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"passengers" within the meaning of sect. 625 of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1894. Therefore the steamship not being bound to take a pilot her owner was liable for damage resulting from a collision due to a pilot in charge of the steamship.-The Clymene, L.R. [1897] A.C. 295.

Thames :

(i.) C. A.-Conservators-Bed of the River--Rights of Owner of Shore as to Raising Sand or Gravel-Thames Conservancy Act, 1894, ss. 87, 238.— The expression "bed of the Thames " in sect. 87 of the Thames Conservancy Act, 1894, includes the soil between ordinary high water mark on one side of the river where it is tidal and ordinary high water mark on the other. Sect. 238 does not reserve to the owner of such soil the right to take gravel, sand and other substances from it.-Conservators of River Thames v. Smeed, Dean & Co., L.R. [1897] 2 Q.B. 334; 77 L.T. 325.

Trade Mark :(ii.) C. D.-Registration-Concurrent Applications by Former Partners to Register separately Trade Marks of Old Firm-Special_Circumstances— Patents, Designs, and Trades Marks Act, 1883, s. 72.-The comptroller may refuse registration of a trade mark identical with or bearing a deceptive resemblance to a mark already on the register, not merely in the interest of the registered owner but for the protection of the public. Where concurrent applications are made to register identical or similar trade marks such registration ought not to be permitted unless the Court is satisfied that there is no reasonable probability that harm is likely to arise. The facts that applicants were formerly partners and used for the partnership business marks identical with those now sought to be registered, and that they concur in their applications, are not "special circumstances" entitling them to an exercise in their favour of such discretion as may be vested in the Court under sect. 72 of the Patents, &c., Act, 1883.-In re Ehrmann's Trade Marks, L.R. [1897] 2 Ch. 495; 77 L.T. 200.

(iii.) C. D.-" Pirle" and "Pearl" Similar Sound Invented Word— Registration-Patents, &c., Act, 1888, s. 10 (1) (d) (e).—The words "Pearl" and "Pirle are to be treated on the same footing on the ground of similarity of sound, and "Pearl" not being registrable as a trade mark, "Pirle," which is a misspelling of Pearl," cannot be registered. In re Ripley and Son's Trade Mark, 77 L.T. 495.

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(iv.) C. A.-Similar Names-Tendency to Deceive-Form of Injunction— L. M. Pinet carried on a small and recently established business for the manufacture and sale of boots and shoes made for a special purpose. F. Pinet et Cie. were an old established firm of boot and shoe makers whose goods were widely known as Pinet's." L. M. Pinet sold his business to a company (Maison Pinet, Limited), which was formed for the manufacture and sale as well of the special boots and shoes, as also of boots and shoes generally. Held, that although the business of L. M. Pinet was not the same as the plaintiffs', yet the company formed to acquire it had no intention to restrict their operations in any way, and would probably develop their business at the expense of the plaintiffs, who were therefore entitled to an injunction limited as in the form in Montgomery v. Thompson [1891] A.C. 217.— F. Pinet & Cie. v. Maison Pinet, Limited, 77 L.T. 322.

Trustee :

(i.) C. D.-Constructive Trustee-Purchase by Tenant for Life under Statutory Right- Improvements.-A tenant for life of settled land purchased under a statutory right land adjoining the settled land, executed on it permanent improvements, and devised it by his will. Held, that the devisees were trustees of the purchased land for the remaindermen under the settlement, who were entitled to a conveyance on recouping the estate of the tenant for life the amount of the purchase money and the value of the improvements.-Rowley v. Ginnever, L.R. [1897] 2 Ch. 503; 77 L.T. 302.

