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DIGEST OF THE ENGLISH LAW REPORTS FOR MAY,
JUNE, AND JULY, 1873.
ABANDONMENT. — See INSURANCE, 3. Action. — See Costs, 1; EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS, 1; FRAUDS,
STATUTE OF, 2; INNKEEPER. ADMINISTRATION. — See ExecUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS; MARSHALLING
ADMIRALTY. The Court of Admiralty is the tribunal to determine whether a vessel owned by a sovereign prince, but apparently not a vessel of war nor a vessel employed for purposes of state, is entitled to the immunity from arrest enjoyed by ships of war and ships used for government purposes. Writ of prohibition refused. — In the Matter of The Charkieh, L. R. 8 Q. B. 197.
ADMIRALTY COURT. — See BOTTOMRY BOND.
ADULTERY. — See DIVORCE.
ALIMONY. The court can allow permanent alimony upon a petition filed after decree of divorce. — Covell v. Covell, L. R. 2 P. & D. 411.
AMALGAMATION. — See COMPANY, 3.
ANTICIPATION. W., who had a power of appointment over a fund subject to a trust to herself for life without power of anticipation, executed the power in favor of her mother. Subsequently she purported to execute the power in favor of her husband, who was enabled, by depositing the appointment as security, to obtain advances from the plaintiff. Held, that the plaintiff was not entitled to impound the income of said fund during the life of W.- Arnold v. Woodhams, L. R. 16 Eq. 29.
APPEAL. — See TENDER.
APPOINTMENT. A testator devised property in trust for A. for life and after A.'s death upon trust for A.'s children or some of them, as A. should by deed or will appoint. A. by will appointed a sixth of said property in trust for each of her six children living at the testator's decease for life, remainder to be held upon such trusts and for such purposes as each child should by will appoint, with limitations over in default of such appointment. Held, that A.'s power of appointment was well executed. — Slark v. Dakyns, L. R. 15 Eq. 307.
See ANTICIPATION; LIEN, 2; POWER, 1; PRIORITY; SETTLEMENT.
ATTORNEY. By statute, notice of appeal must be signed “ by the person giving the same or by his attorney.” A notice of appeal signed by a clerk of the appellant's attorney with authority of the appellant, held, valid. — Regina v. Justices of Kent, L. R. 8 Q. B. 305.
AWARD. — See SPECIALTY DEBT.
BANKRUPTCY. 1. A plea that the plaintiffs claim on a contract, giving them a fraudulent preference, must aver that proceedings in liquidation had begun or were imminent when the contract was entered into. - McKewan v. Sanderson, L. R. 15 Eq. 229.
2. Where a person had been adjudicated insolvent upon his own petition in Australia, upon a question whether a fund belonged to the insolvent in England, the court refused to consider whether claims allowed in Australia had been there properly proved. — In re Davidson's Settlement Trusts, L. R. 15 Eq. 383.
3. By statute all goods in the possession, order, or disposition of a bankrupt trader by consent of the true owner, of which goods the bankrupt is reputed owner, are property of the bankrupt divisible among his creditors. Certain butts of whiskey were sold by C. in Liverpool, and delivery orders sent to the purchaser, and a warrant stating that C. held said butts to the order of the purchaser, who was to pay a warehouse rent. It was shown to be the custom of the spirit trade of Liverpool for a purchaser to allow his goods to remain in the vendor's warehouse after they had been paid for, until required by the purchaser for use. Held, that said custom excluded the presumption that said butts belonged to C., and that they did not pass to his trustee in bankruptcy. – Ex parte Watkins, In re Couston, L. R. 8 Ch. 520.
4. The bankrupts owed P. a certain cash balance at the time of their bankruptcy. Bills in part-payment had been accepted by the bankrupts and negotiated by P. and proved by the holder. P. bad accepted also bills for the bankrupts for a consideration which had failed, and the bills were in the hands of third parties who had proved them. Held, that P. could only prove for the cash balance less the amount of the bills given in part-payment thereof. — Ex parte, Macredie. In re Charles, L. R. 8 Ch. 535.
