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identical terms, one of which he retained, and the other he sent to said legatee. Held, that the legacies in said codicils were not cumulative, and that the legatee was entitled to but one legacy under them.— Whyle v. Whyle, L. R. 17 Eq. 50.
7. A testator gave £1000 to the children of his cousin R., to be divided equally between them. The will contained the proviso that in case any legatee should die in the testator's lifetime leaving children, such legacy should not lapse, but be paid to the children of such deceased legatee. One of R.'s children had died before the date of the will, leaving children. Held, that the children of the deceased child of R. did not take under the will. — Hunter v. Cheshire, L. R. 8 Ch. 751.
8. A married woman having separate estate, and having under her marriage settlement a power of appointment in the event of her dying in the lifetime of her husband, made a will with the assent of her husband, whom she survived. Held, that the will passed the separate estate, but did not execute the power of appointment, nor pass property acquired by the wife after the death of her husband, whose death operated as a revocation of his assent to the will of his wife. — Noble v. WOloek, L. R. 8 Ch. 778; 8. c. 2 P. & D. 276.
9. A testator gave the residue of his estate to his nephews and nieces, and the issue of any of his nephews and nieces dead before him. The testator had not at the date of his will any brother, sister, nephew, or niece of his own, but there were nephews and nieces of his deceased wife. Held, that the nephews and nieces of the testator's wife took under the will, and that evidence that the testator and such nephews and nieces were on unfriendly terms was inadmissible. — Sherratt v. Mountford, L. R. 8 Ch. 928.
10. A testator gave a fund upon trust for his wife for life, then to his daughter for life, and after his daughter's death to her children, who being sons should attain twenty-one, or being daughters should attain that age or marry; and if no such children, to certain persons named. By a codicil the testator added the proviso, that in case his daughter should be living at the expiration of five years from the death of the testator's wife, and should not have had any children, said fund should be at once divided among said ulterior legatees. At the expiration of five years and six months from the death of the testator's wife the daughter had her first child. Held, that the ulterior bequest did not take effect, as there was a child in ventre sa mere at the expiration of said five years. — Pearce v. Carrington, L. R. 8 Ch. 969.
11. A testator gave a fund to his widow for life, and after her decease one moiety in trust for each of his two daughters for life, remainder to their respective children. If either daughter died childless, her moiety to be held upon the trusts of the other moiety. If both daughters died childless, the fund was to go to the testator's two sons in equal shares. If both said sons died childless, the fund was to be held in trust for M. But if said M. should die without leaving issue living at her death, then over. One daughter survived her sister and brothers, and M. survived said daughter, and died without issue. Held, that the gift over was contingent on M.'s dying without issue in the lifetime of said sons, and that M.'s representatives were entitled to the fund. — In re Heathcote's Trusts, L. R. 9 Ch. 45.
See Appointment, 1, 2; Charity; Election; Executors And AdminisTrators, 2; Illegitimate Children; Marshajltno Assets; Mortgage, 3; Trust, 3, 5.
C., a banker at Lyons, received a bill of exchange from D., drawn on a firm at Milan. C. enclosed bills in a letter to D., which he posted. After posting the letter, C. received information from D.'s agent that the Milan firm refused to accept D.'s drafts, and directing him to remit nothing to D. By rules of the French post-office, a letter can be recovered after it has been posted and before it has been despatched. Accordingly C. applied for his letter to D., but it was forwarded to D. by mistake of the post-office clerk. Held, that the property in the bills did not pass to D. — Ex parte Cote. In re Deveze, L. R. 9 Ch. 27.
See Guarantee, 2.
The testator, a domiciled Irishman, disposed of a leasehold estate in England upon the same trusts as those of his other personal estate, which trusts were void under the Thellusson Act in England, though not in Ireland. Held, that the bequest of the leasehold estate was invalid. — Freke v. Lord Carbery, L. R. 16 Eq. 461.
1. Solicitors for the trustees of an estate which is under the administration of the court have not, after their discharge, such a lien for costs and money advanced in the suit as will enable them to refuse production of documents which are required by the receiver for the management of the estate. — Bclaney v. Ffrench, L. R. 8 Ch. 918.
