daily report of such collections and turning in the funds so received by him. The employe having converted to his own use and embezzled large sums of money aggregating more than $1600, an action was brought against the sureties on the bond to recover the amount thereof. On the trial of the case in the court of common pleas a verdict was directed for the plaintiff, at the close of all the evidence, for the amount of the bond. Error is prosecuted to this court, the errors relied on being the introduction of incompetent evidence and the action of the court in directing the verdict. One of the exhibits which was offered in evidence was manifestly not admissible, but no exception was taken to its admission and the action of the court, therefore, can not be relied on as crror in this court. The important question for determination in this case is whether the trial court was authorized to direct a verdict in favor of the plaintiff. Evidence was offered tending to show that in 1910 or 1911 the agent Dieterle had received and appropriated to his own use from $250 to $300 of his employer's money. Captain Jex, one of the bondsmen, had no knowledge whatever of this condition of affairs but it was known to the employer. The amount of that defalcation was subsequently made good by the employe Dieterle. The evidence tends to show that in 1912 Dieterle again misappropriated funds of his employer, but on this occasion the facts were communicated to Captain Jex but were not known to the company. In the years Jex v. Tea Co. 1913 and 1915 the amounts embezzled increased very largely and late in the year 1915 the employer, becoming aware of the situation, caused the arrest of Dieterle and he was tried and convicted of embezzlement. They notified the two sureties of the defalcation in 1915 and subsequently brought this action on the bond. It is urged by the sureties as a defense that the company fraudulently concealed the information which it had as to the defalcations of Dieterle and that by reason of such action of the employer the sureties are released from liability on the indemnifying bond. The evidence contained in the bill of exceptions is not very clear nor explicit as to precisely the time when these various defalcations occurred, nor as to the precise amounts thereof, except that it appears that the amount which he had misappropriated and which remained unpaid in November, 1915, was $1645. The sureties on the indemnifying bond were entitled to the exercise of the utmost good faith on the part of the employer of Dieterle and if such good faith was not exercised we apprehend the true rule of law is that the sureties would be discharged. The law applicable to such cases is stated in 2 Brandt, Suretyship (2 Ed.), Secs. 423 and 424, to be that where there is a continuing guaranty for the honesty of a servant, if a master discovers that the servant has been guilty of dishonesty in the course of the service and continues him in such service without the knowledge of the guarantor, the guarantor is released from the liability to make good any loss which may arise from the dishonesty of the servant during the subsequent service, and the employer is held to impliedly stipulate that he will not knowingly retain the employe in his service after a breach of the guaranty justifying his discharge and if he does do so, without the knowledge or consent of the surety, the surety will be exonerated. The learned author states in the first section cited that if the dishonesty had existed before the surety became bound and the master had concealed it the surety would not have been liable, and that the cases are the same in principle. Lucas County Appeals. To the same effect is Estate of Michael Rapp v. Insurance Co. 113 Ill. 390 [55 Am. Rep. 427]; Delbridge v. Building & Loan Assn. 82 Ill. App. 388; Roberts v. Donovan, 70 Cal. 108 19 Pac. 180; 11 Pac. 599]. The case of Watertown Fire Ins. Co. v. Simmons, 131 Mass. 85 [41 Am. Rep. 196], has been thought by some authorities to lay down a different rule, but a careful examination of that case will show that the court held that, however irregular or negligent the agent had been, he was not guilty of any defalcation or other dishonest or fraudulent conduct, and by reason thereof no duty rested on the creditor to use active diligence to protect the sureties, and that they were not discharged. A fair implication to be drawn from the opinion of the court in the case just cited leads to the conclusion that the Massachusetts court would have held, if they had found that the agent was guilty of fraudulent or criminal conduct and that this fact was known to the employer and concealed from the sureties, that the sureties would have been discharged. It has been held in Ohio in Dinsmore v. Tidball, 34 Ohio St. 411, that if an employer obtain security for the faithful performance of the duties of an agent, knowing at the time that such agent is a defaulter, and fail to disclose the fact to the surety, thereby inducing the surety to execute the bond of indemnity, then such employer can not recover of the surety. See, also, Smith v. Josselyn, 40 Ohio St. 409. In this latter case the trial court had directed a verdict for the plaintiff against the sureties after there had been some evidence tending to show that the agent had been guilty of culpable carelessness while in the employment of the plaintiff and before the giving of the bond sued upon, and that the plaintiff had knowledge of this conduct and had failed to communicate the same to the sureties. The Supreme Court held under these circumstances that these were matters of fact which should have been left to the jury to be determined. While these Ohio cases arose where the fraudulent or criminal conduct occurred before the giving of the bond, the case is the same in principle as if the fraudulent or criminal conduct occurred thereafter, providing Jex v. Tea Co. the facts were known to the employer and concealed from the surety. In view of the fact that the judgment must be reversed and the case remanded for a retrial, we will follow our usual practice and not go into a review of the evidence but content ourselves with stating that sufficient evidence was introduced to require a submission of the case to the jury for its determination. The judgment will be reversed and the case remanded for new trial. Chittenden and Kinkade, JJ., concur. DIVORCE AND ALIMONY. [Lucas (6th) Court of Appeals, April 21, 1916.] Kinkade, Chittenden and Richards, JJ. MARY A. ALBERT V. GEORGE W. ALBERT. 1. Alimony Awarded to Husband on Petition for Divorce and Alimony Notwithstanding Divorce Refused. Where a husband files a petition for divorce and alimony, and upon trial the court refuses to grant a divorce, alimony may be awarded to the husband. 2. May Husband Sue for Alimony Alone, Quaere. Whether a husband can begin and maintain an action for alimony alone,-query. 3. Husband may Compel Support by Wife Regardless of Right to Sue for Alimony Alone. Under Secs. 7995 and 7997 G. C., a husband, unable to support himself, may compel his support by the wife regardless of any right to maintain an action for alimony alone. [Syllabus by the court.] ERROR. Marshall & Fraser, for plaintiff in error. W. W. Campbell and B. F. James, for defendant in error. CHITTENDEN, J. This is a proceeding in error from a decree of the common pleas court awarding alimony to the defendant in error. The |