until the residuary real estate is exhausted. - Lancefield v. Iggulden, L. R. 17 Eq. 556.

2. A testator, who owned pure and impure personal property, directed his trustees to convert his personal estate into money, and out of the proceeds to pay his debts and legacies, and to pay the income to his wife for life, and, after her death, to purchase certain annuities. The testator then gave a legacy to a school, and bequeathed the residue of his personal estate to three charities, in equal portions; and he directed that the latter three legacies should be respectively paid out of such part of his personal estate as could lawfully be applied to the payment thereof, which should be reserved by his trustees for that purpose. Held, that the testator's assets must be marshalled in favor of said three charities, and that the testator's debts and legacies other than those above mentioned must be paid out of the impure personalty; but that such a proportion of the legacy to said school would be paid as the pure personalty bore to the impure. The legacies to said three charities were directed to be paid out of the pure personalty.Miles v. Harrison, L. R. 9 Ch. 316. See LEGACY DUTY.

MASTER AND SERVANT. See CONTRACT, 4.

MINES. See COVENANT, 1.

MORTGAGE.

1. The court allowed an order taken pro confesso, and decreed but not drawn up, for foreclosure of a mortgage, to be altered to an order of sale, on the application of a third mortgagee, with consent of the first and second mortgagees, although the mortgaged property was out of the jurisdiction. — Woodford v. Brooking, L. R. 17 Eq. 425.

2. The court in England has jurisdiction to make a decree in a foreclosure suit depriving the mortgagor of land, in the island of Nevis, West Indies, of his right to redeem. Such a decree is in personam only. - Paget v. Ede, L. R. 18 Eq. 118.

NEGLIGENCE.

The plaintiff's cattle were being driven along a road which crossed a railway, and, while crossing the railway, the servants of the railway company negligently let some trucks run down the railway, and frightened the cattle. Several of the cattle escaped and ran along said road about a quarter of a mile, and then got into an orchard, and, through a defective fence, on to the railway, where they were discovered dead about four hours after their escape, having been run over by a train. Held, that the railway company was liable for the value of the cattle which were killed.- Sneesby v. Lancashire & Yorkshire Railway Co., L. R.

9 Q. B. 263.

PRACTICE. See COLLISION, 2; INTERROGATORY, 1.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT. See INTERROGATORY, 3.

PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS. See DOCUMENTS, PRODUction of. RAILWAY.-See CARRIER; INJUNCTION; NEGLIGENCE; SPECIFIC PER

A testator before his death settled shares in a company upon trustees, in trust for his wife for life, remainder to his children; and he also made said trustees the executors of his will. On settling the estate, after the testator's death, the executors distributed the residuary estate, with knowledge that there was a possibility that calls might be made in respect of said shares, if the company should fail before the remainder-men became entitled to the shares; in which case, if the remainder-men disclaimed, the executors, as trustees, would be liable to pay the calls. The company did so fail, and the trustees paid the calls. Held, that the residuary legatees must refund to the trustees the amount of said calls. Said testator had covenanted in a marriage settlement to bequeath a certain share of his residuary estate to his daughter, which share was to be paid over to the trustees of said settlement. The testator bequeathed said share accordingly. Held, that the trustees of said settlement must refund, as well as the other residuary legatees. — Jarvis v. Wolferstan, L. R. 18 Eq. 18.

RESIDUARY GIFT. — See Devise; Legacy, 3, 4; LEGACY DUTY.

RESIDUE. See APPOINTMENT, 3.

SALE. See FRAUDS, STATUTE OF; VENDOR AND PURCHASER.

SALVAGE.

A steamship sustained severe damage by collision, and her master ordered her boats to be got out. Several of the crew got into a boat, and, without any order from the master, rowed off, and were subsequently picked up, in a position of danger, by another vessel. Held, that the latter vessel was entitled to recover salvage from the steamship. - The Cairo, L. R. 4 Ad. & Ec. 184.

SECURED CREDITOR. See BANKRUPTCY, 3.

A railway company agreed to erect "a station" upon a certain lot of land belonging to the plaintiff. The company subsequently declined to erect the station, and began to build one two miles distant from said land. The court refused to decree specific performance, on the ground that justice could be better

done by an award of damages in an action at law. Wilson v. Northampton & Banbury Junction Railway Co., L. R. 9 Ch. 279.

See FRAUDS, STATUTE OF, 1; INJUNCTION; VENDOR AND PURCHASER, 1.

STATUTE.

1. Common carriers are by statute exempt from liability for loss of undeclared jewelry, unless the loss arise from the felonious acts of the carrier's servants. It was held that to charge a common carrier, it was not necessary to give evidence which would convict a particular servant of felony, but only to convince the jury that some servant of the carrier had been guilty of the felony. - Vaughton v. London & Northwestern Railway Co., L. R. 9 Ex. 93.

