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documents relating to the see of London, and may, through the Chancellor of London, order their relinquishment to a foreign power. -The Log of the Mayflower, 76 L.T. 295.
Revenue:(i.) C.D.-- Account Stamp Duty--Liability - Customs and Inland Revenue
Acts, 1881 (44 d: 45 Vict., c. 12), ss. 38 and 39; and 1889 (52 & 53 Vict., c. 7), 8. 11.--Account stamp duty, in respect of property bestowed within twelve months of his death by a testator, is to be paid by the beneficiary who is required by sect. 39 of the Act of 1881 to render the account.--In re Foster ; Thomas V. Foster, L.R. (1897] 1 Ch. 484 ;
76 L.T. 228. (ii.) Q. B. D.-Estate Duty-Deduction for Mortgages---Annuities--Firance
Act, 1894 (57 & 58 Vict., c. 30), 1, 2 (10), 7 (16) and 7.-By arrangement between an equitable life tenant and an equitable tenant in tail in remainder, certain mortgages were effected on the estate, and the life tenant granted out of his own interest thus arising, an annuity to the equitable tenant in tail. On the death of the life tenant, it was held, that the amount liable to estate duty was the principal value of the estate less the mortgages, but without allowing any deduction for the capitalised value of the annuity.-In re Estate Duty Payable on the
Death of the 2nd Earl Cowley, 76 L.T. 567. (iii.) Q. B. D.-Settlement Estate Duty-Contingent Settlement - Finance Act,
1894, s. 5.-An absolute settlement of part of an estate, together with the contingent settlement of the residue, is, for the purposes of the Finance Act, a settlement of the whole estate, and a contingent settlement of part is a settlement within the meaning of sect. 5.--The Attorney-General v. Fairley and Others, L.R. (1897] 1 Q.B. 698;
76 L.T. 526. (iv.) Q. B.D.-Stamp Duty-Bonds of Foreign Railway Signed in England
Stamp Act, 1891, 8. 82 (1), (b) (i., ii., iii.).—Bonds of a foreign railway expressed not to be valid, unless authenticated by the certificate of a trustee, were sent over for the English holders, and for convenience or safety were signed in London. Held, that such bonds were issued in England within the meaning of the Stamp Act, sect. 82, and liable to
duty.-- Baring v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue, 76 L.T. 563. (v.) Q. B. D-Stamp Duty-Conveyance on Sale- Stamp Act, 1891, ss. 54,
55, 73 and 1st sched.-A company resolved to amalgamate with another company and to exchange its shares for shares in the latter. Held, that an instrument by which a shareholder in the amalgamated company so exchanged its shares was a “conveyance on sale” within the meaning of sects. 54 and 55 (1) of the Stamp Act, and chargeable with ad valorem duty.--J. and P. Coates, Limited, v. Commissioners of
Inland Revenue, L.R.  1 Q.B. 778; 76 L.T. 561. (vi.) Q. B. D.- Estate Duty-Finance Act, 1894, ss. 1, 2 (6), 21, sub-s. 1.
A wife, who died before the commencement of the Finance Act, appointed a trust fund under powers of her marriage settlement, and probate duty was paid on the fund less the value of her husband's life interest. The husband died after the commencement of the Finance Act. Held, that estate duty was chargeable only on that portion of the trust fund (viz., the value of his life interest) upon which probate duty had not been paid.–Attorney-General v. Dodington, L.R. (1897]
1 Q.B. 722; 76 L.T. 557. (vii.) C. D. Succession Duty.- Where under powers of a marriage
settlement an appointment was made of so much of the settled fund as should be sufficient to raise a certain net sum, it was held, that as the appointment was not of a pet sum, the appointee took subject to succession duty. Banks v. Braithwaite, 8 L.T. 80, applied.-In re
Saunders ; Saunders v. Gore, L.R.  1 Ch. 888; 76 L.T. 345. (i.) H. L.-Assignor of Policy of Insurance-Liability for Succession Duty
or Account Duty-Succession Duty Act, 1853 (16 & 17 Vict., c. 51), ss. 2 and 17– Customs and Inland Revenue Act, 1889 (52 Vict., c. 7), s. 11. Seven years before his death a person assigned a policy on his own life to his daughter, who thereafter paid the premiums out of her own money. Held, that she was not liable to pay either succession duty or account duty on the amount received under the policy on the death of the insured.-Lord Advocate v. Robertson, 76 L.T. 125.
