erty. Schools have been established among them in which English is taught, and they appear contented and prosperous.

The Moros did not take kindly to the new order of things, which was distasteful to them in every respect. They resented any interference with their customs or habits of life and regarded the appearance of the white man in their villages as an unwarranted and offensive intrusion. This was generally true of all the Moros, and especially so of those inhabiting the Lanao district. The promulgation of the laws against slavery and the protection of escaped slaves from recapture were regarded by their chiefs and head men as an unwarranted invasion of their vested rights and was deeply resented. Besides, these datos and head men, who practically exercised the power of life and death over their people, were unwilling to abdicate their powers and become subordinate to any superior authority. The governor of the Moro province and his subordinate officials pursued a conservative course and endeavored to win the confidence of the chiefs and to convince them of the advantages of a settled and orderly government, and were fairly successful in their efforts so far as related to the coast Moros, who, as a rule, understood that by reason of the ease with which they could be reached by American troops resistance was futile; but the Lanao Moros were not so easily convinced and persisted in continuing to maintain an attitude of uncompromising hostility. Although they would frequently come in considerable numbers into the American army posts established in their territory, for the purpose of selling their produce, and would express themselves on such occasions as friendly, it was well understood and often announced that they would not permit Americans to come among them, and, to emphasize this fact, they frequently made night attacks on the pickets about these posts.

After all effort to establish friendly relations had failed, it was deemed necessary to bring matters to a head with them and end a situation which was felt to be impossible of continuance. General Wood, therefore, sent out expeditions to march along the shores of the lake, which were immediately attacked; and, thereupon, assuming the aggressive, he reduced several of their cottas and gave them a salutary and much needed lesson.

THE ARMY SINCE THE WAR WITH SPAIN.

BY CELWYN E. HAMPTON.

[Celwyn E. Hampton, captain United States army; born in Ohio, March 1, 1871; graduated from the Ohio Normal university; entered the United States Military academy in 1890 and upon graduation was appointed second lieutenant in the 23rd infantry, 1896; became first lieutenant 1898, and captain in the 2nd infantry, 1901; has been a close student of military science and history and is a contributor to military journals.] Copyright 1905 by Military Service Institution

In order to intelligibly discuss the conclusions and the benefits to the army that are to be derived from our experiences during the Spanish-American war, it appears to me well to revert, first, to the conditions that developed at its inception and during its progress merely as matters of fact; second, to enumerate the primary and most important things learned from these developments either by the army itself or by the people at large, together with some results already achieved; third, to state what will, apparently, be the results, in the near future, from the awakening or reawakening to realization of our military weakness, judging from past experience and present tendencies; fourth, to point out some of the lessons yet to be learned by or, at least, to be solved by the army for the benefit of our service and the people, proposing, briefly, some solutions for these problems.

To the army it was no discovery that at the outbreak of the war we had not sufficient force of either officers or enlisted men with which to prosecute it, or that our organization was faulty and unfit to withstand the strains of active service. Neither was it any secret, for the army had been, for years, proclaiming its belief, producing arguments and proofs to show that these weaknesses existed, and insisting, in the modest way in which our military arm must always work, that its numbers were totally inadequate and its organization obsolete, rendering difficult the carrying on of its work, even considered only as that of a highly trained nucleus in peace times. In spite of some boasting, in the early days, that one American soldier was equal to ten Spanish and that 15,000 troops were an abundant force for the quick reduction of Havana, it may be said that the first act of hostilities served to show the country a por

tion of the fallacy to which it had clung by failing to heed the warnings of its soldiers in the years past. Later, the threatened descent of a Spanish force upon our eastern seaboard, ludicrous as it now appears, in the light of subsequent events, produced a condition of panic fear in a section of the country where I had heard men of intelligence and public standing declare, two years before, that the American people, rising en masse, armed only with scythes, could beat back any foreign invasion that might ever be made. Under the driving force of necessity, therefore, the belated increase and reorganization of the army began. It is needless to use space here to describe the condition that resulted, further than to say what the army saw then, that attempted reorganization after war begins produces a state that would be better described as disorganization.

