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the plaintiff was not a “person claiming under any mortgage " within the Real Property Limitation Act, 1837.-Thornton v. France,

L.R. [1897] 2 Q.B. 143 ; 77 L.T. 38. (i.) C. A.-Inspectorship Deed--Statute of Limitations-Decision of Court

below (sec 22, p. 100 (ii.) ) affirmed.- Trevor v. Hutchins, 76 L.T. 636.

Solicitor :(ii.) C. A.-Compromise of Claim before Action commenced.-A solicitor

cannot before issue of writ compromise a claim on behalf of his client without express authority.--Macaulay v. Polley, L.R. (1897]2 Q.B. 122 ;

76 L.T. 613. (iii.) C. A.-CostsSale of Property subject to Encumbrance--General Order

under Solicitors Remuneration Act, 1881 (44 & 15 Vict., c. 44), sch. 1, part 1, r. 9.-- Where & second mortgagee sells subject to the first mortgage, the amount of the first mortgage is to be deemed part of the purchase money for the purpose of calculating costs.-Fortescue v.

Mercantile Bank of London, L.R. (1897] 2 Q.B. 236; 76 L.T. 645. (iv.) C. A.- Costs-The Limitation Act (21 Jac. 1, c. 16), s. 3--4 & 5 Anne,

c. 16 (also called c. 3), s. 19-Solicitors Act, 1813 6 7 Vict., c. 73), s. 37.-A cause of action for costs arises on the completion of the work to which the costs relate, and the Statute of Limitations begins then to run, not from the date when the solicitor's right of action commences. Reeves v. Butcher (L.R. (1891] 2 Q.B. 509; 65 L.T. 329) considered.—Coburn v. Colledge, L.R. [1897] 1 Q.B. 702; 76 L.T. 608.

Ship:-(v.) C. A.-General Average.-Parties liable to make a general average

contribution cannot require the statement to be made up at any particular place.- - The Wavertree Sailing Ship Co. v. Love, L.R. [1897]

A.C. 373; 76 L.T. 576. (vi.) Q. B.--Charter-Party-Construction. -A vessel was chartered for the

carriage of a cargo of ore from a foreign port. The charterers were not to be liable for delays in loading caused, amongst other things, by floods, accidents to railways and to piers from which the ore was to be shipped. Floods caused a breakdown of the railway which afforded the only means of carrying the ore to the pier for shipment, and the vessel sailed away without cargo. Held, that the charterers were protected by the terms of the charter-party.-Furness and Others

v. Forward Bros. & Co., 77 L.T. 95. (vii.) P. D. - Charter-Party -- Deviation - Damage. - A steamship was

chartered to bring a cargo of wheat from abroad to King's Lynn. Under the charter-party, in certain circumstances (which happened), the master was at liberty to leave the port of loading with part cargo of wheat only and to fill in elsewhere, in which case the steamer was to complete the voyage as if a full cargo had been loaded. He went direct to Cardiff to discharge the second part of his cargo, and on the voyage thence to King's Lynn the wheat was damaged. Held, that the owners of the ship were liable for the damage as she had deviated from the voyage prescribed by the contract.-The Dunbeth, L.R. (1897]

P. 133; 76 L.T. 658. (viii.) P. D.-Collision Pilot --- Passengers -- Merchant Shipping Act, 1894

(57 & 58 Vict., c. 60), ss. 190 to 193, 625, 027.-A collision in the port of London was solely the fault of the pilot of the defendant's ship belonging to that port. But the defendant was held to be responsible as the pilotage was not compulsory, certain distressed sailors shipped by the British consul at a foreign port, who were the only persons on board except the crew, not being “passengers" within the meaning of

sect. 65 of the Act.-- The Clymene, 76 L.T. 811. (1.) P. C.-Collision at Anchor.-- The onus of justification is on a vessel

under way if it comes into collision with a vessel at anchor exhibiting a
proper light, but the vessel at anchor must keep a competent watch.-
5 Mary Tug Co., Limited v. British India Steam Navigation Co., Limited,

L.R. (1897] A.C. 351. (ii.) H. L.--Collision-Compulsory Pilotage-London District Merchant

Shipping Acts, 1854, s. 379, and 1894, s. 625.-Decision of Court of
Appeal (see 22, p. 28 (vi.)) affirmed. Owners of the Edenbridge v.

