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no application to the case, and that the defendant was a trustee of the stables for the plaintiff. — Booth v. Turle, L. R. 16 Eq. 182.


FREIGHT. By charter-party a vessel was to proceed to Riga, there be provided with a full cargo, and then proceed to London and deliver the same, on being paid freight as follows: a lump sum of £315. There was the usual exception of sea risks; and the freight was to be paid half on arrival and the remainder on the right delivery of the cargo. A cargo was loaded and part lost by sea risk. Held, that the ship-owner was entitled to the whole of said £315. — Robinson v. Knights, L. R. 8 C. P. 465; Merchant Shipping Co. v. Armitage, L. R. 8 C. P. 469 (2).


GENERAL AVERAGE. Bark was loaded on a general ship, “average, if any, to be adjusted according to British custom.” A hole was cut in the vessel for the purpose of extinguishing a fire which broke out in the hold, and the water which came in destroyed said bark. By custom of British average adjusters, such a loss is not a general average loss. Held, that the owner of the bark was not entitled to general average contribution. — Stewart v. West India and Pacific Steamship Co., L. R. 8 Q. B. (Ex. Ch.) 362.



IMMEMORIAL Right. — See Common.


INJUNCTION. An interim injunction to restrain a sale expected to take place immediately was granted on motion, and before bill filed, on the plaintiff giving an undertaking to file a bill and affidavit in the course of the day. — Thorneloe v. Skoines, L. R. 16 Eq. 126. See CONTRACT, 2; THEATRICAL ENGAGEMENT.

INQUISITION. — See Trust, 3.

INSANITY. Discussion as to what degree of repulsion of a parent from his child amounts to such mental delusion as will justify setting aside a will made under the influence of such repulsion. — Boughton v. Knight, L. R. 3 P. & D. 64.

See LUNACY; Trust, 3.

INSURANCE. 1. The plaintiff effected an insurance “ on 1711 packages teas” by the “E.," from New York to London, valued at $31,000, and against the usual perils, “and

all losses and misfortunes that shall come to the hurt, detriment, or damage of the said goods or any part thereof, occasioned by sea perils." There was a special warranty, as follows: “warranted by the assured free from damage or injury from dampness, change of flavor, or being spotted, discolored, musty, or mouldy, except caused by actual contact of sea-water with the articles damaged, occasioned by sea perils. In case of loss to hardware, the loss shall be ascertained by a separation and sale of the portion only of the contents of the packages so damaged, and not otherwise; and the same practice shall obtain as to all other merchandise, as far as practicable." 419 packages of the plaintiff's teas were injured by salt water. Teas are usually sold in the order of the consecutive numbers marked on the packages, and if the numbers are broken by some being omitted, or if some packages are damaged, a suspicion is created that the other packages may be affected, and such packages consequently, though sound, bring less prices than if no packages were damaged. Consequently the plaintiff's remaining 1262 packages brought less than they would if the 449 packages bad not been damaged. Held, that the plaintiff could not recover from the insurance company for the loss on said 1262 packages. — Cator v. Great Western Insurance Co. of New York, L. R. 8 C. P. 552.

2. A vessel was insured against fire for a certain period in the Victoria Dock, with liberty to go to a dry dock. The vessel removed part of her paddle-wheels in the Victoria Dock, as was necessary in order to enable her to enter the dry dock. She entered the dry dock, was repaired, and then moored a little farther up the Thames, where she remained ten days, for the purpose of having her paddlewheels replaced before returning to the Victoria Dock, and while so moored was burned. It was usual for steamers to remove their paddles before entering a dry dock, and said ten days was not an unreasonable time for replacing the paddle wheels. Held, that the insurers were not liable for said loss. — Pearson v. Commercial Union Assurance Co., L. R. 8 C. P. (Ex. Ch.) 548; 8. c. 15 C. B. N. 8. 304; 33 L. J. 85. See ANNUITY; CHARTER-PARTY, 2.


INTERROGATORIES. The court disallowed interrogatories upon a commission to take testimony abroad tending to discredit the witness, as being likely to deter the witness from testifying. - Stocks v. Ellis, L. R. 8 Q. B. 454. See LIBEL.



LEASE. 1. A lessor leased a dwelling-house, together with all lights thereto belonging or therewith used and enjoyed. The lessor, at the time of making the lease, held a four-year lease of the adjoininy estate, and subsequently purchased the reversion of this estate. The lessor, more than four years from the time the lease was made, but before its termination, began to build a new building upon his estate, in such a manner as would interfere with the light of the house he bad leased. Injunction to restrain lessor from so building refused. — Booth v. Alcock, L. R. 8 Ch. 663.

2. The defendant let a house, with an agreement to put the premises in repair, and the lessee covenanted to keep the premises in repair. The iron covering of the shoot leading into the coal-cellar was, at the time of the demise, out of repair, so as to be dangerous. After the demise, and while the defendant's workmen were still executing said repairs, the plaintiff stepped upon said covering and was injured by its giving way. Held, that the defendant was not liable. — Pretty v. Bickmore, L. R. 8 C. P. 401.

3. A lease was made of “ all that piece or parcel of woodland suitate in B., and all that close called W., and all that warren of conies, with all and singular the rights, members, and appurtenances whatsoever 'in B., and that lodge or house thereupon built, commonly called B. lodge; and also all that warren of conies, with all and singular the rights, members, and appurtenances whatsoever in R., both which said warrens are known by the name of the B. warren, and extend themselves over the wastes of B., F.," &c. Held, that, by the lease, the soil did not pass, but only a right to the conies and whatever was fairly incident to, or necessary for, the preserving and making profit of them, — Earl Beauchamp v. Winn, L. R. 6 H. L. 223; 8. c. L. R. 4 Ch. 562; 4 Am. Law Rev. 289. · See COVENANT.

