as to settlement of an action made before hearing, but not embodied in terms of settlement at the hearing which are made an Order of Court, does not bind the parties. Observations as to construction of covenants for payment of premiums and interest. Grey v. Pearson, 6 H.L. Cas. 61, followed.-Faber v. Earl of Lathom; Gye third party, 77 L.T. 168.

Probate:

(i.) P. D.-Administrator and Receiver Pendente Lite in Probate SuitChancery Proceedings against Administrator-Jurisdiction of Probate Division to Restrain-Probate Act, 1857, ss. 70, 71-Judicature Act, 1873, 8. 24, sub-s. 5.-A Judge of the Probate Division has no power to restrain or stay proceedings in the Chancery Division against a person appointed by the Probate Division administrator and receiver pendente lite in a probate suit. Leave should however be given to the administrator and receiver to defend such proceedings, and he must apply for his costs in the Probate Division and also in the Chancery proceedings out of the estate.-Martin v. Toleman, 77 L.T. 138.

(ii.) P. D.-Practice-Undue Influence and other Pleas-Right of Plaintiffs to Open whole Case and Reserve Evidence Rebutting Charge of Undue Influence. In a probate case where the three plaintiffs propounded the will which was opposed on grounds (inter alia) of undue influence against all three plaintiffs. Held, counsel for plaintiff was entitled to open the whole case, and after calling one plaintiff to reserve the evidence of the other two.-Faldo and Others v. Lovett, 77 L.T. 220. (iii.) P. D.-Limited Administration-Grant with Will annexed to Assignee of Estate. Where the assignee of the freehold and pure personal estate of a testator applied for a grant of administration limited to certain leaseholds held by the trustee upon trust for the said assignee, it was held that in such cases it was safer that the will should be annexed to the grant. In the goods of Samuel Butler (deceased), 77 L.T. 376. (iv.) P. D.-Mutual Will-Probate of Part.-Where a husband and wife made a mutual will leaving all their property to each other, and further making provision as to what was to be done with the property in the event of the survivor dying without altering these provisions. The wife dying first probate was granted to the husband of so much of the document as became operative through her death.-In the goods of Jessie Piazzi Smyth (deceased), 77 L.T. 375.

(v.) P. D.-Will and Codicil-Codicil not forthcoming at Testator's DeathPresumption of Revocation-Probate of parts of Will not revoked by execution of Codicil.—Where a will and codicil revoking part of the will were proved to have been duly executed, but only the will was forthcoming after the testator's death, the Court, while allowing the presumption as to the destruction of the codicil, granted probate only of such parts of the will as the codicil by its execution had not revoked. In the goods of Debac (deceased); Sanger v. Hart, 77 L.T. 374.

Public Health:

(vi.) Q. B. D.-Drain or Sewer-" Single Private Drain"-Liability of Owner to Abate Nuisance-Public Health Acts Amendment Act, 1890, s. 19.-The expression "single private drain" in sect. 19 of the Public Health Act, 1890, applies to a drain, whether used for the drainage of one or more buildings, which is constructed upon private ground, and into which the public cannot drain without the owner's consent. The owner of such buildings may be compelled by the local authority, under sect. 41 of the Public Health Act, 1875, to abate nuisances in such drain.-Seal v. Merthyr Tydfil Urban District Council, 77 L.T. 303.

(i.) Q. B. D.-Privy Accommodation—Substitution of Water Closets for Privies--General Resolution of Local Authority Requiring Particular Kind of Water Closet-Validity-Public Health Act, 1875, s. 36.-Sect. 36 of the Public Health Act, 1875, does not authorise a local authority to lay down a general rule for the substitution of a particular kind of water closet applicable in every case irrespective of the requirements of the house, but only to order the individual owner or occupier to provide a sufficient water closet: and it is for the authority to say whether the water closet so provided is sufficient or not. Any resolution of a local authority laying such a general rule is invalid and invalidates all subsequent proceedings taken thereunder.-Wood v. Mayor, &c., of Widnes, L.R. [1897] 2 Q.B. 357; 77 L.T. 306.

