« PreviousContinue »
ander said settlement. Held, that as neither ignorance, illness, nor neglect would excuse performance of said condition, said £5000 fell into the residue. In re Hodges' Legacy, L. R. 16 Eq. 92. See LEGACY, 6; VENDOR AND PURCHASER, 2.
CONFUSION. - See CHARITY.
ITY; Class; COMPANY, 4; CONDITION ; CONTRACT; EVIDENCE; INSANITY;
CONTRACT. 1. V. accepted an offer of marriage from F. subject to the approval of her (V.s) father. The father assented, and wrote to F., stating : “ V. being my only child, of course she will come into the possession of what belongs to me at my decease.” The mother of F. wrote to V.'s father concerning his settling £4000 upon F., and the father wrote in reply that he could not take that sum from his business, but that he had made a will leaving all his estate to V. for life, remain-. der as she should by will appoint; he added : “ It has been my intention, in the Erent of the marriage taking place, to make a similar will in accordance with the facts, and of course I should settle my property on my daughter absolutely and independent of her husband, or, in other words, in strict settlement. I will take care that my property shall be properly secured upon her and her children after her death." The marriage took place. V.'s father married again, and made a will giving certain property to his wife. Held, that said letters of V.'s father amounted to a contract to settle whole of the property of which he died seised or possessed upon V. in strict settlement. — Coverdale v. Eastwood, L. R. 15 Eq. 121.
2. The defendant chartered a vessel in France with a stipulation that the vessel should proceed with a cargo of hay to London; the cargo to be taken from the vessel alongside. Before the charter-party was entered into, it had been made illegal to land hay from France in Great Britain. On learning this the defendant, after some delay, received the hay from alongside the vessel in the Thames into another vessel and exported it. Held, that, as there was no intention to violate the law when the contract was made, and as the law was not in fact violated, the contract was not void; and that the defendant was therefore liable for said delay or demurrage. — Waugh v. Morris, L. R. 8 Q. B. 202.
See Auction; BANKRUPTCY, 5; CARRIER ; COMPANY, 4; FRAUDS, StatUTE OF, 1; FREIGHT ; INFANT; INSURANCE, 2 ; RAILWAY, 1; SALVAGE; Trust.
CONTRIBUTORY. — See COMPANY, 4.
COPYRIGHT. By statute copyrighted prints must be engraved with the name of the proprietor. The plaintiff's engravings were marked "Rock & Co., London.” Held, that the proprietors' name was sufficiently set forth on said engravings. – Rock v. Lazarus, L. R. 15 Eq. 104.
CORPORATION. — See WRIT.
Costs. 1. Where A, has been subjected to a suit for unliquidated damages through the default of B., who declines to intervene, and judgment has been rendered against A., the right of A. to recover from B. the costs of defending such action depends upon whether it was reasonable in A. to defend such suit, a question to be left to the jury. - Mors-le-Blanch v. Wilson, L. R. 8 C. P. 227.
2. Rule for a new trial, “ costs to abide the event.” Held, that the "event" was the event of the trial as to the ground on which the verdict was set aside. — Jones v. Williams, L. R. 8 Q. B. 280. See DIVORCE, 1. CRIMINAL Law. - See EMBEZZLEMENT ; INDICTMENT; LARCENY.
CUSTOM. — See BANKRUPTCY, 3.
Damages. The plaintiff carried on business in a warehouse held on long lease, and next to a free dock on the Thames. The dock was filled up under certain embankment acts, and the plaintiff's premises thereby permanently injured with reference to the uses to which he or any owner might put them. Held (by KELLY, C. B., BLACKBURN and ARCHIBALD, JJ., and BRAMWELL, B.; CLEASBY, B., dissenting), that the plaintiff was entitled to compensation. See Land Clauses Consolidation Act, 8 & 9 Vict. c. 18, $ 68. — McCarthy v. Metropolitan Board of Works, L. R. 8 C. P. (Ex. Ch.) 191; 8. c. L. R. 7 C. P. 508; 7 Am. Law Rev. 508.
See BANKRUPTCY, 5; PRESCRIPTION; RAILWAY; RESERVATION; SPECIALTY DEBT.
DELAY. - See DivorCE, 1, 3.
DEVIATION. — See INSURANCE, 1.
