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Statute of Limitations :(i.) C. D.-(3 & 4 Will. IV., c. 27), s. 2- Acknowledgment of Barred Debt by

one Executor and Derisee in Trust.-A testator, who had deposite'l title deeds with the plaintiff to secure repayment of money, appointed defendants as executors and devisees in trust. One of the defendants, without consulting the other, acknowledged the debt and more than six years' arrears of interest. The other defendant in answer to a foreclosure action pleaded the Statute. Held, that the acknowledgment as an act of a trustee was not valid to bind the real estate, and as the act of an executor was not valid against a devisee ; and therefore that arrears of interest could not be recovered for a longer period than six years. Bolding v. Lane (1 De G. J. & S. 122) followed.--Astbury v.

Astbury, 78 L.T. 494. Tender :(ii.) C. A.-" Highest Net Money Tender.”_Decision of Court below

(23, 78, i.) affirmed.-South Hetton Coal Co., Limited, v. Haswell, &c.,

Coal Co., Limited, L.R. (1898] 1 Ch. 465; 78 L.T. 366. Trade Mark:-(iii.) C. A.-Word not Registrable- Invented Word of Similar Sound.

Decision of Court below (23, 54, iii.) affirmed.-In re Ripley and Son's

Trade Mark, 78 L.T. 367. (iv.) C. D.-Non-User--Rectification of Register--Patents, &c., Acts, 1883

(46 & 47 Vict., c. 47), s. 72 ; 1888 (51 & 52 Vict., c. 50), s. 14.-In 1882 à firm registered the figure of a butterfly as a trade mark and applied it to class 42, but made no use of it. In 1897 an application from another firm to have the same figure registered for use in class 42 was refused by the Comptroller. Held (following Edwards v. Dennis, 30 Ch. Div. 454; 54 L.T. 112), that as there was no evidence of user, or of intention to use, on the part of the firm who had registered, the mark must be expunged and the costs of motion be borne by them; and that the Comptroller proceed with the application of 1897.-In re

John Batt and Co.'s Trade Mark, 78 L.T. 552. Trade Name: (v.) C. A.- Similarity - Injunction - Companies Act, 1862, 8. 20. – A

brewery in Manchester called the “ Manchester Brewery Co." and one in Macclesfield called the “North Cheshire Brewery Co.” traded in the same district. A new company was formed to take over the latter under the name of the “ North Cheshire and Manchester Brewery Co.” Held, that Manchester Brewery Co. was entitled to an injunction restraining the new company from using the proposed name. Decision of Court below reversed.-- Manchester Brewery Co., Limited, v. North Cheshire and Manchester Brewery Co., Limited, L.R. [1898] 1 Ch. 539;

78 L.T. 537. (vi.) C. D.- Concurrent Uses by Two FirmsDiscontinuance by One.--- Where

a trade name used by two manufacturers is dropped by one, but continued by the other, the former cannot after some years' disuse revive it if it has meantime become solely associated with the other's

goods.-Daniel and drter v. Whitehouse, L.R. [1898] 1 Ch. 685. Trustee :(vii.) C. D.- Appropriation of Security to meet Trust Legacy.-Where trustees

have bona fide appropriated a security to meet a trust legacy in favour of one of several residuary legatees, the appropriation is good.-In re

Nickels; Nickels v. Nickels, L.R. (1898] 1 Ch. 630 ; 78 L.T. 379. (viii.) C. A.-Breach of Trust-Mortgage of Trust Estate with Trustee's own.

The defendant, who had borrowed money on his English estates, executed as further security a charge on estates in Ceylon, of which the Court of Appeal had declared that he was a trustee with a lien for purchase money. Held, that he must be treated as having raised the sum rateably out of the two estates according to their respective values, and must be debited with the share attributable to the Ceylon

estate.Rochefoucauld v. Boustead, L.R. (1898] 1 Ch. 550. (i.) H. L.-Investments-Trusts (Scotland) Amendment Act, 1884 (47 & 48

Vict., c. 63), $8. 3, 10, 12-Judicial Factors Act, 1849 (12 & 13 Vict., c. 51), ss. 4, 13.—The curator bonis is not exempted from responsibility for an improper investment, on the ground that the accountant of Court

(Scotland) has approved of it.-Hulton v. Annan, L.R. (1898) A.C. 289. Vendor and Purchaser:-(ii.) C. A.-Conditions of Sale.-One of the conditions of the sale of a

house by auction was that the vendor should have power to annul the sale if any objection was made “as to the title, particulars, conditions, or any other matter or thing relating or incidental to the sale which the vendor is unable or unwilling to comply with.” Held, that the vendor was entitled to rescind on conditions to which he objected in the conveyance being insisted on. Bowman v. Hyland (8 C.D. 588; 39 L.T. 90) distinguished. Decision of Court below reversed.-In re

Deighton and Harris's Contract, L.R. (1898] 1 Ch. 458; 78 L.T. 430. (iii.) C. D.-Agent or Principal ?-Misrepresentation ?-An offer to purchase

a Congregational Chapel made by solicitors “on behalf of our client, the manager of the E. Mineral Water Co.," was accepted. The purchaser was buying to re-sell by arrangement at a profit to a committee of Roman Catholics whose agent's tender had been refused by the chapel trustees from an objection to sell the building for Roman Catholic uses. Held, on the evidence, that the purchaser bought not as agent, but for his own profit ; and that any misrepresentation as to the Mineral Water Company was under the circumstances immaterial.

