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RECEIVER. — See COMPANY, 3.
REPAIRS. — See DEVISE, 4.
REVERSION. — See CHARGE.
REVOCATION OF ASSENT. — See LEGACY, 9. SALE. — See BROKER; CONTRACT, 2; TrusT, 4; VENDOR AND PURCHASER.
SALVAGE. 1. More than half of the proceeds of the property saved, less salvor's expenses, awarded as salvage in The Rasche, L. R. 4 Ad. & Ec. 127.
2. Salvage awarded to a steam-tug which attempted unsuccessfully to aid a vessel exbibiting signals of distress. — The Melpomene, L. R. 4 Ad. & Ec. 129. See Wages.
SATISFACTION. — See DEVISE, 3.
SETTLEMENT. 1. A widower, two days before going through the ceremony of marriage with his deceased wife's sister B., executed a deed reciting that he had previously transferred certain bank shares to trustees, and directing said trustees to hold said shares in trust for B. for life, remainder as B. should by will appoint. The wid. ower and B. lived together as husband and wife until the former's death. Held, that said deed could not be set aside as founded upon an illegal consideration, — Ayerst v. Jenkins, L. R. 16 Eq. 275.
2. Where a covenant to settle after-acquired property is limited to the case funds of a specified amount are acquired at any one time, such funds must be derived from the same source; and where a person receives funds subject to such a covenant, but over which he has a power of advancement, any sum advanced must be included in determining whether said funds are of sufficient amount to fall within the covenant. — Hood v. Franklin, 16 Eq. 496.
3. A settlement was executed by a married woman and a trustee, wherein a sum of money recited to be in the trustee's hands was settled upon certain trusts. Said recital was untrue; and the deed was executed upon the faith of a promise made by the woman, that she would forthwith pay said sum to the trustee from her separate estate. Held, that said promise could not be enforced. — Marler v. Tommas, L. R. 17 Eq. 8.
4. By letters-patent a barony was conferred on E. for life, with remainder to her second and other sons and the heirs male of their respective bodies successively. The patent contained a proviso that if any person taking under the patent should succeed to a certain earldom, the succession to the barony should devolve upon the son of said E., or the heir, who would be next entitled to said barony if the person succeeding to the earldom was dead without issue male. A testatrix devised lands to trustees in trust to convey, settle, and assure the same in a course of entail, to correspond as nearly as may be with the limitations of said barony and the provisos affecting the same; and a settlement was made accordingly, containing the proviso that if any person taking under the limitations therein contained should succeed to the above earldom, then the succession to said lands should devolve upon the son of said E. or the heir who would be next entitled to succeed to said barony if the person succeeding to said earldom was dead without issue male. The second son of E. afterward succeeded to said earldom, and had issue male. Held, that the third son of E. became entitled to said lands upon the succession of said second son of E. to the earldom. — Cope v. Earl De la Warr, L. R. 8 Ch. 982. See COMPANY, 4; DEVISE, 4.
SHAREHOLDER. — See COMPANY, 2, 4, 5; PARTNERSHIP, 2. SAIP. - See BILL OF LADING; BURDEN OF PROOF; FREIGHT; JURISDICTION ;
SOLICITOR. — See LIEN, 1.
SPECIFIC BEQUEST. — See LEGACY, 1.
STATUTE. — See APPOINTMENT, 2; CORPORATION.
STATUTORY POWER. — See Railway, 1.
Stock ExchaNGE. — See BROKER.
Suit. - See COMPANY.
SURETY. — See GUARANTEE, 1.
TENANT IN TAIL. The court refused to order money representing land taken by a railway company under compulsory powers to be paid to a tenant in tail until he had exe cuted a disentailing deed. — In re Buller's Will, L. R. 16 Eq. 479.
TESTIMONY. - See EVIDENCE.
TITLE. — See LEASE.
