restrained from further use of the name Glenfield Starch" as a name for their manufacture-a conclusion which must have been gratifying to all lovers of justice. Wotherspoon v. Currie (42 L.J. Ch. 130).

In 1876 an important case about filters arose, the facts of which were as follows:-G. Cheavin, making filters of the same description as those for which his late father, S. Cheavin, had held a patent now expired, labelled them with the words "G. Cheavin's Improved Patent Gold Medal Self-cleaning Rapid Water Filters," surmounted by a medallion of the Royal Arms. The Court of Appeal discharged the injunction of Vice-Chancellor Bacon restraining Walker, Brightman & Co. from manufacturing filters labelled "S. Cheavin's Patent Prize Medal Selfcleaning Rapid Water Filters, Improved and Manufactured by Walker & Co."; nor would they insist upon their removing the word "Cheavin" from their label; and this for three reasons. Firstly, because the label was not a trade-mark, but only a description of the article as made according to S. Cheavin's patent, which was now common. to all the public. Secondly, because nothing in the defendants' label was calculated to mislead the public by a fraudulent imitation of the plaintiff's label. Thirdly, because the plaintiff's label, coupled with the medallion above-mentioned, constituted a false representation that the patent was still subsisting, and disentitled the plaintiff to relief by injunction. We consider that the third reason is the best. He who comes to Equity must come with clean hands. Cheavin v. Walker (46 L.J. Ch. 686).

In 1880 "Thorley's Food for Cattle" became the subject matter of a similar dispute under the following circumstances. Joseph Thorley, down to his death in 1876, had been the only person who manufactured "Thorley's Food for Cattle." After his decease Massam, his executor, continued the business. In 1877 J. W. Thorley, the brother

of Joseph, divulged the secret of the recipe, which he knew from having been in his late brother's employ, to a limited company called "Thorley's Cattle Food Company," in which he took a shilling share. This company now sold the article which they made by the help of that recipe. under the name of "Thorley's Food for Cattle." ViceChancellor Malins refused to interfere; but the Court of Appeal held that the company were not at liberty to use this name unless they took such precautions as would prevent purchasers from supposing that the article sold by them was manufactured at the original establishment of Thorley. Massam v. Thorley's Cattle Food Company" (42 L.T. N.S. 851). Lord Justice James referred in his judgment to the case of James v. James (ubi supra), and pointed out a possible distinction between that case and the present. "It is possible," said he, "that the Master of the Rolls may have thought that 'Lieutenant James' Horse-Blister' was merely an indication that it was made according to the lieutenant's recipe." But he added" in which case I should not be able to concur." He says further on: "I do not think that there is any substantial difference between the two cases." The result therefore is that James v. James may be regarded as practically overruled.

In 1882 the House of Lords was again called upon to decide a similar question. The Singer Manufacturing Company, who had for a long time used the word "Singer" as a designation of all the sewing machines manufactured by them, with specific words to distinguish different kinds, had brought an action against Loog, the agent in England of the Sewing Machine Manufacturing Company of Berlin. That company described the machines which they made "on the Singer principle" as "Singer Machines," with additional words to explain their Berlin manufacture. The plaintiffs had succeeded in obtaining an injunction from Vice-Chancellor Bacon, notwithstanding the dis

couragement which that learned lawyer had received from the Court of Appeal in the filter case. The Court of Appeal once more reversed his decision, and the supreme tribunal refused to interfere. "The defendants," they said, "had a right to do as they did, provided they did so in such a way as to avoid any reasonable possibility of misunderstanding." The Singer Manufacturing Company v. Loog (8 App. Cas. 15; 49 L.T. N.S. 484).

