(i.) Q. B. D.-Repairs of Damage Insured Against-Ship in Dry Dock-Survey for Reclassification while in Dock-Apportionment of Expense of Docking between Shipowner and Underwriters.-A ship being in dry dock for purposes of repairs, for which underwriters were liable, was surveyed by instructions of the owner for the purpose of reclassification, though the time for survey had not yet arrived. Held, that the expenses of dry docking should be borne in equal shares by the shipowner and the underwriters.-The Ruabon Steam Ship Company, Limited, v. London Assurance Corporation, L.R. [1897] 2 Q.B. 456; 77 L.T. 402.

Married Woman:

(ii.) C. A.-Judgment against-Separate Estate-Restraint on Anticipation— Arrears of Income due at date of Judgment-Leave to enter JudgmentJudgment entered after Income due-Appointment of Receiver.--Where a plaintiff obtained leave under O. xiv. to enter judgment against a married woman with separate estate, subject to a restraint on anticipation, but delayed entering judgment until a time when he knew arrears of income had just become due, and then applied for a receiver, held, a receiver ought not to be appointed under such circumstances.-Colyer and Another v. Isaacs, 77 L.T. 198.

(iii.) C. A.--Judgment Against-Separate Estate with Restraint on Anticipation-Re-Marriage-Revival of Restraint-Appointment of Receiver.—A restraint upon anticipation of a married woman's separate estate revives on her re-marriage. Where a married woman, whose interest under a settlement was subject to a restraint on anticipation, was divorced from her first husband and married again and was then sued as a married woman, it was held that no order for a receiver of her interest under the settlement could be made.-Stroud v. Edwards, 77 L.T. 280.

(iv.) C. D.-Separate Estate-Restraint on Anticipation-Removal by Order of Court for payment of Husband's Debts--Indemnity-Conveyancing Act, 1881, s. 39.-Where the restraint on anticipation on a wife's life interest has been removed by order of the Court in order to make it available for raising money to pay her husband's debts, she has no right to indemnity against him or his estate, not reserved by the order. -Paget v. Paget, 77 L.T. 491.

Master and Servant:

(v.) Q. B. D.—Apprentice-Otherwise Employed with Master's ConsentDuly and Truly" Serve.-An apprentice who is employed, with his master's consent, otherwise than actually by him during the term of the apprenticeship" duly and truly" serves his master.-Richardson v. The Colne Fishery Company, 77 L.T. 501.

Matrimonial Suit:

(vi.) P. D.-Compromise-Terms Signed—Application to stay proceedings and to make terms a Rule of Court.-In an undefended suit for judicial separation, where terms were signed before the case came into the list, the parties agreeing to an order staying proceedings upon the said terms, except for the purpose of carrying them out and enforcing them, it was held that the Court had jurisdiction when the case came on for hearing to stay proceedings and to order that the terms be made a rule of Court. Graves v. Graves, 69 L.T. 420, distinguished.— Howard v. Howard, 77 L.T. 140.

Merchant Shipping:-

(i.) Q. B. D. Advance Note for Wages to Seamen-Condition—Nonfulfilment Assignee-Payment by Owners' Agent-Liability of Owner.An advance note for wages given to a seaman payable five days after the sailing of the ship had on it the words "provided he sails in the said ship and is duly earning his wages according to his agreement." The note was presented for acceptance as required to the owners' agents, who accepted it. It was then indorsed by the seaman to a bona fide holder, who was paid by the agents, notwithstanding that they had meanwhile been notified by the captain of the ship that the seaman had been discharged, and directed not to pay the note, as the condition that the sailor should be earning wages five days after the ship had sailed had not been fulfilled. In an action by the agents against the owners to recover the amount as paid on their behalf. Held, neither the agents nor the owners were liable on the note, the condition not having been fulfilled.-Bellamy & Co. (respondents) v. Lunn & Co. (appellants), 77 L.T. 396.