6. H. agreed to supply steam-power to S. for driving looms for twenty-one years at a certain rent for each loom payable in advance The agreement might be terminated at H.'s option in case of the bankruptcy of S. S. subsequently
assigned the benefit of his agreement to W. H. then mortgaged his mill, containing the steam-power, and the mortgagee took possession and refused to supply W. with steam-power; and, in consequence, W. was obliged to pay a certain increased rent for steam-power. H. became bankrupt. Held, that said agreement was not unilateral, and that the damages were capable of being estimated and could be proved in the bankruptcy proceedings. — Ex parte Waters. In re Hoyle, L. R. 8 Ch. 563.
See LIMITATION; PARTNERSHIP, 2; TROVER. BEQUEST. — See APPOINTMENT; CHARITY; Class; CONDITION; EVIDENCE; LIMITATION; Trust; UNDUE INFLUENCE; VESTED INTEREST.
BILL IN EQUITY. The plaintiffs brought a bill to restrain the defendants from issuing a prospectus of a limited company to be formed to carry on auction and land-agency business. The bill alleged facts showing that said prospectus was calculated to make the public believe that said business of the defendants was the business carried on by the plaintiffs' well-known firm. The bill then stated that one of the defendants had been committed for trial on the charge of attempting to defraud by false checks; and that a correct report of the trial appeared in the. Times, a copy of which was annexed; that the money in respect of which said charge was made was subsequently paid by a relative and said prosecution abandoned. Held, that the bill was scandalous. — Christie v. Christie, L. R. 8 Ch. 499. See DISCOVERY, 1.
BILLS AND NOTES. Declaration upon a bill of exchange payable four months after date. Plea traversing acceptance. Held, that under said plea the defendant might show that the original date of the bill had been altered to a later date. - Hirschman v. Budd, L. R. 8 Ex. 171. See BANKRUPTCY, 4.
BLANK. — See Class.
BOTTOMRY BOND. The plaintiffs brought an action in a county court against the “owners unknown of the Elpis," and the case was removed to the Admiralty Court. The claim was for necessary repairs on the Elpis furnished upon the security of an instrument by which the master bound himself, the vessel and owners, to pay for the repairs except in case of the total loss of the vessel. Held, that said instrument was in effect a bottomry bond and that the county court had no jurisdiction; and that the Admiralty Court therefore had no jurisdiction, as the case came before it by removal from the county court. Also, that the plaintiff could not waive the bond and claim for necessaries independently of the bond; all claim for necessaries supplied was merged in the bond. — The Elpis, L. R. 4 Ad. & Ec. 1.
CANCELLATION. - See WILL, 7.
CARRIER. By agreement between the defendant railway and the G. N. Railway it was provided that there should be a complete interchange of traffic from all parts of one company to all parts of the other, the stock of the two companies being treated as one stock; and that the two companies should aid each other in every possible way as if the whole concerns of both companies were amalgamated. The G. N. Railway received a cow from the plaintiff to be conveyed to S., a place upon the defendant's line, under a contract which provided that the G. N. Railway should not be liable for injury caused by the kicking, plunging, or restiveness of the cow. On arriving at S., the defendant's porter began to unfasten the railway truck to let the cow out, but was warned by the plaintiff not to do 80. The cow was let out into a cow-pen, jumped out of the pen, and was killed. Held, first, that the action was rightly brought against the defendant, as under the above agreement it was either partner with the G. N. Railway Company or the latter company was acting as agent of the defendant in making said contract with the plaintiff; and, secondly, that the defendant was liable for want of reasonable care in delivering said cow, notwithstanding the terms of said contract; and that, as a matter of fact, the defendant's porter was guilty of negligence in letting the cow out of the truck as above. — Gill v. Manchester Railway Co., L. R. 8 Q. B. 186. See RAILWAY.