--Nash v. Dix, 78 L.T. 445. (iv.) C. D.-Sale under Same Terms as to Title, dc.," as in an Earlier

Contract-Time for Completion-Interest.-A person who was under contract to buy land with an obligation to pay interest from a given date if the purchase was then incomplete, contracted to sell the land subject to “the same terms as to the title, &c.," as those in the contract in which he was in the position of purchaser. Held, that the clause as to commencement of interest in the original contract could not be read into the second contract, but that the date from which interest should run would be that on which the second purchaser could prudently have taken possession-which was fixed at nine days after the abstract was delivered.-In re Keeble and Stillwell's Fletton

Brick Co., 78 L.T. 383. (v.) C. D.-Specific Performance- Delay-Deposit.-A person agreed to

purchase a reversion subject to life interests, and paid a deposit. No effective steps to complete were taken till the termination of the last life interest, nearly ten years later. Held, that the purchaser had lost his right to specific performance (Eads v. Williams, 4 De G. M. & G. 674); but that he was entitled to the return of the deposit (Howe v. Smith, 50 L.T. 573). — Levy v. Stogdon, L.R. (1898] 1 Ch. 478;

78 L.T. 185. (vi.) C. D.-Title Deeds not in Possession of Vendor.-A purchaser of freehold

agreed to accept the best title the vendor could give. Some of the title deeds were in the hands of a former mortgagee who had been paid off, but who declined to part with the deeds. Held, that the vendor was bound to fulfil his obligation of handing over on completion all title deeds in his possession or power; that sect. 3, sub-sect. 6 of Conveyancing Act, 1881, had no application, and that no question of title within the terms of the agreement was involved.-In re Duthy and Jesson's Contract, L.R. (1898) 1 Ch 419; 78 L.T. 223.

(i.) C, D. House for Private Residence only. - Where a purchaser

covenanted not to use a house otherwise than as a private residence, it was held to be a breach to employ the house as a residence for governesses and school girls attending a distant school.-Hobson v.

Tulloch, L.R. (1898) 1 Ch. 424 ; 78 L.T. 224. (ii.) C. D.- Defect in Title _" Default."-An agreement for the sale of

leaseholds provided that “if from any cause whatever other than the default of the vendor the purchase should not be completed” by date the purchaser should pay interest. Delay was caused by defect in the vendor's title unknown to the vendor and not so obvious as to make his ignorance unreasonable. Held, that he was entitled to interest.--In re Woods and Lewis's Contract, L.R. (1898] 1 Ch. 433;

78 L.T. 250. (iii.) C. D.-Soil of Highway-Presumption of Ownership-Charitable Trusts

Recovery Act, 1891 (54 & 55 Vict., c. 17), s. 3.- The Corporation of London threw into a new roadway property which was subject to a rent charge under an ancient will, and subsequently sold subject to rent charge, if any, premises occupying part of the site of the demolished property. Held, on the rule in Micklethwaite v. The Newlay Bridge Co. (33 C.D. 133; 55 L.T. 336) as to the presumption of the highway passing ad medium filum, that the purchaser was liable, as the rule applied to streets in towns as well as to the country.--In re White's Charities ; Charity Commissioners v. Corporation of London, L.R. (1898] 1 Ch. 659; 78 L.T. 550.

Volunteer :(iv.) C. A.-Army Act, 1881 (44 & 45 Vict., c. 58), ss. 41, 43, 45, 158, 176

Volunteer Act, 1863 (26 & 27 Vict., c. 65), s. 21.-On the facts stated in 23, 88, ii., the Court of Appeal held, reversing the judgment of the Court below, that the members of the corps were subject to military law till they were dismissed on their return home, and that the act of the defendant was justified under the Army Act, 1881.-Marks v. Frogley, L.R. [1898] 1 Q.B. 888; 78 L.T. 607.

Will:(v.) C.A.- Charitable Bequest9 Geo. II., c. 36.-A gift to trustees under the

will of a testator who died before the Mortmain and Charitable Uses Act, 1888 came into force, of property, real, mixed and personal, to dispose of in charity in their discretion, does not call for the interference of the Court unless the trustees make a selection which is invalid according to the law at the date of the testator's death. See 21, 70, iv.