Metropolis:

(ii.) Q. B. D.-Street-New Buildings Forecourt or Space-Distance from Centre of Roadway-London Building Act, 1894, ss. 13, 14, 200 (2).The respondents had erected a new building, of which the external walls were not less than the prescribed distance from the centre of the roadway. When this building was erected, and for probably thirty years before that, there had existed a boundary wall of a garden between the building and the street, and this was left standing and enclosed by iron railings. Held, that no offence was committed by the respondents under sects. 13, 14, 200 (2) of the London Building Act, 1894.- London County Council v. Aylesbury Dairy Company, 77 L.T. 440.

(iii.) Q. B. D.-London Building Act, 1894-Saving of Existing Liabilities— Limit of Term for Proceedings-Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1848, s. 11.Although liabilities actually incurred on or before the 1st January, 1895, are saved by sect. 215 of the London Building Act, 1894, yet proceedings in respect of them are subject to the limitation of time contained in sect. 11 of the Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1848.-Reg. v. Cluer; e. p. London County Council, 77 L.T. 439.

Mine:

(iv.) Q. B. D.- Metalliferous Mine- Abandoned - Duty to Fence- - Person Interested in Minerals-Metalliferous Mines Regulation Act, 1892, s. 13.By the mining customs of the county, as recognised by the Mining Customs and Mineral Courts Act, 1852, the public were entitled to work a certain mine on paying a royalty to the Crown on all lead ore extracted. There were other minerals in the mine which had to be raised in order to get the lead ore; these, when separated, went by the custom to the owner of the mine. The mine being abandoned, it was held, that the duty to fence it under the Metalliferous Mines Regulation Act, 1872, devolved on the owner, as he was interested in the minerals both before extraction, while they were part of his freehold, and after extraction, by the custom.— Stokes v. Arkwright, 77 L.T. 400. Partition:

(v.) C. D.-Tenancy in Common-Possession of Entirety by One Co-OwnerOccupation Rent-Whether Chargeable as against Mortgagee of Share of such Co-Owner-4 Anne, c. 3, s. 27.-A tenant in common of land who has been in occupation of the entirety, though not as tenant or bailiff of his co-owner, is not liable at law to pay anything to his co-owner,

D

nor does the statute 4 Anne, c. 3, apply. Although, therefore, it is usual in partition actions to direct an enquiry as to what sum is due from such an occupying co-owner as occupation rent, yet any sum found to be so due cannot be set off against a legal mortgagee of such co-owner's share. Query, whether an equitable mortgagee stands in any different position.- Hill v. Hickin, L.R. [1897] 2 Ch.579; 77 L.T. 127.

Partnership:

(i.) C. A.-Dissolution-Previous Retainer of Solicitor to Conduct Action— Retirement of Dormant Partners Liability for Costs Subsequently Incurred Partnership Act, 1890, s. 17, sub-s. 2; s. 36, sub-s. 3.—A retainer of a solicitor to conduct an action is one entire contract to conduct it to the end. Where a solicitor was retained by the managing partner of a firm consisting of himself and two dormant partners to conduct an action for the firm, the retirement of the dormant partners while the action was pending without notice to the solicitor was held not to relieve them from liability for costs incurred subsequent to their retirement.--Court v. Berlin and Others, 77 L.T. 293.

Patent:

(ii.) C. A.—Amendment of Specification by Way of Disclaimer-Discretion of Court or a Judge-Patents, d'c., Act, 1883, ss. 19, 26 (4) (e)—Stay of Proceedings Pending Appeal-Patent Rules, 1890, r. 74.-The Court of Appeal will not interfere with the discretion given to the Court or a Judge by sect. 19 of the Patents, &c., Act, 1883, as to granting liberty to a patentee to apply for leave to amend his specification by disclaimer, unless it is clearly of opinion that the discretion was exercised on a wrong principle. Sect. 74 of the Patent Rules, 1890, does not deprive the Court of its jurisdiction to stay execution and cancellation pending appeal on petition for revocation.-Yates v. Armstrong; in re Armstrong's Patent, 77 L.T. 267.

Fetition:

(iii.) C. D.—Charity—Mortgage of Real Estate Belonging to—Sanction of Court-Service of Petition-Lord Romilly's Act (52 Geo. III., c. 101).—The Court may sanction a scheme providing for the mortgage of real estate belonging to a charity. A petition under Lord Romilly's Act for the sanction of the Court to a scheme of sale of real estate of a charity and re-purchase need not be served on the Attorney-General, but the trustees of the charity other than the petitioning trustees should be respondent to the petition. In re The Stockport Ragged Industrial and Reformatory School, 77 L.T. 425.

