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fendant, who had contracted for the purchase of the fee of the inn and other adjoining premises. The plaintiff agreed to surrender part of his leasehold co the defendant, who agreed to lease to the plaintiff a new entrance from a portion of the land contracted for by the defendant, with a covenant in the lease that the plaintiff should enjoy the premises without disturbance from the defendant or those claiming under him. The plaintiff
' accordingly surrendered a portion of his premises ; and such portion was torn down by the defendant, who made a new entrance for the plaintiff according to his agreement. Immediately after the new entrance was opened, it was closed by parties having a title to the land covered by the new entrance superior to that of the defendant's vendors. Held, that the plaintiff was entitled to damages to the extent of the pecuniary amount of the difference between the condition in which he was left and that in which be would have been if he had got a title to the new entrance. — Wall v. City of London Real Property Co., L. R. 9 Q. B. 249. See NEGLIGENCE; SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE, STATUTE, 1.
DECREE. See MORTGAGE, 1.
DEVISE. A testator devised certain real estate to trustees, to the use of the first and other sons of M. in tail male, and devised the residue of his real estate over. Four months after the testator's death, the first son of M. was born. Held, that the residuary devisees were entitled to the intermediate rents. “It is singular that such a question should come before the court in the year 1874.” — In re Mowlem, L. R. 18 Eq. 9.
See APPOINTMENT, 1, 2; ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN ; LEGACY DUTY; MARSHALLING ASSETS; WILL.
DISAFFIRMANCE. -See CONTRACT, 3.
DISTRAINT. - See COMMON.
DISTRESS. Upon a demise of mines, a power of distress for the rent reserved was granted to the lessor over “any lands in which there shall be, for the time being, any pits or openings by or through which the coal or culm by the said deed demised shall for the time being be in course of working by the lessees, their executors, administrators, and assigns." The plaintiffs, assignees of the lease with notice, sued the lessor for a distress, under said power, after the assignment at pits not included in the demise, but then worked by the lessees. Held, that said assignees with notice took subject to said power. – Daniel v. Stephney, L. R. 9 Ex. (Ex. Ch.) 185; 8. c. L. R. 7 Ex. 327.
DOCUMENTS, PRODUCTION OF. In a suit wherein the genuineness of a testator's signature was in question, the defendant was ordered to produce any checks in his possession signed by the testator. The defendant produced certain checks, but said that he had other checks, which, as their signatures were forgeries, he did not produce. Held, that the production of the forged checks could not be ordered, unless their signatures were
proved to be in the handwriting of the testator. — Wilson v. Thornbury, L. R. 17 Eq. 517. See INTERROGATORY, 1.
EASEMENT. 1. Where a warehouse was demised, with all lights and easements thereto belonging, with a covenant that the lessee should hold and enjoy the premises without let or hindrance, it was held that the lessee acquired nothing but the ordinary right. or easement to light, and was not entitled to an injunction to prevent the erection, by the lessor, of a wall which did not substantially diminish said light. - Leech v. Schweder, L. R. 9 Ch. 463.
2. A public-house which had maintained a sign-post on a common opposite the house for forty years, was held to have acquired the right to maintain the sign-post, and that this right was an estate, interest, or right” in the common.
Hoare v. Metropolitan Board of Works, L. R. 9. Q. B. 296.
EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS. 1. The nearest relative of minor children having been abroad without being heard from for seven years, the court ordered administration to issue to the guardian elected by said children, without first citing said next of kin. In the Goods of Burchmore, L. R. 3 P. & D. 139.
2. A testatrix appointed A. her sole trustee, and directed that he should be paid as attorney the same as if he were not a trustee. A's only duties under the will were those of trustee. Held, that A. was not entitled to probate as executor. - In the Goods of Lowry, L. R. 3 P. & D. 157. See CONTRACT, 1; LEASE, 2; MARSHALLING ASSETS, 1.
EXECUTOR DE SON TORT. - See LEASE, 2.
