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with the assets. The bank had no notice of said suit. Held, that the pledge of the picture was valid. — Beny v. Gibbons, L. R. 8 Ch. 747.
False Representation. The plaintiff brought an action against the defendant for advertising that he had a certain farm to let, when in fact he' had no authority to let the same, in consequence of which the plaintiff incurred expense to no purpose, in ascertaining the value of the farm with a view to leasing it. Held, that the above advertisement amounted to a false representation, upon which an action would lie. — Richardson v. Silvester, L. R. 9 Q. B. 34.
Foreign Contract. — See Jurisdiction.
Condonation of fraud. See Moxon v. Payne, L. R. 8 Ch. 881.
Frauds, Statute Of.
The defendant verbally promised the mother of his illegitimate children to give her £300 per annum so long as she should maintain the children. The plaintiff brought an action to recover two years' unpaid arrears. Held, that said agreement need not be in writing under the Statute of Frauds, § 4. — Knorclman v. Bluett, L. R. 9 Ex. 1.
See Contract, 2; Insurance, 4; Landlord And Tenant.
Fraudulent Preference. — See Bankruptcy, 1.
T. accepted bills of exchange against a bill of lading of a cargo of rice. By the bill of lading the rice was to be delivered to T. or his assigns; "freight for the said goods £4 per ton of 20 cwt. net delivered, with primage and average accustomed." The shipper of the rice was also the owner of the vessel. While the vessel was on the voyage, said shipper and owner obtained advances from C, to whom he assigned the freight of the vessel on said voyage as security. Held, that C. was entitled to freight as above; and that under the bill of lading the rice was deliverable only on the freight being paid. — Weguelin v. Cellier, L. R. 6 H. L. 286.
See Bill Of Lading.
1. A guarantee was given, determinable on six months' notice. The guarantor died, leaving the debtor on whose behalf the guarantee was given his executor. The creditor, with knowledge of the death of the guarantor, and that he left but little personal estate, made further advances to the above debtor. Held, that the advances made subsequent to the death of the guarantor could not be satisfied out of the real estate of the guarantor. Semble, that the guarantee was not determined by the death of the guarantor. —Harriss v. Fawcett, L. R. 8 Ch. 866; s. c . L. R. 15 Eq. 311; 8 Am. Law Rev. 100.
2. The plaintiffs declined to sell certain goods to D. without an engagement by the defendants to become responsible for their value. The defendants telegraphed, agreeing to be answerable for said goods, and also sent a letter, in which they said, "Having every confidence in D., he has but to call on us for a check and have it with pleasure for any account he may have with you; and when to the contrary, we will write you." Held, that said letter was a continuing guarantee. — Nottingham Hide Co. v. Bottrill, L. R. 8 C. P. 694.. See Company, 1.
Husband And Wife. — See Action; Legacy, 9.
The testator's daughter had married the husband of her deceased sister. The testator devised estates "to my son-in-law J. C," and "to my daughter M., wife of said J. C.," and also "to the children or child of my said daughter M. C." The testator's daughter had two children by J. C. living at the date of the will. Held, that said illegitimate children of M. C. were sufficiently designated in the will, and took under the devise. — Hill v. Crook, L. R. 6 H. L. 265; S. C. L. R. 6 Ch. 311; 6 Am. Law Rev. 91.
See Devise, 5; Settlement, 1.
Indenture. — See Amalgamation.
By the terms of a contract whereby the defendant agreed to furnish the plaintiff's house, the defendant was to obtain an architect's approval in writing before any money was payable. The defendant brought an action at law for a larger sum than the architect approved, and the plaintiff brought this bill to restrain the action. Held, that there was a good defence at law to the action, and no equity to sustain the bill. — Baron de Worms v. Mellier, L. R. 16 Eq. 554. See Arritration, 1; Company, 3; Jurisdiction; Trade-mark.
Insolvency. — See Legacy, 6; Lien, 2.
