ments for local improvements under the so-called betterment acts. The same doctrine is applied to the real estate of agricultural societies in Worcester Agricultural Society v. Mayor, &c., of Worcester, p. 189. But in the case of Worcester County v. Mayor of Worcester, p. 193, the court decide that land of a county used for county purposes is exempt from taxation for all purposes, whether public or local. The last case stands well upon the grounds on which the court place it. It might also stand on the broader ground that the sovereign is not bound by a statute unless specially named, the principle on which crown property in England is held not to be liable to rates. Dollar Savings Bank v. United States, 19 Wall. 238, 239; United States v. Herron, 20 ib. 251; Mersey Docks v. Cameron, 11 H. L. Cas. 443.

In Montgomery v. Pickering, p. 227, it was decided that where a bond for a deed was procured by fraud from a person who afterwards, with full knowl- · edge of the facts and after taking legal advice, executed and delivered the deed, the deed did not operate as a confirmation of the previous transaction, unless it was given with that intent.

Tapley v. Martin, p. 275, decides that if at the time a suit is brought both parties are citizens of the state, one party by becoming the citizen of another state, does not become entitled to remove the suit to the United States courts.

The most important case in the volume is Sparhawk v. Sparhawk, p. 315, in which the court declared unconstitutional an act of legislature providing that "all divorces nisi heretofore decreed under and by authority of" a former statute "shall be deemed and taken to be, and have the force and effect of, absolute divorces from the bonds of matrimony," and that the Supreme Court upon petition and notice may authorize the party against whom such divorce has been granted to marry again.

It is a pity that a case involving so important a question of legislative power was not more thoroughly argued than this seems to have been; for the reasoning of the court, though very forcible, does not quite convince us that the act in question was beyond the power of the legislature, however unwise it may have been. If it was the exercise of a power confided by the constitution to the judiciary, it of course was beyond the power of the legislature, because the Declaration of Rights of Massachusetts declares that “the legislative department shall never exercise the executive and judicial powers or either of them." This broad statement must, however, be taken with some qualification; for when the Senate sits as a court to try articles of impeachment found by the House of Representatives as the grand inquest of the Commonwealth, the legislature exercises judicial powers, and when, as it formerly did, it elected the Secretary of the Commonwealth and other executive officers, it exercised executive powers. But, besides this, the very words "legislation" and "legislative department" are words of broad import, and imply, ex vi termini, the exercise of very broad judicial functions. Almost all private bill legislation, the regulation of highways and public charities, and legislation of a remedial character, those duties, in short, which devolve on the legislature as parens patriæ, are quasi judicial in character, and yet they are also purely legislative, and such as no court could properly exercise; and it seems to us, too, that there may be a border line where these two depart

ments do in a manner overlap each other, and where the legislature may assign duties to the courts or perform them itself. The case of questions arising in the administration of charitable and other public trusts is a striking illustration. Sometimes the legislature refers such questions to the courts, and at other times enacts special laws to dispose of them. The dissolution of a marriage, as distinct from a divorce, is in one sense judicial; but we think it is quite as much a legislative act, and we believe no court, either in England or the colonies, possessed the power to dissolve a marriage at the time of the Revolution. And the whole subject of marriage and divorce is one to such a degree sui generis, involving so many interests and at times so much happiness or misery, that we should be sorry to see it disposed of by a few broad words which, as Chief Justice Shaw said of the declaration that all men are born free and equal, “as a broad general principle, such as ought to appear in a declaration of rights, is perfectly sound," but, when applied practically, requires great caution and circumspection. Roberts v. Boston, 5 Cush. 206. Indeed, mathematical or even metaphysical precision is not always possible in government and jurisprudence. The subject, however, is too broad a one to be

discussed in a book notice.

Chickering v. Globe Insurance Company, p. 321, is a very important case on the law of life insurance companies and the powers of an agent; but it turned almost entirely upon the particular circumstances of the case, which are too long to be recited here.

There are other cases of considerable interest, for which we have no space. The typographical execution of the volume is worthy of the fame of the Riverside Press.

A Digest of American Railway Decisions: comprising all reported American Cases in which a Railway Company is a Party, and all other Cases in which Railway Law is determined. By JOHN F. LACEY, of the Iowa Bar. Chicago: Callaghan & Co., Law Publishers. 1875.