Scotch Law :(ii.) C. D.-Scotch Will—English Decree of General Power of Appointment.
The distribution of a fund passing under a general power of appointment created by a Scotch Will is regulated by Scotch law, though the power be exercised by the English Will of a domiciled Englishman.-In re Bald; Bald v. Bald, 76 L.T. 462.
Settled Land :(iii.) C. D.--Jurisdiction, Repairs in Nature of Salvage-Capital-Settled
Land Acts, 1882 (45 & 46 Vict., c. 38), s. 25; and 1890 (53 & 54 Vict., c. 69) 8. 13, sub-s. 2.—The Settled Land Acts do not take away the jurisdiction of the Court to sanction, with the concurrence of a remainderman, expenditure, in the nature of salvage, of capital in the repair of farms on the estate of an infant tenant in tail in possession.--In re Hawker's
Settled Estates ; Duf* v. Hawker, 76 L.T. 286. (iv.) C. D. & C. A.- Jurisdiction - Pulling Down and Rebuilding Houses.
- The Court has no jurisdiction to direct the expenditure of settled money in pulling down and rebuilding houses. Decision of Court below affirmed. In re Montagu ; Derbyshire v. Montagu, L.R. (1897] 1 Ch. 685 and 2 Ch. 8; 76 L.T. 289 and 485.
Settlement:(v.) C. D.-Covenant to Settle After-acquired Property of Wife.-By a
marriage settlement it was covenanted that any property above a certain value which the wife became entitled to during coverture should be subject to the settlement. Under & will she became entitled to income for life for her sole and separate use with restraint on anticipation, and out of it she saved and invested sums which amounted to more than the value mentioned in the settlement. Held, that as the income which she received was not subject to the covenant in the settlement, the covenant did not govern investments from such income. Wallis v. Bendy (see Vol. 20, p. 55 (iii.)) not
followed.--Finley v. Darling, L.R. (1897) 1 Ch. 719; 76 L.T. 461. (vi.) C. D.-Sale of Heirlooms—Investment Conditions.-Land purchased
with the proceeds of heirloom chattels sold by the tenant for life was held not to be subject to charges to which other land, but not the settled chattels, was subject by the original settlement.-In re The Duke of Marlborough and the Governors of Queen Anne's Bounty, L.R. (1897]
1 Ch. 712; 76 L.T. 388. (vii.) C. D.-- Trust for Payment of Debts-Death of Settlor-Deed Irrevocable.
-By a re-settlement of estates a father and son were made successive tenants for life with remainder in tail to an infant, subject to a trust for payment of the father's debts. The deed was made in 1867, and the creditors had no notice of it. Held, that on the death of the father the deed became irrevocable, and the tenant in tail took subject to the debts. Synnot v. Simpson (5 H.L. cases 121) followed. Garrard v. Lauderdale distinguished.-Priestley v. Ellis, L.R.  1 Ch. 489; 76 L.T. 187.
Ship :(i.) C. A.-Collision-Bye-Laws for Regulation of River Tyne, 1884, Art. 20.
