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INSURANCE. 1. A policy of insurance upon the life of G. was assigned to trustees, to hold the proceeds for the benefit of C. for life, remainder upon such trusts as C. should appoint. The trustees had power to pay the premiums. C. subsequently, by deed to which G. was party, appointed the policy and moneys to become due thereon to the plaintiffs to secure certain advances. The plaintiffs, in consequence of said trustees and C. neglecting to pay the premiums, paid them themselves, and kept the policy alive. On the death of G. the trustees refused to pay any of the policy money to the plaintiffs. Held, that the plaintiffs were entitled to be repaid the amount they had paid in premiums with interest. — Gill v. Doroning, L. R. 17 Eq. 316.
2. A. obtained a certificate of insurance on flour in his own name. The certíficate stated that the insurance was to be subject to all the provisions contained in the policies of the insurance company. It was the custom of the company to issue to the holder of the certificate a policy running thus: “I, A., as well in my own name as for and in the name of every other person to whom the same doth, may, or shall appertain,” do make insurance, &c.; and it was a condition of the policy that an action should be brought within one year after the loss. The above flour belonged to B., and was shipped by A., consigned to B. on board a vessel which was last seen afloat on the 22d of November, 1867, in the Gulf of St. Lawrence, where a few days later a violent storm raged. The vessel was found, bottom up, ashore in May, 1868, when part of the flour was recovered and necessarily sold at an intermediate port, realizing about a quarter of the insured value. An action on the policy was brought by B. in March, 1869. Held, that B. was entitled to bring the action in his own name; and that the loss did not become total until it was sold at an intermediate port in consequence of the impossibility of carrying it to its destination, and that therefore the action was brought in season. — Browning v. Provincial Insurance Company of Canada, L. R. 5 P. C. 263. See EQUITY; HYPOTHECATION.
INTEREST. - See ADEMPTION, 1.
INTERROGATORIES. 1. In an action by the rector of a parish against the patron of the living, for one-half of the rent of the churchyard and of the tithe rent-charge alleged to have been wrongfully received by the patron, the plaintiff was permitted to administer interrogatories as to the period for which the patron and his predecessors had received the rent and rent-charge, and as to the circumstances under which they had so received them. — Towne v. Cocks, L. R. 9 Ex. 45.
2. In an action for seduction of the plaintiff's daughter, interrogatories as to the defendant's pecuniary means cannot be administered to the defendant; but interrogatories as to whether the defendant had had sexual intercourse with the daughter, and had stated that he believed that she had not had such intercourse with any other man, are allowable. — Hodsoll v. Taylor, L. R. 9 Q. B. 79.
JUDICIAL SEPARATION. — See Divorce, 1.
Jus GENTIUM. – See CRIMINAL Law.
LANDLORD AND TENANT. 1. A part of a house was leased upon condition that, if the lessee should make default in payment of rent“ within twenty-one days after the same shall become due, being demanded,” it should be lawful for the lessor without further proceedings to re-enter. Held, that, to entitle the lessor to re-enter, he must demand rent after the expiration of said twenty-one days. The formalities of a common law demand need not be observed. — Phillips v. Bridge, L. R. 9 C. P. 48.
2. B. demised to the plaintiffs, by an instrument not under seal, “ standings” for three lace-making machines. B. had previously mortgaged the building. The mortgagees subsequently sold the premises to the defendant; but before the sale the plaintiffs attempted to renew their lease with the defendant, but failed so to do. Held, that the defendant was not bound by the demise from B. to the plaintiffs, as it was not by an instrument under seal, as required by Statute 32 Hen. 8, c. 34. — Smith v. Eggington, L. R. 9 C. P. 145.
LEASE. The plaintiff agreed to let, and the defendant to take, a dwelling-house for the term of seven years; upon terms (among others) that the defendant should, during the last year of the term, paint the house. The defendant occupied the house seven years, but neglected to paint the house at the end of the term. Held, that though said agreement was void as a lease, yet that the defendant, by occupying for the whole seven years, bound himself to the performance of his agreement to paint. — Martin v. Smith, L. R. 9 Ex. 50.
