Page images
PDF
EPUB

ally liable in respect of five shares each of the plaintiff's fifteen. — Brown v. Black, L. R. 8 Ch. 939; s. c. L. R. 15 Eq. 363.

- See Mortgage, 1; Partnershif, 2; Penalty. Condition— See Arritration, 2; Mortgage, 2; Trust, 4; Vendor And

Purchaser, 2. Conditional Limitation. — See Settlement, 4. Condonation. — See Fraud. Consideration. — See Contract, 4; Settlement, 1. Construction. — See Appointment, 1; Charity; Contract, 1, 5; Election; Executors And Administrators, 2; Freight; Guarantee; IllegitiMate Children; Insurance, 3; Marshalling Assets; Settlement, 4.

Contract.

1. The plaintiff railway company applied to the defendant railway company for a loan, which the defendant agreed to advance upon receiving running powers over the plaintiff's line. The money was advanced, and an agreement entered into, whereby (1) the defendant was to have running powers over the plaintiff's line, subject to such by-laws as the plaintiff should make from time to time; (2) the receipts from through traffic to be divided in certain proportions; (3) the defendant to be at liberty to have their own servants at the plaintiff's stations; (4) there to be a complete system of through booking, whether running powers were exercised or not; (5) the defendant, if using its running powers, to fix the fares, and, if the plaintiff objected, the same to be referred to arbitration; (6) the defendant not to carry local traffic upon the plaintiff's line unless desired so to do, and in such case to receive fifteen per cent of the local fares; (7) the two companies to send by each other all traffic not otherwise consigned to and from stations on the lines of each other when such lines formed the shortest route; (8) any difference under this agreement to be settled by arbitration. The plaintiff gave the defendant three months' notice of the determination of the agreement. Held, that the agreement was not determinable. — Llanelly Railway and Dock Co. v. London & North-western Railway Co., L. R. 8 Ch. 942.

2. The defendants contracted to deliver to the plaintiffs 2000 tons of iron in equal monthly deliveries during the year 1871, payment to be made by acceptances at four months from the 10th of the month following delivery. At several periods before December, 1871, the plaintiffs requested the defendants by letter to deliver no more iron during the then current month, and these requests were acquiesced in by the defendants. In December, the price of iron had risen, and the plaintiffs demanded delivery of the remainder of the 2000 tons undelivered, or 1280 tons, and brought action for non-delivery. Jleld (by Kelly, C. B., and Pigott, B., — Martin, B., dissenting), that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover. — Tyers v. Rosedale & Ferryhill Iron Co., L. R. 8 Ex. 805.

3. A corporation on July 17 sold at auction the lease of certain tolls, upon condition that the purchaser should on the fall of the hammer pay a month's advance, and furnish two sureties, who should sign a lease. The purchaser paid the advance, but never furnished the sureties, and on August 4 wrote to the corporation that he could not complete the sale, and asked a return of his advance. The contract of sale was not executed by the corporation under its seal, nor by any person authorized under its seal to sell. Tlie corporation on August 7 adopted said sale, which was entered on the minutes under seal. Held, that as there was no contract under the seal of the corporation there was no mutuality; and that the payment of said advance was not such a part performance that the contract might be enforced in equity against the purchaser; and that the ratification of August 7 came too late. — Mayor of Kidderminster v. Hardwick, L. R. 9 Ex. 13.

4. A company advertised for offers for the supply of such quantity of certain stores as the company might order during one year. The defendant sent a certain offer, which was accepted. The defendant refused to supply certain of said stores ordered by the company. Held, that there was a sufficient consideration for the defendant's promise to supply the goods ordered, although the company was not obliged to order such goods. — Great Northern Railway Co. v. Witham, L. R. 9 C. P. 16.

5. The plaintiff sold goods to the defendant, to be paid for according to the written contract in "from six to eight weeks." The sale took place May 1, and the action was begun June 18. The judge left it to the jury to say what was the mercantile meaning of the expression " from six to eight weeks." The jury found that the action had not been brought too soon. Held, that the question was properly left to the jury. Ashforth v. Redford, L. R. 9 C. P. 20.

6. The plaintiff and defendant, both subscribers to a charity, agreed that if the former would vote for an object of the charity the defendant favored, the defendant would at the next election vote for the object of the charity the plaintiff favored. Held, that the contract was valid. — Bolton v. Madden, L. R. 9 Q. B. 55.

See Arbitration, 2; Bankruptcy, 2; Broker; Corporation; Frauds, Statute Of; Injunction; Insurance; Jurisdiction; Landlord And TenAnt; Lease; Mortgage, 2; Penalty; Railway, 2; Settlement, 1, 3.