-The distance from mid-channel which vessels must keep in entering the Tyne is not one to be measured on the chart, but must be such as to leave reasonable room for vessels to pass out of the river.—The John
O’Scott, L.R.  P. 64; 76 L.T. 222. (ii.) C. A.-Damage-River Ribble Navigation-Hired Tugs-Liability. The
corporation of Preston under their powers do the towage of the river Ribble, and for this purpose charter tugs. Held, that the corporation were responsible for the efficiency of the hired tugs and for the competence of the crews supplied by the tag owners.—The Ratata,
L.R.  P. 118; 76 L.T. 224. (iii.) P. D.-Salvage-Tug and Tow-Negligence-Contributory Negligence
Unfair Bargain. A barque went ashore while being towed for a fixed sum by a tug which steered its own course and took no soundings. While the barque was ashore another tug offered assistance for £500, successful or not. This was accepted and the barque was got off by the two tugs. The owners of tug No. 1 claimed salvage and the owners of the barque counterclaimed for damage. Held, that, on the evidence, tug No. I was the cause of the disaster and therefore was not entitled to salvage ; that as the master of the barque had not checked the course of the tug, the barque owners were guilty of contributory negligence and could not succeed on the counterclaim; and that £400 was sufficient remuneration for the second tug as the master of the barque entered into the agreement under compulsion and the
tug ran no risk.-The Altair, L.R. (1897] P. 105; 76 L.T. 263. (iv.) C. C.-Insurance - Master Part Owner-Mortgage-Barratry.—Where
the master of a ship is part owner an act barratous against his co-owners is barratous against his mortgagee. The fact that a master has scuttled a ship his part share on which he had mortgaged, is no defence to an action by the mortgagee on a policy of insurance on the vessel.--Small and oihers v. United Kingdom Mutual Insurance Co.,
L.R.  2 Q.B. 42; 76 L.T. 326. (v.) P. D.-Salvage-Services Rendered by Request without Benefit.-A vessel
which stands by another upon request, is entitled to salvage remuneration, though no benefit is produced to the salved ship.--The
Cambrian, 76 L.T. 504. (vi.) P. D.-Collision-Arrest and Sale of Ship Abroad-Action in England 'to Limit Liability-Life Claimants.-Owners of a British steamship,
which had sunk a German vessel and been sold in Holland under a judgment of the local Court for less than enough to satisfy all claims, commenced an action in the English Admiralty Court for limitation of liability. Held, that the claimants who had recovered in Holland were not estopped from proving in the limitation action, and that life claimants were entitled to interest on the sum representing £7 per ton on the tonnage of the steamship from the date of collision.--The
Crathie, L.R. (1897] P. 178; 76 L.T. 534. (vii.) C. C.-Marine Insurance, General Average.—The master of a ship in
taking measures to repair damage on a voyage caused damage to the cargo. Held, that the ship and cargo were in peril; that the master's
act was a general average act, and the loss to cargo a general average
loss.—McCale & Co., Limited, v. Houlder & Co., 76 L.T. 469. (i.) C. A.-Charter-Party-Timber-Custom of Port of London.-A clause
in a charter-party that timber should be “taken from alongside the ship at merchant's risk and expense” is not inconsistent with the custom of the Port of London, under which it is the duty of the shipowner to lower timber into a barge brought alongside to receive it.- Aktieselskab Helios v. Ekman and Co., L.R. (1897] 2 Q.B. 83; 76 L.T. 537.
Solicitor:(ii.) C. D.-Practice-Costs—Agency Charges-Taxation-Solicitors dct, 1843
(6 & 7 Vict., c. 73), s. 37.-In a case in which the facts were similar to those reported in Vol. 22, p. 80 (ii.), the Court made an order for taxation of a solicitor's bill after the expiration of twelve months from its delivery, where agency charges, amounting to £15 in a bill of £146, were treated as disbursements.-In re Pomeroy and Tanner, No. 2, 76 L.T. 149.
Specific Performance :(iii.) C. D.-Public-house-Sale-Licence “ Affected”-9 Geo. IV., c. 61, ss.
11, 14—5 and 6 Vict., c. 44, s. 1.-An agreement for the sale and purchase of a beer-house, with the off-beer licence attached, contained à proviso that if the licence should be endorsed or “otherwise affected ” before completion, the proposed purchaser could terminate the agreement. He applied to the magistrates, without consulting the vendors, for authority to carry on the business till the next transfer day in the name of a nominee. The magistrate refused the application. On his claim to have the contract set aside, it was held, that the licence had not been “affected ” within the meaning of the contract, and specific performance was decreed on a counterclaim. Tadcaster Tower Brewery Co. v. Wilson, L.R. (1897] 1 Ch. 705; 76 L.T. 459.
