the course of the Mississippi and the whole water system of the west must be mastered; finally, the rebellious government must be driven from Richmond, its chosen capital."

Starting from these broad lines, the late Charles Cornwallis Chesney, colonel in the British army, and lieutenant in the Royal Engineers, one of the most able military writers of his day, observes that "the important part borne by the American navy in the contest; its absolute performance of the first portion of the task indicated by the prince; the powerful share taken by it in the river campaigns, which cut the seceded states in twain, the vast weight due to its exertions in the final successes of the federal generals, had been but little noticed as compared to the din and shock of the great battles with which the new world rang. Yet nothing is more surprising in this contest; no military, political or financial successes more completely defied expectation, prophesy and precedent than the work wrought by this arm of the union forces; and wrought by it in the very process of creation out of actual nonentity."

To this we may add the views of General Viscount Wolsley. That distinguished authority has expressed the opinion that, for Englishmen the naval operations of the Civil war have quite a peculiar importance. "The coöperation of the United States navy with their army" he says, "in producing a decisive effect upon the whole character of the military operations, is akin to what happens to us in nearly every war in which we engage. An English general has almost always to make his calculations strictly in accordance with what the navy can do for him. The operations by which the federal navy, in conjunction with the army, split the confederacy in two, and severed the east from the west, must always, therefore, have for him a profound interest and importance. The great strategetical results obtained by this concentration of military and naval power, which were as remarkable as the circumstances under which the successes were gained, deserve our closest study."

It may be of interest here to note the much larger degree of success achieved by the union forces prior to the summer of 1863 in the southwest than in the east. The armies of the Tennessee and of the Cumberland had, as their names imply,

rivers along which to operate and gunboats to help them on these lines, and by the spring of 1863 these armies had won many victories and made substantial advances. The army of the Potomac, although large and well equipped, and though its soldiers fought gallantly, had accomplished little. This army had been operating mainly along lines where the naval forces of the union could not help it, there were no rivers along which gunboats could ply. It was, as has been heretofore said, only when it changed its base of supplies to Old Point Comfort and operated along the line of the James river, opened and held for it by the navy, that this great army succeeded in winning and keeping the territory for which it was fighting.

Of course it is not possible within the limits of a brief article to properly apportion between the army and navy credit for the final outcome of our Civil war. So complex were the operations of these two arms of the service and so intimately interdependent were they that the solution of the problem suggested would require at the hands of a great strategist a thorough analysis of the whole history of that wonderful struggle. I have attempted no such task; only a brief review to recall facts which, if not forgotten, have apparently been underestimated by the general public.

The operations of the Civil war were carried on upon an extensive scale. There were enlisted in the armies of the union altogether, 2,672,341 men; the navy never at one time contained more than 52,000. The armies represented every hamlet in the United States; there were very few of the older families that did not have some blood relative in their ranks. Soldiers returning to their firesides naturally familiarized their friends and neighbors with the exploits of the armies in which they had served; and these soldiers have in large part written the history of the war. Regimental, brigade, division and corps histories have been written and published almost without number. Soldiers and their intimate friends numbered by the millions have been the readers of these books, while those who were personally concerned in the operations of the navy were relatively few, and most of them were common sailors, drawn largely from the merchant marine. These men have not writ

ten and they have not read to any great extent histories; but they were men who with the officers of their corps, helped to make history during the trying times of the Civil war, and their deeds have never been exploited before the public as they deserve to be. The historian who shall take up the subject, with the time and ability to do justice to it, will render an invaluable service to his country. He will not only rescue from the partial forgetfulness into which it has fallen, one of the most brilliant chapters of that memorable war, but he will also set clearly before the public mind the influence of sea power as a factor in the past history of this country. This he will never be able to do without demonstrating at the same time, that we cannot afford to be without a navy in the future.

The situation as it was during the Civil war, may be, to some extent, repeated in the future in a war with a foreign naval power. The seacoast over which the confederacy was annoyed and attacked is still the seacoast of the United States, and added to this is the coast from Maine to Cape Henry, and from Puget Sound to the gulf of California. All this is assailable in the future, and all this is to be defended by the United States. It is not at all likely that any foreign power could, with success, invade the interior of our country, but we are still vulnerable from the sea. Our ports can be blockaded, our commerce can be destroyed, we can be isolated from the world, our flag can be humiliated and insulted, unless we understand and appreciate the value of sea power. We must stand always ready and able to defend and maintain the integrity of our country, its honor and dignity at home and abroad.

Ships and guns, torpedoes and men, are all of little use unless officers know how to fight them. Individual ships, however bravely and skillfully they may be handled and fought, can accomplish but little if the officers do not know when, where and how to dispose them; while at the same time skill in handling, courage in fighting, and knowledge of the proper disposition of ships in battle, will often be of little avail without continual and prompt supplies of everything needed in the exigencies of war, all of which must be reckoned for beforehand. Successful war means all of these things and more besides. It means, if the exigency requires, the exertion by a nation of its utmost

power, the utilization of all its resources, the tapping of every source of supply, the employment of every manufactory, every ship and every man that can be useful, and all this with the utmost promptitude and despatch. Further than this, plans of attack and defense must be devised, and these cannot be successfully made without the most accurate knowledge of harbors, inlets, safe and unsafe passages, tides and everything else pertaining to the possible theaters of impending war.

THE AMERICAN NAVY OF THE REVOLUTION.

BY CHARLES O. PAULLIN.

[Charles O. Paullin, naval expert, has devoted special attention to the study of the development of naval warfare during the period of history of which the American Revolution was a part, and has delivered addresses on the subject before the Naval Institute at Annapolis, one of which forms the following article which is published with the approval of the Institute.]

American students are more or less familiar with the principal achievements of the continental navy of the American Revolution. Numerous writers have popularized the naval successes of that celebrated sea officer, John Paul Jones. Esek Hopkins, the first and only commander in chief of the American navy, "Commodore" Samuel Tucker, and Captains John Barry, Joshua Barney and Silas Talbot have found their biographers, who have done ample justice to their gallant and praiseworthy conduct. In 1813 Thomas Clark wrote the first narrative history of the continental navy. Clark was not critical of his sources of information, and his statements must be taken with some caution. In 1839 James Fenimore Cooper, the well known novelist, published a readable and entertaining account of the Revolutionary navy, which, upon the whole, has not been improved upon by other writers. This is not to say, however, that Cooper's history is altogether reliable or judicial in its treatment. It is marked by the bias of the period in which it was written. After the manner of our early historians Cooper wrote with a quill plucked from the wing of the American eagle. To the enthusiastic writers who breathed the fresh and invigorating air of the new republic, it seemed unpatriotic, almost traitorous, to write down the seamy side of Revolutionary history. Consequently they touch lightly, or even omit entirely, events disparaging to the Americans. Lieutenant George F. Emmons published in 1853 a list of the vessels and prizes of the continental navy. This is valuable, although not complete. Later histories of the continental navy treat the subject popularly. The most recent narratives are those of Spears and Maclay.

These various authors furnish us with considerable detail