PENAL ACTION.

An action by an assignee to recover the value of goods transferred by the bankrupt in fraud of the Bankrupt Act, is penal in its character, and a state court has no jurisdiction of it. — Brigham v. Claflin, 31 Wis. 607.

PLEADING.-See ABATEMENT; AMENDMENT; DECEIT, 3; MISJOINDER; QUO WARRANTO, 2; USURY, 1; WAIVER.

PLEDGE.-See CORPORATION, 2.

POOR DEBTOR.- See BANKRUPTCY, 2.

PRACTICE.

The Act of Congress of 1872 (17 Sts. at Large, 197), providing that the pleading and practice in the United States courts shall conform as near as may be to that of the courts of the states in which they are held, held, not to authorize the commencement of an action at law in the Circuit Court holden in New York, by summons issued in the name of the plaintiff's attorney, according to the practice of the courts of the state of New York. Martin v. Criscuola, 10 Blatchf. 211.

See NONSUIT; TRIAL, 1, 2.

PRESUMPTION. - See MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, 2; TRIAL, 1.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT.-See AGENT.

PRINCIPAL AND SURETY.-See SURETY.

PROMISSORY NOTE.- See BILLS AND NOTES.

PROXIMATE AND REMOTE CAUSE.

Defendant mounted a pile of stones in the street to make a public speech; a crowd of hearers gathered about him, some of whom also got upon the stones and broke them. In an action by the owner of the stones, held, that whether defendant's act was the proximate cause of the injury was a question for the jury.- Fairbanks v. Kerr, 70 Penn. St. 86.

See INSURANCE (FIRE), 1.

PUBLIC POLICY.-See CORPORATION, 1.

QUO WARRANTO.

1. A statute providing that a quo warranto information may be filed against a corporation when it exercises powers not conferred by law, held, not to include the case of a trespass in constructing a road over lands without lawful authority. State v. Kill Buck Turnpike Co., 38 Ind. 71.

2. The defendant may plead double to an information in the nature of a quo State v. McDaniel, 22 Ohio St. 354.

warranto.

RAILROAD.

Carriers of passengers by street cars drawn by horses are held only to the same degree of care as to pedestrians as the owners of other vehicles, and not

to the degree of care required of those in charge of cars propelled by steam. Unger v. Forty-second Street R.R. Co., 51 N. Y. 497.

See DAMAGES, 1; FIXTURE; INCUMBRANCE; LEASE; MASTER AND SER

The repeal of usury laws takes away the defence of usury in actions thereafter brought on any contracts, whether then in being, or afterwards made.— Woodruff v. Scruggs, 27 Ark. 26.

The rule in Shelley's case is a rule of law, and not merely of construction. Kleppner v. Laverty, 70 Penn. St. 70.

SALE.-See DECEIT, 1; VENDOR AND PURCHASER.

Defendant gave to T. a license to examine his land, and agreed, in case T. should elect to take the land before a fixed time, to convey to him or whomsoever he should direct. T. made no examination or election, but assigned the contract to plaintiff. Held, that plaintiff could not exercise the right of election, nor maintain a bill for specific performance of the contract. - Mendenhall v. Klinck,

51 N. Y. 246.

STATUTE.

A statute not preceded by the formal enacting clause, prescribed in the constitution of the state, held, void. Vinsant v. Knox, 27 Ark. 266.

See CONFLICT OF FEDERAL AND STATE AUTHORITY, 1; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, STATE, 2, 4, 5; PRACTICE; QUO WARRANTO, 1; REPEAL; VOTER; WITNESS.

STATUTE OF FRAUDS. See FRAUDS, STATUTE OF.

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.

- See LIMITATIONS, STATUTE of.

STOCK.

A certificate of stock in a railroad corporation entitled the holder to "preferred dividends, out of the net earnings, after payment of mortgage interest of said company in full." After the issue of the certificate, the corporation bor

rowed money and issued bonds therefor bearing interest, and also hired connecting railroads. Held, that the holder of the certificate was not entitled to receive a dividend before payment of interest or rent. St. John v. Erie Railway Co., 10 Blatchf. 271.

See BANK, 3.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; CORPORATION, 2; DAMAGES, 3; NATIONAL

Sureties on an official bond are liable for defalcations of the officer, though he hold office only de facto and not de jure. State v. Wells, 8 Nev. 105. See EXECUTOR AND ADMINISTRATOR, 1.

SURRENDER.- See CORPORATION, 3.

SURVIVAL OF ACTIONS.

1. The statutory liability of an officer of a corporation for its debts does not survive against his administrator. - Moies v. Sprague, 9 R. I. 541.

2. A proceeding in rem in admiralty is not abated by the death of the claimant. The James A. Wright, 10 Blatchf. 160.

SURVIVORSHIP.

A promise to pay a sum annually to two persons "during their natural lives," binds the promisor to pay the annuity during the joint lives of the two and the life of the survivor. — Douglas v. Parsons, 22 Ohio St. 526.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, STATE, 2; MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, 1.

TELEGRAPH.