TRADE-MARK. Injunction to restrain the defendant from using upon their labels the words "nourishing stout,” which had been used by the plaintiff on their labels as a trade-mark, refused, on the ground that “nourishing” was a mere English adjective denoting the quality of the stout. Interesting discussion concerning trademarks. — Raggett v. Findlater, L. R. 17 Eq. 29. TRESPASS. — See LANDLORD AND TENANT.
Trust. 1. B., an unmarried woman, called her servant, the plaintiff, into her room, placed an envelope in a box, and gave the box to the plaintiff, telling him that the box would be of service to him some day, but that he must not open it until after her death. B. retained the key of the box. The box was opened after B.'s death, and in said envelope was a paper signed by B., stating that the contents of the box was a deed of gift to the plaintiff of certain real and personal estate described. The plaintiff subsequently found in an out-bouse an envelope directed to himself and signed by B., of the same date as the aforesaid paper, stating that the plaintiff would find the deeds of an estate mentioned in the first paper, which deeds were to be handed over to the plaintiff “free, and all expenses to be paid out of the bulk and writings of M” (a certain farm). Held, that there was not a valid declaration of trust of said real and personal estate in favor of the plaintiff. - Warriner v. Rogers, L. R. 16 Eq. 340.
2. The court refused to permit trustees who had authority to “ continue or change securities from time to time, as the majority shall seem meet," to invest trust funds in United States bonds or American railway bonds. — Bethell v. Abraham, L. R. 17 Eq. 24.
3. A testator empowered trustees to apply the annual income of the presumptive shares to which children would be entitled towards the maintenance and education of such children, if the trustees should think fit, notwithstanding the father of such children might be living and able to maintain his children. A suit was instituted for the administration of the testator's estate, and part of the property was sold and the proceeds brought into court. Held, that the court would not interfere with the discretion of the trustees, who might apply the income as empowered in the will. — Brophy v. Bellamy, L. R. 8 Ch. 799.
4. Trustees being about to sell certain land, and being unable to find a deed of 1819, through which the grantors, who had conveyed to the trustees in 1858, derived title, made it a condition of sale that the title should begin with the deed of 1858. A bill was filed by a cestui que trust to set aside the sale. Held, that said condition might have depreciated the value of the land at the sale, and was improper, and that the sale would be set aside. The smallness of the interest of the cestui que trust in the land constituted no objection to the bill. - Dance v. Goldingham, L. R. 8 Ch. 902.
5. A testator directed his real estate to be sold, and the proceeds held upon certain trusts, which failed. The lands remained unsold. Held, that said lands, though unsold, must be treated as money, so that the heiress of the testator who took the same having died, her administrator must pay probate duty. — AttorneyGeneral v. Lomas, L. R. 9 Ex. 29.
See EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS, 2; SETTLEMENT, 3 ; VENDOR AND PURCHASER, 1.
ULTRA VIRES. — See COMPANY, 1; Railway, 2.
UNBORN CHILDREN. — See LEGACY, 11.
VENDOR AND PURCHASER. 1. A testator devised an estate in trust for his daughter for life, remainder to her husband for life, and after the death of the survivor, upon trust to sell and hold the proceeds in trust for all the daughter's children living at the death of such survivor. The daughter had six children living, one having issue two infant children. A petition for sale was filed and assented to by said daughter, her husband, and her children. Held, that an order of sale was not invalid by reason of said infant children not being parties to the petition. — In re Strutt's Trusts, L. R. 16 Eq. 629.
2. The defendant sold lands to the plaintiff at auction upon certain conditions, one of which was that the vendors should deliver an abstract of title to the plaintiff within seven days, and all objections not made within a certain period thereafter were to be considered waived; and in case such objection should be made, the vendor reserved the option of rescinding the contract of sale upon repaying the deposit money. An abstract was delivered and objections were made. The defendant thereupon filed a bill for specific performance, and the plaintiff in answer set up said objections, and a further objection, consisting of matters affecting the title which had not been disclosed in the abstract. The bill was dismissed. The defendant rescinded the contract and tendered the deposit, and the plaintiff brought this action against the defendant for not deducing a good title. Held, that the defendant, by bringing the above bill, waived his right to rescind on any of the original objections, but that he had a right to rescind upon the additional objection made in the answer, although relating to matters not disclosed in said abstract. — Gray v. Fowler, L. R. 8 Ex., and Ex. Ch. 249.