(ii.) C, D.-Breach of Trust-Relief under Judicial Trustee Act, 1896-Time for applying.-Where under an order made in 1893 a trustee had been found by the Chief Clerk's certificate liable in respect of a breach of trust, it was held that he was not too late in applying, on further consideration, for relief under sect. 3 of the Judicial Trustee Act, 1896, and that he ought to be allowed the opportunity at that stage of shewing that his case was a proper one for relief under that Act.In re Stuart; Smith v. Stuart, L.R. [1897] 2 Ch. 583; 77 L.T. 128. (iii.) C. D.-Breach of Trust-Executor Guilty of Devastavit-Relief— Judicial Trustees Act, 1896, s. 3.-An executor was guilty of undue delay in issuing the usual advertisements for claims, and meanwhile paid a legacy and allowed the testator's widow to receive the income of the estate for the support of herself and family. Afterwards large claims, exceeding the value of the estate as ascertained at testator's death, were substantiated against the executor. Held, that although there had been undue delay the executor had not, under the circumstances, acted unreasonably, and might be relieved under the Judicial Trustees Act, 1896, from the consequences of his devastavit.-In re Kay; Mosley v. Kay, L.R. [1897] 2 Ch. 518.

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(iv.) H. L.-Construction-Rule in Shelley's Case-Equitable Estate Tail— Insanity-Subsequent Evidence of.--The rule in Shelley's case is not a mere rule of construction designed to carry out the intentions of the testator, but is a strict rule of law, which applies wherever there is a gift over including the whole line of heirs, general or special. Where the trusts of a will require that during minority of the testator's child, the legal estate should be in the trustees and be in them again after the child's death, the legal estate remains in the trustees throughout, and the child takes an equitable estate tail and the estate limited to his heirs special being equitable also, the rule in Shelley's case applies. Harton v. Harton, 7 T.R. 652, and Jesson v. Wright, 2 Bli. 1, approved. Montgomery v. Montgomery, 3 J. and L. 47, disapproved. A deed executed by a married woman certified at the time to be of competent understanding will not be set aside merely because several years afterwards she is found by a jury to be insane, and to have begun to be insane at a period prior to the execution of the deed.-Van Grutten v. Foxwell and Others, L.R. [1897] A.C. 653; 77 L.T. 170.

(v.) C. D.-Construction—Mistake by Testator as to Number of Children— Presumption of Intention-Practice-Costs-0. lxv., r. 14b.-Under a gift to the two children of a testator's son, there being in fact four, viz., two sons and two daughters, alive at the date of testator's will and of his death, it was held that all four children, and not the two daughters only, took notwithstanding a direction that the shares were to be paid to the said children on their respectively attaining the age of twenty-one years, or marrying under that age. The will directed

the testator's funeral and testamentary expenses to be paid out of his residuary estate. Held, the proper costs of an action by the trustees of the will to determine which children were entitled must be paid out of the residue as part of the testamentary expenses, notwithstanding Order lxv., r. 14b.—In re Groom; Booty v. Groom, L.R. [1897] 2 Ch.407; 77 L.T. 154.

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(i.) C. A.-Legacy-Erroneous Statement of Fact-Gift of Legacy addition" to Sums owing by Testatrix's Husband-Falsa Demonstratio.— By her will a testatrix bequeathed to A. " the sum of £300 in addition to the sums owing to her from my late husband's estate." There were in fact no such sums owing to A., but A. had received an I.O.U. for £500 and a promissory note for the same amount from the testatrix's husband as gifts, but they were not paid before he died. The testatrix had the whole of her husband's estate. In her administration accounts A. included the payment to herself of the two sums of £500. Held, that the testatrix, being the person to pay, and having the whole estate of her husband in her hands, she intended that A. should receive thereout the two sums of £500 plus the £300, the reference to such sums as debts of her husband being merely a falsa demonstratio. In re Rowe; Pyke v. Hamlyn, 77 L.T. 475.

INDEX.

ADAM DODD (DECEASED), in the goods of (77 L.T. 137), 48, iii. Amalgamated Syndicates, in re (L.R.

[1897] 2 Ch. 600; 77 L.T. 431), 34, iii.