DEVISE. 1. A testator gave the residue of his estate in trust “for my nephews and nieces living, and the issue of any my nephews and nieces dead before me." The testator had brothers and sisters, but no nephews and nieces, but there were several nephews and nieces of his wife. Held, that the wife's nephews and nieces were entitled to the gift. — Sherratt v. Mountford, L. R. 15 Eq. 305.
2. Judgment in Allgood v. Blake, reported in English Digest of last number of Am. Law Rev., affirmed in 8 Ex. (Ex. Ch.) 160.
3. A testator devised a certain estate to his son J. for life, remainder to J.'s children in fee, “and in case my son J. shall depart this life without leaving lawful issue” such estate“ equally between my sons G. and R. in the same manner as the estates hereinafter devised are limited to them respectively; subject nevertheless to the proviso hereinafter mentioned, in case my son J. should leave a widow.” The testator then devised certain other estates to G. and R. in identical terms. Then followed this proviso: “Provided, that in case any or either of my said sons shall depart this life leaving a widow, then I give the premises 80 specifically devised to such one or more of them dying, unto his widow" for life. R. died unmarried. G. died leaving a widow, who claimed a life-estate in the moiety of R.'s estate, which had come to G. Held (reversing judgment of Ex. Ch., which reversed judgment of C. P.), that said widow was entitled to a life-estate in said moiety of R.'s estate. — Giles y, Melsom, L. R. 6 H. L. 24; 8. c. L. R. 6 C. P. (Ex. Cb.) 532; L. R. 5 C. P. 614; 6 Am. Law Rev. 294; 5 ib. 478.
See CHARITY; Class; CONDITION; EVIDENCE ; LIMITATION; Trust; UNDUE INFLUENCE ; VESTED INTEREST.
DISCOVERY. 1. Bill by reversioner against tenants holding under an expired lease and underlease, alleging that the defendants were in wrongful possession of certain land, and that they had in their possession documents which would show that said land was included in said lease and underlease, and praying discovery, and also alleging collusion between the defendants to defeat the plaintiff. Demurrer overruled. — Brown v. Wales, L. R. 15 Eq. 142.
2. The court refused to order a solicitor to disclose the address of his client who had absconded, for the purpose of enabling the plaintiff to serve upon the client a subpoena duces tecum. — Heath v. Crealock, L. R. 15 Eq. 257.
3. A plaintiff will not be compelled to produce documents relating to his title, and which he swears do not contain any thing supporting the defendant's title or case to the best of the plaintiff's knowledge, information, and belief. Nor correspondence between the plaintiff and his predecessors in title and their solicitors, having reference to questions connected with the matters in dispute in the case. — Minet v. Morgan, L. R. 8 Ch. 361.
See INTERROGATORIES; PATENT, 1.
DIVORCE. 1. A woman married in 1863, cohabited with her husband until 1870, and in 1871 prayed a decree of nullity on account of her husband's impotency. The court observed that the petitioner could not delay proceedings for three years after knowledge of her husband's impotency without being open to the charge of a want of sincerity or promptitude. The petitioner not having proved her case was obliged to pay costs from her separate income. — M. v. C., L. R. 2 P. & D. 414.
2. A husband cannot obtain a divorce by reason of the adultery of his wife brought about by his agent employed to obtain evidence of the wife's adultery, although the husband has not authorized his agent to bring about such adultery. — Gower v. Gower, L. R. 2 P. & D. 428.
3. A petitioner for a decree of divorce in 1871, for cause arising in 1866, stated as a reason for his delay that he was embarrassed in pecuniary resources; and, further, that until after 1869, when a statute was passed making bis testimony admissible, he had not sufficient evidence to proceed upon. Held, sufficient reasons for the delay. – Wilson v. Wilson, 2 P. & D. 435.
See ALIMONY; EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS, 3.
DRUNKENNESS. — See WILL, 7.
ELECTION. – See PARLIAMENTARY Law.
EMBEZZLEMENT. The captain of a barge, while in the exclusive service of the owner of the barge, took a cargo which the owner had forbidden him to carry, and never accounted for the freight. Held, that said captain was not guilty of embezzlement, as he did not receive said freight “ for, or in the name or on account of his master," under 24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, 8 68. – Regina v. Cullum, L. R. 2 C. C. 28. Equity, - See JURISDICTION; LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF; MISTAKE; POWER, 2; SETTLEMENT, 3; UNCONSCIONABLE BARGAIN; VENDOR AND PURCHASER, 1.