(ii.) C. D.-Land acquired for Sewage Purposes-Not Immediately Wanted— Order for Sale-Public Health Act, 1875, s. 175.-Lands acquired by a district council for sewage purposes, but not immediately required for such, may be temporarily used for purposes not inconsistent with its ultimate use for sewage purposes, and need not be sold under sect. 175 of the Public Health Act, 1875.-Attorney-General v. Teddington Urban District Council, 77 L.T. 426.

(iii.) C. D.-Railway Company-Drains for Carrying Away Surface WaterSewage Flowing Therein-Drains-Whether Vested as Sewers in Local Authority-Injunction--Railway Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845, ss. 16, 68-70, 73-Public Health Act, 1875, ss. 4, 13, 15, 21.—A railway constituted by an Act passed in 1846, was by a subsequent Act transferred to the plaintiffs. To the south of a station on the railway was a field, on the north and south sides of which were ordinary country ditches, communicating by a 9 in. pipe with the drainage system on the plaintiffs' land and ultimately flowing into an 18 in. pipe which discharged into a pool by the side of the line. The pipes were all constructed by the plaintiffs or their predecessors. The defendants alleged that these ditches carried off sewage from eight houses, and that as the sewage passed to the system of pipes in the drain they had become sewers within the meaning of the Public Health Act, 1875, and were vested in them. In 1896 the defendants proceeded to convey such sewage by another ditch into the pipes and drains of the plaintiffs, and it was proved that although sewage had previously passed into such pipes and drains, the plaintiffs had no knowledge that it did so. Held, that the pipes and drains of the plaintiffs were within the exception in sect. 13 of the Public Health Act, 1875, namely, sewers made and used for the purpose of draining, preserving, or improving land under a local or private Act of Parliament, and that consequently they did not vest in the defendants, and that the plaintiffs were entitled to an injunction restraining the defendants from conveying the sewage in such manner.-London and NorthWestern Railway Company and Great Western Railway Company v. Runcorn District Council, 77 L.T. 485.

Railway :

(iv.) H. L.-Station-Right to exclude Public-Jurisdiction of Railway Commissioners.-A railway company may exclude from its stations all persons other than those using or wishing to use them, or may admit them on condition, unless the Railway Commissioners have decided to the contrary. A member of the public unreasonably excluded may apply to the Railway Commissioners, but has no remedy by action at law. Perth General Station Committee v. Ross, L.R. [1897] A.C. 479; 77 L.T. 226.

Rating:

(v.) Q. B. D.-Poor Rate-Station Appurtenances-Part of Railway directly Earning Profits.-Lines primarily used for carrying passengers and

goods are rateable as part of the railway directly earning profits and not as station appurtenances, though shunting and unloading be done or empty carriages left on them.-The Assessment Committee of Stockport Union (appellants) v. The London and North Western Railway Co. (respondents), 77 L.T. 244.

(i.) Q. B. D.—Market Gardens—Glasshouses in—Exemption from Rates— Agricultural Rates Act, 1896, ss. 1, 2, 5, 6, 9-Agricultural Rates Order, 1896, Arts. 1, 4.-Market garden ground, with glasshouses on it used for the purpose of raising fruit and vegetables, is "agricultural land" within the meaning of the Agricultural Rates Act, 1896, and entitled to the exemption created by sect. 1 of that Act in favour of agricultural land. The occupier of agricultural land being entitled to be heard at Quarter Sessions will be heard on appeal to the High Court, but will not be allowed costs.-Smith v. Richmond, 77 L.T. 161.

Revenue:

(ii.) C. A.-Stamp Duty-Conveyance on Sale-Transfer of Shares in one Company in Exchange for Shares in Another-Stamp Act, 1891, ss. 54, 55. -Decision of Court below (22, 107, v.) affirmed.-J. and P. Coats, Limited, v. Inland Revenue Commissioners, 77 L.T. 270.

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(iii.) C. A.-Estate Duty-Exemption-Settlement of Personal Property— Disposition "—Finance Act, 1894, s. 21, sub-s. 1.-Decision of Court below (22, 107, vi.) affirmed.-Attorney-General v. Dodington, L.R. [1897] 2 Q.B. 373; 77 L.T. 299.

