last effort with ram or torpedo; nor does it appear that any account was taken of the actions that might arise through mistaken signals, the ardor of captains to fight or the ignorance and neglect of tactical principles.

In the meantime experimenters and inventors have been busy, and finally they have produced a weapon that has been fired with facility and accuracy at various angles and in a range of three thousand yards has hit the trial target regularly. It is true, as some objectors insist, that tidal currents may effect the path of the weapon, but not the sea ways where the emersion is sufficient and the automatic controlling gear functions. The old theory that battleship must fight battleship has also been replaced by the belief that the supreme test of the future will be found not in a series of duels but in fleet actions. So even at three thousand yards, the maximum distance at which guns are sure of hitting the stray and unusually lucky shot excluded-a flight of under water discharged torpedoes is fairly certain to find one target or more. Then, the moral effect on the crews has to be considered. The torpedo is, if nothing more, an additional weapon which at the outset of an action puts us on an equality with our rivals, while no possible initial advantage is gained by its omission and no excessive penalty in displacement is paid by its addition. These broader views have finally prevailed, and the latest official determination is to equip all armored vessels and possibly some of the superior cruisers and scouts-with submerged torpedo tubes. In the heavier ships the long range and in the lighter vessels and the destroyers and torpedo boats the short range torpedoes are hereafter to be installed.

Too much stress cannot be laid on the value of torpedo vessels as schools of practice and training. It is believed abroad that the experience gained on board torpedo destroyers is the very best preparation for future command that can be given to young officers. Torpedo flotillas supply the most concentrated and least wasteful form and opportunities that develop the highest qualities of the seaman, and duty on board of them reveals the aptitude for command, and furnishes the experiences that foster self reliance, responsibility, and readiness in emergencies. It is a rigorous school, the last place for dul

lards and laggards, but the rewards are commensurately great and the work is eagerly sought. Our inferiority in the number of vessels commissioned for this duty counts tremendously against an all round naval efficiency and calls for a new order of things as soon as the emergencies and the deficiencies in personnel permit. If we are to be guided by the best foreign experience, and notably by the lessons of the Russian-Japanese war, many divisions of torpedo craft must hereafter be kept in commission and the duty be made attractive to the best talent of the service and be of a nature that will yield the greatest profit. Paradoxical as it may seem, comparatively long periods passed at sea do not supply the best training. In France the torpedo service is deemed to be above all a school of pilotage. Night exercises are particularly insisted upon, as destroyers will have to fight mainly at night, and for this reason the training and experience that enable officers to carry their vessels safely into difficult and unlighted channels are of the highest importance.

ARMOUR PLATE MAKING IN THE

UNITED STATES.

BY CHARLES O'NEIL.

[Charles O'Neil, rear-admiral U. S. N.; born England, 1842; entered the United States navy on the sloop Cumberland as master's mate, July 1861, and was with it at the capture of Forts Hatteras and Clarke, August 1861; in engagement with confederate ironclad Merrimac 1862; rescued lieutenant Morris from drowning; was favorably mentioned in dispatches and promoted to acting master, 1862; was in both attacks on Fort Fisher; promoted acting volunteer lieutenant 1865; commissioned lieutenant 1868; lieutenant commander 1868; commander 1884; captain 1897; chief naval bureau of ordnance 1897, rear admiral April 22, 1901.]

The manufacture of armour plate as an industry in the United States dates back only to the year 1888, as prior to that time, there being no demand for armour, no establishment in the country was equipped with the necessary machinery for making it, or fully understood the process of manufacture; but as soon as a demand was created, private enterprise quickly provided a source of supply. It is difficult at this time to understand the indifference that existed in this country for a period of at least twenty five years prior to 1888 with regard to armoured ships of war,-a subject which during that time had deeply engrossed the attention of other leading maritime nations of the world, several of which had created powerful fleets of ironclad vessels before the people of the United States had awakened to the necessity of following their example. The enjoyment of peace after the long years of civil war no doubt had much to do with this seeming indifference. During the succeeding years the wooden ships of which the United States navy was almost entirely composed gradually went to decay, until there was but a vestige of a navy remaining; and when matters got to the worst, in 1883, a reaction set in and the United States government went to work seriously to build up a modern navy, and found that it was necessary to aid and encourage several new branches of industry which did not exist in the country, but which were necessary in the construction and equipment of modern ships of war.