2. The creditors of a liquidating debtor resolved, in 1872, to allow him to carry on his business, he accounting to the trustee for the stock in hand as and when disposed of. The debtor carried on his business for two years, when the creditors resolved to sell the same for the benefit of the estate. The business was accordingly sold and the proceeds paid to the trustee. A creditor who had lent the debtor money since 1872 claimed a lien on such part of said proceeds as represented stock purchased after 1872. Held, that said creditor had no lien upon any part of the purchase-money.—Ex parte Robertson. In re Magnus, L. R. 8 Ch. 962.
Light And Air. — See Party-wall.
A testator gave an annuity and certain legacies, devised his real estate in trust for sale and payment of said annuity and legacies from the proceeds, and then bequeathed his personal estate upon trust for payment of so much of the debts and legacies as the proceeds of the real estate might be insufficient to satisfy, and the residue for charitable purposes; and he directed that only such parts of his estate should be included in said residue as might by law be bequeathed for charitable purposes. The testator left real and pure and impure personal estate. Held, that the proceeds of the real estate and the impure personal estate must be applied in payment of said annuity and legacies before the pure personal estate. — Wills v. Bourne, L. R. 16 Eq. 487.
1. A company had power to raise money by mortgage, with or without a power of sale, of any of the property of the company. The company borrowed money on mortgage, among other things, of its book debts. Held, that said mortgage covered debts accrued due since the date of the mortgage.—Bloomer v. Union Coal and Iron Co., 16 Eq. 883.
2. The plaintiff handed title-deeds to a bank with a memorandum stating that the deeds were deposited in consideration of the bank's lending B. £1000 for seven days from date. The bank allowed B. to overdraw his account within said seven days to the extent of £900. Held, that there had been no advances to B. according to the terms of said memorandum, and that the bank was not entitled to retain the deeds. — Burton v. Oay, L. R 8 Ch. 932.
3. A testator directed that his debts should be paid, and then gave a certain estate to J., one of his executors, subject to the payment of the testator's debts. J. mortgaged the estate to C., and used the money for his own purposes. C. had no notice of the purpose to which J. intended to apply the mortgage money. Held, that the mortgage was valid, and not subject to a charge for the payment of the testator's debts. — Corser v. Cartwright, L. R. 8 Ch. 971.
See Charge; Executors And Administrators, 4; Priority.
By statute, railway trains which travel twenty miles without stopping must maintain means of communication between the passengers and the servants of the company in charge of the train. Held, that where a passenger on such a train was injured, the act was to be taken into account in determining whether there had been negligence. — Blamires v. Lancashire jf Yorkshire Railway Co., L. R. 8 Ex. (Ex. Ch.) 283.
See Burden Of Proof; Railway, 1; Statute.
Notice. — See Guarantee, 1; Mortgage, 8; Priority, 1.
1. Where a partnership is terminated prematurely, a person who has paid a premium to become a member of the partnership may lose his right to a return of a proportionate part of the premium by waiver, by wilful repudiation of the partnership contract, and by gross misconduct necessitating the dissolution of the partnership. Discussion concerning forfeiture of such premium by misconduct. — Wilson v. Johnstone, L. R. 16 Eq. 606.
2. L. borrowed money in London of W., one of two partners in the firm of W. & Co., bankers at Vienna, and a deed transferring shares in a company from L. to W. & Co. by way of security for said loan was executed by L., and W. who signed as W. & Co. L. held the above shares, but the transfer to hiin had not been registered at the time he transferred to W. & Co. Subsequently the transfer to W. & Co. was registered, and shortly after this the transfer to L. was registered. L. died insolvent, and said company was wound up. Held, that W. had authority to accept the transfer of shares from L. so as to bind the firm of W. & Co., and that the irregularities in the registration of the transfers did not affect the liability of W. & Co. to call. — In re Land Credit Company of Ireland. Weikersheim's Case, L. R. 8 Ch. 831.