Poor Law:

(iv.) H. L.—Loans to Guardians for Fixed Terms--Redemption without consent of Lender-Poor Law Loans Act, 1871, s. 2.-Decision of Court of Appeal (22, 71, iv.) affirmed.-Guardians of West Derby Union v. Metropolitan Life Assurance Society, L.R. [1897] A.C. 647; 77 L.T. 284. (v.) Q. B. D.-Order of Removal-Settlement-Division of Parish into Separate Parishes-Loss of Settlement-Local Government Act, 1894, s. 1, sub-s. 3.- Where a parish, which is partly within and partly without a rural sanitary district, is divided into separate parishes under sect. 1 (3) of the Local Government Act, 1894, a settlement acquired in the undivided parish before the division is extinguished, and a person does not by such previous settlement acquire a settlement in either of the separate parishes.-St. Saviour's Union (appellants) v. Dorking Union (respondents), 77 L.T. 466.

Practice :

(i.) C. A.-Action in Chancery Division-Counterclaim for Libel-Striking Out-Foreign Government-0. xix., r. 27—0. xxi., r. 15.-In an action by a foreign government in the Chancery Division for the appointment of a new trustee of a fund, the defendants pleaded that the fund was not a trust fund, and counterclaimed damages for alleged libel contained in a letter referring to the conduct of the defendants in the matter. Held, the counterclaim was properly ordered to be struck out, and it made no difference that the plaintiffs were a foreign government and could not be sued in this country.-The South African Republic v. La Compagnie Franco-Belge du Chemin de Fer du Nord, L.R. [1897] 2 Ch. 487; 77 L.T. 241.

(ii.) H. L. Discovery Penal Proceedings - Statutory Offence - Penalty Imposed for Disobedience to Order-Rivers Pollution Prevention Act, 1876, 39 & 40 Vict., c. 75, ss. 3, 10.—Decision of Court of Appeal (22, 23, v.) affirmed.-Derby (Mayor and Corporation of) v. Derbyshire County Council, L.R. [1897] A.C. 550; 77 L.T. 107.

(iii.) Q. B. D.-Action for Cancelling Allotment of Shares-No appearanceNo defence-Application to Sign Judgment-Evidence-O. xix, r. 10; (. xxvii., r. 11.—On application to sign judgment in default of defence in an action for cancelling an allotment of shares; where there is no appearance, under O. xxvii., r. 11, it is not necessary to file any evidence.-Webster & Co., Limited, v. Vincent, 77 L.T. 167.

(iv.) C. A.—Discovery—Information-Right of Crown-Crown Suits Act, 1865, ss 13, 16-Rules of Court as to Practice in English Informations (Easter Term, 1866), rr. 4 (1), 5 (5).-The Crown has the same right to discovery against a subject as one subject has against another in an ordinary action, and in an information the Crown's right to discovery is not lost because the answer is not excepted to within six weeks. In an information by the Crown against the conservators of a river claiming part of the foreshore and bed the defendants claimed to be owners of the whole of the foreshore and bed within the limits of the port. Held, the Crown was entitled to inspection, as well of the documents relating to the parts claimed by it, as of all those relating to acts of ownership by defendants within the limits of the port, including their acts as conservators.-Attorney-General v. Mayor, &c., of Newcastle-upon-Tyne, L.R. [1897] 2 Q.B. 384; 77 L.T. 203. (v.) C. A.-Interpleader-Seizure Under Execution-Claim by Bill of Sale Holder-Order for Sale-Jurisdiction--O. lvii., r. 12—Bankruptcy Act, 1890, s. 11.-The jurisdiction conferred by O. lvii., r. 12, ought not to be exercised against the grantee of a bill of sale unless thera is reasonable ground for holding that the sale will produce more than sufficient to answer the just claims of the grantee so as to have a surplus available for the execution creditor. Semble, an execution is only put an end to by sect. 11 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1890, at the option of the trustee in bankruptcy, and if the trustee instead of asserting his rights supports the execution creditor, s. 11 does not invalidate the execution.Stern v. Tegner; Smith, claimant, 77 L.T. 347.

