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PREROGATIVE. Ejectment lies against an officer in the United States army for land occupied by him for military purposes under orders of the President and Secretary of War. - Polack v. Mansfield, 44 Cal. 36.
PRIVILEGE. — See ATTORNEY, 1.
PROCLAMATION. The President's proclamation removing restraints on trading with certain states theretofore in rebellion, was signed and sealed with the seal of the United States on June 24, 1865, but was not published in the newspapers or otherwise till June 27. Held, that it took effect from the former date. (MILLER, FIELD, BRADLEY, and Hunt, JJ., dissenting.) – Lapeyre v. United States, 17 Wall. 191.
PROFANE SWEARING. - See BY-LAW.
PROHIBITION. The Supreme Court of Mississippi, having only appellate jurisdiction, refused to grant a writ of prohibition. — Planters' Ins. Co. v. Cramer, 47 Miss. 200.
PUBLICATION. — See PROCLAMATION.
Public Policy. Plaintiff and defendant agreed that plaintiff should endeavor to obtain from the legislature a grant of a franchise to defendant, and should enjoy half the profits thereof, The franchise was granted to defendant, who refused to allow plaintiff any share in the profits; and plaintiff brought a bill to enforce the agreement. Held, that the agreement was against public policy and void, and the bill not sustainable. — Powell v. Maguire, 43 Cal. 12. RAILROAD. — See CARRIER, 2; ConstitUTIONAL LAW, 4, 7, 9; Constitu
TIONAL LAW, STATE, 9; CORPORATION, 1, 2; EMINENT DOMAIN; MASTER
RATIFICATION. — See MARRIAGE.
RECORD. — See EVIDENCE, 2; STATUTE.
RELEASE. — See DOWER, 1.
REMOVAL OF SUITS FROM STATE TO UNITED STATES COURTS. Plaintiff sued defendants before a justice of the peace, recovered judgment, and defendants appealed to a higher court. Held, that a motion made in the latter court to remove the cause into the United States Circuit Court was not too late, the trial before the justice not being a final hearing, within the meaning of the act of Congress. — Rathbone Oil Trust Co. v. Ranch, 5 W. Va. 79.
REPEAL. By statute, an action might be brought within six months after the dismissal of a prior action for the same cause, although the Statute of Limitations would
have barred it as an original demand. A subsequent statute enacted that all actions of certain classes should be brought by a certain date, “or the right of the plaintiff, and all rights of action for its enforcement, shall be for ever barred." Held, that the second statute was pro tanto a repeal of the first. (WARNER, C. J., dissenting.) — Adams v. Davis, 47 Ga. 339.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 8.
RETURN. The sheriff's return on a writ showed that he had served it, by leaving a copy of the summons at the defendant's usual place of residence. On motion to quash the writ for defective service, held, that evidence was admissible to show that the place where the summons was left was not in fact the defendant's residence. - Bond v. Wilson, 8 Kans. 228. See MONEY
RULE IN SHELLEY'S CASE. Devise to “my son R. during his life, and after his death to his issue, by him lawfully begotten of his body, to such issue, their heirs and assigns for ever. In case he shall die without lawful issue, then to my wife and my two sisters, during the life of each, and to the survivor, and, after the death of all of them, to W." Held, that R. took but an estate for life. — Daniel v. Whartenby, 17 Wall. 639. SALE. — See FRAUDS, STATUTE OF, 2, 5; GUARDIAN; PARTIES, 1. SEPARATE EstatE. — See HUSBAND AND WIFE.
SERVICE. — See RETURN.
SHERIFF. 1. Where the sheriff was required by law to advertise sales of land for nonpayment of taxes, and to collect the expense of advertising in the bill of costs, for the use of the persons entitled, held, that he was liable to the publisher for the expense of advertising. — Moore v. Magee, 48 Miss. 567.
2. A sheriff is not indictable for taking in good faith the property of A. on an execution against B. — State v. Tatom, 69 N. C. 35. See Money; RETURN.
SLAVE. — See MARRIAGE. .
SOLDIER. — See PREROGATIVE.
STATUTE. Although a statute appears to be duly enrolled and certified by the proper officers, and published by authority as the law of the state, it is competent for a court to refer to the journals of the legislature to ascertain whether the statute actually was passed. Opinion of the Justices, 52 N. H. 622; and see the reporter's note, ib. 625. Acc. Osburn v. Staley, 5 W. Va. 85. (BERKSHIRE, P., dissenting.) Contra, People v. Burt, 43 Cal. 560. See GUARDIAN; REPEAL.
STATUTE OF FRAUDS. — See FRAUDS, STATUTE OF.