Trade Mark :(iv.) C. D.-“ Magnolia ” — Geographical Name - Character of Goods-
Assignment-Patents, Designs and Trade Marks Acts, 1883 (s. 70), and 1888 (s. 10).- A representation of a Magnolia flower, and the word “ Magnolia,” notwithstanding that several towns in America are so named, may be available for trade marks; but the word cannot be used as the trade mark of goods made of a metal known as Magnolia, and a representation of the flower cannot be assigned as a trade mark of metal bearings by a foreign assignor who had a goodwill in the metal only.-In re Magnolia Metal Co.'s Trade Mark, 76 L.T. 190.
Vendor and Purchaser :(v.) C. D.-Sale as Going Concern--Negotiations after Date fixed for Com.
pletion - Title and Draft Conveyance Approved -- Reasonable Notice to Complete. - Where the time fixed for the completion of the purchase of a public-house as a going concern was past by six weeks, a notice from the vendor, after the title and the draft conveyance had been approved, to complete in ten days, was held to be a reasonable notice.--Smith v.
Batsford, 76 L.T. 179. (vi.) C. A.-Contract Founded on LettersUncertainty of Date-Specific
Performance.-- Decision of Court below (see Vol. 22, p. 61 (iii.)) affirmed. -- Simpson v. Ilughes and Armstrong, 76 L.T. 237.
(i.) C. D.-Partnership-Judgment for Dissolution and Sale--Purchase by
one of other's Share-Copyholds conveyed as Freeholds--Compensation.--On an enforced dissolution of partnership between two persons in a brewery business, one bought the other's moiety by tender. It was agreed that the title to tied houses should be accepted as it stood. Some which were conveyed as freeholds turned out to be copyholds, and the purchaser sought repayment of half the cost of enfranchisement. Held, that the principle laid down in Mortlock v. Buller (10 Ves. 315), and Castle v. Wilkinson (5 Ch. 536), that when a vendor contracts to sell more than he possesses the purchaser is entitled to compensation, applies only where the vendor knows the title and the purchaser does not. The point whether compensation could be enforced by a purchaser after the money had been paid and the conveyance executed did not therefore need decision.--Hopcroft v. Hopcroft, 76 L.T. 341,
(ii.) C.D.-Mortgage to Building Society-Power of Sale-Whether transferred
to Assignee.-A power of sale on a mortgage to a building society is not, according to Bradford v. Belfield (2 Sim. 263), transferred to the assignee of the mortgage debt not named in the power, and it was held that a good title had not been shewn by such an assignee to a purchaser from him.-In re Rumney and Smith's Contract, 76 L.T. 343.
(iii.) C. D.-Specific Performance--Insuficient Description--Parol Evidence
Statute of Frauds.-An agreement provided for the sale and purchase of “twenty-four acres of land, freehold, and all appurtenances thereto, at T.," without any words of ownership. Held, that the description was insufficient, and that parol evidence was not admissable to shew that the land referred to was the plaintiff's.- Plant v. Bourne, 76 L.T. 349.
(iv.) C. D.-Settled Land- Power of Tenant for Life-Judicature Act, 1873
(36 & 37 Vict., c. 66), S. 25, sub-s. 4.--A tenant for life, after he had agreed to sell part of the settled estate, granted it to a trustee for years, on trusts, to secure a valuable consideration, and subject to those and to the term, to the use of his son, who was the succeeding life tenant, his heirs and assigns. Held, that having regard to sect. 25 (4) of the Judicature Act, 1873, and to the fact that it was for the benefit of the son that the father's life estate should be kept alive, this life estate was not merged and extinguished, and that the father had power to make a valid conveyance to his purchaser.-The Barry Railway Co. and Lord Wimborne and the Vendor and Purchaser Act, 1874, 76 L.T. 489.
(v.) C. A.–Voluntary Settlement — Bankruptcy-Title of Purchaser. – A
voluntary settlement is void under sect. 47 only from the time the title of the trustee, on the bankruptcy of the settler, accrues; and a bonâ fide purchaser before that time will have a good title against the trustee. In re Briggs and Spicer ( 2 Ch. 127; 64 L.T. 187) overruled.-In re Carter and Kenderdines Contract, L.R.1 Ch. 776; 76 L.T. 476.
Vexatious Legal Proceedings :-
Retrospective Operation.--The Act is retrospective, and the Court will