FALSE RETURN. A sheriff had received two writs against B. to levy £63 and £44, respectively, and made a levy under each writ. He then received a third writ against B. to levy £125, but made no levy, and returned nulla bona. B. owned property to the value of £50. Said two writs were fraudulent. Held, that it was the duty of the sheriff to have levied on said third writ, when the plaintiff therein could have disputed the validity of the said writs. — Dennis v. Whetham, L. R. 9 Q. B. 845.
FERRY BOAT. See COLLISION 1.
Fog. - See COLLISION.
FRAUDS, STATUTE OF. 1. T. agreed in writing, July 6, 1870, to purchase the plaintiff's interest in a
leasehold house. A lease was accordingly prepared, but with a covenant inserted that T., the lessee, would not carry on the business of a grocer on the premises. T. died suddenly before the lease was executed. The plaintiff testified that it was distinctly understood between T. and himself that said covenant should be inserted; and the plaintiff's solicitor testified that he had shown said lease to T. in August, 1873, and that T. bad said it was all right and in accordance with the arrangement between him and the plaintiff. After T.'s death the plaintiff prayed that T.'s administrator be ordered to execute the counterpart of said lease to T. Held, that, under the Statute of Frauds, T.'s administrator could not be compelled to execute said lease containing such a variation from the written agreement. Snelling v. Thomas, L. R. 17 Eq. 303.
2. “ Proprietor" is sufficient description of the vendor of real estate, whose name is not mentioned, to satisfy the Statute of Frauds. - Sale v. Lambert, L. R. 10 Eq. 1. Otherwise with “vendor.” — Potter v. Duffield, L. R. 18 Eq. 4.
GIFT. See Trust, 2.
HUSBAND AND WIFE. See BANKRUPTCY, 2.
ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN. A testator who had married the day before the date of his will, gave his wife power to dispose by will of his property amongst their children; and, in default of such disposal, the testator gave his property equally between his children by his said wife. At the date of the will the testator had two illegitimate children by his said wife. Held, that said children would take, in default of disposal as aforesaid by the wife. — Dorin v. Dorin, L. R. 17 Eq. 463. See LEGACY, 1. INCUMBRANCE. — See VENDOR AND PURCHASER, 2.
INDICTMENT. - See TRIAL.
INJUNCTION. A railway company, which had running power over another railway, applied for an injunction to restrain the latter railway from preventing the former's exercising such powers. Held, that, inasmuch as an injunction would involve an order that the second railway company should properly work its switches and signals, which was a continuous act involving labor and care, the injunction could not be granted. Powell Duffryn Steam Coal Co. v. Taff Vale Railway Co., L. R. 9 Ch. 331.
See COVENANT, 1; EASEMENT, 1.
INSURANCE. A policy of insurance, effected by the plaintiff upon the life of another person, contained a proviso that the policy should be void if the declaration concerning the insured, made out by the plaintiff, was not in every respect true. An answer to a question in said declaration was untrue, though not to the plaintiff's knowledge. Held, that the policy was void. - Macdonald v. Law Union Insurance Co., L. R. 9 Q. B. 328.
INTEREST. A contract between a railway company and a contractor provided that payments should be made monthly. There was no provision as to payment of interest. The contractor demanded a sum alleged to be due, with interest thereon. The account being disputed, the contractor filed a bill, and proved that a sum less than half that demanded was due him. Held, that the contractor was not entitled to interest. — Hill v. South Staffordshire Railway Co., L. R. 18 Eq. 154.
INTERROGATORIES. 1. In an action against a partnership the partners were interrogated as to who their customers were, and in their answer the partners set out the names of their customers in a long schedule. A summons was then taken out, calling on the partners to state what partnership books and documents they had. The judge declared that he was convinced that there must be such documents, although the partners had not admitted possessing the same; and he ordered the partners to admit that such documents were in their possession. Saull v. Browne, L. R. 17 Eq. 402.
