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RESIDUARY GIFT. — See ADEMPTION, 2.
Right OF Way. — See Way.
SEAL. — See CORPORATION.
SET-OFF. Action for goods sold and delivered. Plea, that the goods were sold to the defendants by S., then being agent of the plaintiffs and intrusted by them with the possession of the goods as apparent owners thereof, and that S. sold the goods in his own name and as his own goods with consent of plaintiffs; that the defendants did not know that S. was the plaintiff's agent; and that before they did know that the plaintiffs owned said goods or that S. was their agent, S. became indebted to the defendants in an amount equal to the plaintiffs' claim. Replication that the defendants had the means of knowing that S. was only agent of the plaintiffs. Held, that the plea was good, and the replication no answer to it. – Borries v. Imperial Ottoman Bank, L. R. 9 C. P. 38.
1. In a marriage settlement, a covenant to settle property acquired after the marriage is to be construed as applying only to property acquired during the coverture, although the usual words, “ during the intended coverture,” were omitted from the settlement.-In re Edwards. In re London, Brighton, & South Coast Railways Act, L. R. 9 Ch. 97.
2. A testator devised his P. estates in trust for C., the second son of A., provided that if C. should become entitled in possession to the S. estates, then said trusts in favor of C. were to cease. The S. estates had been settled upon A. in tail male. A., with his eldest son B., executed a disentailing deed of the S. estates, limiting a portion thereof to A. in fee, and the remainder to such uses as A. and B. should appoint. A. and B. accordingly appointed to A. for life, with power of creating a certain charge, remainder as B. and C. should appoint. A. created said cbarge. B. and C. appointed, subject to a life-estate in B., to the use of C.'s daughter for life, with remainders over until the entail in the P. estate should be barred; then to the use of C. for life, remainder to C.'s first and other sons in tail male. B. died, and subsequently A. died. Held, that as C. acquired the S. estates under a new title, and as said estates were destroyed in identity in point of quantity and value, said proviso did not take effect, and C. did not lose the P. estates. — Meyrick v. Laws. Meyrick v. Mathias, L. R. 9 Ch. 237. See ANNUITY; COVENANT, 1.
SHAREHOLDER. — See COMPANY, 1, 3. SHIP. – See BILL OF LADING; CAPTURE; CHARTER-PARTY; COLLISION; FREIGHT; INJUNCTION; NEGLIGENCE, 1, 2.
SLANDER. Declaration that the defendant falsely said of the plaintiff, a stone-mason, “ He was the ringleader of the nine-hours system,” and “He has ruined the town by bringing about the nine-hours system, and he has stopped several good jobs from being carried out by being the ringleader of the system at L.," whereby the plaintiff was discharged from his position as mason in certain works. Held, that said words were not defamatory in themselves; and were not connected with the trade of the plaintiff, either by averment or by implication; and were therefore not actionable, even though followed by damage. — Miller v. David, L. R. 9 C. P.118. See PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS, 2.
SOLICITOR. — See Trust.
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE. 1. The defendant contracted to deliver to the plaintiff the whole of the get of coal raised from a colliery leased by the defendant, and not to be less in quantity than a specified amount. Subsequently the defendant contracted to sell the colliery to R. Held, that the court had no jurisdiction to grant an injunction restraining the defendant from selling the colliery. It seems that a court of equity will not restrain the breach of a contract which it cannot specifically perform. — Fothergill v. Rowland, L. R. 17 Eq. 132.
2. A. agreed in writing to lease a wine-cellar from B. for twenty years from a certain future date. As inducement to the agreement, B. had promised to make the cellar dry. A. entered into possession, and remained there two years, but, finding that the cellar had not been made dry, complained of the dampness to B., and paid his rent under protest. B. brought a bill for specific performance of said agreement by the execution of lease in accordance therewith. Held, that A. had not precluded himself from setting up in answer to the bill non-performance of the agreement to keep dry. Bill dismissed. — Lamare v. Dixon, L. R. • 6 H. L. 414.
STABLE-KEEPER. - See BAILMENT.
Taxes. - See POOR-RATE.
TITHE. — See INTERROGATORY, 1.
TRESPASS. 1. H. brought ejectment against S., who set up adverse possession for twenty years, and H. was nonsuited. H. then went to the land in question and cut down a tree, and threatened to cut down more. Held, that cutting down the tree was not evidence of possession, but only a trespass, and H. was enjoined from cutting down any more trees. — Stanford v. Hurlstone, L. R. 9 Ch. 116.
2. In the defendant's land were hollows caused by the subsidence of the ground over spots which had been worked out in mining operations. Heavy rains caused
water to overflow from a watercourse running over the land into the hollows, thence into the defendant's mines, and thence into the plaintiff's mines. The defendant had diverted the watercourse, and thereby lessened its liability to overflow. The defendant had not been guilty of negligence in working his mines; and he offered evidence to show that he had taken all reasonable precautions to guard against emergencies. The judge excluded the evidence, and directed a verdict for the plaintiff. Held, that said evidence should have been admitted ; and that the opinion of the jury should be taken as to whether what was done by the defendant was done in the ordinary, reasonable, and proper mode of working the mine. New trial ordered. — Smith v. Fletcher, L. R. 9 Ex. (Ex. Ch.) 64; s. c. L. R. 7 Ex. 305; 7 Am. Law Rev. 300. See INJUNCTION, 2.