-In re Piercey; Whitwham v. Piercey, L.R.[1898]1 Ch.565 ; 78 L.T. 277. (vi.) C. D.-Contingent Equitable Limitation follows the Law.-Real estate

was left in trust for A for life and then in trust for such of his children as attained 21, or being daughters married earlier. Held, that on A's death the eldest child who fulfilled the conditions became entitled to the whole income, the class opening to admit the other children as they became respectively qualified, in the same manner as if the limitations had been legal.-- In re Averil ; Salsbury v. Buckle, L.R. [1898] 1 Ch. 523;

78 L.T. 320. (vii.) C. D.-Construction. A testator bequeathed a legacy to trustees on

trust to pay the income to B for life, and if he should have two children who attained the age of 21, then a moiety of the legacy to his executors or administrators. Held, that B having had two children he was, on their attaining 21 years, absolutely entitled to this moiety.-In re

Bogle ; Bogle v. Yorstoun, 78 L.T. 457. (viii.) Q. B.-Construction-Rule in Shelley's Case.-A testator devised lands

in trust for the sole use and benefit of his daughter for life and after

wards to the use of the heirs of her body "such freehold lands. ..
to be legally conveyed and assured unto such heirs of my child or
children in equal shares as they shall severally and respectively attain
the age of 21 years or be married and to their several and respective
heirs and assigns for ever.” The daughter left one son, who died
intestate without heirs of body. Held, that the fee simple expectant
on the estate tail to the daughter passed to her son under the will, and
that he took as purchaser as the rule in Shelley's case did not apply.

See 23, 55, iv.- Foxwell y. Van Grutten, 78 L.T. 231. (i.) C. D.-Construction.-A gift of property in thirds to the children of

A, the children of B, and the children of C, upon the death of A and B and C, will be construed as “upon the death of the survivor of A, B, and C," if any other construction would cut down a clear gift, in an earlier part of the will, of income to tenants in common for life ; in re Hutchinson's Trusts (21 C.D. 811; 47 L.T. 573) distinguished. On the death of a life tenant the accumulations of income would follow the destination of the corpus, subject to the provisions of the Thelluson Acts. By the terms of the will if A, or B, or C, had no issue the lapsed share of the corpus was to be divided between the “issue of the

survivor or survivors.”In re Rubbins; Gill v. Worrall, 78 L.T. 218. (ii.) C. D.- Construction-Bequest to Buy Annuity-Interest.--A bequest to

executors of a sum of money to be laid out in the purchase of an annuity is in the nature of a trust legacy and does not commence to bear interest until twelve months after testator's death. In re

Friend ; Friend v. Young, 78 L.T. 222. (iii.) P. D. - Alteration Appointment of Executors by Marginal Note.

Certain persons whose appointment as executors had been cancelled were referred to as executors in a marginal note to the will, and they were left as trustees. Held, that the effect of the note was to appoint

as executors expressly.-In the goods of Ellen Nussey, 78 L.T. 169. (iv.) C. D.- Construction-Apportionment Act, 1870 (33 & 34 Vict., c. 35),

ss. 2, 5, 7.-A testator in 1895 left to his wife for life the “ whole of the income derived” from certain shares in a company, and gave the residue of his estate to others. Held, that the bequest of the income came within sect. 7 of the Act, and was therefore not subject to

apportionment.-In re Meredith ; Stone v. Meredith, 78 L.T. 492. (v.) C. D.- Power of Appointment- Unattested Foreign Will--Mills Act, 1837

(1 Vict., c. 26), ss. 9, 10, 27-- Lord Kingsdown's Act, 1861 (24 & 25 Vict., č. 114), s. 1.--A woman who was resident in France had under the will

portion of his residuary estate. She left a paper writing, signed but unattested, “ To my Executors. I leave A B in case of my death £600.” This was a valid will according to French law, but was held not to operate as an execution of the power.--Hummel v. Hummel, L.R. [188] 1 Ch. 642; 78 L.T. 518.


ABDUL HAMID BEY, in the goods of į Anderson v. Manchester, Sheffield, (78 L.T. 202), 95, v.

and Lincolnshire Railway (78 L.T. Ackerman v. Lockhart; in re Hawkes 251), 113, viii. (78 L.T. 336), 118, vii.

Andrew v. St. Olave's Board of Works Allhusen v. Ealing and South Harrow (L.R. (18987 1 Q.B. 775 ; 78 L.T.

Railway (78 L.T. 285 & 396), 114, i. 1 504), 113, vi.

Anglo - Continental Corporation of Button v. Tottenham Urban District

Western Australia, Limited, in re Council (78 L.T. 470), 113, v.

(78 L.T. 157), 23, 66, iv. Ardern, in the good's of (L.R. (1898) CALCOTT AND Elvin's CONTRACT, in re P. 147 ; 78 L.T. 536), 95, ii.