2. By statute, where sheep are carried by sea, certain precautions are to be taken to prevent the spread of disease. The defendant carried the plaintiff's sheep, which were washed overboard. The sheep would not have been lost, if the precautions directed by said statute had been taken. Held, that, inasmuch as said precautions were ordained solely for the purpose of protecting against disease, the plaintiff could not recover. — Gorris v. Scott, L. R. 9 Ex. 125. See BANKRUPTCY, 2; EASEMENT, 2.

When a true bill has been found, and the indictment removed into the Court of Queen's Bench, and a day fixed for trial, the case is pending — Queen v. Castro. Onslow's and Whalley's Case, L. R. 9 Q. B. 219.

TROVER.

The plaintiffs forwarded barley to the defendant, and sent him an invoice by mail, describing the barley as sold by G. as broker between buyer and seller. The defendant had not ordered the barley, and, at the request of G., indorsed a delivery order to him. G. obtained delivery of the barley and absconded. The jury found that the defendant had no intention of appropriating the barley to his own use, and had indorsed the order with a view of returning the barley to the plaintiffs. Held, that the defendant had, by an unauthorized act, deprived the plaintiff of his property, and was guilty of conversion. - Hiort v. Bott, L. R. 9 Ex. 89.

TRUST.

1. A trustee, holding a fund in trust for his children, became insolvent, and was largely indebted to the trust. One of said children died intestate, and a small sum was carried over to his account. The court ordered said sum to be paid over to the other children, and not to the trustee. - Jacubs v. Rylance, L. R. 17 Eq. 341.

2. A trustee, with power of sale, holding in trust for A. for life, remainder to B. for life, remainder over, was authorized to appoint new trustees, with consent of the tenant for life. He appointed A. and B. cotrustees. B. survived the other two trustees, and contracted to sell the trust estate; but the purchaser re

fused to complete the purchase, on the ground that the appointment of B. as trustee was invalid. Held, that said trustee had properly appointed A. and B. Forster v. Abraham, L. R. 17 Eq. 351.

cotrustees.

3. D., who was possessed of a mill, with machinery and stock in trade, indorsed upon his lease of the premises, "This deed, and all thereto belonging, I give to R., from this time forth, with all the stock in trade. D." Held, that there was neither a valid gift nor declaration of trust in favor of R. — Richards v. Delbridge, L. R. 18 Eq. 11.

See ANNUITY, 2; Executors AND ADMINISTRAtors, 2; Legacy, 3; ResidUARY ESTATE.

VENDOR AND PURCHASER.

1. The conditions of sale of a public-house described it as in the occupation of a tenant. The defendant paid a deposit, and signed an agreement for the purchase, which contained no reference to the lease. The house was subject to a lease for eight years, of which fact the defendant was ignorant when he signed the agreement, and he refused to complete the purchase. Held, that the defendant was not bound to inquire into the nature of the tenancy of the tenant, and that specific performance must be refused.— Caballero v. Henty, L. R. 9 Ch.

447.

2. The defendants were devisees for sale of an estate in H. county, subject to a verbal lease. It is usual in this county for valuations of hay, straw, &c., between outgoing and incoming tenants, to be made at fodder value, which is less than market-value. The defendants gave the tenant notice to quit, and, at the same time, agreed to pay the tenant at the termination of his lease the marketvalue of his hay and straw. The estate was subsequently put up for sale, and the particulars of sale specified certain incumbrances, but did not refer to said agreement; and there were conditions that the property should be taken as described as to quantity and otherwise, and that, if any error or omission in the particulars or conditions should be discovered, the same should not annul the sale, nor should any compensation be allowed therefor. The plaintiff purchased said estate, with knowledge of said lease, but without knowledge of said agreement. He subsequently paid the tenant for his hay and straw at market-value, without prejudice to his right to indemnity from the defendants, and now brought this action to recover the difference between the fodder and market-value of said hay and straw, and contended that said agreement formed no term of said tenancy. Held, that the terms of the contract did not limit the claims of the tenant to fodder value; that said agreement formed a term of the lease; and that notice of the tenancy was notice of the tenant's equities as between vendor and purchaser. Phillips v. Miller, L. R. 9 C. P. 197.

See FRAUDS, Statute of.

WAGES.

-See CONTRACT, 4.
WARRANTY. — See Contract, 2.

WILL.

By will dated 1869, a testatrix gave certain legacies to her relatives, and the remainder of her property to her daughter, whom she constituted her sole executrix and residuary legatee. In 1871, the testatrix executed another instrument

purporting to be her last will and testament, in which she gave all her property to her daughter for life, and, upon her death, directed legacies to be paid to some of the legatees mentioned in the earlier will, and added other legacies in the same terms; and she appointed her daughter her sole executrix. There was no express revocation of the former will in the latter. Held, that the two instruments must be admitted to probate as together containing the will of the testatrix. In the Goods of Petchell, L. R. 3 P. & D. 153.

See APPOINTMent, 1, 2; ExeCUTORS AND Administrators, 2; IllegitiMATE CHILDREN; LEGACY DUTY; MARSHALLING ASSETS.