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vested in the executor qua executor, are held by necessary implication to devolve on the administrator de bonis non, when not 80 expressed.” The facts here were quite on all fours with those in Greenough v. Welles, and this decision must be regarded as plainly controlling the dictum in that case. There seems, therefore, to be no sound authority in this State to impeach the broad conclusion we have intimated to be the law, that such testamentary powers survive even to an administrator cum testamento annexo.
DIGEST OF THE ENGLISH LAW REPORTS FOR FEB
RUARY, MARCH, AND APRIL, 1874.
ACCOUNT. — See MORTGAGE, 1.
ADEMPTION. 1. A testator, reciting that £1440, or thereabouts, was due from his son, secured by bills or notes, released his son from payment of interest to the time of the testator's death. At the date of the will the son owed the testator about £1400, which was paid off before the date of a codicil, which contained no reference to the son's debt or interest thereon. At the date of the codicil the son owed his father £1291 for advances made subsequently to the will. Held, that said son must pay interest on the £1291. – Sidney v. Sidney, L. R. 17 Eq. 65.
2. A testator, by his will, gave the residue of his property equally between his children on their attaining twenty-one. He subsequently covenanted that he would, during bis life or within six months after his death, settle a certain sum upon his daughter. This sum was not so settled at the testator's death. Held, upon all the circumstances of the case, that said daughter's share of the residue · was pro tanto adeemed. — Stevenson v. Masson, L. R. 17 Eq. 78.
3. A railway company served a notice upon W. to treat for the purchase of certain leaseholds. The price was settled by surveyors appointed by the company and W., and was agreed to by W. Before this W. had bequeathed the leaseholds to A. The sale of the leaseholds was not completed until after W.'s death. Held, that said bequest was adeemed; but that A. was entitled to rents accruing between the death of W. and the completion of said sale. — Watts v. Watts, L. R. 17 Eq. 217.
ADULTERY. — See DivorCE, 1, 2.
ALLOTMENT. — See COMPANY, 3.
ANNUITY. A testator gave the residue of bis estate, real and personal, to trustees for eleven years, upon trust to pay out of the rents and proceeds certain annuities. The testator then directed that the residue of said rents and proceeds should, duriog said term, be accumulated for the benefit of the person who should become entitled to the residue of his personal estate upon the expiration of said term; and after the determination of said term he devised his real estate, subject to the payment of said annuities, with powers of distress and entry for the recovery of the said annuities as if they had been secured by a lease for years, to
said trustees to the use of T. in strict settlement. Held, that said annuities were
APPOINTMENT. — See DEVISE, 2.
ATTORNEY. - See Trust.
AUCTION. An auctioneer at a sale of horses sold a horse described in the catalogue as “steady to drive" and as to be sold subject to the conditions set forth therein. M. bought the horse at auction, and the auctioneer's clerk wrote in a sales ledger the name of M. and the price. Neither the catalogue nor conditions of sale were affixed to the sales ledger, nor were they referred to therein. Held, that there was not a sufficient memorandum in writing of a contract, within the Statute of Frauds, to bind M. – Peirce v. Corf, L. R. 9 Q. B. 210.
BAILMENT. The plaintiff delivered a carriage to the defendant, a livery-stable keeper, who put it into a building which had been erected for the defendant by a competent builder, and which, so far as the defendant knew, was well built. The building was blown over and the carriage injured. The plaintiff offered evidence to show that the builder had negligently and unskilfully built the building; but the evidence was rejected by the judge, who ruled that the defendant's liability was that of an ordinary bailee for hire, and that he was only bound to use ordinary care in keeping the carriage, and that, if he had used ordinary care in haring the building erected by employing a builder, he would be exempt from liability for an event caused by the careless or improper conduct of the builder of which the defendant had no notice. Held, that said ruling was correct. — Searle v. Laverick, L. R. 9 Q. B. 122.
Bank. - See LIEN.
BANKRUPTCY. Two partners obtained an advance from A., and delivered to him a written agreement to assign to him on request their lease, stock, fixtures, and book-debts; provided that if the partners should repay said advance the agreement should be void; otherwise the premises were to be valued by valuers on each side, and any surplus repaid to the partners. Subsequently the partners became embarrassed, and thereupon, on request of A., assigned said lease, stock, &c., being all the partners' property, upon a valuation to A., who repaid to them a small surplus. Shortly afterward the partners filed a petition in liquidation, stating their assets to be nil. Held, that said agreement was, after demand, a valid, equitable security upon the property of the partners; and that the subsequent assignment was valid, and was not invalidated by the Bankruptcy or Bills of Sale Acts. — Ex parte Izard. In re Cook, L. R. 9 Cb. 271.
See COVENANT, 1.