(vi.) C. A.-Service of Writ-Defendant leaving Jurisdiction-Substituted Service-0. ix., r. 2.--When a defendant went out of the jurisdiction before service of a writ could be effected but not for the purpose of evading service, it was held that an order for substituted service might be made under O. ix., r. 2.-Jay and Another v. Budd, 77 L.T. 335. (vii.) C. A.-District Registrar-Jurisdiction to Set Aside Judgment-R.S.C., O. xxxv., rr. 1-6.-A district registrar has a concurrent jurisdiction under O. xxxv., r. 6, to set aside a final judgment obtained in the district registry.-Townend v. Kirkman, 77 L.T. 419.

(i.) C. A.-Costs-Action founded on Tort― Agistment-Negligence of Agister -Action in High Court-County Courts Act, 1888, s. 116.-An action for damages for injuries to a horse, through negligence of an agister, is founded on tort within the meaning of sect. 116 of the County Courts Act, 1888.-Turner v. Stallibrass, 77 L.T. 482.

(ii.) Q. B. D. in B.--Payment into Court with Denial of Liability-Secured Creditor. Where money is paid into Court under O. xxii., r. 6, of R.S.C., 1883, with a defence denying liability, and cn the defendant's subsequent bankruptcy his trustee admits the plaintiff's claim, either in whole or part, to that extent the plaintiff is a secured creditor in respect of the money paid into Court. In re Gordon; e. p. Navalchand, L.R. [1897] 2 Q.B. 516.

Presumption of Death:

(iii.) P. D.- Probate Practice Motion to Presume Death - EvidenceMerchant Shipping Act, 1894, ss. 255, 256, 257, 695.-Upon a motion to presume the death of a man, the certificate of the Registrar-General of Shipping and Seamen was produced in evidence pursuant to the Merchant Shipping Act, 1894. The certificate stated that the person in question was returned as serving upon a certain vessel as second mate at the time when she was last heard of, and that he was "supposed drowned." Two members of the deceased's family swore to their belief in his death, and the underwriters of the vessel had paid the insurance money as on a total loss, while notice had been given to the insurance office in which the deceased's life was insured. On this evidence, the Court presumed the death of the deceased as having occurred on or since the date when the vessel was last heard of.-In the goods of Adam Dodd (deceased), 77 L.T. 137.

Principal and Agent:

(iv.) H. L.-Company - Receiver appointed by Trustees for Debenture-holders—Goods ordered by Receiver after Winding-up-Liability of Trustees.Trustees for debenture-holders under a deed authorising them to appoint a receiver to carry on the business as agent for the company, appointed a receiver. He was to pay all moneys received to an account at the trustees' bank, and all cheques drawn were to be countersigned by their solicitor, who was also chairman of the company. Upon a winding-up order being made the liquidator did not interfere with the business, which continued to be carried on by the receiver. Held, that the trustees were not liable as principals for the price of goods ordered by the receiver after the winding-up. Cox v. Hickman, 8 H. of L. Cas. 268 applied. Decision of Court below (22, 24, i.) _reversed.— Gosling v. Gaskell and Grocott, L.R. [1897] A.C. 575; 77 L.T. 314.

Principal and Surety :

(v.) Q. B. D.- Covenant by Surety for Payment of Interest and Premiums on Policies-Judgment Against Principal Debtor-Merger-Release of Surety Agreement to Settle Action-Not Embodied in Order of Court – Construction of Covenant. By a deed made between a mortgagee of life policies, the mortgagor and two sureties for the latter, the sureties covenanted with the mortgagee that in the event of the mortgagor not paying the interest on the mortgage-money and the premiums on the policies, they would pay the said interest and premiums within a certain period of their respectively falling due. The mortgagee obtained judgment for the principal sum against the mortgagor. Held, that their liability to pay future interest became merged in the judgment, and the sureties were released. But, semble, there was no merger of interest accrued before the judgment. A verbal agreement