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agreement, by giving the other three months' notice in writing." Held (by Bramwell and Pigott, BB.; Kelley, C. B., dissenting), that at the end of the twelve months either party could end the agreement, without notice. — Langion v. Carleton, L. It. 9 Ex. 57.
2. The plaintiff agreed to sell to the defendant "the house and premises he now occupies, known by the sign of the ' White Hart,' with stabling and garden;" and it was agreed that if either party should refuse to perform the agreement, such party should pay the other " £100 as damages." At the time of the agreement one S. held, under lease, a coach-house and harness room attached to the "White Hart." The defendant refused to complete the agreement, as possession of the coach-house could not be given by the plaintiff. Ueld, that, as the coachhouse was not in the plaintiff's occupation, it was not included in the agreement; but that said £100 was a penalty, and that the plaintiff could only recover damages awarded by a jury. — Magee v. Lavell, L. R. 9 C. P. 107.
3. Action for dismissal from service in breach of alleged contract. The plaintiff had written to the defendant as follows: "Referring to my conversation with you, I now state my willingness to enter the service of your firm for one year, on trial, on the terms; viz., a list of the merchants to be regularly called on by me to be made and corrected as occasion requires. My salary for the year to be £120. If the terms herein specified are in accordance with your ideas, confirm them by return, and I will then enter on my duties on Monday morning next." The defendant answered: " Yours of yesterday embodies the substance of our conversation and terms. If we can define some of the terms a little clearer, it might prevent mistakes; but I think we are quite agreed on all. We shall, therefore, expect you on Monday. I have made a list of customers, which we can consider together." Held, that the letters did not constitute a complete contract . — Appleby V. Johnson, L. R. 9 C. P. 158.
4. A. and B. contracted as follows: "A. sells and B. buys all of the spars manufactured by M., say about 600 red-pine spars, averaging sixteen inches. The above spars will be out of the lot manufactured by J., the lengths of which according to his specification I am satisfied with." The J. lot contained 603 spars, of which 496 averaged sixteen inches. Held, that B. was bound to accept the 496 logs; the words, " say about" 6OO spars, beinjr words of expectation and estimate only, and not of warranty. — McConnel v. Murphy, L. R. 5 P. C. 203.
See Bills And Notes, 2; Company, 1; Corporation; Lease; LimitaTions, Statute Of; Mortgage, 2; Specific Performance.
Contributory Negligence. — See Negligence.
The contract for the engagement of a clerk to the master of a workhouse by a board of guardians, must, in order to bind the guardians, be under seal. — Austin v. Guardians of Bethnal Green, L. R. 9 C. P. 91.
Costs, Bill Of. — See Privileged Communications.
1. A covenant by a solvent trader to settle all future real and personal estate which he should at any time, during his intended coverture, be entitled to upon Vol. Viii. 45
the trusts set forth in the settlement of the property he then owned, held, void ai against creditors, who were entitled to shares acquired by said trader subsequent to said settlement, and which were standing in his name at the time of his bankruptcy.— Ex parte Bolland. In re Clint, L. R. 17 Eq. 115.
2. A husband covenanted in a deed of separation to pay an annuity to hij wife during their joint lives, and so long as they should live separate and apart. Subsequently the husband obtained a divorce for the adultery of his wife. Held, that he was not released from his covenant to pay said annuity. — Charlesicorth v. Holt, L. R. 9 Ex. 38.
3. A. sold a portion of his land to B. by deed, which declared that it was agreed that an adjoining piece of land belonging to A. should never be sold, but left for the common benefit of both parties and their successors. Held, that said clause amounted to an agreement that the piece of land should be left open in the state it was at the date of the deed; and that B.'s vendee might apply to a court of equity to obtain the removal of a building erected upon said land. — McLean v. McKay, 5 P. C. 327.
See Landlord And Tenant, 2; Legacy; Settlement, 1.