Plaintiffs sent a telegram written on a blank, furnished by defendants, which had the following condition printed on it: "It is agreed that the company shall not be liable for . . . non-delivery of any message beyond the amount received for sending the same." The message was not delivered, and in an action brought by the plaintiffs to recover damages therefor, defendants admitted their liability to the extent of the amount paid for sending the message. Held, that the above condition was unreasonable, and that defendants were liable for all damages accruing to plaintiff. (APPLETON, C. J., dissenting.) - True v. International Telegraph Co., 60 Me. 9.

A debtor's property was attached on March 8, at 7 P.M., and his petition in bankruptcy was filed July 8, at 4 P.M. Held, that the maxim that in law there is no fraction of a day, did not apply, and that the attachment was dissolved by the clause in the Bankrupt Act dissolving attachments made within four months before the commencement of proceedings in bankruptcy.- Westbrook Manu facturing Co. v. Grant, 60 Me. 88.

See INSURANCE (FIRE), 2.

TORT. - See EJECTMENT.

See BANKRUPTCY, 3; EJECTMENT; INJUNCTION; QUO WAR

RANTO, 1.
TRIAL.

1. Where the record of a criminal case purports to set forth the oath of the jury, it must strictly pursue the statutory form.-J. Johnson v. The State, 47 Ala. 9; A. Johnson v. The State, ib. 62; Stephens v. The State, ib. 696. But where it merely states that the jury were duly sworn according to law," or "sworn well and truly to try the issue joined," the court will presume that the oath was in due form. - Lockett v. The State, ib. 42; McNeill v. The State, ib. 498.

2. At a criminal trial, the court, at a recess, gave additional instructions to the jury, received their verdict, and discharged them, in the absence of the prisoner's counsel. Held, error. - McNeill v. The State, 47 Ala. 498.

A custom in a city, that the property in goods shall pass by delivery of the warehouse receipts for the goods, without indorsement, is bad in law. — Lehman v. Marshall, 47 Ala. 362.

USURY.

1. Where by statute the taking of usury does not avoid the contract, but only forfeits the entire interest, the defence of usury must be pleaded specially, and proved strictly as averred. — Frank v. Morris, 57 Ill. 138.

2. The maker of a note for a certain sum payable in United States currency, with legal interest, obtained an extension of time by promising to pay the note in gold coin, or in currency with the premium that gold should be worth at a certain date. Held, that this agreement was usurious. · Gates v. Hackethal, 57 Ill. 534.

3. A borrower who has not agreed to pay usurious interest cannot set up the defence of usury on the ground that a third person has agreed to pay the usury demanded by the lender for making the loan. — McArthur v. Schenck, 31 Wis. 673.

See INDORSER; NATIONAL BANK, 1, 2; REPEAL.

VARIANCE. -See DECEIT, 3.

VENDOR AND PURCHASER.

A. and B. jointly bought land of C., who gave a bond to them, conditioned to convey on payment of the purchase-money. A. died, B. paid the purchasemoney, and demanded a conveyance to himself, which C. refused to give. Held, no breach of the condition. — Field v. Martin, 46 Ga. 99.

See DECEIT, 1; EQUITY; INCUMBRANCE; LIEN, 1.

VENDOR'S LIEN. See LIEN, 1.

VOTER.

A statute, requiring inspectors of elections to indorse on the ballot cast by each voter a figure corresponding with the number placed opposite the name of

the voter on the poll list, conflicts with a constitutional provision that all elections shall be by ballot, because voting by ballot implies absolute secrecy. - Williams v. Stein, 38 Ind. 89.

WAIVER.

Action on a policy of fire insurance. Plea, that the action was not commenced within twelve months after the loss, as stipulated by a condition of the policy. Replication, that within the twelve months defendants" waived the said condition." Held, bad, for not setting out specifically the facts relied on as a waiver. Oakman v. City Ins. Co., 9 R. I. 356.

WAR.

Action on a note dated Little Rock, Feb. 7, 1865. Plea, that when the note was executed plaintiff was a citizen of Minnesota, and defendants were citizens of Arkansas, aiding the rebellion, and public enemies of the United States. Held, good. (MCCLURE, C. J., dissenting.) - Rice v. Shook, 27 Ark.

WAY.-See INJUNCTION; MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, 1; QUO WARRANTO, 1. WIFE.-See HUSBAND AND WIFE.

WILL.

1. Testator devised land to trustees for the use of A., B., and C., for their lives, and directed that upon the death of the last survivor of said three persons the trustees should dispose of the land and divide the proceeds equally among the surviving children of B. and C. Held, that the word "surviving" referred to the period of distribution, and not to the time of the testator's death. - Slack v. Bird, 8 C. E. Green, 238.

2. Testator gave to his wife "the rents and profits of all my property during her life for her support and the support and education of my children, under the direction of my executors." Held, that no trust was created for the children, either in the widow or executors. - Paisley's Appeal, 70 Penn. St. 153. EXECUTOR AND ADMINISTRATor, 3; War

See DEVISE; ESTATE TAIL;

RANTY.

WITNESS.

Action brought by husband and wife against husband and wife for slanderous words spoken by the female defendant of the female plaintiff. Under a statute making parties competent witnesses, but excluding husband and wife from testifying for or against each other, held, that each of the married women was a competent witness on her own behalf. — Bennifield v. Hypres, 38 Ind. 498.