See EVIDENCE; LANDLORD AND TENANT, 1; LEGACY; MINES; SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE, 2.
LEGACY. A testator bequeathed to the plaintiff “all and every sums of money which may be due to me at the time of my decease.” Held, that damages recovered by the testator's executrix, for breach of covenant in a lease which took place in the testator's lifetime, passed under the bequest. — Bide v. Harrison, L. R. 17 Eq. 76.
See ADEMPTION; ANNUITY; DEVISE; ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN; SETTLEMENT, 2.
LETTER. — See CONTRACT, 3.
LIEN. The defendants, bankers, who were in the habit of making advances to L. on the security of deeds and documents deposited with them, were held to have no general lien upon a box deposited with them by L., of which L. alone held the keys, and to which he only had access. — Leese v. Martin, L. R. 17 Eq. 224. See TROVER.
LIFE-ESTATE. — See DEVISE, 2.
LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF. A testator died in 1857, and his widow took possession of all the real and personal property, and paid interest upon a debt due from the testator to the plaintiff until February, 1864. In September, 1870, the will was proved, and under it the wife took an estate for life in the testator's property. Held, that the plaintiff's debt was barred by the Statute of Limitations. — Boatwright v. Boatwright, L. R. 17 Eq. 71.
LIQUIDATED DAMAGES. — See CONTRACT, 2.
Loss. — See InsURANCE, 2.
Mines. The Queen possesses the mines in the Isle of Man as of her own original title in the soil. It was held that the holder of a mining lease from the Queen was not liable to make compensation for the withdrawal, by percolation into his mine, of water which would have otherwise flowed into, or would have been retained in, superjacent land. — Ballacorkish Silver, Lead, and Copper Mining Co. v. Harrison, L. R. 5 P. C. 49.
See TRESPASS, 2.
MORTGAGE. 1. A mortgagee in possession, defendant to a bill for redemption, admitting the mortgage to be redeemable, cannot refuse to state the particulars of his accounts as mortgagee. — Elmer v. Creasy, L. R. 9 Ch. 69.
2. A. mortgaged a station and the stock upon it to B., to secure repayment of a certain sum with interest at a certain date, and to secure payment of any bill which the mortgagee might take, make, or indorse, by way of renewal of the note secured by the mortgage. The bill was renewed from time to time by a bank which had discounted it; and the mortgagee paid the discounts on behalf of the mortgagor, and entered the discounts in the same account with other transactions with the mortgagor, debiting him with interest and commissions on the same. Held, that the sums advanced in payment of the discount on the renewed bills were covered by said mortgage, and were not an advance to said mortgagor on his personal security only. — Fenton v. Blackwood, L. R. 5 P. C. 167. See LANDLORD AND TENANT, 2; PRIORITY.
MURDER. — See CRIMINAL LAW.
NEGLIGENCE. 1. A tug, towing a vessel in a thick fog, ran the vessel aground. The vessel had not requested the tug not to proceed. Held, that the vessel was guilty of contributory negligence, and that the tug was not liable for damages. — Smith v. St. Lawrence Tow-boat Co., L. R. 5 P. C. 308.
2. The master of a vessel moored to a buoy which belonged to a private company. The mooring of ships to the buoy was sanctioned by the port authorities. The master also got an anchor in readiness for use in case of necessity. The shackle band of the buoy gave way in a gale, and the vessel drifted. The master endeavored to drop anchor, but its chain became accidentally entangled, and the anchor did not reach bottom until the vessel had collided with another vessel. Held, that under the circumstances the master was guilty of no negligence in mooring to the buoy - Doward v. Lindsay. The William Lindsay, L.R. 5 P. C. 338.
3. The plaintiff, a season-ticket holder, and residing near a station, arrived at the station when it was dark; and hearing the opening and shutting of carriage doors, and seeing another person alight, stepped from his carriage, which had overshot the platform, and fell and was injured. The train had made its final stoppage at the station when the plaintiff got out, and was not afterward backed into the station. Held, (the court having liberty to draw inferences of fact), that there was evidence of negligence on the part of the railway company, and no evidence of contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff. — Weller v. London, Brighton, & South Coast Railway Co., L. R. 9 C. P. 126.