Arbitration between Thos. Palmer and Co. and Hosken & Co., Ltd., in re, An (77 L.T. 350), 29, iv. Arbitration between Messrs. Richardson and Samuel & Co. (77 L.T. 479), 53, iv.

Armstrong's Patent, in re; Yates v.
Armstrong (77 L.T. 267), 46, ii.
Ashton, in re; Ingram v. Papillon
(L.R. [1897] 2 Ch. 574), 23,
15, i.

Assessment Committee of Stockport
Union (Apps.) __v. L. & N.W.
Railway Co. (Resps.) (77 L.T.
244), 50, v.
Attorney-General V. Beech and
Another (L.R. [1897] 2 Q.B. 535;
77 L.T. 156), 51, vi.
Attorney-General

V. Dodington
(L.R. [1897] 2 Q.B. 373; 77 L.T.
299), 22, 107, vi.; 51, iii.
Attorney-General v. Mayor, &c., of
Newcastle-upon-Tyne (L.R. [1897]
2 Q.B. 384; 77 L.T. 203), 47, iv.

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BAKER V. WILLIAMS (77 L.T. 495),
36, v.

Balme (deceased), in the goods of (77
L.T. 219), 23, 14, vi.

Bank of Australasia v. Palmer (L.R.
[1897] A.C. 540), 38, v.
Baring (App.) v. Commissioners of
Inland Revenue (Resps.) (77 L.T.
353), 22, 107, iv.; 51, vii.
Barraclough v. Brown (L.R. [1897]
A.C. 615), 23, 21, i.

Bellamy & Co. (Resps.) v. Lunn &
Co. (Apps.) (77 L.T. 396), 45, i.
Bensaude and Others v. Thames
and Mersey Marine Insurance Co.,
Ltd. (L.R. [1897] A.C. 609;
77 L.T. 282), 22, 45, iv.; 43, v.
Birmingham Vinegar Brewery Co.
v. Powell (L.R. [1897] A.C. 710),
19, 27, i.; 106, iv.; 20, 58, iii.;
and 23, 21, v.

Booty v. Groom; in re Groom (L.R. [1897] 2 Ch. 407; 77 L.T. 154), 55, v.

Bosanquet v. St. John D'El Rey Mining Co., Ltd. (77 L.T. 206), 34, i.

Boulter v. Justices of Kent (L.R. [1897] A.C. 556; 77 L.T. 288), 22, 15, viii.; 41, ii.

Brickwood & Co., Ltd. v. Reynolds (77 L.T. 456), 23, 17, iii.; 52, i.

British & Foreign Marine Insurance Co., Ltd., v. Sturge (77 L.T. 208), 43, iv.

British Premium Provident Association v. Bywater (L.R. [1897] 2 Ch. 531), 23, 11, vi. Broster, in re; e. p. Pruddah (L.R. [1897] 2 Q.B. 429), 23, 5, iv. Brown v. Attorney-General for New Zealand (77 L.T. 414), 36, iii. Butler, Samuel, in the goods of (77 L.T. 376), 49, iii.

CAREW, e. p. (L.R. [1897] A.C. 719), 33, ii.

Carlton Steamship Co., Ltd., v. The

Castle Mail Packets Co., Ltd. (L.R. [1897] 2 Q.B. 485; 77 L.T. 332), 53, iii.

Chilcott, Eliza, in the goods of (L.R. [1897] P. 223; 77 L.T. 372). Chioggia, the (77 L.T. 472), 31, iii. City of Montreal v. Standard Light

and Power Co. (L.R. [1897] A.C. 527; 77 L.T. 115), 32, ii. Clark, in re; e. p. Clark (77 L.T. 417), 30, ii.

Clymene, the (L.R. [1897] A.C. 295), 53, vi.

Coats, Limited, J. & P., v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue (77 L.T. 270), 22, 107, v.; 51, ii. Colyer & Another v. Isaacs (77 L.T. 198), 44, ii.