1. The A. Insurance Company sold its business to the B. Insurance Company in October, 1868, the B. company to undertake the liabilities upon existing policies, and, if required, to issue new policies in exchange. The A. company was to be wound up voluntarily, and its assets were to be collected by the B. company and distributed among the creditors of the A. company. E., the assignee of a policy in the A. company on the life of another party, after the date of said sale paid the annual premium to the A. company, who received the same as agent of the B. company, as authorized by the latter. On December 31, E. sent the policy to the B. company for indorsement, and on Jan. 21, 1869, the insured died. In March, the B. company resolved to pay E.'s claim, and a memorandum under seal was indorsed on the policy, declaring that the capital of the B. company should alone be liable for the sum insured by the policy, and that E.'s claim was admitted payable. In June, the B. company cancelled the contract of sale of October, 1868, in consequence of the A. company having failed to comply with its terms, and in November an order was made for winding up the B. company. Held, that there was a good consideration for said memorandum, and a complete Vol. vm. 35
novation of said contract of insurance, and that E. was entitled to recover from the B. company the sum due under the policy. — In re United Poris and General Insurance Co., Evens' Claim, L. R. 16 Eq. 854.
2. The plaintiffs, cotton brokers in London, received advice from B. that he had shipped cotton to them and had drawn upon them at six months' sight for £3000 on account of that shipment, and the plaintiffs (according to their custom) declared the cotton valued at £5000 upon an open policy "as well in their own names as for and in the name or names of all and every person or persons to whom the same doth, may, or shall appertain in part or in all" with the defendant, May 23, intending to insure B. and themselves. The plaintiffs accepted the bills "against shipping documents" for said cotton May 21. The cotton was lost at sea June 11. The plaintiffs afterward paid said bills and received the bills of lading for said cotton. Held, that the plaintiffs were entitled to recover said £3000, being the amount of their advances; and held (by Bovill, C. J., and Denman, J.), that the plaintiffs were entitled to recover said £5000, being the whole amount insured. (keating and Brett, JJ., contra). —Ebsworth v. Alliance Marine Insurance Co., L. R. 8 C. P. 596.
3. The plaintiff insured silks " at and from Japan and [or] Shanghai to Marseilles and [or] Leghorn and [or] London via Marseilles and [or] Southampton,
and whilst remaining there for transit . . . and in the good ship called the
steamers or steamer per overland, or via Suez Canal." The perils insured against included arrests, restraints, and detainments of all kings, princes, and people of what nation, condition, or quality soever, and all other perils, losses, and misfortunes that shall come to the detriment of said goods. The policy contained a memorandum that it was agreed that said goods should be shipped by the M. or certain other steamers only. Goods were never in the ordinary course of business carried to London via Marseilles except by the M. steamers, which stopped at Marseilles, and the M. steamer company always sent such goods overland through France and thence to London, and this was well known among underwriters. Said silks were transmitted by the M. steamers from Shanghai to Marseilles, and thence through France eta Paris. In Paris the goods were detained in consequence of the city being besieged and surrounded by the Germans. After the silks had been detained a month the plaintiff gave notice of abandonment to the underwriter. Held, that the policy covered the whole journey from Shanghai to London, including the overland transit through France; and that said detention in Paris was in consequence of a " restraint of princes," and that the plaintiff was entitled to abandon and recover as for a total loss. — Rodocanachi v. Elliott, L. R. 8 C. P. 649.
4. An insurance company in Liverpool employed E. as their agent in London to accept risks and receive premiums there. The plaintiff employed P. to effect insurance for him, and P. prepared a slip, which was initialed by E. for said company, and transmitted the same day to Liverpool. The company received the slip, and held it for some time, and in the mean time E. received a check payable to the company's order for the amount due the company for premium and stamp duty, and by virtue of his authority indorsed the check and received the money. The goods insured were lost by the perils insured against, and the companyrefused to execute a policy. Held (by Quain and Archibald, JJ.), that no action would lie; (by Blackburn, J.) that accepting the initialed slip amounted to a contract to either properly and diligently prepare a policy, or to return the slip, and without delay inform the plaintiff that the company would not execute a policy. — Fisher v. Liverpool Marine Insurance Co., L. R. 8 Q. B. 469.
Interest. — See Legacy, 1, 2.
A ship-owner at Hamburg agreed to sell a vessel to H., an Englishman, resident and domiciled at Hamburg, possession to be given upon the delivery of the cargo after arrival from the voyage in which the vessel was then engaged, and deductions to be made for damage above wear and tear. The master of the vessel, who was authorized to complete the sale, arrived in England and discharged his cargo, but refused to there deliver the vessel to II. unless paid the full price, and refused to allow a survey to enable H. to ascertain what damage the vessel might have sustained. H. filed a bill for specific performance, and for restraining the vessel from leaving port, and served a copy of the bill upon said master. Held, that the service was sufficient, and that the court had jurisdiction, and would restrain the vessel from removing from said port. Injunction granted. — Hart v. Herwig, L. R. 8 Cb. 860.
