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(i.) C. D.-Patent-Discontinuance of Action for Infringement-CertificatePatents, &c., Act, 1883 (46 & 47 Vict., c. 57), s. 29, sub-s. 6.--In an action for infringement of patent, if the plaintiff gives notice of discontinuance before pleadings are closed, the Court cannot enquire into facts in order to determine whether a defendant should have a certificate that his particulars of objection were reasonable.-Wilcox and Gibbs v. Janes, L.R. [1897] 2 Ch. 71.

(ii.) C. D.-Compound Settlement-Settled Land Acts-Settled Land Act, 1890, s. 4 (1).—Several settlements were made under powers of a will by which lands were limited to one for life with remainder to her eldest son with remainders over, with power to charge the property with an annuity for any husband who should survive her, and with portions for younger children. Held, that trustees appointed for the purposes of the Settled Land Act must be appointed for the purposes of all the settlements. In re Tibbit's Trusts, L.R. [1897] 2 Ch. 149; 77 L.T. 88.

(iii.) C. D.-Vendor and Purchaser Summons-Frivolous and Vexatious— 0. xxxv., r. 4.-In an agreement to sell a public-house the vendor undertook that if he opened another house within a certain distance of the premises during the occupancy of the purchaser or his widow he would pay the purchaser £500. Before completion, the purchaser agreed to sell the house to B. with a similar penalty on his own part in like circumstances. But the original vendor refused to covenant with B., who then took out a vendor and purchaser summons for a declaration that he was entitled to the covenant. Held, that B.'s remedy was for specific performance with abatement and that the summons should be struck out as frivolous and vexatious.-In re Bartlett and Berry's Contract, 76 L.T. 751.

(iv.) P. D.—Divorce--Death before Suit of Alleged Adulterer.—In a petition for dissolution of marriage where adultery is charged with a person deceased the leave of the Court must be obtained to excuse making him a co-respondent.-Slaytor v. Slaytor and Jackson, L.R. [1897] P. 85. (v.) P. D-Divorce-Costs-Delay in Enforcing Order.-Where no steps has been taken for more than six years to enforce an order for costs in a decree nisi, application must be made to the Court for leave to issue execution.-Goodwin v. Goodwin and Arnold, L.R. [1897] P. 87.

(vi.) P. D.-Will-Probate-Incorporated Document.-Probate was granted of a will by which a bequest was made of books entered in a catalogue without requiring the catalogue to be brought into the Registry under rules 12 and 13 of 1862.-In the goods of Balme, L.R. [1897] P. 261.

Probate:

(vii.) P. D.-Next of Kin Abroad-Limited Grant of Administration to Stranger. Where it would have taken many weeks to communicate with the next of kin of a deceased, a general grant for a limited time was made to a firm of accountants who held the deceased's books.In the goods of Suarez, L.R. [1897] P. 82.

Pur Autre Vie:

(viii.) C. D.-Devolution-Wills Act, 1837 (1 Vict., c. 26), s. 6.-To an estate pur autre vie devised without words of limitation, the personal representative of the person last entitled succeeds, under sect. 6 of the Wills Act during the life of the cestui que vie.-In re Sheppard; Sheppard v. Manning, L.R. [1897] 2 Ch. 67; 76 L.T. 756,

Powers:

(i.) C. D.-Power of Appointment by Deed or Will-Double Portion.-A testator left £10,000 in trust for his daughter for life and afterwards amongst her children, as she should by deed or will appoint, and in default equally. She made a will, distributing the fund equally amongst her three children. Subsequently by deed she appointed onethird of the fund, £3,333 6s. 8d., to one of her children, but made no change in her will. Held, that the doctrine of double portions applies only where the father is the apportioner, and that therefore the child who took by deed took also under the will a third of the remainder of the fund. In re Ashton; Ingram v. Papillon, 77 L.T. 49.

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(ii) C. D. Power of Appointment--Lapsed Shares.-J. K., under a power of appointment, bequeathed £5,000, and also all the residue of her property, to nephews and nieces by name equally. By a codicil, she gave legacies out of her own money, and directed all legacy duties to be paid out of general residue," but there was no direction for payment of debts. Two of the appointees predeceased the testatrix. Held (following in re Davis's Trusts, L.R. 13 Eq. 123; 25 L.T. 227), that the lapsed shares went as in default of appointment.-- In re Boyd; Kelly v. Boyd, L.R. [1897] 2 Ch. 232; 77 L.T. 76.