Conservators of River Thames v. Smeed, Dean & Co. (L.R. [1897] 2 Q.B. 334; 77 L.T. 325), 54, i. Court v. Berlin & Others (77 L.T. 293), 46, i.

Cunningham v. Cunningham (77 L.T. 405), 37, vii.

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De Hertel v. Goddard & Others (77 L.T. 113), 32, iii.

Derby (Mayor, &c., of) v. Derbyshire County Council (L.R. [1897] A.C. 550; 77 L.T. 107), 22, 23, v.; 47, ii.

Dimond v. Newburn; in re Freman (77 L.T. 460), 52, v.

Dodd, Adam (deceased), in the goods of (77 L.T. 137), 48, iii.

Dr. Jaeger's Sanitary Woollen System Co., Ltd., v. Walker and Sons (77 L.T. 180), 34, vi.

ECROYD V. COULTHARD (L.R. [1897] 2 Ch. 544; 77 L.T. 357), 35, ii. Edwards v. Edwards & Wilson (L.R. [1897] P. 316; 77 L.T. 406), 23, 18, iv.; 37, vi. Edwards' Settlement, in re (L.R. [1897] 2 Ch. 412).

Edwards v. Steel, Young & Co. (L.R.

[1897] 2 Q.B. 327; 77 L.T. 297), 23, 20, iv; 53, i. Ehrmann's Trade Marks, in re (L.R. [1897] 2 Ch. 495; 77 L.T. 200), 54, ii.

Emile George, e. p.; Reg. v. Governor of Holloway Prison (77 L.T. 247), 36, ii.

FABER V. EARL OF LATHOM; GYE THIRD PARTY (77 L.T. 168), 48, v. Faldo and Others v. Lovett (77 L.T. 220), 49, ii.

Felix Hadley & Co., Ltd., v. Hadley (77 L.T. 131), 33, iii. Fielding & Co. v. Corry and Others (77 L.T. 453), 31, ii.

Forster v. Clowser (L.R. [1897] 2 Q.B. 362), 23, 13, v.

Fort, in re; e. p. Schofield (77 L.T. 274), 30, i.

Freman, in re; Dimond v. Newburn (77 L.T. 460), 52, v.

Friend v. Young (L.R. [1897] 2 Ch. 421), 23, 11, iii.

GALLAGHER V. RUDD (77 L.T. 367), 41, iii.

Gauder v. Dassenaike and Others (L.R. [1897] A.C. 547; 77 L.T. 321), 32, iv. Gordon, in re; e. p. Navalchand (L.R. [1897] 2 Q.B. 516), 48, ii. Gosling v. Gaskell and Grocott (L.R. [1897] A.C. 575; 77 L.T.314), 22, 24, i.; 48, iv.

Graham v. Sutton, Carden & Co. (L.R. [1897] 2 Ch. 367), 23, 11, v.

Grange v. Silcocks (77 L.T. 340), 38, i.

Greta Holme, the (L.R. [1897] A.C. 596; 77 L.T. 231), 22, 28, iii.; 29, ii.

Groom, in re; Booty v. Groom (L.R. [1897] 2 Ch. 407; 77 L.T. 154), 55, v.

Gruger, in re; e. p. London and Universal Bank (L.R. [1897] 2 Q.B. 461), 23, 2, vi.

Guardians of West Derby Union v. Metropolitan Life Assurance Society (L.R. [1897] A.C. 647; 77 L.T. 284), 22, 71, iv.; 46, iv. HANDSWORTH LOCAL BOARD V. TAYLOR (L.R. [1897] 2 Ch. 442), 42, iii. Handsworth U. D. C. v. Derrington (L.R. [1897] 2 Ch. 438), 42, iv. Hatton v. Treeby (L.R. [1897] 2 Q.B. 452; 77 L.T. 309), 39, v. Heston v. Isleworth District Council

and Grout (77 L.T. 118), 23, 9, v. Heywood, in re; Parkington V. Heywood (L.R. [1897] 2 Ch. 593; 77 L.T. 423), 29, i.