Green and Others. The Rutland, L.R. [1897] A.C. 333; 76 L.T. 662. (iii.) P. C.- Art. 18 of Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea.- The

Court is not bound to hold that Art. 18 of the Regulations under the Merchant Shipping Act must be complied with the instant that danger becomes apparent.-Owners of ss.Kwang Tungv. Owners of

85. Ngapoota, L.R. [1897] A.C. 391. (iv.) C. C.--Seaman-Discharge at Foreign Port-Maintenance and Passage

Home-Merchant Shipping Act, 1894 (57 € 58 l'ict., c. 60), ss. 134, 186.Liability for passage home and for maintenance of a seaman discharged at a foreign port is satisfied when the Consul fixes a sum therefor and accepts the master's undertaking to pay it without actual deposit. "Home,” in sect. 186 (2) is not necessarily the British port at which the seaman shipped, and expenses incurred by the seaman by default of the master are not " wages."--Edwards v. Steel,

Young & Co., L.R. (1897] 1 Q.B. 712; 76 L.T. 689. (v.) C.A.--Insurance -- Master Part Owner Mortgage-Barratry.-Decision

of Court below (22, p. 109 (iv.j) affirmed.- Small v. United Kingdom

Mutual Insurance Co., 76 L.T. 828. (vi.) C. A.- Insurance--Liability of Broker for Premiums.--Decision of

Court below (22, p. 79 (vi.) ) affirmed.--The Universe Insurance Co. of
Milan v. The Merchants' Marine Insurance Co., L.R. [1897] 2 Q.B. 93;

76 L.T. 748. (vii.) Q. B.-Insurance, Underwriters' Liability.-- Where a loss occurs to a

ship through the negligent navigation of the assured himself, the underwriters are liable, unless the negligence was wilful.- Tronders Anderson d Co. v. The North Queensland Insurance Co., Limited,

77 L.T. 80. (viii.) C. C.-Marine Policy Covering War Risks.-Where a ship insured

against war risk is captured but restored after action brought, but before trial, the rights of plaintiff as for total loss are not diminished. -Ruys and Others v. London Assurance Co., L.R. [1897] 2 Q.B. 135;

77 L.T. 23. (ix.) P, D.-Necessaries-- Master's Disbursements-Ilis Lien--Owners not

Liable--Settlement of Action. The master of a vessel which was worked by a firm who were not her legal owners procured coals at a foreign port on bills drawn by him on the firm. The bills were dishonoured, and the coal suppliers by arrangement with the master brought an action in rem in his name for their own benefit. The shipowners settled the action with the master. Held, that as the liabilities were incurred by the master on account of the ship a maritime lien could be enforced by him notwithstanding that the legal owners were not personally liable to the coal suppliers, and that the settlement was void as against the suppliers. - The Ripon City, 77 L.T. 98; L.R. (1897] P. 226.

(i.) IT. L.-Removal of Wreck from Tidal River-Expenses-Owner

Harbours, Docks, and Piers Clauses Act, 1847 (11 Vict., c. 27)-Aire and
Calder Navigation Act, 1889 (52 &: 53 Vict., c. 122), s. 47.-Decision of
Court of Appeal (21, p. 67 (v.)) affirmed; and held also that as remedy
was prescribed by the Act, expenses could not be recovered by action

in the High Court.-Barraclough v. Brown, 76 L.T. 797. (ii.) H. L.-Floating Beacon--Salvage - Jurisdiction - Merchant Shipping

Act, 1854 --County Court Admiralty Jurisdiction Act, 1868.-Decision of
Court of Appeal (see 21, p. 68 (iii.)) affirmed.-- Wells and Another v.

The Gas Float Whitton, No. 2, L.R. (1897] A.C. 337; 76 L.T. 663. (iii.) Q. B.- Charter-Party " Weather-Working Days"_- Computation.

Where a charter-party provides for the working at a certain rate per weather-working day, days which are only partially available are counted as whole days where more than half a day's work is done and as half days where less is done.-- The Branckelow Steamship Co. v. Lamport and Holt, L.R. (1897] 1 Q.B. 570.

Trade Name:-
(iv.) C. D.-- Common Laue Trade Mark- Evidence.--An injunction was

granted restraining the defendant company from applying the word
“Hunyadi” to water derived from other sources than the springs of
the plaintiff known by that time, and it was held that evidence of
“intent to deceive" ought not to be tendered in trade mark actions
where the goods sold were on the face of them “ calculated to deceive.”
- Sarlehner v. Apollinaris Co., Limited, L.R. (1897] 1 Ch. 893;
76 L.T. 617.