Certain Chinese coolies, headed by K., while in a French vessel on the high seas killed the master of the vessel and seized the vessel and ran her ashore on the Chinese coast and escaped. Under an ordinance authorizing magistrates at Hong-Kong to arrest Chinese who, there is probable cause to believe, have committed "any crime or offence against the laws of China," K. was there arrested on a charge of murder. K. was released on habeas corpus, and again arrested on a charge of piracy. Held, that said ordinance covered crimes and offences against the laws of all nations, and not those peculiar to the laws of China; that K., in killing said master, was not guilty of murder within said ordinance; that piracy was not an offence against the law of China within said ordinance; and that if K. was punishable for piracy, it was only because that was a crime which jure gentium is justiciable everywhere. Also, that K. could not be released on habeas corpus from the second arrest, on the ground that he was committed a second time for the same offence, contrary to 31 Car. 2, c. 2, § 6. This section only applies when the second arrest is substantially for the same cause as the first, so that the return to the second writ of habeas corpus raises for the opinion of the court the same question with reference to the validity of the grounds of detention as the first. — Attorney-General for the Colony of Hong-Kong v. Kwok-a-Sing, L. R. 5 P. C. 179.
Cruelty. — See Divorce, 1, 2.
1. A testator devised a freehold estate to trustees and their heirs in trust to stand seised of the same during the life of A., and also, until the whole of the testator's debts were paid, upon trust to set and let the same, and apply the rents and the value of whatever timber may be considered at its best growth, in discharge of said debts; and after said debts were paid, upon further trust to pay over the rents to A. during his life; and after A.'s death the testator gave said estate to the heirs of the body of A. After said debts were paid, said trustees conveyed said estate to A. for life; who subsequently suffered a common recovery, and then mortgaged the estate. After A.'s death his eldest son filed a bill against the mortgagee, alleging that under said devise A. was only equitable tenant for life; that the limitation to the heirs of the body of A. was a legal contingent remainder; that such remainder was intended to be supported by the legal estate in said trustees; that their conveyance to A. was a breach of trust, of which said mortgagee had notice; and praying that said mortgagee might be declared a trustee of the property for the plaintiff. Held, that said trustees took a legal fee by the terms of the devise, and that consequently A. took an equitable estate tail, which was barred by the recovery. —Collier v. Wallers, L. R. 17 Eq. 252. See 84 Beav. 426; L. R. 1 Ch. 81.
2. A testator gave all his property to his wife for her sole use and benefit, "in the full confidence that she will so dispose of it amongst all our children, both during her lifetime and at her decease, doing equal justice to each and all of them." Held, that the wife took an estate for life, with power of disposition among her children in her lifetime, or by deed or will, as she might think fit. — Curnick v. Tucker, L. R. 17 Eq. 820.
3. For a case where it was held that, from the tenor of a will, there was evidence of intention in the testator not to include leaseholds for years in a devise of lands, see Prescolt v. Barker, L. R. 9 Ch. 175.
See Ademption; Annuity; Illegitimate Children; Legacy; SettleMent, 2.
Director. — See Company, 2.
1. A woman in November, 1868, obtained a judicial decree of separation from her husband on the ground of adultery. In February, 1872, she petitioned for dissolution of marriage on the ground of cruelty committed before the filing of the first petition, and adultery committed since said decree of separation. Held, that the decree of separation did not preclude her from obtaining a dissolution of marriage. — Green v. Green, L. R. 8 P. & D. 121.
2*. Qumre, whether a woman who has been guilty of adultery can obtain a divorce for the subsequent cruelty of her husband. — Grossi v. Grossi, L. R. 3 P. & D. 118.
3. Whenever a husband attempted connection with his wife she had hysteria. The wife refused to submit to inspection. Divorce granted. — H. v. P., L. R. 3 P. & D. 126.
See Covenant, 2.
Change of domicile. — See Stevenson v. Masson, L. R. 17 Eq. 78.
The plaintiff was grantee of a right of way for a tow-path over land of M. M. built a road and bridge across the canal, obstructing the tow-path; and the plaintiff in consequence went round the bridge, and then back to the tow-path. M. subsequently sold the land adjoining the road and bridge to the defendants. The plaintiff used the substituted path round the bridge for many years, when the defendants erected a fence along the side of said street, preventing the plaintiff crossing the road. Held, that it was not necessary for the plaintiff to proceed against M. for the removal of the bridge; and that the defendants would be restrained from interfering with the plaintiff's substituted right of way round the bridge. — Selby v. Nettle/old, L. R. 9 Ch. 111.
See Trespass, 2.
Election. — See Privileged Communications, 2.