Corporation.

By the registered articles of association of a mining company it was provided that immediately after incorporation P. enter into an agreement for the purchase of the mine for a sum in cash and 3200 fully paid-up shares. The vendor of the mine received said shares, and directed that ten of them should be allotted to F. By statute, an agreement concerning paid-up shares must be registered. Held, that the articles of association did not constitute an agreement with said vendor of the mine, and that consequently the holder of the shares allotted to him was liable as a contributory. —Pritchard's Case, L. R. 8 Ch. 956.

See Company; Contract, 3.

Costs. — See Lien, 1.
Covenant. — See Arbitration, 2; Penalty.
Cumulative Legacy. — See Legacy, 7.
Curtesy, Tenant By. — See Estofpel.
Damages. — See Landlord And Tenant; Statute.
Death. — See Guarantee, 1; Legacy, 9.
Declaration Of Trust. — See Trust, 1.

Devise.

1. A testator in his will directed that his debts should be first paid out of his residuary estate, and then gave a share of the residue to his daughter for life, remainder to her children as tenants in common, remainder to testator's other children. Subsequently to the date of his will the testator executed a settlement in which he recited his agreement to give his daughter £5000, whereof £1000 was to be paid to her intended husband, and £4000 was to be a provision for his daughter, and then covenanted to pay to the trustees of the settlement in his lifetime, or within two years after his death, £4000 to be held upon certain trusts. The £1000 was paid to the husband of said daughter. Held, that said daughter's share of the residuary estate was adeemed to the extent of £4000. — Cooper v. Macdonald, L. R. 16 Eq. 258.

2. A testator devised specific estates in trust for each of his children for life, with power in each child to appoint to such person as he or she should marry an annuity not exceeding, in the whole, one-third of the income of the estate devised to him or her for life. He then directed his trustees to hold his residuary estate upon trusts and subject to powers which should correspond with those declared concerning those estates specifically devised. Held, that each child had power of appointment of an annuity not exceeding one-third of the income of the specifically devised estate and his share of the residuary estate. — Cooper v. Macdonald, L. R. 16 Eq. 258.

8. A testator made specific devises upon trust for each of his children for life, remainder to the children of each tenant for life as tenants in common, with crossremainders between such children, and failing such issue of the tenant for life, in trust for the testator's other children as tenants in common, or, if there should be only one of his children "then living," in trust for that child and his heirs. There followed bequests of residuary real and personal estate upon trusts to correspond with those above set forth, with a proviso that if any of the testator's children should die in his lifetime, leaving children, they should take the share they would have received if their parent had survived the testator. Held, that the gift over on failure of issue of a tenant for life was to the testator's children or to their children living at the time when the gift over took effect. — Cooper v. Macdonald, L. R. 16 Eq. 258.

4. A testator devised his real estate in strict settlement with a proviso that during the minority of any person who should become tenant for life the trustees of the settlement should accumulate the rents, and should invest such accumulations and interest thereon at certain periods in the purchase of lands to be settled to the same uses. Held, that the court could not authorize laying out any portion of said accumulations in necessary repairs and improvements of the estate. Brownskill v. Caird, L. R. 18 Eq. 493.

5. A testator gave his real and personal estate in trust to convert both into money and from the proceeds pay certain legacies, and to hold the residue of his

'said personal estate so converted into money as aforesaid in trust to pay the income to his four natural children until they should respectively attain the age of twenty-one, and, when they should attain that age, upon trust to transfer the said residue of his personal estate unto said children in equal shares as tenants in common. Held, that under the residuary clause the proceeds of the real estate passed, and that the share of a child who died under twenty-one lapsed and would, as regards the real estate, go to the testator's heirs-at-law, and, as regards the personal estate, go to the testator's next of kin. — Spencer v. Wilson, L. R. 16 Eq. 501.

6. A testator devised certain estates upon trust for his daughter EX for life, remainder to the use of E.'s husband W. for life, remainder to trustees for 1000 years to raise portions for younger children of E. and YV., remainder subject to said term to the eldest and other sons of E. in tail male. The testator then directed that in case said E. and W. or either of them should, during their lives or the life of the survivor of them, advance or pay any sum of money for the use of any younger child for whom a portion was provided, then such sum should be taken in full or part satisfaction of the portion to which such child would have been entitled under the will, unless said E. and W. or the survivor of them should direct to the contrary by a deed sealed and attested. E. and W. had several children, of whom one, J., was of weak mind. E., W., and their eldest son covenanted together that if the share of J. devolved upon any of them, they would divide it among the younger children of E. and \V. J. died, and her portion devolved upon W., and in accordance with the above covenant passed to the younger children. W. survived his wife, and died, bequeathing shares of his personal estate to his younger children. Held, that said younger children's portions taken under the will of the first testator were not to be diminished by the suras received under the above covenant or under W.'s will. — Cooper v. Cooper, L. R. 8 Ch. 813.