In 1889, Mr. Justice North heard the complaint of Thomas Turton and Sons, steel manufacturers, of the Sheaf Works, Sheffield, who sought to restrain John Turton and his two sons, steel manufacturers, of the Vulcan Works, Sheffield, from calling themselves "Turton and Sons," which they claimed had long been the business name of the plaintiff firm. The learned judge granted an injunction as prayed; but the Court of Appeal held that, although there was a probability that the public would occasionally be misled by the similarity of the names, still, as there was no fraud on the part of the defendants, no injunction should have been granted against them. Turton v. Turton (42 Ch. D. 128). Notice the particular ground upon which this decision, like that of Burgess v. Burgess (ubi supra) rests, viz., the fact that no fraud was proved.

In 1891 came the "Stone Ale" case. Here the plaintiffs and their predecessors had, for a hundred years, carried on a brewery at Stone, and their ale had become well-known as "Stone Ale." In 1888 the defendant built a brewery at Stone, and immediately began to call his ale "Stone Ale." It was found that he intended to use the term in connection with liquor of his own manufacture with a view of leading to the belief that the ales which he sold were those which had become well-known in the market, and thus obtaining the advantage of the reputation which the plaintiffs' ales had won. The defendant was restrained by Mr. (now Lord) Justice Chitty by perpetual injunction from using this name

"Stone Ale." The Court of Appeal affirmed this perpetual injunction, and the House of Lords refused to interfere. Montgomery v. Thompson, [1891] A.C. 217.

At last, in 1896, the whole matter was satisfactorily thrashed out before the House of Lords in the great case which has now established what is the true principle of law relating to this subject. In spite of all the cases which had been decided, the dodge was not dead yet. A man called Banham thought that he would try it once more. This ingenious person had been in the employment of a manufacturer of belting of the name of Reddaway up till the year 1889. Reddaway was flourishing, and he called the commodity by which he was making his fortune, "Camelhair Belting" to distinguish it from the belting of other manufacturers. "Now," said Banham in effect, "he is in my power; he has not given his commodity an 'absurd' name. 'Camel-hair Belting' is a mere elemental description of the commodity which he sells. I can use that name as well as he, and the public will buy my belting thinking that it is his." So, having started the inevitable company, he began to make his belting and to endeavour to pass it off as that of the plaintiffs. That this was his endeavour the jury expressly found at the trial before Mr. (now Lord) Justice Henn-Collins, who gave judgment accordingly in the plaintiffs' favour. The Court of Appeal reversed this decision, holding that a man could not have any right to the exclusive use of a name which was only the mere elemental description of an article. Lord Esher more suo ridiculed the arguments of the plaintiffs to the contrary by asking whether if A. B.'s "iron shovels" became so well known upon the market that until C. D. started his rival establishment for their manufacture, "iron shovels" came to mean A. B.'s "iron shovels," C. D. could be restrained from selling his commodity, under the name of “iron shovels." The House of Lords, however, restored the

decision of Mr. (now Lord) Justice Henn-Collins. This conclusion was eminently desirable; and the grounds of law upon which it stands are stated in two sentences for which Lords Halsbury and Herschell are respectively responsible in language so convincing and clear that the would-be "cheat and swear-by-the-card "men of business seem at length to have their last support taken from beneath them. The Lord Chancellor said: "I believe the principle of law may be very plainly stated: and it is that nobody has any right to represent his goods as the goods of somebody else." And Lord Herschell added:-" If the defendants are entitled to lead purchasers to believe that they are getting the plaintiffs' manufacture, when they are not, and thus to cheat the plaintiffs of some of their legitimate trade, I should regret that the law was powerless to enforce the most elementary principles of commercial morality." Reddaway and Company, Limited, v. Banham and Company, Limited, [1896] A.C. 199.

We rejoice that the law is not so powerless: we rejoice that the "iron shovel" argument did not prevail; even although the rejection of it induces the somewhat startling reflection that circumstances may be imagined in which it might possibly be illegal to call a spade a spade!

ERNEST A. JELF.

III. THE PRISONS BILL.

LEGISLATION on prison discipline is again called for,

and there is an impression abroad that our system, since the transference of prisons to Government control, has become too rigid, and inelastic in its adaptation to cases. Ideas of penal discipline are constantly tending to relaxation from severity, partly as civilization softens