THERE are no books more practically useful, and more certain to be well received by the profession, than digests devoted to particular branches of the law; and we have no doubt that this, like the Digest of Fire Insurance Decisions, will find a ready welcome. We think, however, that the author made a mistake when he abandoned his original design, which was to make simply a digest of American railway law, and undertook to include all reported cases in which a railway company was a party. A digest like this should contain all the cases on the subject of which it treats, and should include nothing else; but it is obvious that railway companies must occasionally be involved in litigation in which no question of railway law arises, and hence many decisions have crept into this volume which would be better placed under other heads of the law. The result is an unnecessary addition to the size of the work, while its logical symmetry is much impaired. We have been surprised, in running over its pages, to see how many of the cases cited have nothing whatever to do with railway law; and it is not uncommon to find heads under which there is not a single case which properly belongs in a railway digest. Thus, under the head of "Admiralty" there is only one case, which is digested as follows: "The jurisdiction of a court of admiralty in

torts depends entirely on the locality. It may extend to places within the body of a county." Under "New Trials" a case is cited to support the proposition, "A verdict supported by the evidence will not be disturbed;" and others involve principles equally obvious, and equally out of place in this digest. Further illustrations are to be found under the heads, Arrest," "Broker," " Executors de son Tort," 66 Appeals" (one subdivision of the latter being entitled "General Term " and devoted exclusively to points of practice peculiar to New York), "Pleading," "Writs of Assistance," and others which we have no space to enumerate. This interpolation of foreign matter, with the consequent multiplication of heads and cross-references, is so serious a fault that we venture to hope that the work will be remodelled in future editions.

We notice also occasionally very awkward sentences, which a little more care would have improved; as, for example, this on the first page: "Suits for injuries to the person die with the person, and may be taken advantage of by the defendant on the trial, without a plea in abatement; or this on page 11: "Parol evidence of a contract is properly stricken out, where a letter making the contract of the appointment of an agent is subsequently produced on the trial." No one, to be sure, would misunderstand the first sentence; but as much can hardly be said of the second. Again, it is desirable that, if the alphabetical arrangement of heads is adopted, it should be adhered to; and yet on page 24 we find " Costs" between " Estoppel" and "Engineer as Arbitrator," which last head, by the way, is not perhaps one to which the inquirer would naturally turn. These, to be sure, may be small matters; but it is by them that our judgment as to Mr. Lacey's care and accuracy must in great measure be formed.

Among the nice points which have come before the courts for decision we observe on page 35, under the head " Revolver," two cases which are not without interest. The first is thus stated, "A revolver is included in personal baggage; " while the second decides that "Two revolvers are not reasonably necessary as a part of a passenger's baggage in Illinois, and a recovery can only be had for one in case of loss of baggage." How far the second case was decided upon considerations peculiar to Illinois, and how far the court took judicial notice of the dangers which beset the traveller in that state, we are unable to say without consulting the case; but we can easily foresee that a conflict of decision on the question is extremely probable. Surely, if one revolver is necessary in Illinois, a cautious man might not unreasonably guard against accidents by having an extra weapon, especially if he was merely passing through the state on his way to the Black Hills.

The volume contains a table of cases cited and a table of cases overruled, the value of which would be greatly increased if the cases were cited under the defendants' names as well as those of the plaintiffs. One is quite as apt to forget the plaintiff's name as the defendant's, and provision should be made for defective memories.

The author claims that he has included "all the reported American cases in which a railway company is a party;" and we are satisfied that he is substantially correct, though we do not find Shaw v. The Boston & Worcester Railroad, 8 Gray, 45, among the cases cited in the table. The defects in the

work which we have pointed out will not, however, prevent its being of great service in practice; and if the matter which Mr. Lacey has collected with so much industry is sifted, and to a certain extent rearranged in a future edition, he will very materially increase its value, and add to the obligations under which he has placed the profession.

Hall's Essay on the Rights of the Crown and the Privileges of the Subject in the Sea-shores of the Realm. Second edition, revised and corrected, together with extensive annotations, and references to the later authorities in England, Ireland, Scotland, and the United States. By RICHARD Loveland LOVELAND, of the Inner Temple, Barrister at Law. With an Appendix containing: I. Lord Chief Justice Hale's De Jure Maris; II. The Case of Dickens v. Shaw; III. Mr. Serjeant Merewether's Speech; IV. Forms in use by the Board of Trade. London: Stevens & Haynes, Law Publishers, Bell Yard, Temple Bar. 1875.