Hill v. Hicksin (L.R. [1897] 2 Ch. 579; 77 L.T. 127), 45, v. Hill v. Rowlands (L.R. [1897] 2 Ch. 361), 23, 11, ii.

Hill (Viscount) v. Bullock (L.R. [1897] 2 Ch. 482; 77 L.T. 240), 22, 97, iv.; 39, ii.

Hirsch & Co. v. Burns and Another

(77 L.T. 377), 33, iv. Holt v. Holt; in re Holt (L.R. [1897] 2 Ch. 525), 23, 13, vii. Hopper, in re (a Lunatic), (77 L.T. 154), 43, ii.

Howard v. Howard (77 L.T. 140) 44, vi.

Humphreys, in re; e. p. Roberts (77 L.T. 501), 30, iii.

Hunt v. Hunt (77 L.T. 421), 23, 8, i.; 40, ii.

INGRAM V. PAPILLON; in re ASHTON (L.R. [1897] 2 Ch. 574), 23, 15, i.

JAMES V. DICKINSON; in re MATSON (L.R. [1897] 2 Ch. 509), 23, 6, i. Jay and Another v. Budd (77 L.T. 335), 47, vi.

KAY, in re; MOSLEY V.KAY (L.R. [1897] 2 Ch. 518), 55, iii.

Kelly v. London Pavilion, New Tivoli, and Oxford (77 L.T. 215), 34, v.

Kent County Council v. Lord Gerard (L.R. [1897] A.C. 633; 77 L.T. 109), 22, 64, vi. ; 39, iv.

Kerr v. Kerr (L.R. [1897] 2 Q.B. 439), 23, 8, ii.

Kerrison v. Smith (L.R. [1897] 2 Q.B. 445; 77 L.T. 344), 35, i. Kharaskhoma Exploring & Prospecting Syndicate (L.R. [1897] 2 Ch. 451), 23, 4, vi.

Kimberley Waterworks Co. v. De Beers Consolidated Mines Co. (L.R. [1897] A.C. 515; 77 L.T. 116), 32, i.

King v. Eversfield (L.R. [1897] 2 Q.B. 475; 77 L.T. 195), 40, v. Kingston Race Stand v. Mayor, &c., of Kingston (L.R. [1897] A.C. 509), 33, i.

LAMBETH

OVERSEERS V. LONDON COUNTY COUNCIL (L.R. [1897] A.C. 625), 23, 16, ii.

Leeds Permanent Benefit Building Society v. Mallandaine (L.R. [1897] 2 Q.B. 402; 77 L.T. 122), 23, 3, iii.; 51, v.

Lewis (App.) v. Poole (Resp.) (77 L.T. 369), 41, v.

London and Colonial Finance Corporation, Ltd., in re (77 L.T. 146), 33, v.

London and Lancashire Life Assurance Co. v. Fleming (L.R. [1897] A.C. 499), 32, vi.

London and N.W. Railway Co. and G.W. Railway Co. v. Runcorn District Council (77 L.T. 485), 50, iii.

London and Universal Bank, e. p. ; in re Gruger (L.R. [1897] 2 Q.B. 461)

London County Council v. Aylesbury Dairy Co. (77 L.T. 440), 45, ii. London County Council and City of London Brewery Co., in re, An arbitration between (77 L.T. 463), 42, i. London County Council, e. p.; Reg. v. Cluer (71 L.T. 439), 45, iii. London County Council, e. p.; Reg. v. Mead (77 L.T. 462), 43, iii. London County Council v. Wood (L.R. [1897] 2 Q.B. 482; 77 L.T. 312), 39, vi.

London Freehold and Leasehold Property Co., Ltd., v. Baron Suffield (L.R. [1897] 2 Ch. 608; 77 L.T. 445), 38, iv.

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