Trade Mark:(v.) H. L.- Right to Name apart from Registration. -Decision of Court of

Appeal (22, p. 32 (iii.) ) affirmed. See also 19, p. 27 (i.), and p. 106 (iv.), and 20, p. 58 (iii.)--Birmingham Vinegar Brewery Co. v. Powell,

76 L.T. 792. (vi.) C. A.-Registration -- Solio" - Photographic Paper - Practice in

Patent Office - Patents, &c., Act, 1888 (51 52 Vict., c. 50), 8. 10, sub-8. 1 (d) (e).- It is the practice of the Patent Office to refuse to register, in connection with photographic paper, the words “Sun" or “ Sol” alone, or with a prefix or suflix; and the Court approved of such a refusal in the case of the word “ Solio” as applied to paper of that character.-In re The Eastman Photographic Materials Company's

Trade Mark Application, 76 L.T. 730. (vii.) C. A.-" Magnolia _ Geographical Name -- Character of Goods--Patents,

Designs and Trade Marks dcts, 1883 (s. 70) and 1888 (s. 10).—The
Magnolia Company were owners of three registered trade marks
which they desired to assign : (1) a representation of a Magnolia
flower without any words; (2) the same device with the addition of
the words “ Magnolia Anti-Friction Metal”; (3) the word “ Magnolia"
alone. Held, that (1) was a good trade mark, and that on the facts
there was no valid objection to its assignment within sect. 70 of the
Patents Act, 1883. On this point the decision of the Court below
(22, p. 110 (iv.)) was reversed. Held, that (2) and (3) had been
wrongly registered, because they had, before registration, been used to
distinguish an article manufactured by a secret process. That (2) was
invalid also because the words annexed had reference to the character
or quality of the goods within sect. 10 (sub-sect. 1) of the Patents Act,
1888; but that (3) did not come under the like objection. That the

objection to (2) and (3) as a geographical name failed. Decision of Court below (22, p. 110 (iv.) ) that (2) and (3) were invalid and wrongly registered, approved.-In re The Magnolia Metal Company's Trade Marks, 76 L.T. 672.

Trust :(i.) C. D.--Construction-Whether Tenant for Life purchasing Reversion

becomes Trustee for Remainderman.- A lessee bequeathed a lease not renewable to one for life, with remainder to another for life, with remainder to latter's children. The second life tenant purchased the reversion. Held, that the doctrine of Keech v. Sandford does not apply to leases not renewable, and that the purchaser was not a trustee for

the remaindermen.--Longton v. Wilsby, 76 L.T. 770. (ii.) C. D.--Bank - Trust Money placed to Trustee's Overdrawn Account.

By the direction of a sole trustee, trust money was sent to his bankers to his trust account. He had no other than a private account, which was overdrawn, and the bankers advised him that the money had been placed to this account, but he made no rectification. Subsequently he became bankrupt, indebted to the bank. There was no evidence that the bank had designed to benefit themselves. Held, that the bank were not liable for the loss of the trust money.---Coleman v. The Bucks.

and Oxon. Union Bank, Limited, L.R. (1897) 2 Ch. 313; 76 L.T. 684. (iii.) C. A.-Will--Precatory Trust.-A gift of residue to the testator's wife,

her heirs, executors, administrators and assigns, absolutely “in the fullest confidence that she will carry out my wishes in the following particulars,” which were that she would leave to the testator's daughter, L., the money that would become payable on the death of the wife on a policy (her own property) on her own life, and also the same part of the residue, which would be payable to her on a policy on the testator's life, was held to be a gift free from any condition or trust (Rigby, L.J., dissenting).-In re Williams ; Williams v. Williams, L.R. (1897) 2 Ch. 12; 76 L.T. 600.

Vagrant:(iv.) Q. B. D. --Bonâ fide Belief of Adultery --Wilful Neglect to Maintain

Wife and Family-Vagrant Act, 1824 (5 Geo. IV., c. 83), s. 3.- Where a man bonâ fide believed that his wife had committed adultery, and when he had offered, under certain conditions, to support his children, it was held, that justices were right in dismissing a charge against him under the Vagrancy Act, 1824, of having “wilfully refused or neglected" to maintain his family.-Morris v. Edmonds, 77 L.T. 56.