LEGACY. 1. A testator gave his property equally among his daughters, directing F., one of them, to bring an estate she owned into hotchpot. After the date of the will, said estate was, by the advice of the testator, settled upon J. for life, remainder to her husband for life, remainder as J. should appoint among her children. The trustees sold the estate and held the proceeds upon the same trusts. Beld, that said proceeds must be brought into account in respect of J.'s share. — Middleton v. Windross, L. R. 16 Eq. 212.

2. A testator gave £5000 to trustees in trust, to invest and to apply the income to and for the education of the testator's nephew, until the nephew should attain the age of twenty-four, and when he attained that age to pay him said principal sum: in case the nephew should die under the age of twenty-four, the trustees to hold said principal upon trust for R. The nephew died under twenty-four, and, at the time of his death, said trustees held an accumulation of income. Held, that the legacy to the nephew was vested at the death of the testator, liable to be divested in case the nephew should not attain twenty-four, and that the nephew's personal representative, and not R. or the testator's residuary legatee, was entitled to said accumulation of income. – In re Peek's Trusts, L. R. 16 Eq. 221.

3. A testator gave his personal estate to trustees, to hold in trust for his daughter for life, and after her decease to transfer the principal equally among the children of his daughter, whether by her present putative husband or by any other person whom she might marry. But, in case his daughter should die, leaving no issue, then over. For several years prior to, and at the date of the will, the daughter had been living with a man, whom she subsequently married, as his reputed wife, and at the date of the will had one son by her reputed husband who was believed by the testator to be illegitimate. Said son was born in 1831, and his mother, who was sixty-seven years of age, and whose husband had died, petitioned with her son to have said principal paid to them jointly. Held, that the son had a vested remainder after his mother's life-estate, and that said principal should be paid to the petitioners. — In re Brown's Trust, L. R. 16 Eq. 239. See VESTED INTEREST.



LIBEL. Action for libel in charging the plaintiff with sending vessels to sea overloaded, over-insured, and under-manned. Plea, that the several words and matters concerning the plaintiff were true. Particulars were offered with the plea. Held, that such an answer was more convenient than a special plea of justification, and allowable. The defendant being ordered to deliver to the plaintiff particulars stating the substance and the dates of the matter relied on, the court refused to allow the defendant to administer interrogatories to the plaintiff for the purpose of enabling the defendant to comply with said order. — Gourley v. Plimsoll, L. R. 8 C. P. 362.

LIGHT. — See LEASE, 1.

LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF. By statute, any person building beyond the general line of buildings may be summoned before a justice, who may order the demolition of such building; and no person shall be liable for the payment of any penalty or forfeiture under said statute for an offence cognizable before a justice unless complaint is made within six months from the discovery of such offence. Held, that the above limitation clause did not apply to the case of building beyond the general line of buildings. — Vestry of Bermondsey v. Johnson, L. R. 8 C. P. 441.

LUNACY. The court refused to allow the legatee, in the will of a lunatic, to attend proceedings in lunacy. - See In re Scarlett, L. R. 8 Ch. 739. See INSANITY; Trust, 3.



MORTGAGE. On a bill by an equitable mortgagee, the court will direct a foreclosure, not a sale. — James v. James, L. R. 16 Eq. 153.

See REPLEVIN; Trust, 4.

Motion. By statute, a judge, “ upon the trial of any issue,” may grant leave to move to enter a nonsuit, &c. At a trial, which took place on Thursday, the judge refused such leave, but reconsidered the matter, and granted leave on the following Monday. Held (by Bovill, C. J., KEATING and GROVE, JJ.; BRETT, J., dissenting), that said leave was not granted upon the trial of the issue. — Folkard v. Metropolitan Railway Co., L. R. 8 C. P. 470.

NEGLIGENCE. A passenger in an omnibus was injured by a blow of the hoof of one of the horses, who kicked through the front of the omnibus. There was no evidence that the horse was vicious, or a kicker, but two marks, as of kicks, were found beside the hole made by the above kick. It was shown that the consequences of kicking might have been obviated by a kicking strap. Held, that there was evidence of negligence, on the part of the omnibus company, to go to the jury. - Simson v. London General Omnibus Co., L. R. 8 C. P. 390.

NEW TRIAL. On a trial as to the testamentary capacity of a testatrix, the jury disagreed. On a second trial the jury found for the plaintiff, and an application for a new trial was refused. The plaintiff and certain other persons testified at each trial, and subsequently the plaintiff was found guilty of perjury at the latter trial. On the trial for perjury the above plaintiff could not testify, and he was convicted upon the testimony of said other persons who had testified in the first trials. An application for a new trial, made after the plaintiff's conviction for perjury, was refused. — Davies v. Reynolds, L. R. 3 P. & D. 90.

NUISANCE. — See LEASE, 2; Way.



PATENT. Two applications for the same patent were filed July 20 and July 23, respectively. The patent applied for July 23 was first sealed. Held, that under 15 & 16 Vict. c. 83, § 24, the patents took effect upon the days on which they were applied for. – Saxby v. Hennett, L. R. 8 Ex. 210.



PLEADING. A bill was filed by a creditor for administration of a testator's estate, alleging that one of the defendants, who was named executor, was a debtor to the estate, and that his co-executor was insolvent and did not intend to take steps to secure the debt, and that said defendant, though he had not proved the will, had not renounced probate. The defendant answered, not admitting the debt. The

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