3. By articles of partnership it was provided that upon the death of A., (the partner to whom the capital belonged), the share of B., the other partner, in the profits should belong to A.'s representatives, who should carry on the business and pay to B. his share of the profits up to A.'s death. The business was carried on by B., who was A.'s executor, until liquidation was ordered. It then appeared that the stock on hand was partly the old stock formerly belonging to A., but principally new stock bought by B. Held, that the terms of said partnership did not convert the stock on hand at A.'s death into separate estate, but that such stock was applicable to payment of the joint firm debts, and that stock bought since A.'s death was B.'s property, and applicable to his separate liabilities. — Ex parte Morley. In re White, L. R. 8 Ch. 1026.
See Bankruptcy, 2; Bills And Notes, 1.
Where a wall was a party-wall to the height of the first story, and above that height had ancient windows opening to the external air, it was held, that the wall was not a party-wall above the height of the first story. — Weston v. Arnold, L. R. 8 Ch. 1084.
Upon a decree against a party for infringement of patent the patentee is not entitled to have both an account of profits and an inquiry into damages, but must elect which he will have. — De Vilre v. Detts, L. R. 6 H. L. 819. See Neilson v. Betls. L. R. 5 H. L. 1; 6 Am. Law Rev. 94.
Payment. — See Evidence, 2.
A dock company incorporated by statute agreed to purchase certain land for £4000, half payable upon the execution of the agreement, the remainder on a certain future day. The agreement provided that if the second moiety was not paid by a certain day, in which respect time should be of the essence of the contract, it should be lawful for the vendors to enter and repossess themselves of their former estate without any obligation to repay any part of said sum which might have been paid to them. Held, that the above stipulation was in the nature of a penalty, from which the company would be relieved on payment of the residue of the purchase-money remaining unpaid with interest. — In re Dagenham (Thames) Dock Co. Ex parte Hulse, L. R. 8 Ch. 1022.
Pledge. — See Executors And Administrators, 4; Mortgage, 2;
Shares were held in trust for a woman for life, and after her death as she should by deed or will appoint. The trustee and the woman joined in a deed of
transfer of the shares to herself. Held, that the power of appointment was well
Premium. — See Partnershif, 1.
1. L. deposited title-deeds with his bankers to secure advances, and agreed to execute any deeds necessary to carry out the security. Subsequently, when about to be married, the intended wife directed her solicitor to prepare the necessary settlement. The solicitor asked L. if the title-deeds of his land were in his possession unincumbered, and L. replied that they were, but were at his bankers. The solicitor thereupon prepared the settlement whereby the real estate was to be settled upon trusts for the wife and issue of the marriage; and after the marriage L. conveyed the land upon trusts accordingly. Held, that the wife had constructive notice of the mortgage to the bankers, also that L.'s contract to execute a legal mortgage gave the bankers a priority over subsequent purchasers without notice. — Maxfield v. Burton, L. R. 17 Eq. 15.
2. S. sued out an elegit upon a judgment against a railway company. The company subsequently filed a scheme of arrangement, which was confirmed by the court, whereby mortgagees of the railway were to be paid by certain debentures preferred in payment of interest over other stock. Held, that S. was not bound by said scheme, but that he could not claim a priority over the holders of said debentures on the ground that their mortgage, which was a charge prior to the elegit, had been discharged. — Stevens v. Mid-Hants Railway Co. London Financial Association v. Stevens, L. R. 8 Ch. 1064.
Public Policy.—See Contract, 6.
1. The court ordered an inquiry as to damages where a railway company had exercised its statutory powers carelessly in constructing its railway. — Biscoev. Great Eastern Railway Co., L. R. 16 Eq. 636.
2. The H. railway company was empowered by statute to make a junction with the G. railway at B. The plaintiff railway company obtained by agreement running powers over the G. railway passing through B. The plaintiffs then, by agreement with the H. railway, obtained the right to use the H. railway; the H. company to keep its line in repair and provide a sufficient staff for the traffic of the plaintiffs; the plaintiffs to pay the H. railway a proportion of the through rates and fares by way of commuted toll; and the plaintiffs to haul the local traffic of the H. company, should the latter so desire. The G. company refused to permit the passage of trains from the plaintiffs' line on to the H. railway, alleging that said agreement between the plaintiffs and the H. railway was ultra vires and void. Held, that said agreement was valid. — Midland Railway Co. v. Great Western Railway Co., L. R. 8 Ch. 841.
See Contract, 1; Statute.
Ratification. — See Contract, 3.