Vendor and Purchaser :(v.) C. A.-Mortgage to Building Sociсty --- Power of Sale --- Whether

Transferred to assignee.---Decision of Court below (22, p. 111 (ii.))

affirmed.-In re Kumney and Smith's Contract, 76 L.T. 800. (vi.) C. A.--Agreement for Sale of Land --Parol Evidence ---Statute of

Frauds, s. 4.-A written agreement was entered into for the sale and purchase of “ 24 acres of land, freehold, and all appurtenances thereto at T.” Held, that parol evidence was admissible to shew that the vendor was owner of land of those dimensions at T., and that on the day on which the agreement was signed, the defendant inspected the land with him. Decision of Court below (22, p. 111 (iii)) reversed.-

Plant v. Bourne, L.R. (1897] 2 Ch. 281; 76 L.T. 820. (vii.) C. D. -- Land and Policies Included in One Mortgage--Land Sold and

Policies Retained by Vortgagee - Purchaser of Land Entitled to Jlortgage
Deed-Vendor and Purchaser Act, 1874, 8. 2, r. 5.- Where a mortgagee

sold land, but retained policies of insurance, which were included in the mortgage deed, it was held, that the purchaser of the land was entitled to possession of the mortgage deed.-In re Fuller and Leathley's Contract and Vendor and Purchaser Act, 1884 ; in re Williams and the

Duchess of Newcastle's Contract, L.R. (1897] 2 Ch. 144; 76 L.T. 646. (i.) C. D.- Building Agreement-Exercise of Option to Purchase Freehold

Subsequent Termination of Agreement by Tenant's Delay in Building.Under a clause in a building agreement, the defendant, the lessee, gave notice to the plaintiff, the lessor, to purchase the freehold. Shortly after, under another clause, the plaintiff gave notice of the termination of the agreement, in consequence of the defendant's failure to proceed with the works. Held, that compliance with the clause as to proceeding with the buildings was not a condition precedent to exercise of the option of purchase, and that the possession of the defendant ought not to be interfered with pending completion.-Raffety v. Schofield, L.R. (1897] 1 Ch. 937; 76 L.T. 648.

Will:(ii.) C. D.- Construction--Charitable Bequest.--A bequest to a certain

charity,“ or some one or more kindred institutions” is an alternative and not a substitutional gift.-In re Delmar's Charitable Trusts, L.R.

[1897] 2 Ch. 163 ; 76 L.T. 594. (iii.) C. D.-Construction, Gist in Remainder to a Class -- Children of Deceased

Member to Take Parent's Share.-A testator gave his real and personal property in trust for sale and conversion, and to pay the interest to his wife during widowhood, and after to transfer the property to his brothers ard sisters in equal shares, the lawful child or children of any deceased brother or sister taking the parent's share. One brother died before the date of the will, leaving issue, who were admitted to have no claim. One leaving issue died before the testator, but after the date of the will. One, who left no issue, survived the testator, but had attested the will. On an originating summons to determine the persons entitled and their rights, subject to the widow's interest, it was held that the estate would be divisible in equal shares amongst the brothers and sisters (excluding the one who witnessed the will) who survived the testator, to the exclusion of such as died in his lifetime and of their children ; and that in the event of any of the brothers and sisters entitled dying during the widow's tenancy, their shares would be divested in favour of their respective children. Thornhill v. Thornhill (4 Madd 377) approved.--In re Hannam; Hadderley v. Hannam, L.R. [1897] 2 Ch. 39; 76 L.T. 681.

(iv.) C, A.-Construction-Charitable Purposes.-A testator left property

on trust for the purchase of alvowsons or prezentations, but on conditions which construed strictly were hardly applicable. Held, that on the construction the object of the testator was to promote Evangelical doctrines and that the purchases were to be made with that purpose; that this was a charitable purpose and the gift was good. Decision of the Court below (22, p. 112 (111.)) reversed.-In re Hunter; Hood v. Attorney-General, L.R. (1897] 2 Ch. 105 ; 76 L.T. 725.

(v.) C. D.-Construction --- Issue - Child of Deceased Wife's Sister. - A

testatrix gave the income of personalty to nephews and nieces named, directing that if any should die leaving issue, such issue should take the parent's share. One niece, M., married her deceased sister's husband, F. H. A., and had issue G. The testatrix also bequeathed money in trust for “my niece, M., the wife of F. H. A., for life," and after her decease “in trust for her daughter, G., absolutely.Held,

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