(iii.) C. D.-Fraud on Power-Remoteness.-By a marriage settlement, property was given to the wife for life, with remainder to her children, under such conditions as she should appoint, and, in default of appointment, amongst them in equal shares. She had three children, to each of two of whom she appointed in trust one-third of her estate, and the remaining third she appointed in trust to pay the income to her other daughter until she should enter a sisterhood, and subject thereto to the two other children in equal shares. Held, that the appointment was not a fraud on the power (following Hodgson v. Halford, 11 Ch. Div. 959), and that the gift over was good as not infringing the rules against perpetuities (following dictum in Boughton v. James, 1 Coll. Ch. Cas. 46).—Wainwright v. Miller, L.R. [1897] 2 Ch. 255; 76 L.T. 708.

(iv.) C. D.-Fraud on Power-Severance of Good from Bad Appointment.—A father agreed with the three children of his first marriage, who were resident with him, amongst whom he had a power of appointment under the settlement, to set aside a portion of the settled fund in favour of his second wife and her children. He left the whole fund by will to one of the children entitled, subject to an annuity to the other two. and with the request that the one who had the corpus should settle £100 a year on the second wife and her children. Held, that the agreement and the request to favour the second family were invalid, but that otherwise (following Topham v. Duke of Portland, 1 De G. J. and S. 570) the appointment was good.-Viant v. Cooper, 76 L.T. 768.

Restraint of Trade:

(v.) C. D.--Agreement in Restraint of Trade- Death of Covenantee--Rights of Surviving Partner.--The defendant, in consideration of employment, agreed with the late owner of a school not to engage in tuition within a certain radius of the school for a period not expired. During the defendant's engagement, the plaintiff became a partner in the school under an agreement, by which he succeeded to the ownership. Held, that the defendant's undertaking was not limited to the life of the person with whom it was made, and as the undertaking was part of the goodwill of the school, the plaintiff was entitled to an injunction. Jacoby . Whitmore (49 L.T. 355) followed.-Smith v. Hawthorn, 76 L.T. 716.

Rating:

(i.) Q. B. D.-Water Rate-House and Garden-Waterworks Clauses Act, 1847, s. 68-Grand Junction Waterworks Act, 1852, s. 46.-Justices in determining the assessment to water rate of a house and its garden occupied together, must value the premises as they exist as one tenement, and have no jurisdiction to diminish the assessment on the ground that the garden is unnecessarily large and might be severed and part applied to other purposes.-Grand Junction Waterworks Co. v. Davies, L.R. [1897] 2 Q.B. 209; 76 L.T. 833.

(ii.) H. L. - Public Park ·Beneficial Occupation. - A county council acquired, under statutory powers, but not in fulfilment of a duty, land for a public park in perpetuity. The expense of maintenance was in excess of any revenue. Held, affirming decision of Court below (22, p. 20 (iv.)), that the park was not rateable, as there was no beneficial interest. See also 21, p. 16 (iii.).—Churchwardens, &c., of Lambeth v. London County Council, 76 L.T. 795.

(iii.) Q. B. D.-Floating Pontoons-Liability to be Rated. In a creek, excavated for the purpose, two pontoons were placed, fastened to piles and dolphins by shackles, which could be detached. They were held to be rateable as enhancing the value of the occupation of the land. Reg. v. Morrison (1 Ell. and Bl. 150) followed --The Tyne Pontoons Co. v. The Guardians of the Tynemouth Union, 76 L.T. 782.

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(iv.) R. & C. C. C.-Siding Rent-Railway Rates and Charges, No. 10 (Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway)-Order Confirmation Act, 1892 (55 and 56 Vict., c. 48), s. 5, sub-s. 4—Railway and Canal Traffic Act, 1894, s. 1, sub-s. 1.-A railway company, after carrying coal in consignees' own trucks, had allowed the loaded trucks to remain without extra charge in sidings for an indefinite period. The company altered its system and allowed four days to consignees for taking delivery, making after that a charge of 6d. per day per truck for siding accommodation. Held, that this was not an increase in any charge within the meaning of sect. 1 of the Railway and Canal Traffic Act, 1894, and that the circumstances were such as to justify the company in limiting the accommodation; but that the reasonableness of the charge was a question for an arbitrator.-The Manchester and Northern Counties Federation of Coal Trades Association v. The Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway, 76 L.T. 786.

