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New Trial. — See Cost, 2.
NUISANCE. An injunction was granted on the circumstances of the case to restrain the defendant from using the ground floor of his house as a stable, and creating a nuisance from the noise of his horses. – Ball v. Ray, L. R. 8 Ch. 467.
PARLIAMENTARY Law. A peer of parliament is incapacitated from voting at an election for members of the House of Commons, and is not entitled to be placed upon the list of voters. — Earl of Beauchamp v. Madresfield, L. R. 8 C. P. 245.
1. A nurseryman devised and bequeathed all his real estate, upon part of which he had carried on his business, and his residuary personal estate to his three sons as tenants in common. After the testator's death, a contract for the purchase of additional land for said business purposes, which had been entered into by the testator, was completed by the sons. Subsequently one of said brothers conveyed to the other two his undivided third in said real and personal estate, which was purchased by said two brothers for said business purposes. Held, that said land being used for business purposes must be considered partnership property and personal estate. — Waterer v. Waterer, L. R. 15 Eq. 402.
2. A., a partner in a banking firm, was appointed treasurer of a Board of Guardians, and gave bond for the performance of his duties, with B., also a partner, and C., not a partner, as sureties. All sums of money received by A. as treasurer were deposited in said bank. The bank stopped, owing a consideraable sum to said board. The sureties each paid half of the deficit to said board ; and then B. claimed to prove against A.'s separate estate. The claim was disallowed. — Lacey v. Hill, L. R. 8 Ch. 441.
See CARRIER; COPYRIGHT.
PATENT. 1. A patentee who had his machines manufactured by an agent obtained an injunction against an infringing manufacturer, and the latter was ordered to file an affidavit stating the number of machines made by him since the date of the patent, and the names and addresses of the persons to whom the machines had been sold, but was not required to give the names of the agents concerned in the transactions. — Murray v. Clayton, L. R. 15 Eq. 115.
2. A patent was taken out in America, afterward in England, and two days later in France. The French patent expired. The Privy Council refused to recommend that the term of the English patent be extended, on grounds of public policy. – In re Blake's Patent, L. R. 4 P. C. 535.
PEDLAR. Twelve ladies made garments of materials purchased by others, carried the garments from house to house for sale, and used the profits for a village school and religious purposes. Held, that the ladies were not “pedlars ” under the Pedlars' Act, 1871, § 3. — Gregg v. Smith, L. R. 8 Q. B. 302.
PEER. — See PARLIAMENTARY Law.
PENALTY, By statute the master of a vessel is obliged when going from Quebec to Montreal to take a pilot, under a penalty which is to go to the Decayed Pilot Fund. The master of a vessel going to Montreal took a pilot, who so guided the vessel that a collision occurred. Held, that the master was not liable for the collision; where a statute inflicts a penalty for not doing an act, the penalty implies a legal compulsion to do such act. — Redpath v. Allen. The Hibernian, L. R. 4 P. C. 511.
PERIL OF THE SEA. — See INSURANCE, 3.
Pilot. — See SALVAGE, 1.
POWER. 1. Under a marriage settlement, G. had a power of appointment over a trust fund. He directed a portion to be held upon such trusts, to take effect only after the marriage of L., as L. should by deed appoint, and until such appointment in trust for L. for life, remainder as L. should by will appoint. Held, that said appointment by G. was void for remoteness. G. also appointed another portion of said fund upon similar trusts for E., who subsequently married. G. then reciting the appointments in favor of L. and E. confirmed the same, and made additional appointments with power to revoke the “ direction and appointment thereby made.” Held, that there was a valid reappointment in favor of E.; and that said power of revocation extended only to appointments made by way of “ direction and appointment," and not to those made by way of confirmation, and that therefore G. had no power to revoke the appointment to E. — Morgan v. Gronow, L. R. 16 Eq. 1.
2. K. had a power of appointment over certain property by any instrument in writing sealed and delivered in the presence of a witness. K. wrote and signed a paper stating, “ If I die suddenly, I wish my eldest son to have it [said property). My intention is to make it over to him legally if my life is spared.” Held, that there was a defective execution of the power, which a court of equity would hold effectual. — Kennard v. Kennard, L. R. 8 Ch. 227.
See ANTICIPATION; APPOINTMENT; LIEN, 2; PRIORITY ; SETTLEMENT, 2, 4; SPECIALTY DEBT. PRACTICE. — See ALIMONY; TENDER; WRIT.
PRESCRIPTION. The defendant was bound by prescription to maintain a fence between his and the plaintiff's land. The defendant sold the “ fallage” of the wood on his land to H., who cut down a tree which in falling broke down a large portion of the fence. The plaintiff's cows passed through the gap and fed on the leaves of a yew-tree which had been felled, and died in consequence. Held, that the defendant was liable for the loss of the cows. — Lawrence v. Jenkins, L. R. 8 Q. B. 274.
PRESUMPTION. - See BANKRUPTCY, 3; EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS. PRINCIPAL AND AGENT. — See ATTORNEY; CARRIER; COMPANY, 2; DIVORCE, 2; FRAUDS, STATUTE OF, 2; INNKEEPER; VENDOR AND PURCHASER, 1.
PRINCIPAL AND SURETY. A. and B., partners, were jointly and severally liable on a bond to D. for partnership moneys, B. purchased A.'s share in the partnership and assumed his liabilities, covenanting to save him harmless. B. made an arrangement with his creditors under the English Bankrupt Act, 1869, and the creditors, including D., passed resolutions to accept a composition payable by instalments extending over two years. Afterward a deed was executed releasing B. and reserving to creditors all rights against sureties or persons other than B. Held, that the effect of said resolutions was to give time to B. and discharge A. - Wilson v. Lloyd, L. R. 16 Eq. 60.
