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plaintiff amended by introducing charges, showing advances from the testator to the defendant. The defendant then pleaded that he had renounced probate since his answer, and before the plaintiff had amended. Held, that the plea could not be sustained. — Morley v. White, L. R. 8 Ch. 731.
See CHARTER-PARTY, 1; LIBEL.
Poor RATE. The appellants owned certain warehouses, workshops, &c., in connection with their docks, constituting one estate and under one system of management. The warehouses, &c., were capable of separate beneficial occupation apart from their connection with the docks. The appellants were obliged to maintain the docks at a loss. Held, that said warehouses, &c., and the docks might each be rated separately, and not as a whole, in assessing the poor rate, and that the warehouses might be rated at an enhanced value, because of the proximity of the docks, although the docks by themselves were maintained at a loss. — Mersey Docks and Harbor Board v. Overseers of Birkenhead, L. R. 8 Q. B. 445.
POWER. — See Trust, 3.
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT. 1. Iron was being unloaded from a cart for the purpose of being carried on board a ship. The defendant's foreman not being satisfied with the manner of unloading, got into the cart and threw out part of the iron and injured the plaintiff. It was the duty of the defendant, a stevedore, to carry the iron, after it was thrown from the cart, to the ship. Held (by GROVE and DENMAN, JJ., BRETT, J., dissenting), that it was a question for the jury whether the foreman was acting within the scope of his employment. — Burns v. Poulsom, L. R. 8 C. P. 563.
2. A foreigner employed brokers to buy car-wheels for him. The defendant, in the presence of the foreigner, contracted to furnish wheels to the brokers, and subsequently failed to perform the contract. Held, that under the circumstances of the case the plaintiff, being a foreign principal, could neither sue nor be sued on said contract. — Elbinger Actien-Gesellschaft v. Claye, L. R. 8 Q. B. 313.
3. By agreement between a London firm and a Rangoon firm, the former firm was to purchase goods “on joint account," charge two per cent commission, and send the goods to the Rangoon firm. The plaintiff, with no knowledge of this agreenient, furnished goods to the London firm, which were exported to the Rangoon firm under the above agreement. Held, that the foreign firm at Rangoon was not liable as an undisclosed principal to the plaintiff for the price of said goods. — Hutton v. Bulloch, L. R. 8 Q. B. 331. See BOTTOMRY BOND; BROKER; Custom.
PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS. Where one defendant in a suit, being a solicitor, acted as agent of the solicitor on the record to collect evidence in the suit, the letters between him and his codefendant were held to be privileged communications. — Hamilton v. Nott, L. R. 16 Eq. 112.
RAILWAY. – See STREET.
RECEIVER. — See Trustee, 1.
RELIGIOUS EDUCATION. A Catholic, being about to marry a Protestant woman, agreed verbally that the boys of the marriage should be brought up as Catholics, and the girls as Protestants. There was a daughter born, who was baptized a Protestant, with the knowledge of the father, who was, however, absent and ill, and who shortly before his death made a will directing his children to be brought up Catholics, and appointing his brother, a Catholic, their guardian. The daughter was brought up by the mother's family, who had no knowledge of said will, as Protestant until she was nine years old, when said guardian first claimed her. Held, that the father's right to have the child brought up as Catholic had been abandoned, and that said guardian would be restrained from interfering with the custody or education of the child. – Andrews v. Salt, L. R. 8 Ch. 622.
RENT-CHARGE. Declaration that the defendant, being seised in fee of certain messuages, granted them to C., subject to a yearly rent-charge, which C. covenanted to pay; and that subsequently all the estate of C. became vested in the defendant, who did not pay said rent-charge. Held, that said rent-charge being in fee, debt would not lie at common law until the fee determined, and that the plaintiff would have been driven to a real action; but that real actions having been abolished by statute, an action of debt would lie. — Thomas v. Sylvester, L. R. 8 Q. B. 368.
REPAIRS. — See LEASE, 2.
REPLEVIN. A mortgagor leased the mortgaged premises to the plaintiff. The mortgage gave the mortgagee power to distrain the goods of the mortgagor, in a certain event; and such event happening, the mortgagee by mistake distrained the plaintiff's goods. The plaintiff replevied and recovered the expenses of the replevin bond, and then brought trespass for further damages to said goods, and for trespass to the land. Held, that the judgment in replevin was a bar to the action for trespass to the goods; otherwise as to the action for trespass to the land; but that the defendant not having recognized the plaintiff as a tenant, was entitled to judgment in such action on a plea of not possessed. - Gibbs v. Cruikshank, L. R. 8 C. P. 454.