CHARITY. A testator devised certain houses to a corporation “for this intent and purpose, and upon this condition," that it should yearly distribute £8 in certain charities; and he directed that the rest of the profits of the houses should be bestowed upon repairs; and in case the corporation should leave any of these things undone, then the testator's next of kin were to enter and hold the houses upon the same condition. At the testator's death the annual value of the property was £95.4, and its present value was £330. In 1790, over 200 years after the date of the will, the corporation purchased land adjoining the devised premises, and the two estates were thrown together and built over, and now formed one set of premises. Held, first, that the whole of said increased annual value was applicable to charitable purposes; secondly, that said land purchased by said corporation belonged to it, and that there must be a separation and division of the two pieces of land, or an apportionment of the rents arising therefrom. Attorney-General v. Wax Chandlers' Co., L. R. 6 H. L. 1; s. c. L. R. 5 Ch. 503; L. R. 8 Eq. 452 ; 4 Am. Law Rev. 463; 5 Am. Law Rev. 293.
CHARTER-PARTY. - See CONTRACT, 2.
CLASS. Bequest “ unto each of my four nieces,
, the daughters of my deceased brother Y., the sum of £500.” Y. had five daughters at the date of the will and of the death of the testator. Held, that the above blank did not affect the general rule, and that said five children took £500 each as members of a class. – McKechnie v. Vaughan, L. R. 15 Eq. 289.
CODICIL. — See LEGACY, 4; WILL, 5, 6, 8.
COLLISION. For discussion of duties of steam-vessels in navigating the Thames, see Malcomson v. The General Steam Navigation Co.; The Ranger v. The Cologne, L. R. 4 P. C. 519. See PENALTY.
COMMON CARRIER. — See CARRIER.
COMPANY. 1. The A. company, limited, and the B. company, unlimited, consolidated. A stockholder in the A. company applied, in June, for ten shares in the consolidated company “ if limited.” The directors of the consolidated company replied that they had allotted him ten shares in the « United Ports and General Insurance Company,” being said consolidated company. Nothing more was done by the applicant until November, when the consolidated company was wound up. Held, that the absence of the word “limited” after the name of said consolidated company was notice to said applicant that the company was unlimited, and that under the circumstances said applicant had lost all rights to relief from being placed upon the list of contributories. — Perrett's Case, L. R. 15 Eq. 251.
2. The plaintiff through his broker sold fifteen shares of stock. The name of W. K. was given by the purchasing broker as that of his principal. W. K. was an infant, and therefore the plaintiff's name was placed upon the list of contributories. The plaintiff filed a bill against the purchasing brokers, who disclosed as their principals A., B., and C., who were the purchasers of 30, 40, and 30 shares respectively; all of the shares having been bought at the same time, and including in their number said fifteen shares. Upon an amended bill, held, that the plaintiff was a trustee of said fifteen shares for A., B., and C., who were bound to procure a release of the plaintiff from the payment of calls, and to indemnify him against all expenses in respect of such shares. — Brown v. Black, L. R. 15 Eq. 363.
3. The A. and B. banks agreed to consolidate. The A. bank was to be wound up and new shares in the consolidated bank were to be issued to the stockholders in the A. bank on their paying £6 premium per share, and they were also to be credited £5 per share. The plaintiff was allotted twenty-five shares in the consolidated company, paid £150, and was credited with £125 in addition. Said amalgamation was declared ultra vires and void, and the plaintiff demanded return of £275. Held, that the plaintiff was entitled to the return of said £150, but not of said £125. — In re Bank of Hindustan, China, and Japan. Ex parte Alison, L. R. 15 Eq. 394.
4. An agreement to place shares is not equivalent to an agreement to take shares, and will not render the contracting party liable as a contributory. - Garrisson's Case, L. R. 8 Ch. 507.
CONDITION. A testator bequeathed £17,000 to F., provided F. relinquished, within six months after attaining twenty-one, all his interest under his father's marriage settlement. In case of neglect the legacy to be reduced to £12,000, and £5000 to fall into the residue. F. was ignorant of the legacy until more than six months after his attaining twenty-one, but subsequently relinquished his interest