PRIORITY. Funds were vested in trustees in trust for L. for life, without power of anticipation, and after her death for her children, and if no children, for such persons as she should appoint. In 1843 L. appointed that, in case she should have no children, said trustees should raise sufficient out of the fund to pay a debt of her husband, and the trustees were notified of the appointment. Subsequently, in place of the old trustees, new trustees were appointed who had no notice of said appointment, and at the request of L. and her husband dealt with the trust funds so that they were diminished. L. died without children. In May, 1870, the trustees received notice of a charge in favor of R., dated 1864, and in October, 1870, of the deed of 1843. Held, that the charge under the appointment of 1813 took priority over the charge of 1864; and that the new trustees having received no notice of the appointment of 1843 were not obliged to make good the loss which their action had occasioned. — Phipps v. Lovegrove, L. R. 16 Eq. 80. See SPECIALTY DEBT. PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION. — See DISCOVERY, 2, 3 ; LIBEL.
PROBATE. If a will has been proved in a foreign country, a certified copy will be admitted to probate in England, and an English court will not allow the validity of the will to be there questioned. — Miller v. James, L. R. 3 P. & D. 4.
PROBATE COURT. — See RECEIVER.
PROHIBITION. — See ADMIRALTY.
Railway. 1. The plaintiff was injured while travelling on the defendant railway by the train of another company, which bad statutory running powers over said railway
on paying certain tolls. The defendants were guilty of no negligence. Held, that the defendants were not liable. — Wright v. Midland Railway Co., L. R. 8 Ex. 137.
2. The plaintiff was travelling in a railway carriage, and leaned slightly against the door for the purpose of seeing the signal lights of the next station. The door immediately flew open, and the plaintiff fell out and was injured. The jury found a verdict for the plaintiff. Held, that there was evidence of the railway company's liability. — Gee v. Metropolitan Railway Co., L. R. 8 Q. B. (Ex. Ch.) 161. See CARRIER.
REAL ESTATE. — See PARTNERSHIP, 1.
RECEIVER. The court has jurisdiction to grant a receiver of personal estate pending the grant of probate, which has been delayed by a caveat in the probate court; where, however, no actual suit has been begun. Also of the rents of real estate, under the same circumstances, where neither the devisee nor the heir-at-law is in actual possession. — Parkin v. Seddons, L. R. 16 Eq. 34.
RELATIONS. — See LEGACY, 3.
RELEVANCY. — See BILL IN Equity.
REMOTENESS. — See POWER, 1.
RENT. — See SPECIALTY DEBT.
RESERVATION. Land was conveyed to M. subject to a reservation of all mines and minerals to the grantors, with power to use sufficient land for working the same; and it was provided that it should not be lawful for M. to do any thing whereby the grantors should be obstructed in the exercise of their powers, and that the grantors should pay reasonable compensation for damage or spoil of ground occasioned by the exercise of said powers. Held, that M. was not entitled to compensation in respect of the mere existence of old pits, but was entitled to compensation for future damage occasioned thereby, and for land used as accessorial to such pits, not so used at the time of the conveyance. Also, that compensation should be assessed with reference to the value of the land for any purpose to which it might be reasonably considered as applicable; and that M. might use said land in any way, provided he did not take the minerals themselves. — Mordue v. Dean and Chapter of Durham, L. R. 8 C. P. 336.
RESIDUARY BEQUEST. — See LEGACY, 2, 5.
SALVAGE. 1. A barque in need of a pilot was boarded by the plaintiff, who was not a Licensed pilot, but who agreed to pilot the barque for 78. a day. A gale came on,
but the pilot brought the vessel safely into port. Held, that the plaintiff having engaged as a pilot was not entitled to recover salvage. — The Æolus, L. R. 4 Ad. & Ec. 29.
2. In the 12th article of an answer in a salvage suit the defendant stated that
SCANDAL. — See Bill in EQUITY.
2. A woman executed a voluntary settlement in which was reserved no power of revocation. The deed was delivered to the trustee of the settlement and redelivered to the woman; who subsequently asked and obtained permission of the master to execute a mortgage of the property. Afterward the woman destroyed the deed of settlement, and expressed her satisfaction at having got rid of it. Hdd, that said settlement was valid and irrevocable, and not affected by omitting a power of revocation. — Hall v. Hall, L. R. 8 Ch. 430.
3. A wise was entitled to an equity to a settlement in a sum of money. The court directed that in case of the death of the wife and her children the fund should go to the husband whether dying in the lifetime of his wife or not. — Walsh v. Wason, L. R. 8 Ch. 483.
4. A husband and wife, having power of appointment over personalty, in favor of the children of the marriage, appointed a part of the property to trustees, on such trusts as their son H. should by deed appoint with the written consent of his father, and after the decease of his father, with the consent of the trustees under said father's will, or as said H. should by will appoint; and in default of appointment upon trust, to pay the income thereof for life, or until bankruptcy, insolvency, or assignment, and on the decease of said H., if his interest should not have determined, to his executors or administrators, as part of his personal estate; but if such interest should have determined, upon the like trusts as would have affected the residue of the same share, if the same had been appointed in favor of H. only during his life, or until the period of such determination. Held, that H. was absolutely entitled to his share, subject to forfeiture in case of bankruptcy or assignment. By settlement, husband and wife had a life estate in realty, with power of appointment among children, and in default of appointment,