press seem to imagine that the Right of Visitation and Search by Public Ships of a Belligerent was abolished by the Declaration of Paris, to which the United States and Spain (as is well-known) did not accede. The really important questions will, of course, be: whether privateering will be employed by the belligerents; whether they will respect the principles of "Free ships, free goods" and Enemy's ships, free goods;" and, above all, whether neutral powers will tolerate any departure from the principles laid down in the Paris Declaration, merely because the belligerents for different reasons were not signatories of the latter?

As the chief objection of the United States to the Declaration was that it did not go far enough in favour of neutral property, it is more than probable that they will waive any theoretical rights they may have. In such case, it is hardly likely that Spain would venture to act otherwise, or that neutral powers would permit her to do so. Incidentally, another important question is certain to arise as to the right of neutrals to allow belligerent warships to coal in their territory.

Effect of Marriage on Property.

A most interesting question arose in the recent case of In re Nichols; De Nichols v. Curlier, 1898, 1 Ch. 403. A., a Frenchman, married B., a Frenchwoman, in France in 1854, both being at the time domiciled in that country. The parties being then in very poor circumstances no marriage settlement was made upon the marriage. In 1862 both A. and B. removed to England and became domiciled there, and in 1865 A. became a naturalized British subject. At the time of their removal to England their property was worth about £400. In 1897 A. died, still being domiciled in England, and by his will left his residuary property to

trustees in trust for his widow for life, and upon her death for his daughter, her husband, and children. The testator's property at death was worth nearly three-quarters of a million, and consisted of freehold and leasehold land and pure personalty.

An originating summons was taken out by the trustees to ascertain the rights of the widow as regards the movable property under the following circumstances. By French Law (which was the law of the matrimonial domicile) the rights as regards the property of the husband and wife would, in the absence of any express marriage contract, be subject to the rule of "community of goods." The material question was: "Did the change of domicile alter "the legal position of the parties to the marriage in "reference to the movable property?"

The case was exhaustively argued by, amongst other counsel, Professor A. V. Dicey, Q.C., for the defendants, and Kekewich, J., finally decided the question in the negative.

The point has hitherto been a matter of doubt. Practically all authorities agree that the law of the matrimonial domicile (as to the meaning of which see Westlake, 3rd ed., p. 68, and Dicey, Conflict of Laws, p. 649) primâ facie governs the mutual rights of husband and wife. to each other's existing or subsequently acquired movables. (See Dicey, rule 171.) But a dictum of Kay, J., in In re Marsland, 55 L.J. Ch. 582, seems to imply that such rights. can always be changed by a change of domicile, and Dicey (p. 653) has suggested that possibly this would be so as regards movables acquired by the parties during the existence of the new domicile. The present decision, however, if not overruled, seems to conclusively override both these propositions.

The reports of the case do not make clear what precisely is the nature of the French Law of "Communauté de

biens."

This seems to be a very material question as regards the rights of the widow under the particular circumstances of the case, though it does not, of course, affect the main point decided.

The subject appears to be governed by articles 1393 and 1399 to 1496 of the Civil Code; by which, in the absence of express agreement to the contrary, the property of both husband and wife is deemed to belong to both in community; and upon death of either party the common property is divided in equal shares between the survivor and the representatives of the deceased. It would seem that movable property acquired after the marriage does not fall into community unless it is acquired "by way of succession or gift" (Art. 1401), and that the position of after-acquired immovables depends upon the particular title by which it was acquired. In addition to the authorities referred to in the course of argument in the case, there are a few others worthy of note, decided in the American Courts and mentioned by Mr. Bodington in his "French Law of Marriage," chap. 5, particularly Bonati v. Welch, New York Reports, Vol. XXIV., p. 157; and Harteau v. Harteau, 14 Pick. 181.

Lis Alibi Pendens.

In Christian v. Christian, 78 L.T.R. 86, an application was made to our Courts by a wife who was bringing proceedings here for a judicial separation, to restrain the husband from instituting contemporaneous divorce proceedings in the Scotch Courts. Sir Francis Jeune made an order staying the latter proceedings as vexatious, pending the suit in this country. Incidentally the Court expressed the view that "matrimonial residence without domicile is sufficient to give the English Courts jurisdiction in matters of judicial separation.

Foreign Powers of Attorney.

In the case of In the Goods of Abdul Hamid Bey, 78 L.T.R. '202, a question arose as to whether letters of administration of the property of a testator domiciled in Egypt could be granted here to an attorney appointed for that purpose under another power of attorney granted by the person entitled to the property under Egyptian Law. The first power of attorney in this case was made in Egypt and expressly authorised the appointment of another attorney. It was shewn that such an appointment was under the circumstances valid by Egyptian Law, and the Court therefore held it to be effectual in England and granted letters of administration accordingly. (See Dicey, Conflict of Laws, rule 167.)

Lunatics out of the Jurisdiction.

A point left open in the decision in In re Brown (1895) 2 Ch. 666 was decided by the Court of Appeal in In re Agnes Maria Knight, 46 W.R. 289. In the latter case a lady, who was resident in Jersey, owned stock and shares in this country. She was duly found by the Jersey Courts to be of unsound mind, and a curator of her person and property was appointed. By Jersey Law such curator was entitled to obtain possession of her property wherever situated. He accordingly petitioned in the English Courts for a transfer of the English property. The Court of Appeal held that the Lunacy Act, 1890, sect. 134, did not make it obligatory to order such a transfer to the foreign curator, and, under the circumstances, they refused the application. (See Dicey, rule 136.)

Foreign Wills.

A curious point as to the construction of Lord Kingsdown's Act (24 and 25 Vict., c. 114) arose in the

recent case of Stokes v. Stokes and Others, 78 L.T.R. 50. The testator was Mr. A. B. Stokes, a British subject, whose murder on the Congo in 1895 was the subject of recent Diplomatic negotiations. In 1894, while resident in the Congo Free State, he made a holograph will unattested. The sole question at issue in the case was whether this will was valid by sect. 1 of Lord Kingsdown's Act as being made "according to the forms required by the law of the place "where the same was made."

It was proved that the Congo Free State was an independent State, and that by its Constitution the King of the Belgians had power to make decrees having the force of Law in the State. By one of such decrees, in 1891, it was provided that testamentary dispositions by foreigners might be, as to their form, made by the law of the place where they were made, and as to their substance by the law of the nationality of the testator, but "nevertheless a "stranger making a testamentary act in the Congo State "should have the power of following the forms provided by "the law of his nationality."

By another article of the decrees mentioned, it was provided that where a matter is not specially provided for by decree, the questions which are within the competence of the Congo tribunals may be judged according to local customs and the general principles of Law and Equity. It was further shewn that the will in question would have been valid by Belgian Law. Sir Francis Jeune held (a) that having regard to the decrees above mentioned "any "form in the absence of special provision would be sufficient which reasonably carried out the necessary "requirements of testamentary disposition;" (b) that the fact that in the present case the will was valid by Belgian Law and also by "the law of many other countries" was good reason for holding that it complied with the "general principles of Law and Equity;" (c) that it was

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