S., who had effected two policies of insurance with an insurance company, brought actions upon the policies. An order of court was made that one action should be stayed- until the other had been tried, the company agreeing to be bound by the result of that action if against them. S., however, was left at liberty to proceed with the other action, if judgment should be against him. The company filed a bill in equity to have both the policies cancelled, as having been obtained by fraud. Judgment in said action at law was subsequently given for the company, on the ground that the policies were obtained by fraud. The court ordered the policies to be cancelled. —London and Provincial Ins. Co. v. Seymour, L. R. 17 Eq. 85.
See Covenant, 3; Specific Performance, 1.
Estate For Life. — See Devise, 2.
The plaintiff was to receive a commission if the defendant's house was leased by him. A. went to the plaintiff's office, and inquired what houses he had to let, and was given cards to view several houses, among which was the defendant's. The premium for the house as given to A. by the plaintiff was £2200. A few days later A. examined the house with the defendant, and the offer was accepted. The judge asked A., under objection by the defendant, whether he should have taken said house if he had not gone to the plaintiff's and obtained a card to the same, and A. replied that he thought not. Held, that there was evidence for the jury that A. had taken said house through the plaintiff's intervention. It seems that, said question was admissible. — Mansell v. Clements, L. R. 9 C. P. 139.
See Interrogatory, 2; Poor-rate; Will, 1.
The defendant shipped upon the plaintiff's vessel petroleum, to be delivered at Havre, and to be taken out within twenty-four hours after arrival, or pay £10 per day demurrage. The authorities at Havre refused to permit the petroleum to be landed; and it was taken, by direction of the ship's broker, to Honfleur and Trouville, but permission to land was there also refused. The vessel then returned to Havre, and transshipped the petroleum into lighters hired by G.; but, being obliged by the authorities to reship it, sailed back to London. Held, that the plaintiff was entitled to freight, back freight, and expenses, but not to demurrage and expenses incurred in ineffectual attempts to land the petroleum at Honfleur and Trouville. — Cargo ex Argos, L. R. 5 P. C. 134; 8. O. L. R. 4 Ad. & Ec. 13; 8 Am. Law Rev. 99.
Husband And Wife. — See Covenant, 2.
H Y POTH ECATION.
A., in Bombay, shipped cotton to B., in Liverpool, and drew a bill against the cotton for B.'s acceptance. A. insured the cotton, and then sold the draft to a bank, to which he gave the bill of lading with a letter of hypothecation, and the policy of insurance. The letter of hypothecation authorized the bank, in default of acceptance or payment of said bill, or on B.'s suspension during the currency of the bill, to sell the cotton, and apply the proceeds in payment of the bill; "the balance, if any, to be placed against any other of A.'s bills which may at the time be in the hands of the said bank, or any liability of A. to the bank." • B. accepted the bill, but, before its maturity, failed, and the bill was dishonored. The cotton was burnt at sea and became a total loss. The bank received the insurance money, which was more than the amount of the bill, and claimed the surplus toward satisfying other bills of A. held by the bank and unpaid. A. had assigned said insurance money to a creditor before it was paid to the bank. Held, that the bank was only entitled to said insurance money to the amount of said bill. — Latham v. Chartered Bank of India, L. R. 17 Eq. 205.
Hysteria. — See Divorce, 3.
Illegitimate Children. A testator, who had gone through the ceremony of marriage with M., his deceased wife's sister, bequeathed half of his property to the two then living children of M., and all other the children he might have or be reputed to have by M. At the date pf the will M. was enceinte with a third child, whom the testator subsequently acknowledged as his child. Held (selborne, L. C., dissenting), that said third child was entitled to share with the other two children. — Occleston v. Fullalove, L. R. 9 Ch. 147.
1. Injunction refused to restrain an "Underwriter's Registry" association placing upon their registry, after the name of a vessel belonging to a member of the association which had ranked in the highest class, the words, "class suspended."—See Clover v. Royden, L. R. 17 Eq. 190.
2. An injunction was granted to restrain the defendant from allowing water pipes which he had laid, to remain in land belonging to the plaintiff but over which there was a highway. — Goodson v. Richardson, L. R. 9 Ch. 221.
See Easement; Equity; Specific Performance, 1; Trespass, 1. .