The United States navy register of 1864 contains among the list of vessels of the navy the names of seventy three iron

clads, showing that the use of armoured protection for vessels of war, even though of an inferior quality, was recognized as an essential feature of their construction at that period, which makes it all the more astonishing that the matter should have been so completely dropped after the close of the Civil war and allowed to slumber for a period of twenty five years.

The vessels referred to consisted of double and single turreted monitors, of which several remain on the navy list to-day, though the vessels themselves are of but little value, having obsolete guns and very inferior armour. There were also some of the so called light draught monitors, which proved to be utter failures, and a number of Mississippi river steamers which had been adapted for military purposes, and a few of more notable type, such as the Dunderberg, New Ironsides, Galena, and Keokuk.

The armour of nearly all of the United States vessels of that period consisted of several layers of thin plates, each about 1 inch thick, laid on heavy wooden backing; and while of very inferior quality, as viewed from the present standpoint of efficiency, it proved to be quite effective against the artillery then opposed to it. The old monitors received many hits off Charleston, some of the records being as follows:-Montauk, hit 214 times; Weehawken, 187 times; Patapsco, 141 times; Passaic, 134 times; Catskill, 106 times; Nahant, 105 times; Nantucket, 104 times; Lehigh, 36 times; and the New Ironsides, 193 times. Many of these hits were from 10-inch guns, and though the vessels were, as a rule, able to remain at their stations, they suffered considerable injury, though but little was said about it at the time.

The most notable United States ironclads of that period were the Dunderberg and the New Ironsides, and a few words concerning them may not be without interest. The Dunderberg (or Thundering Mountain) was built by William H. Webb, at New York, and is described in the official papers as an iron clad, shot-proof, steam-screw ship of war with ram, to be built of wood and cased with iron. She was designed to carry two revolving gun turrets on the casemate deck, each 21 feet in diameter and 8 feet high in the clear, the armour iron of which was to be 11 inches thick. Each turret was to contain two

guns of 15-inch caliber, and in the casemate eight 11-inch Dahlgren guns were to be carried. The turrets were to be turned by steam. There was to be a shot proof pilot house on one of the turrets or on the casemate deck. The engines and boilers were to be of sufficient capacity to propel the vessel at least 15 knots per hour for twelve consecutive hours in fair weather and smooth water at sea. The vessel was to be completed in fifteen months from July 3, 1862. The guns were to be supplied by the government, but the contractors were to furnish the gun carriages. The contract price was $1,250,000.

The port shutters were of wrought iron, 4 inches thick, and the outer hull was of wood, 6 feet thick at the main deck level, decreasing to 2 feet at the bilge. The under water body was coppered. The sides of the vessel from the main deck to about 5 feet below the load water line were covered with iron 3 inches thick from deck to water line, tapering to 2 inches at the lower edge, and also tapering towards the bow and stern to 2 inches, made in slabs placed vertically. The sloping sides and ends of the casemate were covered with iron plates 4 inches thick, made in one thickness, and about 28 inches wide.

The ship itself was a little over 380 feet long and of 73 feet beam, with a displacement of 7000 tons. The total weight of armour was 1000 tons. The engines were of about 5000 indicated horse power.

The armament as projected was probably more than the ship could carry, and it was finally decided to omit the turrets and the turret guns, and to give the vessel two 15-inch and four 11-inch guns, one 15-inch and one 11-inch gun to be mounted on each broadside and one 11-inch at each end of the casemate. This battery was mounted about February, 1867, from which it will appear that instead of being completed in October, 1863, as required by the contract, the vessel was not completed until three years and a half later.

On February 22, 1867, the Dunderberg went to sea to test her battery, and its general performance was reported as satisfactory. On account of the omission of the turrets a deduction of $22,860 was made from the contract price. It