THE NAVY AND ITS FUTURE.

BY WILLIAM HENRY MOODY.

William Henry Moody, attorney-general and former secretary of the navy; born Newbury, Mass., December 23, 1853; educated at Philips academy, Andover, and Harvard university; lawyer by profession; district attorney for eastern district of Massachusetts 1890-5; member 54th congress from 6th Massachusetts district to fill vacancy; also member of 55th, 56th and 57th congresses; appointed secretary of the navy May 1, 1902.]

The task which is employing the highest energies of the navy, and receiving the greatest attention from the heads of bureaus, the commanders in chief of stations, the commanding and subordinate officers of squadrons, divisions, and single vessels everywhere, is the work of training. To the development of the greatest efficiency in all branches of the service the attention, zeal, and thought of those in charge is mainly directed. This is an era of training. The reports of the several bureaus are largely made up of criticisms upon and plans for the improvement of present systems of practice, drill, and instructions.

The training of apprentice boys and landsmen entering for the first time the enlisted force of the navy in all that is comprehended by the term the sea habit; the training of seamen who have acquired this, but need greater familiarity with the specialized work of a modern ship of war; the training of officers and men of the marine corps in the military and naval duties of that organization; the training of officers and men, sailors and marines in the essential matter of marksmanship with all arms, great and small, including machine and rapid-fire guns, in the care and handling of ordnance, and, particularly, in gun pointing; training in developing and maintaining the efficiency of the main engines of ships, as well as of all auxiliary machinery and devices, steam, electrical, and other; the training of young officers of the staff corps in the specialties of their profession, as well as in its general obligations and duties; the training of junior officers in torpedo work of all kinds, and in the handling of the smaller vessels, and the training of more experienced officers in the capacity to bring

out and utilize the full powers of the vessels under their command, whether operating singly or in squadrons, appears to be the important present business of the navy.

For this purpose schools of instruction have been established wherever practicable, among them being the school for petty officers of the seaman branch at Newport, and for the artificer branch at the navy yards, Portsmouth, Va., and New York; the school at the medical museum, and the torpedo school at Newport. At the same time the work of the naval war college has received increased attention.

It is needless to say that the purpose of all this instruction and training is to make the navy fit for its ultimate design as an instrument of warfare. The navy serves many useful purposes in times of peace which should by no means be minimized. Nevertheless it would not exist in anything like its present form if the possibility of war were not in contemplation. It is believed to be the duty of the department to employ the means which congress has placed at its disposal to develop every latent power of material and personnel and see that all branches of the service operate in intelligent harmony. This constitutes that preparedness for war which is the best guaranty of the continuance of peace. It has been remembered at every step that the people desire peace and not war, and that the navy should be potent that peace may be preserved. This preparedness for war should be complete; a partial or half-way preparation will not insure us against attack, may even invite it.

Among the most important lessons learned in the war with Spain was that a modern navy can not be improvised during a war or upon the threshold of a war. Much money was then expended in the purchase of ships. Many of them served useful auxiliary purposes, but it may well be doubted whether they added materially to the fighting efficiency of our fleet. The time best suited to the development and perfection of our navy is the time when there is neither war nor threat of war. Happily the present is such a time, and it permits a dispassionate consideration of the future.

The country approves, with hardly a dissenting voice, the policy of strengthening our power upon the sea. What

would have been an adequate navy some years ago is totally inadequate for the performance of the duties growing out of our new possessions in the Pacific and Atlantic and the determination of congress to construct a canal across the Isthmus.

If, then, the policy of strengthening our power upon the sea to the point where it can respond to the national needs be not abandoned, the navy has manifold needs. There must be additional naval and coaling stations; more ships, fighting and auxiliary; and an increase of officers and men. In all of these respects, congress in the past has dealt with the navy wisely and generously, and I doubt not that in the future it will as accurately register the will of the people.

TWENTIETH CENTURY IDEAS ABOARD OUR

FIGHTING SHIPS.

BY I. V. LEE.

I. V. Lee, naval expert, is a New York literary man who has devoted much of his time to the study of naval problems; at first a hobby with him, he has gained such a thorough knowledge of the naval equipments of the United States and other nations, that he has become a recognized expert, and articles on these subjects from his pen are in demand by the leading periodicals and newspapers; Mr. Lee has inspected personally most of the ships of the United States navy.]

Fighting ships, more ships, finer ships! Such is the supreme demand of the nations. Money beyond computation is being poured into the huge floating forts which the world powers are launching. Brains, blood, and all that inventive genius or patriotism can command are being spent to build and to improve these great fighting machines called warships.

Increasingly complicated in its machinery, ever growing in cost, calling constantly for more speed, greater destructiveness, and greater safety-the naval engineer is almost bewildered by the problems which confront him when he is called upon to design a new ship. The admiralty departments of the nations, despairing of keeping their old ships in the best fighting trim, are putting their best efforts into new ships, allowing the old ones to shift for themselves. Russia, in the face of the destruction of her Port Arthur fleet, announced that $800,000,000 would be spent in the next few years on her navy. Great Britain, although possessing the largest navy in the world, yet announced not long since that her admiralty was designing a battleship of 17,000 to 18,000 tons, with ten 12-inch guns in its main batteries, capable of firing a broadside of seven 850-pound shells able to perforate two feet of the best existing armor-in other words, a ship that would have no trouble in destroying anything now afloat or yet designed.

Into this strenuous race for naval supremacy the United States has entered with all her militant Americanism. It is said that her navy department is even planning a battleship of 20,000 tons displacement. The president calls for an American navy which shall be not necessarliy the largest, but as an or

ganized unit the most effective on all the seas. In American shipyards there are now in process of construction thirteen first class battleships, eight armored cruisers, and seven protected cruisers-the greatest aggregate fighting power now being added to the navy of any one of the great powers.

The United States has been building modern types of cruisers since 1883, battleships since 1890. Consequently her navy has not had much time to grow out of date, yet the new ships embody a great number of important improvements over their predecessors.

Among these developments none is more important than the means of insuring the safety of the ship in case of collision, grounding, explosion, or other disaster resulting in puncture of the hull. The system devised to render the new ships of the navy almost unsinkable consists, so far as a visitor to the bridge can see, of two dials with a hole in the center of each and borders of small disks around the edge. These are the central emergency stations, each controlling fifteen bulkhead doors and hatch gears below the protected deck. Each of the disks is numbered to correspond to a door or hatchway in some vital part of the ship.

But this is not, of course, the important part of the system It is merely the controller. On all the main bulkhead openings are electric motors connected with the station by conductor wires. Now suppose that the Colorado is rammed by a careless or hostile navigator. The man who is nearest this emergency station pulls a latch similar to a fire alarm box. Instantly the doors are set in motion in rapid succession, within less than two minutes every door is brought into its water tight groove, and immediate danger of sinking is averted.

If there is trouble at any door it will show in the corresponding disk of the station. If a sailor or seaman has been imprisoned in a compartment he has only to raise a lever, the door will move back and allow him time to pass through, and then close again automatically. This long arm control of the bulkhead doors, combining as it does, distant and local control, assures the safety of the ship and the safety of its crew, leaving nothing to chance or individual initative, bravery, or effi