Wages. The master of a vessel gave a bottomry bond on ship, freight, and cargo, and also bound himself personally. The bond was indorsed to the owner of the cargo, who began a suit against ship, freight, and cargo, to enforce payment of the bond. The master afterward instituted a suit against the vessel and freight for bis wages. The proceeds of the ship were insufficient to pay said bond, but the proceeds of ship and cargo were sufficient to pay both the bond and the wages. The wages of the master were ordered to be paid from the proceeds of the vessel before any portion of such proceeds was appropriated to payment of said bond. — The Eugenie, L. R. 4 Ad. & Ec. 123.
Wall. - See PARTY-WALL. Will. — See APPOINTMENT, 1; CHARITY; ELECTION; EXECUTORS AND AD
MINISTRATORS, 2; ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN ; LEGACY; MARSHALLING AsSETS; MORTGAGE, 3; Trust, 1, 3, 5.
“ Devolve upon.” — See SETTLEMENT, 4.
“ Nephews and Nieces.” — See LEGACY, 10.
“ Restraint of Princes." - See INSURANCE, 3.
“ Then licing.” — See DEVISE, 3.
SELECTED DIGEST OF STATE REPORTS.
[For the present number of the Digest, selections have been made from the following volumes of State Reports : 39 Connecticut; 3 Houston (Delaware); 58 Illinois ; 39 and 40 Indiana ; 37 Maryland ; 108 Massachusetts ; 25 Michigan : 18 Minnesota ; 51 and 52 Missouri; 52 New York; 71 Pennsylvania State; 3 South Carolina ; 35 Texas ; 45 Vermont; and 6 Vroom (New Jersey Law); also from 16 Wallace (Supreme Court of the United States).]
ACCESSION. H. bought a wagon of b. on condition that it should remain the property of B. till paid for. Plaintiff repaired it for H., by putting in new wheels and axles. H. took it from plaintiff's possession without his knowledge or consent, and afterwards agreed with plaintiff that the “ running part " supplied by plaintiff should remain his property till paid for. H. never paid either B. or plaintiff, and neither had notice of the other's claim. B. took the wagon back and sold it to defendant, who did not know of plaintiff's claim. Held, that defendant was liable in trover for the wheels and axles. — Clark v. Wells, 45 Vt. 4. See RIPARIAN OWNER.
ACCOUNT. In an action of account, the defendant cannot be charged for the value of property which he has received, but not turned into profits, unless he has converted it to his own use; and quære whether he is liable for a conversion in this form of action. — Gibbs v. Sleeper, 45 Vt. 409.
Action. 1. A statute permitting the assignee of a chose in action to sue thereon in his own name, held, not to preclude the bringing of an action in the name of the assignor. — Saugatuck Bridge Co. v. Westport, 39 Conn. 337.
2. Defendants built a reservoir on land sold to them by plaintiff for that pur. pose. Water from the reservoir percolated through the soil and injured plaintiff's adjacent land. Held, that defendants were liable for the damage. — Wilson v. New Bedford, 108 Mass. 261.
3. Declaration against a railroad company for negligence whereby plaintiff's buildings were burned, averring that the loss had been paid to plaintiff by an insurance company, and concluding to the damage of the company. Held, (1) that the action would lie, notwithstanding such payment; (2) that no substantiai damages could be recovered without amending the declaration so as to conclude to the damage of the plaintiff. — Weber v. Morris & Essex R.R. Co., 6 Vroom, 410.
See ACCOUNT; AssumPSIT; BANKRUPTCY, 2, 3; BROKER ; CARRIER ; ConSTITUTIONAL LAW, State, 4; CORPORATION, 4; DEED, 4.
ADMINISTRATOR. — See EXECUTOR.