See Appointment, 1; Election; Executors And Administrators, 2; Illegitimate Children; Legacy; Lex Loci; Marshalling Assets; MortGage, 3; Settlement, 4; Trust, 3, 5.

Domicile. — See Lex Loci.
Easement. — See Party-wall,

Election.

A testator gave a legacy to his widow for life or until her second marriage, charged upon part of his freehold and copyhold hereditaments, with a direction that she should occupy his mansion-house and enjoy the rents of a portion of the property. The testator then devised his real estate specifically, and gave to his trustees powers of management and leasing. His real estate consisted chiefly of customary lands, out of which his widow was entitled to freebench, but in no instance in these manors had a widow ever been admitted or her freeholds set out by inetes and bounds. Held, that the widow was put to her election. — Thompson v. Burra, L. R. 10 Eq. 592.

Elegit. — See Priority, 2. Eminent Domain. — See Tenant In Tail. Equitarle Mortgage. — See Mortgage, 2. Equity.—See Arbitration, 1; Company, 1, 3; Injunction; Railway, 1;

Trust, 4.

Estofpel.

A tenant by the curtesy of certain estates devised the same to A. for life, remainder to B. in fee. A. occupied the premises without interference by the heir entitled to the estates for more than twenty years, and then conveyed to C., who entered after A.'s death. Held, that B. was entitled to the estates, inasmuch as A., wiio had entered into and enjoyed the estates under said will, was estopped from asserting that said will was void and that she, A., had acquired title by twenty years' possession. — Board v. Board, L. R. 9 Q. B. 48.

Evidence.

1. Testimony by the maker of a promissory note given to a payee, since deceased, that the note was given merely for the purpose of securing payment of interest upon a sum advanced by the payee, even if legally admissible, should be wholly disregarded. — Hill v. Wilson, L. R. 8 Ch. 888.

2. By statute a railway company, with whose line a junction is effected, may erect signals at such junction, and the expense thereof is to be repaid by the company making the junction. Such a junction was made by the defendant with the plaintiff, who, to prove payment for signals erected, stated that a check had been sent the person erecting the signals; and it was also proved that said latter person received the check and sent a receipt. Held, that said receipt was admissible in connection with the other facts to prove payment. — Carmarthen & Cardigan Railway Co. v. Manchester & Mil/ord Railway Co., L. R. 8 C. P. 685.

See Legacy, 4.

Executors And .administrators.

1. Where a person possesses himself of the assets of a testator or intestate without having administered, a bill for an account to the extent of the specifio assets he has received will lie against him as executor de son tort, though there is no legal representative. — Coote v. Whittington, L. R. 16 Eq. 534.

2. A testatrix bequeathed £1000 to E., and legacies to other persons. By a codicil, after stating that it was her intention to give T. the residue of her estate after paying the legacies, free of all deductions in respect of probate duty or on any other account, she declared her will to be that all the legatees should contribute ratably to her funeral and testamentary expenses in full exoneration of the residue of her estate given to T., and she appointed T. and E. her executors. T., who received all the assets, in consideration of £700, part of the legacy to E., agreed to pay E. an annuity, whose life he knew to be a bad one. Held, that the burden was upon T. to prove that his transaction with E. was a fair one; and that the costs of suit must be paid from the residuary estate. — In re Diets Estate. Gray v. Warner, L. R. 16 Eq. 577.

3. The plaintiffs supplied goods to an innkeeper, ho subsequently died without having paid for the goods. His administratrix carried on the business and held the goods for fifteen months, when she became bankrupt. Held, that the plaintiffs had lost their claim as against the creditors of the administratrix. — Kitchen v. Ibbetson, L. R. 17 Eq. 4(i.

4. An executrix and sole legatee of a testator opened an account with a bank as " executrix of G.," the testator. Having overdrawn her account, she deposited with the bank a picture belonging to the testator's estate as security for present and future advances. Before said account was opened a decree had been made in a creditors' suit for the administration of the testator's estate, but no receiver was appointed nor an injunction granted to prevent the executrix from dealing

« PreviousContinue »