(v.) Q. B.-Obstructing Road-Penalty-Railway Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845 (8 d9 Vict., c. 20), ss. 53, 54, 55.-A railway interfered with an occupation road without previously making a sufficient one in its place. Held, that they were liable to a penalty under sect. 54 of the Act in an action by the owner and a tenant of part of the road. Semble, that they would be liable to the full penalty to every person owning any part of the obstructed road.-Llewellyn and Others v. The Vale of Glamorgan Railway Co., L.R. [1897] 2 Q.B. 239; 76 L.T. 778. (vi.) C. A.-Accommodation Works-Railway Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845 (8 & 9 Vict., c. 20), ss. 68-73.--Land was conveyed to a railway company for certain payments as compensation for severance and damages of all kinds and in full satisfaction for all accommodation and other works, the vendor reserving the right to make at his own cost level crossings at specified spots. The vendor's representatives desired to erect a bridge over the line. Held, that under the agree ment no works for the use of the land, other than those specified, were to be done by the company or anybody else, and that Railway Clauses Act could not be invoked.--The Rhondda and Swansea Railway Co. v. Talbot, L.R. [1897] 1 Ch. 131; 76 L.T. 694.

Receiver and Manager:

(i.) C. A.—Appointment without Salary—Allowance for Extra Work.—A man who had undertaken to act as manager and receiver of a business without salary was allowed to charge a weekly wage for labour done by him in the business as a workman. See 22, p. 105 (vi.).—Harris v. Sleep (No. 2), L.R. [1897] 2 Ch. 80; 76 L.T. 870.

Revenue:

(ii.) Q. B. D.-Estate Duty-Finance Act, 1894 (57 & 58 Vict., c. 30), 8.5 (3).-Estate duty is not payable on an ultimate absolute interest in settled property, which, through failure of intermediate interests, becomes vested in the life tenant.-Attorney-General v. Wood and Others, L.R. [1897] 2 Q.B. 102; 76 L.T. 654.

(iii.) Q. B. D.-Repairs to “ Tied" Houses--Income Tax Acts, 1842, s. 100, First Case, r. 3; 1853, s 2, scheds. A and D--Finance Act, 1894, s. 35.Repairs done by brewers to their tied houses are not a trade expense and for assessment purposes, such houses fall under schedule A, not under schedule D. Watney r. Musgrave (5 Ex. Div. 241; 42 L.T. 690) applied.-Brickwood & Co. v. Reynolds, 77 L.T. 31.

(iv.) Q. B. D.--Shares and Debentures-Transfer to Names of Executors without Probate--55 Geo. III., c. 184, s. 37.-An English company, who transferred into the names of American executors, who had not taken out English probate, the shares and debentures of an American holder, deceased, and paid to the executors interest accrued due on the debentures up to the date of the testator's death, were held not to have taken possession of, and administered the estate so as to become liable to a penalty under sect. 37 of the above Act.-Attorney-General v. New York Breweries Co., L.R. [1897] 1 Q.B. 738; 76 L.T. 721.

(v.) C. A.-Debentures Repayable with Premium-Stamp Act, 1891 (54 & 55 Vict., c. 39), s. 86, sched. 1.-A limited company issued debentures of £100 each, with an undertaking to pay back each with a premium of £7 10s. Held, that each debenture was a security for £107 10s., and liable to ad valorem duty under schedule 1, division B, of the Stamp Act, 1891.-Rowell v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue, L.R. [1897] 2 Q.B. 194.

(vi.) Q. B. D.-Stamp Duty-Annuities Granted under Borrowing PowersStamp Act, 1891 (54 & 55 Vict., c. 3), ss. 54, 60, 87 (2).-Sect. 87 (2) of the Stamp Act applies to terminable annuities, in which each annual payment discharges a portion of the loan in consideration of which the annuity was granted, not to perpetual annuities. The latter, therefore, are liable to an ad vaiorem duty of 10s., not of 2s. 6d., per £100.-The Mersey Dock and Harbour Board v. The Commissioners of Inland Revenue, L.R. [1897] 1 Q.B. 786; 76 L.T. 596.