(iv.) C. A.—Stamp_Duty — Instrument Creating a Perpetual Annuity— Conveyance on Sale--Stamp Act, 1891, ss. 54, 60, 87.-Decision of Court below (23, 17, vi.) affirmed.--The Mersey Docks and Harbour Board v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue, L.R. [1897] 2 Q.B. 316; 77 L.T. 120. (v.) C. A.--Income Tax-Building Society--Interest on Loans to Members-Liability of Society to Income Tax-Income Tax Act, 1853, ss. 1, 2, sched. D.-Decision of Court below (23, 3, iii.) affirmed.-The Leeds Permanent Benefit Building Society v. Mallandaine, L.R. [1897] 2 Q.B. 402; 77 L.T. 122.

(vi.) Q. B. D.—Estate Duty-Surrender by Life Tenant to Remainderman— Duty Payable on Death of Tenant for Life-Finance Act, 1894, ss. 1; 2 (1) a, b, c, d (2) ; 5 (1) a, b (2), (3); 7 (5), (7) a, b; 22 (i).--Estate duty by the remainderman is payable under sect. 2 (1) b of the Finance Act, 1894, on the death of a life tenant in respect of property subject to such life interest, although such life tenant had surrendered her life interest to the remainderman. The duty is payable in respect of such property as property passing on death, notwithstanding the conveyancing rule as to merger.-Attorney-General v. Beech and Another, L.R. [1897] 2 Q.B. 535; 77 L.T. 156.

(vii.) C. A.-Stamp Duty-Marketable Security-American Bond authenticated by endorsement in England-Issued in United Kingdom - Stamp Act, 1891, 8. 82. Decision of Court below (22, 107, iv.) affirmed.—Baring (appellant) v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue (respondents),

77 L.T. 353.

(viii.) Q. B. D-Estate Duty-Property Settled by either Husband or Wife on the Other-Survivor Entitled to Property Settled by SurvivorExemption from Duty-Finance Act, 1894, s. 21, sub-s. 5.-Sub-sect. (5) of sect. 21 of the Finance Act, 1894, applies as well to cases where, on the death of either husband or wife, the income only of property settled by the survivor reverts to the survivor, as to cases where the whole property settled passes to the survivor, e.g., where under a covenant to settle after acquired property in a marriage settlement the income of

property belonging to the wife was settled on the husband for life, and on the husband's death the wife, as survivor, became entitled, not only to the income, but to the property itself, estate duty is not payable in respect of such property until the death of the survivor.-AttorneyGeneral v. Strange, 77 L.T. 362.

(i.) C. A.—Income Tax-Brewers-Tied Houses—Deduction of Expense of Repairs-Balance of Profits of Brewery-Income Tax Act, 1842, s. 100Income Tax Act, 1853, s. 2.-Decision of Court below (23, 17, iii.) affirmed.--Brickwood & Co., Limited, v. Reynolds, 77 L.T. 456.

School Board:

(ii.) Q. B. D.—Teacher's Salary-Deductions by Agreement towards Superannuation Fund-Elementary Education Act, 1870, s. 35.-A teacher appointed by the London School Board, under sect. 35 of the Elementary Education Act, 1870, agreed with the board that they should retain portion of her salary as contribution to a superannuation fund formed out of contributions from teachers and managed for their benefit by the board. It was held, that the teacher could not after leaving the board's service claim to recover any portion of the sums so retained by the board. The term "remuneration" in sect. 35 of the Act is sufficiently wide to include direct payments to the teacher, and payments made to a fund for her and other teachers' common benefit. Phillips (appellant) v. School Board of London (respondents), 77 L.T. 397.

Sea Shore:

(iii.) C. A.-Foreshore of Tidal and Navigable Rivers-Right to Fix Moorings --Immemorial User-Presumption of Legal Origin.-An immemorial user of the foreshore in tidal and navigable rivers by the owners of vessels by fixing moorings in the soil, in order to attach their vessels to them, may be supported either as an ordinary incident of the navigation of such waters or on a presumption of a legal origin by grant from the Crown of the foreshore to all persons navigating the waters to use it for fixing moorings.-Attorney-General v. Wright, L.R. [1897] 2 Q.B. 318; 77 L.T. 295.

