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"passengers" within the meaning of sect. 625 of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1894. Therefore the steamship not being bound to take a pilot her owner was liable for damage resulting from a collision due to a pilot in charge of the steamship.—The Clymene, L.R.  A.C. 295.
Thames :(i.) C. A.-Conservators-Bed of the River--Rights of Ouner of Shore as
to Raising Sand or Gravel--Thames Conservancy Act, 1894, ss. 87, 238. — The expression “ bed of the Thames " in sect. 87 of the Thames Conservancy Act, 1894, includes the soil between ordinary high water mark on one side of the river where it is tidal and ordinary high water mark on the other. Sect. 238 does not reserve to the owner of such soil the right to take gravel, sand and other substances from it.—Conservators of River Thames v. Smeed, Dean & Co., L.R.  2 Q.B. 334; 77 L.T. 325.
Trade Mark:(ii.) C. D.--Registration-Concurrent Applications by Former Partners to
Register separately Trade Marks of Old Firm-Special CircumstancesPatents, Designs, and Trades Marks Act, 1883, s. 72.-The comptroller may refuse registration of a trade mark identical with or bearing a deceptive resemblance to a mark already on the register, not merely in the interest of the registered owner but for the protection of the public. Where concurrent applications are made to register identical or similar trade marks such registration ought not to be permitted unless the Court is satisfied that there is no reasonable probability that harm is likely to arise. The facts that applicants were formerly partners and used for the partnership business marks identical with those now sought to be registered, and that they concur in their applications, are not “special circumstances" entitling them to an exercise in their favour of such discretion as may be vested in the Court under sect. 72 of the Patents, &c., Act, 1883.-In re Ehrmann's
Trade Marks, L.R.  2 Ch. 495 ; 77 L.T. 200. (iii.) C. D.-" Pirle" and "Pearl” – Similar Sound – Invented Word
Registration-Patents, &c., Act, 1888, S. 10 (1) (d) (c).--The words “ Pearl” and “ Pirle" are to be treated on the same footing on the ground of similarity of sound, and “Pearl” not being registrable as a trade mark, “ Pirle," which is a misspelling of “ Pearl," cannot be registered.--In re Ripley and Son's Trade Mark, 77 L.T. 495.
L. M. Pinet carried on a small and recently established business
Trustee :(i.) C. D.-Constructive Trustee- Purchase by Tenant for Life under
Statutory Right- Improvements.--A tenant for life of settled land purchased under a statutory right land adjoining the settled land, executed on it permanent improvements, and devised it by his will. Held, that the devisees were trustees of the purchased land for the remaindermen under the settlement, who were entitled to a conveyance on recouping the estate of the tenant for life the amount of the purchase money and the value of the improvements.- Rowley v.
Ginnever, L.R. (1897] 2 Ch. 503; 77 L.T. 302. (ii.) C, D.-Breach of Trust-Relief under Judicial Trustee Act, 1896– Time
for applying.–Where under an order made in 1893 a trustee had been found by the Chief Clerk's certificate liable in respect of a breach of trust, it was held that he was not too late in applying, on further consideration, for relief under sect. 3 of the Judicial Trustee Act, 1896, and that he ought to be allowed the opportunity at that stage of shewing that his case was a proper one for relief under that Act.
In re Stuart ; Smith v. Stuart, L.R. (1897] 2 Ch. 583; 77 L.T. 128. (iii.) C. D,- Breach' of Trust-Executor Guilty of Derastavit-Relief
Judicial Trustees Act, 1896, s. 3.-An executor was guilty of undue delay in issuing the usual advertisements for claims, and meanwhile paid a legacy and allowed the testator's widow to receive the income of the estate for the support of herself and family. Afterwards large claims, exceeding the value of the estate as ascertained at testator's death, were substantiated against the executor. Held, that although there had been undue delay the executor had not, under the circumstances, acted unreasonably, and might be relieved under the Judicial Trustees Act, 1896, from the consequences of his derasturit.-In re Kay; Mosley v. Kay, L.R.  2 Ch. 518.
Will:(iv.) H. L.-Construction-Rule in Shelley's Case-Equitable Estate Tail
Insanity-Subsequent Evidence of.--The rule in Shelley's case is not a mere rule of construction designed to carry out the intentions of the testator, but is a strict rule of law, which applies wherever there is a gift over including the whole line of heirs, general or special. Where the trusts of a will require that during minority of the testator's child, the legal estate should be in the trustees and be in them again after the child's death, the legal estate remains in the trustees throughout, and the child takes an equitable estate tail and the estate limited to his heirs special being equitable also, the rule in Shelley's case applies. Harton v. Harton, 7 T.R. 652, and Jesson v. Wright, 2 Bli. 1, approved. Montgomery v. Montgomery, 3 J. and L. 47, disapproved. A deed executed by a married woman certified at the time to be of competent understanding will not be set aside merely because several years afterwards she is found by a jury to be insane, and to have begun to be insane at a period prior to the execution of the deed.–Van Grutten v. Foxwell and Others, L.R.  A.C. 653 ;
77 L.T. 170. (v.) C. D.-Construction-Mistake by Testator as to Number of Children
Presumption of Intention--Practice-Costs-0. lxv., r. 146.--Under a gift to the two children of a testator's son, there being in fact four, yiz., two sons and two daughters, alive at the date of testator's will and of his death, it was held that all four children, and not the two daughters only, took notwithstanding a direction that the shares were to be paid to the said children on their respectively attaining the age of twenty-one years, or marrying under that age. The will directed
the testator's funeral and testamentary expenses to be paid out of his
77 L.T. 154.
auldition” to Sums owing by Testatrix's Husband-Falsa Demonstratio.-
ADAM DODD (DECEASED), in the goods | Attorney-General v. Strange (77 L.T.