(vii.) H. L.-Succession Duty--Policy of Insurance. -A father, by gratuitous assignation, gave to his daughter policies of long standing on his own life, and she thereafter paid the premiums. Held, that neither succession duty nor account duty was payable by the daughter on receiving the policy moneys.-The Lord Advocate v. Fleming or Robertson, L.R. [1897] A.C. 145.

Settlement:

(viii.) C. D.-Trust for Accumulation - Thelluson Act (39 & 40 Geo. III., c. 98), s. 1. Policies of insurance on different lives were settled on trust to invest the amounts payable on the falling in of each life and accumulate the fund until all the policies should have become due. Held, that the period of accumulation would terminate with the life of the settlor.-In re Errington; Errington-Tarbutt v. Errington, 76 L.T. 616.

B

(i.) C. A.-Estoppel. Decision of Court below (22, p. 78 (iii.) ) approved. Board v. Board (29 L.T. 459; L.R. 9 Q.B. 48) considered. Paine v. Jones (30 L.T. 779; L.R. 18 Eq. 320) distinguished. - Dalton v. Fitzgerald, L.R. [1897] 2 Ch. 86; 76 L.T. 700.

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(ii.) C. D.-Construction — Hotchpot. Of two funds comprised in a marriage settlement, one, the property of the wife, was, in the event of an appointment being made to any of the children, to be brought into hotchpot. The other, the property of the husband, was to be on similar trusts. The first fund was fully appointed in unequal shares. In the other no appointment had been made. Held, that the two funds were distinct; that the first was not to be brought into hotchpot; and that the second was to be equally divided amongst the children.In re Marquis of Bristol; Earl Grey v. Grey, L.R. [1897] 1 Ch. 946 ; 76 L.T. 757.

(iii.) C. D.--Marriage Settlement-Covenant to Settle After Acquired Property. -A husband covenanted to settle any property he might acquire during the coverture. Premises were subsequently demised to him for 21 years under covenant not to underlet or assign without consent. He afterwards became bankrupt and the lessor claimed possession from the wife. Held (following Lewis v. Madocks, 8 Ves. 150; 17 Ves. 55) that the premises came within the settlement; that a withholding of consent by the lessor could be dealt with as pointed out in In re Turcan, 40 Ch. Div. 5; 59 L.T. 712; and that therefore the premises were bound by the trusts of the marriage settlement.-Lord Churston v. Buller, 77 L.T. 45.

Settled Land:

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(iv.) C. A.-Conditional Life Estate-Non Compliance-Settled Land Act, 1882, ss. 2, 51, 52, 58, sub-s. (1), clause 6.-Settled premises were to be occupied by a widow so long as she was desirous of personally occupying the same." There was a gift over on her decease or second marriage. After having joined in granting a lease of the premises for five years, she became desirous of exercising the powers of a tenant for life. Held, that until the expiration of the lease she had not the possession required by sect. 58 of the Settled Land Act, 1852, to confer upon her the powers of a tenant for life.--In re Edwards's Settlement, 76 L.T. 774.

Statute of Limitations:

(v.) C. D.— Effect of Acknowledgment of Statute Barred Debt by Executrix and Beneficiary-Statute of Limitations-Lord Tenterden's Act (9 Geo. IV., c. 14), ss. 1, 2-Mercantile Law Amendment Act (19 & 20 Vict., c. 97), ss. 13, 14.-An acknowledgment by an executrix and beneficiary of a statute barred debt, though not binding on her co-executor personally, may bind her personally and the unadministered assets of the testator. Tullock v. Dunn (Ry. and Moo. 217); Scholey v. Walton (12 M. and W. 510); Fordham v. Wallis (10 Hare 217); in re Hollingshead (58 L.T. 758) considered.-In re Macdonald; Dick v. Fraser, L.R. [1897] 2 Ch. 181; 76 L.T. 713.

(vi.) C. A.-" Person Claiming under a Mortgage "-Real Property Limitation Acts, 1837 & 1874, s. 9.- The owner of an undivided moiety of a piece of land had been in possession of part of the land from 1875 to 1896, and the defendant was his representative. In 1886 the person who claimed as owner of the other undivided portion mortgaged it, and in 1890 conveyed his equity to the plaintiff, who paid off the mortgage, and now claimed, as tenant in common in fee, an equal undivided moiety of the portion in the possession of the defendant. Held, that

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