Cuyahoga County Appeals. Many authorities are cited by the court in this opinion in support of the absolute necessity of the ordinance fixing the standard of reasonableness, and establishes as settled law that in criminal proceedings it is an indispensable essential. This case is cited in Leading Case Law, and is controlling on the subject. We therefore have reached the conclusion that this ordinance is invalid for three reasons: First, that by reason of the acts aimed to be punished, it fails to use the word "knowingly," or words of similar import. Second. That it drafts the time and services and perhaps money of a citizen without substantial compensation, whether he is to blame or blameless for the injury. Third. That the ordinance fixes no standard of what constitutes reasonable assistance-an indispensable requisite in criminal law. The judgment of the court below is therefore reversed as being contrary to law, and the defendant is discharged. Grant and Carpenter, JJ., concur. SCHOOLS. [Fairfield (5th) Court of Appeals, April 28, 1917.] Powell, Houck and Shields, JJ. *DILLON FISHER V. J. W. WHITTUS ET AL. Jusisdiction of County Boards of Education to Dissolve and Consolidate Village School Districts. A county board of education has authority to dissolve two village school districts and consolidate them into one, in the absence of procedure on the part of said districts under Secs. 4688 and 4688-1, which would exempt them from such action. [Syllabus by the court.] ERROR. M. A. Daugherty and B. E. Shell, for plaintiff in error. James M. Butler and J. H. Fultz, Pros. Atty., for defendant in error. *Motion to certify record overruled, Fisher v. Whittus, 62 Bull. 444. Fisher v. Whittus. HOUCK, J. The plaintiff is an elector and tax-payer and the father of children of school age, who reside with him, in the Basil village school district of Fairfield county, Ohio. The defendants are the members of the board of education of the Liberty union village school district of said county, the county board of education of Fairfield county, Ohio, and C. C. Miller, as clerk of said county board of education. The amended petition of the plaintiff seeks to enjoin the defendants from taking any steps or doing any act towards the abolishment of two village school districts known as the Basil village school district and the Baltimore village school district, and from selling certain bonds and doing certain other things in the way of creating these two districts into a new one to be known as the Liberty union village school district. These villages and school districts adjoin each other. In February, 1916, the county board of education of Fairfield county united these two village school districts into one new district, appointed a provisional board of education for same, and authorized the issuance of $60,000 of bonds to purchase a site and to erect a new school building thereon. The petition seeks to restrain the issuance of these bonds, the purchase of the school site, the erection of the building and to prevent the consolidation of these two village districts into a new one. A general demurrer was filed to the amended petition in the court below and was sustained, and error is here prosecuted seeking a reversal of the judgment of the common pleas court. Plaintiff in error relies upon the claim that the county board of education was wholly without authority or power, statutory or otherwise, to create a new school district out of the two village districts. In other words, learned counsel for the plaintiff in error contend that a county board of education has no jurisdiction to dissolve village districts and create a new district therefrom. Section 4684 G. C. clearly defines what constitutes a county school district: "Each county, exclusive of the territory embraced in any Fairfield County Appeals. school district and the territory in any village school district exempted from the supervision of the county board of education by the provisions of Sections 4688 and 4688-1, and territory detached for school purposes, and including the territory attached to it for school purposes, shall constitute a county school district. In each case where any village or rural school district is situated in more than one county such district shall become a part of the county school district in which the greatest part of the territory or such village or rural district is situated." We find no allegation in the mended petition that would warrant us in holding that the two village districts in question are within the exceptions found in the above statute, but we do find that they are not within the exceptions. Therefore, if they are not exempted from the provisions of Sec. 4684 as provided in Secs. 4688 and 4688-1, then they are under the jurisdiction and authority of the county board of education as contemplated in and provided by Sec. 4684, and the county board of education has full and complete power and authority to create a new district from the territory embraced in them. No claim is made in the amended petition that advantage was taken by the electors of the new school district of the provisions of Sec. 4736, "which said arrangement shall be carried into effect as proposed unless, within thirty days after the filing of such notice with the board or boards of education, a majority of the qualified electors of the territory affected by such order of the county board file a written remonstrance with the county board against the arrangement of school districts so proposed." From a careful examination of Sec. 4736 G. C., which further provides, "The county board of education is hereby authorized to create a school district from one or more school districts or parts thereof," we are fully convinced that the county board of education has full power and authority ever village districts and may create a new district by consolidating two village districts. Fisher v. Whittus. This language is clear, plain and explicit and certainly gives to the county board full and complete power in the premises, unless the village district or districts are exempted from the jurisdiction of the county board of education as provided in Secs. 4688 and 4688-1 G. C., which does not appear in the immediate case. Section 4679, G. C., reads as follows: "The school districts of the state shall be styled, respectively, city school districts, village school districts, rural school districts and county school districts." Thus it will be seen that we have four kinds of school districts: city, village, rural and county. The statute, Sec. 4684, specifically exempts city districts from the jurisdiction of a county board of education, but gives it complete authority over rural and village districts, unless village districts take advantage of the provisions of Secs. 4688 and 4688-1 G. C., and thereby become exempt from such jurisdiction. We think that a fair interpretation of the provisions of the new school code and the legislative intent, which must be ascertained from the language used therein, can lead to but one conclusion as to the jurisdiction of a county board of education over village districts, and that is, that it has such jurisdiction unless they become exempt therefrom in the way provided by said law. In passing upon the question raised by the demurrer to the amended petition, we have put aside any technical questions that might be urged for it and looked wholly and entirely to the real question involved and the one urged and relied upon by counsel for plaintiff in error, namely: Has a county board of education jurisdiction to dissolve two village districts, which have not become exempt as provided by Secs. 4688 and 4688-1, G. C., and create a new district from the territory embraced therein ? We must and do answer this inquiry in the affirmative. Thus holding, we find that the common pleas court was not in error when it sustained the demurrer to the amended petition Fairfield County Appeals. in this case; and finding no prejudicial error in the record the judgment of the common pleas court must be affirmed. Judgment affirmed. Powell and Shields, JJ., concur. STREET RAILWAYS. [Licking (5th) Court of Appeals, October Term, 1916.] Shields, Powell and Houck, JJ. THE OHIO ELECTRIC RY. v. ISAAC BURKHAM. 1. Instruction before Argument Authorizing Verdict against Interurban Railway if Motorman by Proper Care Could have Avoided Collision. In an action for injuries from being struck by an electric car which it is alleged was being operated over a crossing at an excessive and dangerous rate of speed, it is not error to give a special charge to the jury before argument, to the effect jury find that the motorman might and by the exercises of ordinary care would have avoided striking him, a verdict should be returned in his favor, unless the jury also find that the plaintiff was himself guilty of negligence contributing to his injury. 2. Failure of Plaintiff to Support Some Material Facts not Ground for Reversal. The fact that some of the testimony of the plaintiff relating to material facts is unsupported is not sufficient ground of itself to warrant a reviewing court in setting the judgment aside on the ground of weight of the evidence. [Syllabus by the court.] ERROR. Fitzgibbon, Montgomery & Black, for plaintiff in error. HOUCK, J. The plaintiff in error seeks a reversal of the judgment of the common pleas court in this case. The plaintiff in error was the defendant below, and the defendant in error was the plaintiff below. The suit below was one for personal injuries alleged to have been received by said Burkham while attempting to drive over the tracks of said railway company in a one-horse buggy |