362), 51, viii.
 2 Ch. 600 ; 77 L.T. 431), U. D. C. (77 L.T. 426), 50, ii.
Attorney-General v. Wright (L.R.
and Co. and Hosken & Co., Ltd., 52, iii.
in re, An (77 L.T. 350), 29, iv.
son and Samuel & Co. (77 L.T. 36, v.
Balme (ileceased), in the goods of (77
Armstrong (77 L.T. 267), 46, ii. Bank of Australasia v. Palmer (L.R.
(L,R. (1897] 2 Ch. 574), 23, Baring (App.) v. Commissioners of
Inland Revenue (Resps.) (77 L.T.
Union (Apps.) v. L. & N.W. Barraclough v. Brown (L.R. 
Bellamy & Co. (Resps.) v. Lunn &
Another (L.R.  2 Q.B. 535 ; Bensaude and Others v. Thames
and Mersey Marine Insurance Co.,
(L.R. (1897] 2 Q.B. 373; 77 L.T. 77 L.T. 282), 22, 45, iv.; 43, v.
Birmingham Vinegar Brewery Co.
Newcastle-upon-Tyne (L.R. 19, 27, i.; 106, iv. ; 20, 58, iii. ;
Booty v. Groom; in re Groom (L.R. | De Hertel v. Goddard & Others (77
 2 Ch. 407; 77 L.T. 154), L.T. 113), 32, iii.
Derby (Mayor, &c., of) v. Derbyshire
Mining Co., Ltd. (77 L.T. 206), 550; 77 L.T. 107), 22, 23, V.;
(77 L.T. 460), 52, v.
Dodd, Adam (ileceased), in the goods
(77 L.T. 456), 23, 17, ill. ; Dr. Jaeger's Sanitary Woollen System
Co., Ltd., v. Walker and Sons (77
Co., Ltd., v. Sturge (77 L.T. 208),
ECROYD V. COULTHARD (L.R. (1897]
tion v. Bywater (L.R. (1897] 2 Ch. Edwards v. Edwards & Wilson
(L.R. (1897] P. 316; 77 L.T. 406),
 2 Q.B. 429), 23, 5, iv. Edwards' Settlement, in re (L.R.
Zealand (77 L.T. 414), 36, iii. Edwards v. Steel, Young & Co. (L.R.
23, 20, iv; 53, i.
Ehrmann's Trade Marks, in re (L.R.
Castle Mail Packets Co., Ltd. of Holloway Prison (77 L.T. 247),
332), 53, iii.
THIRD PARTY (77 L.T. 168), 48, v.
and Power Co. (L.R. (1897] A.C. Felix Hadley & Co., Ltd., v. Hadley
(77 L.T. 131), 33, iii.
(77 L.T. 453), 31, ii.
2 Q.B. 362), 23, 13, v.
L.T. 270), 22, 107, v. ; 51, ii. Freman, in re ; Dimond v. Newburn
Friend v. Young (L.R. (1897] 2 Ch.
421), 23, 11, iii.
2 Q.B. 334 ; 77 L.T. 325), 54, i. GALLAGHER v. Rudd (77 L.T. 367),
Gauder v. Dassenaike and Others
Gordon, in re; e. p. Navalchand
LAND & TRADING CO., Ltd.(77 L.T. Gosling v. Gaskell and Grocott (L.R.
1897) A.C. 575; 77 L.T.314), 22,
Sanger v. Hart (77 L.T. 374), Graham v. Sutton, Carden & Co.
(L.R.  2 Ch. 367), 23, 11, v.
Grange v. Silcocks (77 L.T. 340), ) Kent County Council v. Lord Gerard
(L.R. (1897] A.C. 633; 77 L.T.
596 ; 77 L.T. 231), 22, 28, iii.; Kerr v. Kerr (L.R. (1897] 2 Q.B.
439), 23, 8, ii.
(1897] 2 Ch. 407; 77 L.T. 154), Q.B. 445 ; 77 L.T. 344), 35, i.
Kharaskhoma Exploring & Prospect-
Universal Bank (L.R. 2 Q.B. 451), 23, 4, vi.
Kimberley Waterworks Co. v. De
Beers Consolidated Mines Co.
475; 77 L.T. 195), 40, v.
Kingston Race Stand v. Mayor, &c.,
of Kingston (L.R. A.C. 509),
LAMBETT OVERSEERS V. LONDON
COUNTY COUNCIL (L.R.  A.C.
625), 23, 16, ii.
Leeds Permanent Benefit Building
Society V. Mallandaine (L.R.
 2 Q.B. 402; 77 L.T. 122),
23, 3, iii.; 51, v.
Lewis (App.) v. Poole (Resp.) (77 L.T.
369), 41, v.
London and Colonial Finance Cor-
poration, Ltd., in re (77 L.T. 146),
London and Lancashire Life Assur-
ance Co. v. Fleming (L.R. (1897]
A.C. 499), 32, vi.
London and N.W. Railway Co, and
G.W. Railway Co. v. Runcorn
District Council (77 L.T. 485),
London and Universal Bank, e. p. ; in
re Gruger (L.R.  2 Q.B.
London County Council v. Ayles.
bury Dairy Co. (77 L.T. 440),
London County Council and City of
London Brewery Co., in re, An
arbitration between (77 L.T. 463),
London County Council, e. p.; Reg.
(L.R. (1897] 2 Ch. 509), 23, 6, i. London County Council, e. p.; Reg.
London County Council v. Wood
(L.R. (1897] 2 Q.B. 482; 77 L.T.
London Freehold and Leasehold
Tivoli, and Oxford (77 L.T. 215), Suffield (L.R.  2 Ch. 608 ;
77 L.T. 445), 38, iv.