(78 L.T. 417), 97, vi. Ashworth y. Wells (78 L.T. 136), i Calcraft V. Guest (L.R. (1898] 1 103, ii.

Q.B. 759 ; 78 L.T. 283), 111, ix. Astbury v. Astbury (78 L.T. 494), Caledonian Railway v. Turcan (L.R. 119, i.

(1898) A.C. 256), 107, iii. Attorney-General for New South Cardiff, Vicar, &c., of St. John's v.

Wales v. Walters and Others (78 Parishioners of same (L.R. (1898] L.T. 272), 99, v.

P. 155), 103, iii. Attorney-General v. Mayor, &c., of Chaplin v. Laing (78 L.T. 410),

Swansea (L.R. (1898] 1 Ch. 602; 112, vi. 78 L.T. 412), 108, vi.

Charity Commissioners v. London Attorney-General v. Strange (78 L.T. Corporation, in re White's Charities 516), 116, iii.

(L.R. [1898] 1 Ch. 659 ; 78 L.T. Attorney - General v. Tynemouth 550), 121, iii.

Corporation (L.R. (1898) 1 Q.B. Clarke, in re (L.R. (18987 1 Ch. 336 ; 604 ; 78 L.T. 372), 108, vii.

78 L.T. 275), 109, iii. Auriferous Properties, Limited, in re Clifford v. The Thames Ironworks

(L.R. (1898) i Ch. 691), 101, vii. Co. (78 L.T. 164), 23, 68, ii. Averill, in re; Salsbury v. Buckle Clyde Cycle Co. v. Hargreaves (78

(L.R. (1898) 1 Ch. 523; 78 L.T. L.T. 296), 105, x. 320), 121, vi.

Coghlan v. Cumberland (L.R. (1898]

| 1 Ch. 704 ; 78 L.T. 540), 112, vii. BARNEs v. YoungS (L.R. [1898] 1 Ch. Colchester Grammar School, &c. 414), 111, iii.

(78 L.T. 509), 103, v. Barnett, in the goods of (L.R. (1898] Coppen v. Moore (78 L.T. 520), P. 145 ; 78 L.T. 391), 95, iii.

110, iv. Bartlett v. Mayfair Property Co., Crawley v. White (78 L.T. 167), Limited (78 L.T. 302), 101, iii.

104, iii. Bateman v. Bateman (otherwise Cronmire, in re; e. p. Waud (78

Harrison) (78 L.T. 472), 105, iv. L.T. 170, 483), 104, i. · Batt, John, & Co.'s Trade Marks, Cuckfield Rural Council v. Goring in re (78 L.T. 552), 119, iv.

(L.R. (1898) 1 Q.B. 865 ; 78 L.T. Beckwith, e. p.: in re New British 530), 108, i.

Iron Co., Limited (78 L.T. 155), Currie and Timmis's Patent, in re 23, 67, v.

(L.R. [1898) A.C. 347), 111, iv. Birmingham Breweries, Limited, v.

Jameson (78 L.T. 512), 98, vii. DALLIMORE v. TUTTON (78 L.T. 469), Blenkinsop v. Ogden (L.R. (1898] 1 108, i. | Q.B. 783; 78 L.T. 554), 103, vi. Daniel and Arter v. Whitehouse Bogle v. Yorstoun ; in re Bogle (78 (L.R. (1898] 1 Ch. 685), 119, vi. L.T. 457), 121, vii.

Day v. Day and Erskine (78 L.T. Boord v. African Consolidated 358), 105, i.

Land Co. (L.R. [1898] 1 Ch. 596), Deighton and Harris's Contract, in re 23, 67, iii.

(L.R. [1898] 1 Ch. 458; 78 L.T. Brandon v. Hughes ; in re Hughes 430), 120, ii.

(L.R. (1898] 1 Ch. 529; 78 L.T. Denaby and Cadeby Colliery Co. v. 432), 110, i.

Doncaster Union Assessment Brook and Fremlin's Contract, in re Committee (78 L.T. 388), 115, i.

(L.R. [1898] 1 Ch. 647; 78 L.T. De Nicols v. Curlier ; in re De Nicols 416), 109, v.

(L.R. (1898) 1 Ch. 403 ; 78 L.T. Brownscombe v. Johnson (78 L.T. 152, 541), 106, i. 265), 102, vi.

D'Esterre v. Waverley Type Writer Bryant v. Hancock & Co. (L.R. [1898] (L.R. (1898] 1 Ch. 699; 78 L.T.

1 Q.B. 716 ; 78 L.T. 397), 107, i. 593), 102, i. Buckwell v. Norman (L.R. (1898] Donovan, in the goods of (78 L.T. 567),

1 Q.B. 622; 78 L.T. 248), 97, v. L 110, ii,

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