REVOCATION. — See Will, 4, 5.
SALE. By 35 & 36 Vict. c. 74, § 2, any person who shall sell as unadulterated any article of food or drink which is adulterated, is subjected to a penalty. The respondent, a butter dealer, sold an inspector a pound of adulterated butter on being asked for “a pound of butter at 7d." Held, that there was an implied representation by the respondent that the article he sold was unadulterated butter. Filzpatrick v. Kelly, L. R. 8 Q. B. 337.
See MORTGAGE. VOL. VIII.
SEAL. — See BILLS AND NOTES, 1. . SETTLEMENT. — See ELECTION.
SHAREHOLDER. — See COMPANY, 1; Trust, 4. SHIP. — See BOTTOMRY BOND; CHARTER-PARTY; CUSTOM; FREIGHT; GEN
ERAL AVERAGE; INSURANCE; SOVEREIGN PRINCE.
SOVEREIGN PRINCE. A cause was instituted on behalf of the owner, master, crew, and passengers of the Batavier against the steamship Charkieh and her freight for damages arising out of a collision. An appearance was entered under protest for the Khedive of Egypt, and a petition was filed stating that the Charkieh was the property of the Khedive, as reigning sovereign of the state of Egypt, and was a public vessel of the government and semi-sovereign state of Egypt, and praying the judge to declare that the court bad no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. It appeared that the vessel was sent to England to be repaired, and had brought a cargo and advertised to carry one back, for the sake of lessening expense; that she was chartered to an English subject for her return voyage to Alexandria ; that she was entered at the custom-house like an ordinary merchant vessel, and that all freights and passage money earned by her were received by the Egyptian minister of the interior as part of the public revenues of Egypt. Held, on the facts that the Khedive had failed to establish that he was entitled to the privilege of a sovereign prince; that if he were entitled to such privilege, it would not oust the jurisdiction of the court in this action; and that if such privilege existed, it had been waived with reference to the Charkich by the action of the Khedive in engaging her in traffic. — The Charkieh, L. R. 4 Ad. & Ec. 59.
SPECIFICATION. — See CONTRACT, 1.
STOCK EXCHANGE. — See BROKER.
Stocks. — See Trust, 4.
A qul-de-sac, into which the public has been allowed to enter for twenty years, is dedicated to the public, and is a public highway. A railway constructing its line under such cul-de-sac is not to pay compensation to the abuttors. — Souch v. East London Railway Co., L. R. 16 Eq. 108.
SUITORS' MONEYS. — See Bona VACANTIA.
THEATRICAL ENGAGEMENT. An actor, who had contracted to act at the plaintiff's theatre during the season of nine months, was restrained by injunction from acting at any place other than the plaintiff's theatre. — Montague v. Flockton, L. R. 16 Eq. 189.
TILLAGE. In case any part of certain land was cồnverted into “tillage," a tithe rentcharge became due. The owner of the land built a house thereon, and converted a part into garden ground and the remainder into orchard. Fleld, that the land was not converted into tillage. — Dudman v. Vigar, L. R. 6 H. L. 212; 8. c. L. R. 7 C. P. (Ex. Ch.) 72; L. R. 6 C. P. 470; 6 Am. Law Rev. 304, 699.
TITHE. — See TILLAGE.
TREATY. — See EXTRADITION.
Trust. 1. If a trustee will not take proper steps to enforce a claim against a debtor to the trust fund, the remedy of the cestui que trust is to file a bill against the trustee for the execution of the trust, or for the realization of the trust fund, and then to obtain the proper order for using the trustee's name, or for obtaining a receiver to use the trustee's name. — JAMES, L. J., in Sharpe v. San Paulo Railway Co., L. R. 8 Ch. 597.
2. Before executing a deed of assignment of his property, a debtor had deposited with his solicitor a bill of exchange as security for charges. At the time the bill became due nothing was due the solicitor, who, however, retained the bill and brought suit upon it, but recovered nothing, in consequence of the acceptor's bankruptcy. The creditors charged the trustee of the debtor with a breach of trust in leaving the bill with the solicitor, instead of claiming it and making the best terms possible with the acceptor. Held, that there was no breach of trust. — Ex parte Ogle. In re Pilling, L. R. 8 Ch. 711.