ESTOPPEL. The plaintiff, the executor under a will, gave notice of the existence of the will to the defendant, the executor under a previous will, and entered a caveat. Before contentious proceedings the plaintiff withdrew the caveat, stating to the defendant that he did not intend to prove the last executed will, and that he was willing that administration under the first executed will should be granted to the defendant. Subsequently the plaintiff obtained a citation calling upon the defendant to bring in the administration, and he filed his declaration setting forth the last executed will. Held, that the plaintiff was not estopped from maintaining the action, — Goddard v. Smith, L. R. 3 P. & D. 7.
EVIDENCE. A testator gave legacies to J. B., N. L., and J. D. C. W., curates of the T. Church. At the time of the testator's death, said first two persons, together with a third person, were curates of said church ; but said J. D. C. W. never had been a curate of the church. Held, that evidence to show that it was not the testator's intention to give a legacy to said W. was inadmissible. — Farrer v. St. Catharine's College, Cambridge, L. R. 16 Eq. 19.
See DOMICILE; LIBEL; RAILWAY, 2; Will, 3, 5,
EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS. 1. Executors carried on the testator's business as authorized by him. The plaintiff alleged that he had become a creditor since the testator's decease, and, on behalf of himself and all other creditors of the testator, prayed for general administration of the testator's personal estate, for a receiver, and for accounts, without suggesting insolvency of the estate. Held, that the plaintiff's remedy was by action at law. – Owen v. Delamere, L. R. 15 Eq. 134.
2. A married woman died intestate in 1856. Her husband was last heard of in Australia, in 1853. The court refused administration to the woman's next of kin without citing the husband or his representatives. — In the Goods of Nicholls, L. R. 2 P. & D. 461.
3. The court refused to pass over the widow in appointing an administrator to an intestate's estate, although the widow had been separated by judicial decree from her husband, by reason of her cruelty. - In the Goods of Ihler, L. R. 3 P. & D. 50. See ESTOPPEL; MARSHALLING ASSETS; Will, 2, 5. EXPECTANT HEIR.— See UNCONSCIONABLE BARGAIN.
Fact, MISTAKE OF- See COMPANY, 3.
FOREIGN STATE. — See ADMIRALTY.
FRAUDS, STATUTE OF. 1. The plaintiff agreed to purchase land of A. He then verbally agreed to assign the contract to B. upon certain conditions. Subsequently the plaintiff assigned said contract to B., leaving out said conditions at B.'s request. B. paid a deposit to A. according to the terms of said contract, and then repudiated said conditions, and the plaintiff filed a bill to have said assignment set aside. Hed, that said assignment was but machinery subsidiary to and for the purposes of the verbal agreement, and that any use of it inconsistent with said agreement Fas fraudulent. Also that the bill was not demurrable for want of an offer to repay to B. the deposit he had paid A. - Jervis v. Berridge, L. R. 8 Ch. 351.
2. The plaintiff, being the customer of a bank, requested the bank to make inquiries concerning the credit of R. The manager of the bank wrote to the manager of a banking company inquiring R.'s standing. G., the manager of said company, wrote a reply, signed by G. as manager, in which he knowingly made false representations as to R.'s credit, in consequence of which the plaintiff supplied R. with goods, for which the plaintiff was never paid. The plaintiff sued R. and W., the registered public officer of the company. Held, that Go's signature was the signature of the company; that the representation as to R.'s credit was a representation of the bank; that, according to the custom found by the jury, it must be intended that G.'s answer was sent, not merely for the use of said bank, but for the benefit of the customer on whose behalf said inquiry was made ; that the company was liable for the false representations of G. made in the course of conducting the company's business, and that in an action of tort both R. and W. might be sued jointly. - Swift v. Winterbotham, L. R. 8 Q. B. 214.
FREIGHT. The defendant shipped upon the plaintiff's vessel petroleum to be delivered at Havre, and to be taken out within twenty-four hours after arrival, or pay £10 a day demurrage. The authorities at Havre refused to permit the petroleum to be landed, and it was taken by direction of the ship's broker to Honfleur and Trouville, but permission to land was there also refused. The vessel then returned to Havre and transshipped the petroleum into lighters hired by G., but being obliged to reship it by the authorities, sailed back to London. Held, that