TROVER. The purchaser of goods which remain in the vendor's possession, and subject to his lien for the purchase-money, cannot maintain trover against a third party for their conversion. — Lord v. Price, L. R. 9 Ex. 54.
TRUST. A., a trustee, appointed B. a trustee of half of the trust-fund against the terms of the trust. A.'s solicitor advised against said appointment, but drew a deed of transfer from A. and a deed of indemnity from B.; and he also introduced A. to a broker, for the purpose of enabling him to sell a portion of the trust-fund for payment of costs. B.'s solicitor examined and approved the deed appointing B. trustee, but warned B.'s wife, who was a cestui que trust, of the consequences which might follow a change in the trust. B. subsequently misapplied the trust. fund held by him. Held, that the solicitors of A. and B. were not liable for the misapplication of said trust-fund by B. – Barnes v. Addy, L. R. 9 Ch. 244. See DEVISE, 2.
Tug. — See NEGLIGENCE, 1.
VALUE. — See POOR-RATE.
WATER. — See MINES.
Way. A railway company took land for the railway under statutory powers, and, in accordance with their contract with the owner of the land, built level crossings connecting the portions of the land separated by the railway. Said land was, at the time of the contract, subject to a statutory provision against being built upon. This prohibition was subsequently removed, and the land was built upon. The company objected to the occupants of the houses crossing their line at said crossings. Held, that the right to use said crossings was not restricted to purposes for which the land adjoining the railway was used at the time of said contract, and that said occupants might use said crossings, but so as not to obstruct the proper working of the railway. — United Land Co. v. Great Eastern Railway Co., L. R. 17 Eq. 158.
WILL. 1. Declarations of a testator that he had destroyed his will were admitted, not as evidence of such destruction, but as evidence of intention, from which, when united with other circumstances, destruction may be inferred. – Keen v. Keen, L. R. 3 P. & D. 105.
2. The court allowed, with consent of all parties, proof of a will, reserving power to the executor to prove certain codicils not in the country, upon his filing an undertaking to prove such codicils as soon as they, or an exemplication thereof, should come to his hands. — In re Goods of Roberts, L. R. 3 P. & D. 110.
See ADEMPTION; ANNUITY; DEVISE; ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN; LEGACY; LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF; SETTLEMENT, 2.
WITNESS. - See INTERROGATORIES, 2.
“ Lands.” — See DEVISE, 3.
“ Say about.” — See CONTRACT, 4.
SELECTED DIGEST OF STATE REPORTS.
[For the present number of the Digest, selections have been made from the following volumes of State Reports : 42, 43, and 44 California; 47 Georgia; 3 and 4 Heiskell (Tennessee); 41 Indiana; 8 and 9 Kansas ; 26 Michigan; 19 Minnesota ; 47 and 48 Mississippi; 52 New Hampshire; 53 New York; 69 North Carolina; 36 Texas; and 5 West Virginia; also from 17 Wallace (Supreme Court of the United States).]
ABATEMENT. Plaintiff gave defendant written notice that he discontinued an action which he had brought against him, and immediately commenced another action for the same cause, to which defendant pleaded in abatement the pendency of the first action. Held, that the plea was good, and that it was immaterial whether or not the second action was vexatious. — Gamsby v. Ray, 52 N. H. 513. See MANDAMUS.
Action. 1. Defendant claimed title to land occupied by other persons, who threatened to resist by force any interference with their possession. Defendant knowing this, but not communicating it to plaintiff, employed plaintiff to go with him to the land and pull down a fence; in doing which plaintiff was shot by the persons in possession. Held, that he might recover against defendant for the damage so suffered by him. — Baxter v. Roberts, 44 Cal. 187. :
2. Defendant and others were a committee of a town to make improvements about a pond for the purpose of supplying the town with water; in so doing they made a contract with N. to clear, for a certain price, some land belonging to the town, adjacent to the pond. By the negligence of N., in burning brush on that land, fire escaped on to plaintiff's land, and did damage. Held, that defendant was not liable. — Wright v. Holbrook, 52 N. H. 120.
See CARRIER, 2; DoWER, 2; EXECUTOR, 2; INSURANCE (LIFE); MASTER AND SERVANT, 1; MORTGAGE; PARTIES, 1; PASSENGER, 1, 2, 3; SHERIFF, 1; WAGER.
ADMINISTRATOR. — See EXECUTOR AND ADMINISTRATOR.
ADMIRALTY. — See CONSTITUTIONAL Law, 1.
ADVERTISEMENT. — See SHERIFF, 1.
AGENT. Where a firm are employed as agents, their authority is determined by the death of one partner. — Martine v. International Life Ins. Society, 53 N. Y. 339.
See ACTION, 2; FORGERY.