Depending, as always, upon volunteer levies for the main strength of the large army required, the organization of these forces began in the greatest possible haste, and developed all the well known weaknesses inseparable from such a system. Men absolutely untrained and inexperienced in matters relating to the profession of arms were commanded, mainly, by officers as untrained and inexperienced as themselves. It was recognized that a leavening of regular officers should be added to this force, but so keen is the civilian to preserve his right to exercise military command upon opportunity that congress was called upon to pass, and did pass, a law limiting the number of regular officers that could be used with volunteer troops to two per regiment. Even this small number could not obtain places, so great was the objection made to their use and, consequently, the leavening process was almost inappreciable. Furthermore, the addition of these regular officers was made in so irregular a manner, owing to a total lack of all previous plans for their advancement, that two anomalous and weakening conditions at once developed. First, nearly all fell under the command of civilian volunteer officers. Second, these promotions and appointments, being made by favor of one kind or another, young subalterns of perhaps only a few months' service, were frequently jumped into comparatively high command rank, while officers of long service,

experience and really tried ability suddenly found themselves junior in rank to and actually serving under youngsters who had barely begun their novitiate in the high calling of arms. When the natural disappointment at the passing of what might be truthfully considered their lawful occasions had somewhat subsided, officers of the regular army began to find that it was perhaps well for their organizations that no more were taken for this purpose, because the number with troops became so depleted, from various causes, that, considering the influx of recruits to the ranks and the reorganization muddles, the efficiency of the army began to be seriously impaired.

The national guard had formerly looked upon itself as in the forefront of forces prepared for filling honorable positions in war time, but when need came, they were not found to be fitted and, after many furious controversies, were entirely disregarded.

The regular army was looked upon as a force which, though small, was in the highest state of training and efficiency. So far as concerned the interior economy of the army under its peace organization, this was true enough. But to meet its expanded state and its supposed readiness for war, it was not true. Mainly the fault for its unpreparedness must be laid at the door of congress-that is, of the people themselves. The latter are ever prone to disregard the advice of purely military men and to prefer ideas of easy faith in the future; while congress cared more for a record of economy, which was popular where military matters were concerned, than for the careful provision demanded by wise forethought. Guns and ammunition for the artillery had not been provided, either of sufficient quantity or of modern character. We possessed a good small-arm rifle, but not in anything like the numbers required to equip the force we proposed to raise. The bulk of our army, therefore, prepared to take the field armed with an obsolete and antiquated weapon, using ammunition totally unfitted for modern conditions. Before the war was over, it even began to be suspected that our best was inferior to the arm of the enemy against whom we were pitted. Stores of proper clothing and food were not at hand, and plans for their acquisition had not been made. Plans for the transpor

tation, mobilization and encampment of the forces had not been provided and those hastily decided upon often broke down under the strain imposed upon them. For a part of these deficiencies the army itself was not entirely blameless. Another weak point in the army, which soon resulted in a fracture, was in the supply and administrative departments. Under the system then existing the officers of those departments were appointed for a permanent tenure. Whether true or not, the rest of the army generally considered that these appointments were made as the result of favor and influence. At any rate the departments were very close corporations and the officers of the line were prevented from acquiring much knowledge of their workings. Between the line and the departments there was little or no sympathy. Although there could be no doubt that the departments were created for the purpose of serving the line of the army, that object had long been lost sight of, and the departments had grown seldom to seek the advice or consider the needs of the line. Great stress was laid on the value of long tenures in having made experts of their officers and on the consequent impossibility of displacing or replacing them. Nevertheless, when war became certain, large numbers of these officers, seeing greater individual glory and gain in service with the troops, sought to return, and many did return, to the line with all the advantage that whatever influence might have accrued to them could give. Thereby officers of the line were shut out from positions that they had hoped and believed themselves entitled to fill, while the departments, which should have been awake and alert and straining every fiber to equip and care for the army in the field, were crippled by these withdrawals from their ranks of officers who claimed to be, and doubtless were, experts in the work they were now leaving to be performed by officers of the line with little previous experience, and by civilian appointees with absolutely none. Among the acts of army officers perhaps none were considered by the army to be more reprehensible than this.

Finally, under numerous handicaps, thus imposed, month after month was frittered away and lost in attempting to com