3. Three trustees had power to appoint their successors in case any of their number became unable to act. One of the trustees becoming of unsound mind, though he was not found so by inquisition, the other trustees appointed a new trustee in his place. Held, that the power was properly exercised. — In re East, L, R. 8 Ch. 735.
4. H. held, as trustee for the defendants, certain certificates of stock in a railway company as registered proprietor thereof. Such stock was issued to registered proprietors, and it was never noticed on the face of the certificates that the proprietor was a trustee. H. obtained advances from R. on deposit of the certificates as security, with a written agreement to execute a valid mortgage and transfer of the stock when requested. The defendants discovered the fraud of H., and gave R. notice that H. had been trustee for them. R. thereupon obtained a transfer of the certificates to himself. Held, that under the circumstances R. was entitled to the stock. – Regina v. Shropshire Union Co., L. R. 8 Q. B. (Ex. Ch.) 421; 6. c. L. R. 3 Q. B. 701.
See COMPANY, 4; EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS; FRAUDS, STATUTE OF.
VESTED INTEREST. A testatrix gave a sum of money, payable at the decease of A., to the brothers and sisters of S., to be equally divided among them, share and share alike, the said shares to be vested interests on the majority or marriage of each; and the income, in the event of A.'s death, in the mean time to be paid towards the maintenance of said legatees. There was no gift over. Two of the legatees survived A., and died under age and unmarried. Held, that the share of said two legatees passed to their legal personal representatives. — Simpson v. Peach, L. R. 16 Eq. 208.
See LEGACY, 2.
VOTE. By statute, a person rated in respect of distinct premises in two or more wards shall be entitled to vote in such of said wards as he shall select, but not in more than one. A burgess on the roll for two wards voted first in one ward and immediately after in the other ward. Held, that by voting in the first ward the burgess made his selection, and that the fact of his voting afterward in another ward could not vitiate his previous vote. — Regina v. Harrald, L. R. 8 Q. B. 418.
WAIVER. — See ARBITRATION; SOVEREIGN PRINCE.
Way. P., the owner of an inn with a passage-way to the same from a street, agreed with M., an abuttor, to change the direction of the passage-way. M. accordingly conveyed to P. a small piece of land between said inn and the new passageway, and granted to P., his heirs and assigns, “ rights of way and passage at all times and for all purposes over a passage intended to run between the land conveyed and said street.” The plaintiff, the lessee of the inn, brought a bill against M. and his tenants, alleging that some of the defendants, but which of them the plaintiff could not discover, blocked up the passage with carts and machinery for loading and unloading goods. Held, that the right of way was not a right in gross, but a right appurtenant, and passed to the plaintiff; that it was not necessary for the plaintiff to show what share each defendant had in causing the obstructions, and that an injunction should be granted. — Thorpe v. Brumfitt, L. R. 8 Ch. 650. See DEDICATION.
WILL. 1. A testator, having made a will and codicil, made another codicil, in which he stated his desire to cancel said will, and that a previous will should stand as his last will. The only previous instrument of the testator was a settlement on his marriage. Held, that said will was revoked whether the settlement could be incorporated in the probate or not. — In the Goods of Gentry, L. R. 3 P. & D. 80.
2. A testator's will had been originally engrossed on fifteen sheets of paper by a law stationer, with blanks for legatees and legacies, which were filled up by the testator. The fourth sheet had been removed, and replaced by one in the handwriting of the testator, but the original had been preserved. The number of the sheet incorporated in the will had been altered from seventeen to four. On the sixteenth sheet a codicil had been written by the testator, and on the eighteenth a schedule of property. The sheets of the will were tied together with tape. Held, that the presumption that the sheets bound together were so bound together at the time of the execution and attestation of the will was not rebutted by the facts of the case. — Rees v. Rees, L. R. 3 P. & D. 84.
3. A testator signed his will in the presence of two witnesses by making a mark thereon. One witness made a mark below the testator's mark, and the second witness then wrote the name of the testator opposite the testator's mark, and the word “witness," and the name of the first witness opposite his mark, but did not add his own name. Held, that the will was not properly attested. — In the Goods of Eynon, L. R. 3 P. & D. 92.