PEACE TRAINING OF OFFICERS.

BY EBEN SWIFT.

[Eben Swift, instructor in military science n the United States Infantry and Cavalry School and Staff college: born May 11, 184, in Texas; appointed to United States Military academy, 1872; second lieutenant 14th U. S. infantry, 1876; first lieutenant, 1884; captain, 1893; major 7th Ill. vol. May 1898; lieutenant colonel, 9th Ill. inf. July 1898; colonel, 4th Ill. Inf. Nov., 1898; major, Porto Rico battalion of infantry, 1899; major 1st cavalry Jan. 24, 1903.] Copyright 1901 by United States Cavalry Association

The idea of turning out trained soldiers from a university is, I know, ridiculed by many, who fail to see the analogy between other professions and our own. No one refuses to recognize the graduates of the schools of medicine, electricity, law, engineering and others, as competent in their professions, but it is natural to ask the question, How can soldiers obtain the necessary practice in their profession, which in all peaceful arts is so easy to secure? Inability to solve this question as wars became rare, caused the military art to fall behind other arts and led to some of the greatest failures in history. It was maintained that the theory alone could be learned in time of peace, so that when war actually did occur, the armies found themselves overwhelmed with knowledge that was fine in peace but useless in war.

The Germans had their attention directed to this matter by their own misfortunes, and decided that if a school of war were not possible, the next best thing was to make their peace training come as closely as practicable to the actual condition of war. Under the guidance of the greatest of modern generals, who in the years preceding his great successes was commonly called the schoolmaster, new methods of giving the practice were introduced in the schools and the army. Then after three successful wars in six years the old fallacy that war alone teaches war was dispelled. The chasm between practice and theory was bridged at last-an undertaking which was long supposed to be impossible in our profession, although easy in others. It cannot be said, however, that the world ceased to view the university soldier with surprise and suspicion. It is a part of the slow development of a great idea.

From the club of primeval man to the magazine rifle of to-day the changes have not been rapid. The idea of a flank attack was as slow to dawn upon the human mind as the forging of metals was to be comprehended by the artisans. The art of issuing a field order to a large command came more slowly than the steam engine and almost as late as the telephone.

The practical test of the new method wrought the third revolution in the art of war in one hundred years. Frederick the Great had inherited a ready made army. It had been trained in time of peace to a high degree of proficiency without especial reference to its usefulness in war, but he found at once that he could march all round his enemies and strike where he pleased. His victories quickly proved him to be the greatest soldier of his time, and his army became the accepted model for the world. Military men of every nation made pilgrimages to his maneuver grounds at Potsdam, Spandau and Berlin, and sought eagerly for the slightest bit of information about his methods. A system of parade ground maneuvers, which leaves out of question the terrain, cannot fail to strike us as strange at this day. Frederick had only been dead twenty years, and his army still contained some of his best soldiers, when the Corsican captured his capital. A new master had come who knew the relation between the ground and the battle, a matter which had been ignored until then. This single idea developed by a man of wonderful mental and physical capacity placed the French nation at the front of the world. Then we began to follow blindly the ways of the French soldiers, adopted their words into our military vocabulary, and for fifty years studied Napoleon Bonaparte Since the battles of Metz and Sedan we have turned again to the Prussians.

Our own military history, great as it has been, does not encourage us to ignore these lessons taught by foreigners. A certain regiment on our frontier in the spring of 1861 contained about thirty five officers. It was a good regiment and had been officered with great care. In a rather small way its experience had been great, for it had much active work chasing Indians over a great expanse of country. Within a few months at least half of the officers of that regiment were generals of

the line, and four of them were soon at the head of great armies. When it came to applying their previous knowledge to greater questions than came up at a frontier post or on an Indian scout, they found themselves without experience, instruction or precedent. It was a year and a half before the troops which they organized and commanded were capable of really good work, notwithstanding all the aid that money, patriotism and ability could bring to help. At the present day the country will expect quicker work than that. It is absolutely necessary, now that modern methods are beginning to be developed all around us in the world, and when readiness for war is the first requisite of a great state.