4. The plaintiff was a passenger on the defendant's railway, travelling to B. On arrival at B. the name of the station was called out, and the train stopped, leaving the carriage in which was the plaintiff beyond the platform. The plaintiff attempted to alight; but the train, immediately after stopping as aforesaid, was backed to a proper position in the station, and the plaintiff was thrown down and injured. The plaintiff was familiar with the station. Held, that calling out the name of the station did not amount to an invitation to alight, and that there was no evidence of negligence on the part of the defendant to go to the jury. — Lewis v. London, Chatham, & Dover Railway Co., L. R. 9 Q. B. 66. See TRESPASS, 2. NOTICE. — See BILL OF LADING, 2; CONTRACT, 1; PRIORITY.
NULLITY OF MARRIAGE. — See DIVORCE.
PACKAGE. Pictures were placed in a wagon open at the top. Held, that the pictures were contained in a package within 11 Geo. 4 and 1 Wm. 4, c. 68. – Whaite v. Lancashire & Yorkshire Railway Co., L. R. 9 Ex. 67.
PARTNERSHIP. — See BANKRUPTCY ; PRIORITY.
PERIL OF THE SEAS. — See CHARTER-PARTY.
Piracy. — See CRIMINAL LAW.
PLEADING Declaration that the defendants maliciously and without reasonable cause caused the plaintiff's ship to be arrested for necessaries supplied by H., and to be detained until the proceedings in the court were determined and the ship released. Demurrer. Held, (by BLACKBURN and ARCHIBALD, JJ.; QUAIN, J., dissenting), that by reasonable intendment the declaration must be taken to mean that the proceedings were determined in the plaintiff's favor, and that the declaration was good. — Redway v. McAndrew, L. R, 9 Q. B. 77.
POOR-RATE. A railway company acquired a branch line upon terms which made the own. ers of the branch line become shareholders in said company. In consequence of competition the income from the branch line became very small. It was held, that, in assessing the poor-rate upon the branch line, the fact that three other railway companies with which the branch line connected would pay a high rent for the branch line if it were in the market, was to be taken into account in ascertaining the rent for which the branch line would reasonably rent. — Queen v. London & North Western Railway Co., L. R. 9 Q. B. 134.
PRACTICE. — See INTERROGATORY, 2; Will, 2.
PRIORITY. The tenants in common of certain land entered into partnership under the terms of which the land was to be partnership property; and the business was conducted on the land. One of the partners mortgaged his moiety of the land to secure a private debt. The mortgagee knew that the partnership was in occupation of said land. Said partner absconded, and the remaining partner was obliged to pay the firm debts, whereby a considerable sum became due him on the partnership ac 'ounts. Held, that said mortgagee had constructive notice of the title of the partnership in said land, and that his claim must be postponed to that of the partner. Cavander v. Bulteel, L. R. 9 Ch. 79.
PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS. 1. Confidential communications between a solicitor and client before and with no view to litigation are privileged. Bill' of costs held to be privileged. – Turton v. Barber, L. R. 17 Eq. 329.
2. A. and B. were candidates for Parliament. The chairman of a district committee formed to promote B.'s election, and B.'s election agent, wrote to A.'s election agent, stating that A. had been guilty of bribery. Held, that the communication was not privileged. — Dickeson v. Hilliard, L. R. 9 Ex. 79.
PROBATE. — See WILL, 2.
RAPE. An attempt to have connection with a girl who was to the prisoner's knowledge so idiotic as to be incapable of expressing assent or dissent, held, to be an attempt at rape. — The Queen v. Barratt, L. R. 2 C. C. 81.
RECEIPT. - See BILL OF LADING, 1.
RECOVERY. — See DEVISE, 1.
Rest. — See LANDLORD AND TENANT, 1.