STOCK. Bondholders of a railroad agreed to exchange their bonds for preferred stock, the same to be seven per cent stock, and to share with the common stock any surplus earned over seven per cent on both in any year. By an indenture made in execution of this arrangement, it was covenanted that holders of preferred stock should be entitled to a dividend of seven per cent per annum before any dividend was paid on other stock, and to an equal dividend with said other stock in the earnings beyond said seven per cent. The certificates issued to the preferred stockholders purported to be made pursuant to the indenture, and to entitle the holders to receive all the net earnings divided each year under the indenture up to $7 per share, and to share in any surplus beyond $7 per share, which might be divided on the common stock. Held, that after the preferred stockholders received seven per cent, the common stockholders were entitled to an equal sum before the preferred ones got more. - Bailey v. Hannibal & St. Jo. R.R. Co., 17 Wall. 96.
See DAMAGES, 2; PLEDGE.
SUBSCRIPTION: In consideration of an agreement by W. to build a hotel in a town, and of the benefits to accrue to them therefrom, certain land-owners in the town agreed to pay him a certain sum. Afterwards defendant, with others, signed a paper whereby each subscriber“ for himself agreed to give the sum set opposite his name,” to enable the contract with W. to be carried out. The hotel was built. Held, that defendant's subscription was without consideration, and that he was not liable for it. — Culver v. Banning, 19 Minn. 303.
Tax. 1. By the law of Kansas, property is taxable to the person who holds it on the 1st of March. A resident of that state, having a large balance at a bank, on February 28th drew it all in legal-tender notes, exempt from taxation, and returned the notes, in a parcel sealed up, to the bank as a special deposit, and on March 3d took them out again, and deposited them in the ordinary way on his current account. Held, that he was taxable on the amount of his deposit. — Mitchell v. Leavenworth County, 9 Kans, 344.
2. Sale of mortgaged land for taxes, without notice to the mortgagee, held, invalid. — Whitehurst v. Gaskill, 69 N. C. 449.
3. By act of Congress, railroad companies indebted for money for which interest-bearing bonds had been issued, were taxable on all interest payable on such bonds. A city lent to a railroad company money raised by the issue of its bonds, the interest on which the company undertook to pay. Held, that a tax on this interest was a tax not on the company, but on the city, and therefore unconstitutional. (CLIFFORD and MILLER, JJ., dissenting.) - United States v. Balt. & O. R.R. Co., 17 Wall. 322. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 4; CONSTITUTIONAL Law, STATE, 7.
TENANT IN COMMON. Ejectment. Plaintiff claimed title as one of several tenants in common. Defendant relied on a judgment obtained by him against all the tenants in com
mon except plaintiff. Held, that plaintiff was entitled to recover the whole property. – Williams v. Sutton, 43 Cal. 65.
TENANT FOR LIFE. — See RULE IN SHELLEY'S CASE.
TIME. — See PROCLAMATION.
TRUST. — See PLEDGE; POWER; PRECATORY Trust.
VENUE. Where a new county was set off, composed of parts of several counties, held, that an offence committed in the territory set off before the division, could be prosecuted only in the new county, - State v. Donaldson, 3 Heisk. 48. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, STATE, 4, 5.
VoID and VOIDABLE. — See DowER, 1. VOTER. — See CITIZEN ; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 3; CONSTITUTIONAL Law,
WAGER. Defendants were captains of two contesting parties at a squirrel hunt, where it was agreed that the losers should pay for suppers for both parties, and contracted with plaintiff for the suppers. Plaintiff knew that the suppers were ultimately to be paid for by the losers of the wager. Held, that he could recover of defendants the price of the suppers. — Winchester v. Nutter, 52 N. H. 507.
1. The horse of plaintiff, a resident of Tennessee, was taken during the war by defendant, a soldier, by order of his superior officer, for the use of the United States army. Held, no conversion. — Thomasson v. Glisson, 4 Heisk. 615.
2. The horse of defendant, a Union man, was captured by Confederate soldiers. An officer of the Federal army took away a horse from plaintiff, who had “ voted for the ordinance of secession," and gave it to defendant. Held, that defendant was liable to plaintiff in trover. — Moran v. Smell, 5 W. Va. 26.
See EXECUTOR, 1; FORECLOSURE, 1; ILLEGAL CONTRACT; Jus PostLIMINII; MONEY; OFFICER, 3.
Way. — See EVIDENCE, 3; EXCEPTION. WILL. — See DEVISE; PRECATORY TRUST; RULE IN SHELLEY'S CASE.
WITNESS. An Indian who had no exact idea of an oath, but supposed he would be hanged if he told a lie, held, a competent witness. — Smith v. Brown, 8 Kans.