As I have intimated, the early experience in the Civil war was a painful one. The first battles excited the risibilities of the world, and are said to have brought from the greatest soldier of the age the cynical remark, that he was not paying attention to the war in America, because he was not interested in the maneuvers of an armed mob. Whether true or not, that statement well expresses the common idea then held of our military efforts-an idea that was not dispelled for years. The sad experience of the first Bull Run was not improved nearly a year later when the battle of Shiloh showed every fault of raw troops, notwithstanding all the efforts at drill and discipline which had been applied by the best soldiers we had. Without entering into the disputed points concerning Shiloh, we cannot fail to agree on the facts, that one army passed several days forming line of battle within sight of the opposing camp, that a commanding general was not able to bring up a command six miles away, and that at the close of a day of battle only about ten thousand out of more than eighty thousand who started in were on the line of battle. The army of the Potomac passed under the command of its fourth commander before the purposes, uses and organization of cavalry received attention. Artillery was not in a better condition. Such things appear strange to amateurs as well as to professional soldiers. But it is also strange that the magnificent Roman armies should have been fooled and ruined by the simple stratagems of Hannibal, or that the Grecian generals should have been confounded by the newness of the idea of a flank attack. A new idea

in war is as slow to arrive as any other momentous event in the history of mankind.

Not the least of our sad experiences during the Civil war was the fact, that many excellent officers were ruined before they had a fair chance to learn, while others whose mistakes were just as great were permitted to goon and learn. The point of greatest importance for us to consider is the fact, that all had to learn. No man ever jumped into the field of battle, fully armed and equipped, like the dragon's brood in the fable. Time went on, and at the end of four years our armies were equal to any that history knows of. In maneuvering and in marching, the leaders and the troops were unsurpassed. It was an army formed in the school of experience, such as Napoleon found in his hand at the end of the wars of the French revolution, and with which he was able to fight Europe for twenty years. It was such an army as a Hannibal or an Alexander inherited from his father. Such armies of course are perfect in their way. The process by which they learned may not be improved upon. If war were the common state of mankind, we might continue to rely upon the same school and to believe that no other would suit.

The adoption of a suitable system of peace training did not come quickly. It was years before it was evolved, and it was the result of many independent lines of thought. Some ideas ran into extremes, as in Kriegsspiel, for instance. It was long before it was possible to harmonize them all into a consistent system in which each had its place. The term deductive system or applicatory system, best describes the whole. It had its inception in the necessity for supplying troops in time of peace with more of the experience and training which they get in actual war. After learning the theory, it was thought best to apply it to various concrete cases, which were made as practical and real as possible. Tactical schemes were worked out, based on probable and real military situations. The principle and the application were given at the same time, and thus both were firmly fixed in the mind.

In working out this idea it soon became apparent that the new system possessed some decided advantages, which might even be claimed as affording better instruction than

the old school of experience in actual war. In peace we can learn one element of one problem at a time, turning from one to the other in order. In war, the ground, the troops, your own decisions, the orders of your superiors, the killed, the wounded, are crowded upon you at once with a thousand variations. It is like taking the university course without having studied the primer. The greatest difficulty in peace training is in the length of time it takes to acquire knowledge in this way. The variety of situations is so infinite that no ordinary school course could do more than indicate the general object and character of this kind of study. We may only begin by producing a small variety of situations, presented and applied in such a way as to make the lesson like real experience. To form the military eye, as it were, to develop a proper habit of thought and action, and to render decisions quickly and accurately, we must rely on practice and intelligence before the highest result will be reached. In the same way that the habit of the drill ground is carried into battle by well disciplined troops, we hope to see the maneuvering habit burned into the soul of every man who is called to command.

The applicatory system has its value for troops, but its value for those who exercise the higher duties of command is greater. Here it is possible to reproduce in the section room almost exactly the conditions of a real campaign. In fact, we can take an example from history and work it out from our own point of view, aided by the light of experience and criticism. We shall lack the sense of responsibility, the excitement and the physical strain. We gain by being able to submit our decisions to the test of criticism and study. In the real campaign we have not the time to digest our experience. In the imaginary campaign we exclude every matter that would tend to divert the untrained mind, from the particular subject in hand.

The results of the new methods are startling indeed. We might expect nothing but success from a nation which for centuries had bound her best and brightest men to the trade of war. But when the Chilians, the Turks and the Japanese, adopting these ideas under good instructors, astonish us by their military proficiency, obtained in a marvelously short

Vol. 9-10