A VALUABLE repertory of information and collection of cases on the subject to which it is devoted. The essay by ROBERT GREAM HALL was originally published in 1830, and the present editor modestly contents himself with hoping that his own labors may prove an assistance to those engaged in cases relating to the foreshores of the country, which hope will doubtless be gratified. The word "foreshore " is new and seems to have been first authoritatively used in 1866 in the Act of 29 & 30 Vict. c. 62, § 7, as equivalent to the shore and bed of the sea, and of every channel, creek, bay, estuary, and of every navigable river of the United Kingdom as far up the same as the tide flows."

We infer from the transfer, by the before-mentioned statute of 1866, of the jurisdiction over the foreshore from the Commissioners of Woods and Forests to the Board of Trade, and from the forms adopted by the latter, requiring returns from various public officers, that the British Government has awakened to the necessity of guarding the public rights from the encroachments of private landholders, and is proceeding in its deliberate and solid way to take the proper measures to meet the emergency. And we look forward expectantly to further legislation on the subject.

The law is clearly laid down in the essay that the shore of the sea, defined as the space between the ordinary high and low water marks, and the fundum or soil at the bottom of all the British seas, belong to the king, subject to the public rights of fishing, landing, and the like. The rights of the crown may be the subjects of grant, or prescription which supposes a grant; but the grant must be precise, and a grant of wreck or of royal fish, or flotsam, or the like, may accompany a grant of the shore, or each may be held in severalty. This peculiarity, of course, embarrasses the lord of a manor who wishes to claim a right to the shore by prescription, and Mr. Loveland very properly hopes that in the interest of the public such embarrassment may not be diminished by incautious decisions.

The case of Dickens v. Shaw is one in which the lord of a manor near Brighton in England unsuccessfully claimed a right as such to the shore used by the bathers. The English law is fully discussed, and seems to be sufficiently uncertain. But the speech of Mr. Serjeant Merewether utterly denies

the doctrine of the essay, and claims that it first came in with the Stuart kings, and is not law. The case in which he so spoke was entitled "The Attorney-General against the Mayor and Corporation of the City of London," and concerned the respective rights of the crown and the city in and to the harbor of London. It was before the Court of Chancery in 1849, and is doubtless fully reported somewhere, but where does not appear; and, if the case has ever been decided, that does not appear. It may still be in gremio legis.

The learned serjeant also denies stoutly that the book printed in the appendix, and there called "Lord Chief Justice Hale's De Jure Maris," was ever written by that great jurist, and avers that there exists but very slight reason why any one should ever have supposed that he wrote it.

To descend for a moment from grave to gay, -a friend of ours some years ago wrote a copy of verses on the King's Prerogatives, and we gladly give the benefit of our circulation to one of his stanzas:

"All wrecks were his; and that no man

Might doubt his sovereign claim,

He added in the Latin tongue

Rex when he wrote his name.' ""

An Introduction to the History of the Law of Real Property, with original Authorities. By KENELM EDWARD DIGBY, M.A. Oxford. 1875.

ever,

THIS little volume is a signal evidence of the growing appreciation of the fact that the true economy of legal study is a careful and exact examination of the sources of the law. Lord Coke's advice, "melius est," &c., has, howbeen much oftener quoted than followed; and the books present numerous instances of how abundant a harvest of errors a mistaken analogy or a false etymology may produce. We may refer for illustration to the note on page 129 of the volume before us, on the doctrine that prescription implies a grant, or to the absurd derivation of agreement from aggregatio mentium, which was the foundation of the much-contested doctrine of Wain v. Walters, 5 East, 10.

The spirit of critical analysis and patient investigation has achieved admirable results in the field of history; and the labors of Kemble, Palgrave, and Freeman have illustrated the inquiries of Austin in theoretical and of Stubbs in constitutional law. If, moreover, a precise historical method is applicable to any branch of the law, it is especially so to that of real property, and is in this particularly fruitful in results. In no other branch have the principles been so long established, or are so clearly traceable to their origin, or so capable of full and apt illustration from records and other permanent memorials from the earliest period.

Mr. Digby's modest volume professes to be designed for the student. It is singularly well adapted to its purpose. The style is clear, and the author seems to possess a happy faculty of presenting the many abstruse and difficult parts of his subject in a simple form, readily intelligible to the legal student, whose path heretofore has been by no means strewn with roses. There is at the same time evidence on every page of a thorough ácquaintance with sources of authority on the topic he is handling, while, by the judicious yet copious