2. The plaintiff filed a bill, praying that a certain business, good-will, and assets, alleged to have been abstracted from the business of the plaintiff's deceased husband, were assets of her husband's estate. Two of the defendants had been in partnership with the plaintiff, who had carried on her husband's business; but they left the plaintiff, and established a similar business with the third defendant. The plaintiff filed an interrogatory, asking whether any of the defendants had drawn out of their business any money on his own account, either in respect of capital or profits. Said third defendant refused to answer until the plaintiff had established her right to a decree. Held, that said defendant must answer the interrogatory. -- Saull v. Browne, L. R. 9 Ch. 364.
3. The plaintiff filed a bill to establish the agency of the defendant in a transaction. The court refused to order the defendant to exhibit the accounts of his private business, and of his transactions with other people. - Great Western. Colliery Co. v. Tucker, L. R. 9 Ch. 376. LANDLORD AND TENANT. See DISTRESS; VENDOR AND PURCHASER, 1.
LEASE. - See COVENANT, 2, 3; VENDOR AND PURCHASER, 2.
LEASE. 1. A. leased to B., without a covenant against underletting without A's consent. B. agreed to lease to C. upon the same terms upon which A. leased to him. Held, that the person whose consent to underletting was required by the terms of the second lease was A. – Williamson v. Willia on, L. R. 17 Eq. 549.
2. A lessee died, and his widow took out administration, and became assignee of the term. The widow left a daughter, who was the mother of the defendant, who entered into possession of the premises which he underlet, paying the ground rent to the lessor, and the balance to his mother in her lifetime, and, after her death, appropriating the balance to his own use. Held, that, whether the defendant was executor de son tort or not, he was assignee of the term and liable for
the non-performance of covenants in the lease. – Williams v. Heales, L. R. 9 C. P. 171. See Covenant, 2, 3; DISTRESS ; VENDOR AND PURCHASER, 2.
LEGACY. 1. A testatrix who had married P., the husband of her deceased sister, bequeathed her property to all her children by the said P. The testatrix bad one child born before the date of the will, and one born ten years afterward, and about a month before the death of the testatrix. The child was registered as the son of P. and the testatrix before the latter's death. Held, that the second child was entitled to a share of said property. — In re Goodwin's Trust, L. R. 17 Eq. 315.
2. A testatrix bequeathed to A., a woman, a sum of bank annuities, and then directed that all gifts and provisions (whether absolute or limited) by her will made for any female should be for her separate use and (while she should be under coverture) without power of anticipation. Held, that A. could only have the income of said annuities during coverture. — In re Ellis's Trusts, L. R. 17 Eq. 409.
3. A testator bequeathed a sum of money to his executors, upon trust to apply the interest to keeping in good repair all the tombstones and headstones of his relations and himself in the churchyard of G.; and he directed that any surplus money, which might remain after defraying yearly the expenses as before stated, should be given yearly to poor, pious members of the Methodist Society in G. above the
age of fifty. Held, that the gift for keeping the tombstones in repair being invalid, the whole of said sum went to the Methodist poor as above provided. — Dawson v. Small, L. R. 18 Eq. 114.
4. A testator gave by his will the residue of his personal estate to his wife, for her own absolute use and benefit; and in a subsequent portion of his will
"all the money, if any, that shall be remaining a ter payment of the just debts and funeral expenses of my wife,” to certain persons. Held, that the testator's widow was absolutely entitled to the said residue. — Perry v. Merritt, L. R. 18 Eq. 152.
See APPOINTMENT, 1, 2; ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN; LEGACY DUTY; MARSHALLING ASSETS; WILL.
LEGACY DUTY. A testator bequeathed several legacies, of which a part were to be paid free of legacy duty. After payment of all the legacies, it was found that there was not enough surplus to pay the duties. Held, that every legacy must pay its own duties, and that the duty on the exempted legacies was not to be made a charge upon the legacies not exempted. — Wilson v. O'Leary, L. R. 17 Eq. 419.
LIGHT AND AIR. - See EASEMENT, 1.
MARRIED WOMAN. — See BANKRUPTCY, 2.
MARSHALLING ASSETS. 1. In the administration of an estate, when the personal estate is insufficient. for the payment of debts, specifically devised real estate is not liable to contribute