See Arbitration, 1.
Jury. — See Contract, 5.
Landlord And Tenant. The defendant, before leasing an estate, promised B. that he would kill down the game upon the estate, and would not let the game during the lease. B. took the lease, but the lessor then let the game, and did not kill it down. B.'s crops were in consequence damaged by the game'. B. also lost sheep, which were poisoned by browsing upon yew-trees, the branches of which extended over the lessor's fence so as to be within reach, and other sheep by their feeding upon yewtree clippings, thrown by the lessor's gardener upon B.'s land; he also lost cattle by their getting at yew-trees upon the lessor's land by reason of the insufficient fence upon the lessor's land. After this the lessor died. Held, that B. was entitled to recover for the damage to his crops caused by the defendant's failure to keep his collateral agreement to kill down the game; that he could not recover for the loss of his sheep, as for that injury B. had only a personal action, if any, which died with the lessor, and that he could not recover for the loss of the cattle, as there was no obligation upon the lessor to maintain a fence between his and his lessee's land. — Erskine v. Adeane, L. R. 8 Ch. 7-56.
Lapse. — See Devise, 5; Legacy, 8.
The owner of a ten-year lease agreed in writing to let the property to K., and not to give him notice to quit so long as he paid the rent when due, having previously verbally agreed to let the premises to K. for any term of years not exceeding his own. A railroad company contracted to purchase K.'s interest in the premises, which he described as any term at tenant's option, but not beyond said owner's term. The company subsequently denied that K. had proved title as alleged. Held, that K. had an interest in said premises, and was entitled to the purchase-money. — In re King's Leasehold Estates. Ex parte East of London Railway Co.. L. R. 16 Eq. 521. See Charge; Lex Loci.
1. A testatrix had a power of appointment by will over a fund held in trust for her for life. She gave "£100 of such trust funds to my nephew P.," and several other legacies in the name terms. Held, that said legacies were specific, and bore interest from the date of the death of the testatrix. —Davies v. Fowler, L. R. 16 Eq. 308.
2. A testatrix bequeathed to certain parties "all the money of which I die possessed." At the time of her death she held a sum in cash in her house, and she was entitled to a legacy which the executors had not paid or acknowledged aa at her disposal, to the apportioned part of an annuity from the last stated day of payment, and to interest on a balance at the bankers accrued since the last time she was credited with it. Held, that the cash only passed by the bequest.— Byrom v. Brandreth, L. R. 16 Eq. 475.
3. A testatrix gave a legacy to "my niece L., second daughter of J. H. W. She then gave a further legacy " to each of my nieces, the said L. W.," &c., and gave her residuary estate "in trust for the said L. W." and others. The testatrix had another niece, L. F. T. W. Held, that evidence was not admissible to show that the testatrix intended her niece L. F. T. W. to take in the residuary bequest. — Webber v. Corbett, L. R. 16 Eq. 515.
4. A testator, after giving certain pecuniary legacies, gave all his messuages, farms, and lands at N., his stock, crops, and implements of husbandry, moneys, securities for money, and all the residue of his estate and effects, real and personal, to his wife, until his youngest child should attain twenty-one. Held, that said pecuniary legacies were not charged upon the testator's real estate. — Castle v. Gillett, L. R. 16 Eq. 530.
5. A testator gave his interest in leasehold estates to trustees, to pay half the income to his son H. for life, or until his bankruptcy or insolvency, and after H.'s decease, bankruptcy, or insolvency, which should first happen, to pay said income to all or any the children of H., in such manner as H. should appoint, and in default of appointment, to pay the same to all the children of H. There was a similar provision in favor of the testator's son F. The will contained a proviso that if, at the death of the testator's wife, either H. or F. should become entitled to the D. estate, then the son so entitled should receive no portion of said rents, but that the other son should receive the whole rents. H. filed a declaration in insolvency in Australia in 1863, and afterward received his discharge. He had four children born before said insolvency and one afterward. The testator's widow died in 1866, and F. became entitled to the D. estate. Held, that upon the death of the testator's wife new trusts arose of the whole of said leaseholds, identical with the trusts of H.'s moiety, and that said rents were payable to H.'s five children, subject to his power of appointmens, as the gift over on the insolvency of H. took effect upon his insolvency in Australia. — In re AylwMs Trusts, L. R. 16 Eq. 585.
6. A testator sent a duplicate of his will to a legatee, leaving the original with his solicitor. Subsequently he executed upon the same day two codicils in