Settled Land:

(iv.) C. D.—Practice—Settled Estates Act, 1877, 8. 50—Settled Land Act, 1882, 8. 33-No Tenant for Life-Investment of Money as Capital MoneyMarried Woman-Dispensing with Examination. Under a discretionary trust in favour of a man, his wife, and children, with remainders over, though there is no life tenant to exercise the option as to investments given by sect. 33 of the Settled Land Act, 1882, yet the money may be invested as capital money under that Act, and separate examination of a married woman consenting to any application to the Court under the Settled Estates Act, 1877, may be dispensed with where her interests are remote and represented by trustees. In re Tessyman's Trusts, 77 L.T. 484.

Settlement:

(v.) C. D.-Bequest of Personalty to be Invested in Realty-RepairsEquitable Tenant for Life.-A testator empowered his trustees, by direction or with consent of tenant for life, to invest in real estate, but gave no directions as to repairs or management of real estate so purchased. The fact that the trustees allowed the tenant for life to enter and receive the rents did not make him liable to do any repairs, which must be executed by the trustees and the cost charged to capital. In re Freman; Dimond v. Newburn, 77 L.T. 460.

Ship:

(i.) C. A.-Seaman-Termination of Service at Foreign Port-Maintenance and Passage Home-Merchant Shipping Act, 1894, s. 186.--Decision of Court below (23, 20, iv.) affirmed.-Edwards v. Steel, Young & Co., L.R. [1897] 2 Q.B. 327; 77 L.T. 297.

(ii.) C. A. -Charter-Party-Construction-Freight Payable in Advance.Under a charter-party, by which it was provided that the charterer should pay freight at the rate of £709 per month, and at the same rate for any part of a month, hire to continue until the ship's re-delivery to the owner, payment for said hire to be made in cash monthly in advance, it was held, that the charterer was bound to pay the full freight in advance at the beginning of each month, although it might be probable that the hire would not continue for the whole month.— Tonnelier v. Smith and Others, 77 L.T. 277.

(iii.) C. A.-Charter-Party-Ship to Lond“ Always Afloat "-- Berth as Ordered by Charterers-Delay caused by Ordinary Tides-Reasonable Order. A charter-party provided that a ship should proceed to a certain dock and load a cargo in the customary manner always afloat as and where ordered by the charterers, both parties to the contract knowing that there was a possibility of delay on arrival of the ship owing to neap tides. When the ship arrived at the dock, the charterers ordered her to a berth, where, through the neap tides, she could not load immediately always afloat, and a detention of some days took place, until the spring tides enabled her to load always afloat at the berth as ordered. Held, the order was such as the charterers were entitled to give under the charter-party, and they were not liable to the shipowners for the delay. The Carlton Steamship Company, Limited, v. The Castle_Mail_Packets Company, Limited, L.R. [1897] 2 Q.B. 485; 77 L.T. 332.

(iv.) C. A.-Detention at Port of Loading-Exception in Charter-Party— Strikes, Lock-outs, Accidents to Railway-Other Names Beyond Charterers' Control.—By a charter-party, a ship was to load a cargo of petroleum at a certain port, and the charterers were not to be responsible for delay in loading caused by strikes, lock-outs, accidents to railway or other causes beyond charterers' control. Owing to a breakdown in the railway, the loading could not commence, as there was no oil, and the workmen employed in packing the oil were dismissed by the charterers. But after the supply of oil recommenced, the loading was delayed by the difficulty in getting the men together again and restarting the packing, and also by the shippers loading other steamers first. Held, that the delay in loading after the oil supply recommenced was not covered by the exception clause, and the charterers were liable to damages for the detention. --In re An Arbitration between Messrs. Richardson and Samuel & Co., 77 L.T. 479. (v.) Adm.- Bill of Lading Exception of "Accidents of the Seas"Carriage by Steamship-Damage to Cargo by Heat-Proximate Cause.Damage done to a cargo of grain carried on a steamship through closing of the ventilation, necessitated by exceptionally heavy weather is damage of which the severity of the weather was the proximate cause, and is therefore covered by an exception of "accidents of the seas in a bill of lading.- The Thrunscoe, L.R. [1897] P. 301; 77 L.T. 407.

(vi.) Adm. - Compulsory Pilotage - Liability of

Owner - Passengers

Distressed Seamen-Merchant Shipping Act, 1894, ss. 191, 192, 625.— Distressed British seamen being conveyed in a British steamer under a conveyance order of a British consular officer were held not to be