BEQUEST. — See ADEMPTION; ANNUITY; DEVISE; ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN ;
BILL OF LADING. 1. The master of a vessel may properly sign bills of lading in favor of the shipper of goods, without production of the mate's receipt for the goods, if he is satisfied that the goods are on board the vessel, and has no notice that any one but the shipper claims any interest in them. — Hathesing v. Laing, L. R. 17 Eq.
2. The omission of the words “ or order or assigns " from a bill of lading will not give an indorsee constructive notice of an agreement between the shipper and consignee to realize proceeds from the goods shipped, and appropriate the same to a special purpose. An indorsee of such a bill of lading, who also has the goods delivered to him, obtains legal and equitable title to the same. It seems that such a bill of lading is not a negotiable instrument.-Henderson v. The Comptoir d'Escompte de Paris, L. R. 6 P. C. 253. See HYPOTHECATION.
BILL OF SALES Act. - See BANKRUPTCY.
BILLS AND NOTES. 1. The acceptor of a bill requested the holder to defer presentment for payment, agreeing to hold himself liable in every respect on account of said accepted bill, as if it had been regularly presented at due date. The holder did not present the bill for payment at maturity. Held, that the maker was discharged. — Latham v. Chartered Bank of India, L. R. 17 Eq. 205.
2. B. accepted a bill drawn by A. Before the bill became due A. represented to a bank which held the bill that B. would be willing to accept a renewed bill, and a new bill was accordingly drawn by A. on B., and discounted by the bank. At the same time A. drew a check on the bank, which the bank accepted, payable to B., and sent it to B. in a letter stating that he had drawn a second bill on B., and enclosed the check to retire the first bill. B., before the first bill became due, received and cashed the check, but refused to accept the second bill. Held, that B. had no right to cash the check, unless he accepted the second bill; also, that B. was not discharged from liability as acceptor of the first bill by the transactions between A. and the bank. — Torrance v. Bank of British North America, L. R. 5 P. C. 246. See MORTGAGE, 2.
BROKER. — See EVIDENCE.
CAPTURE. An apprehension of capture, founded on circumstances calculated to affect the mind of a master of ordinary courage, judgment, and experience, will justify delay in sailing from a neutral port. — Anderson v. Owners of the “ San Roman,” L. R. 5 P. C. 301.
Cargo. — See CHARTER-PARTY; FREIGHT.
CHARGE. - See ANNUITY.
CHARTER-PARTY. By the terms of a charter-party a vessel was to load a full cargo and deliver the same at London, fire and other dangers of the sea excepted; "a lump sum freight of £5000 to be paid after entire discharge and right delivery of the cargo, in cash, two months after date of the ship's report inward at the custom house.” A full cargo was loaded, but part was destroyed by fire on the voyage, and the remainder was delivered. Held, that the ship-owner was entitled to the whole of said £5000. — Merchant Shipping Co. v. Armitage, L. R. 9 Q. B. (Ex. Ch.) 99; s. c. L. R. 8 C. P. 469, n. See CAPTURE.
CHECK. — See BilLS AND NOTES, 2.
Common Recovery. — See DEVISE, 1.
COMPANY. 1. By the articles of a company, the qualification of a director was the holding of fifty shares. It was held that attending a meeting of the company as a director did not amount to a contract to take shares sufficient for qualification as director. — Brown's Case, L. R. 9 Ch. 102.
2. It seems that a director in a company who has signed the memorandum and articles of association, and has had shares appropriated to him, cannot set up, as a defence to an action against all the directors in consequence of false statements in a prospectus issued by them, that he took no part in preparing or issuing the prospectus. — Peek v. Gurney, L. R. 6 H. L. 377.
3. The appellant, not an original allottee, was the holder of shares in a company, and, upon its being wound up, was placed upon the list of contributories, and paid a large sum upon the shares. He then filed a bill against the directors of the company, alleging misrepresentation and concealment of facts on the part of the directors in the prospectus they issued, and by which the appellant bad been induced to purchase his shares, and he prayed indemnity from the directors. Held, that, as the prospectus was drawn up solely for the original allottees, the directors were not liable to the appellant. — Peek v. Gurney, L. R. 6 H. L. 377. See L. R. 2 H. L. 325; L. R. 13 Eq. 79.
Condition. - See LANDLORD AND TENANT, 1. CONSTRUCTION. — See ADEMPTION; ANNUITY; CONTRACT ; COVENANT ; CRIM
INAL Law; DEVISE; HYPOTHECATIOX; ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREX; LANDLORD AND TENANT, 1; LEGACY; MORTGAGE, 2; PACKAGE; SETTLEMENT.
CONTINGENT REMAINDER. — See DEVISE. 1.
CONTRACT. 1. It was agreed that the plaintiff should serve the defendant “ for twelve months certain, after which time either party should be at liberty to terminate the